@techreport{Buttner2006Efficient,
abstract = {Recent literature has emphasized that redistributive grant systems may tend to internalize
fiscal externalities arising from tax competition. This paper further explores the conditions
under which local grant systems enforced by the state government will enhance efficiency. A
system of redistributive grants among governments is introduced into a standard model of tax
competition. This basic model is then extended in order to allow for variations in the
government objectives at the state level. A subsequent empirical analysis of local tax policy
exploits the experience with local fiscal revenue sharing in Germany. The results suggest that
attempts of state level governments to extract fiscal resources from the local revenue sharing
system exert an upward pressure on tax rates.},
author = {Thiess B\"{u}ttner and Sebastian Hauptmeier and Robert Schwager},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {H71; H77; 330; fiscal equalization; tax competition; fiscal federalism; Germany; Kommunaler Finanzausgleich; Steuerwettbewerb; Finanzf\"{o}deralismus; Theorie; Deutschland},
language = {eng},
number = {1656},
title = {Efficient revenue sharing and upper level governments : theory and application to Germany},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19120},
year = {2006}
}
