@techreport{Konrad2005market,
abstract = {We examine a stark setting in which security or protection can be provided by self-governing
groups or by for-profit entrepreneurs (kings, kleptocrats, or mafia dons). Though selfgovernance
is best for the population, it faces problems of long-term viability. Typically, in
providing security the equilibrium market structure involves competing lords, a condition that
leads to a tragedy of coercion: all the savings from the provision of collective protection are
dissipated and welfare can be as low as, or even lower than, in the absence of the state.},
author = {Kai A. Konrad and Stergios Skaperdas},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {H10; D70; D30; 330; property rights; anarchy; government; Kriminalit\"{a}ts\"{o}konomik; Innere Sicherheit; Sicherheitsgewerbe; Organisierte Kriminalit\"{a}t; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1578},
title = {The market for protection and the origin of the state},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19042},
year = {2005}
}
