@techreport{Gottardi2004Market,
abstract = {We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed
over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of buyers and a finite
number n of sellers. All buyers are uninformed, while at least one seller is privately informed
about the true state of the world. When n = 1, full information revelation never occurs in
equilibrium and the only information transmission happens in the first period. With n > 1 the
outcome depends both on the structure of the sellers? information and, even more importantly,
on the intensity of competition allowed by the trading rules. When there is intense
competition (absence of clienteles), information is fully and immediately revealed to the
buyers in every equilibrium for n large enough, regardless of the number of informed sellers.
On the other hand, for trading arrangements characterized by less intense forms of
competition (presence of clienteles), for any n we always have equilibria where information is
never fully revealed. Moreover, in that case, when only one seller is informed, for many
parameter configurations there are no equilibria with full information revelation, even for
large n.},
author = {Piero Gottardi and Roberto Serrano},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D82; C78; C72; D83; 330; asymmetric information; information revelation; dynamic trading; oligopolistic competition; clienteles; Marktmechanismus; Informationsverhalten; Wettbewerb; Oligopol; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1300},
title = {Market power and information revelation in dynamic trading},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18938},
year = {2004}
}
