@techreport{Khalil2005Monitoring,
abstract = {We study the problem of multiple principals who want to obtain income from a privately
informed agent and design their contracts non-cooperatively. Our analysis reveals that the
degree of coordination between principals has strong implications for the shapes of contracts
and the amount of monitoring. Equity-like contracts and excessive monitoring emerge when
principals are able to coordinate monitoring or verify each others? monitoring efforts. When
this is not possible, free riding in monitoring weakens the incentive to monitor, so that flat
payments, debt-like contracts and very low levels of monitoring appear. Free riding may be so
strong that there may even be less monitoring than if the principals cooperated with each
other, which shows that non-cooperative monitoring does not necessarily lead to excessive
monitoring.},
author = {Fahad Khalil and David Martimort and Bruno Maria Parigi},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {G3; G2; D8; D2; 330; monitoring; common agency; costly state verification; Agency Theory; Leistungskontrolle; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten; Finanzierungstheorie; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1514},
title = {Monitoring a common agent : implications for financial contracting},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18978},
year = {2005}
}
