@techreport{Huber2005Interregional,
abstract = {Empirical evidence from the U.S. and the European Union suggests that regions which
contribute to interregional redistribution face weaker borrowing constraints than regions
which benefit from interregional redistribution. This paper presents an argument in favor of
such differentiated budgetary institutions. It develops a two-period model of a federation
consisting of two types of regions. The federal government redistributes from one type of
regions (contributors) to the other type (recipients). It is shown that a fiscal constitution with
lax budget rules for contributors and strict budget rules for recipients solves the self-selection
problem the federal government faces in the presence of asymmetric information regarding
exogenous characteristics of the regions.},
author = {Bernd Huber and Marco Runkel},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D82; H77; H74; 330; asymmetric information; interregional redistribution; borrowing rules; Finanzausgleich; \"{O}ffentliche Schulden; Region; Asymmetrische Information; Finanzf\"{o}deralismus; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1491},
title = {Interregional redistribution and budget institutions under asymmetric information},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18955},
year = {2005}
}
