@techreport{Amegashie2005Sabotaging,
abstract = {This paper studies sabotage in a contest with non-identical players. Unlike previous papers, we consider sabotage in an elimination contest and allow contestants to sabotage a potential or future rival. It turns out that for a certain partition of players there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which only the most able contestant engages in sabotage while less able contestants do not. The most able contestant may therefore prefer a situation where sabotage is allowed to one where sabotage is not allowed. For another partition of players, there is a unique equilibrium in which none of the players invests in sabotage.},
author = {J. Atsu Amegashie and Marco Runkel},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D74; D72; 330; all-pay auction; elimination contests; potential rival; sabotage; Wirtschaftskriminalit\"{a}t; Wettbewerb; Auktionstheorie; Spieltheorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1500},
title = {Sabotaging potential rivals},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18964},
year = {2005}
}
