@techreport{Cigno2005political,
abstract = {The paper examines the scope for mutually beneficial intergenerational cooperation, and
looks at various attempts to theoretically explain the emergence of norms and institutions that
facilitate this cooperation. After establishing a normative framework, we examine the
properties of the laissez-faire solution in a pure market economy, and in one where
reproductive decisions and intergenerational transfers are governed by self-enforcing family
constitutions. We then show that first and second-best policies include a pension and a child
benefit scheme. Finally, we look at the possibility that intergenerational redistribution might
be supported by either a constitution, or some kind of voting equilibrium.},
author = {Alessandro Cigno},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {J1; I2; H5; H31; D7; D91; D82; H2; 330; intergenerational cooperation; family; fertility; saving; private transfers; education; child benefits; pensions; self-enforcing constitutions; Generationenbeziehungen; Kooperation; Public Choice; Verfassungs\"{o}konomik; Alterssicherung; Familienleistungsausgleich; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1632},
title = {The political economy of intergenerational cooperation},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19096},
year = {2005}
}
