@techreport{Kotsogiannis2005incentives,
abstract = {Conventional wisdom has it that policy innovation is better promoted in a federal rather than
in a unitary system. Recent research, however, has provided theoretical evidence to the
contrary: a multi-jurisdictional system is characterized - due to the existence of a horizontal
information externality - by under-provision of policy innovation. This paper presents a
simple model that introduces political competition for federal office. Under such competition
political actors use the innovative policies in order to signal ability to the electorate. In the
equilibrium analyzed policy innovation may occur more frequently than in a unitary system. It
is thus shown that, once electoral motives are accounted for, the conventional wisdom is
likely to be a valid proposition.},
author = {Christos Kotsogiannis and Robert Schwager},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {H77; R59; 330; fiscal federalism; policy innovation; policy experimentation; F\"{o}deralismus; Politik; Innovation; Public Choice; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1585},
title = {On the incentives to experiment in federations},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19049},
year = {2005}
}
