@techreport{Juerges2004Teacher,
abstract = {Applying the theory of yardstick competition to the schooling system, we show that it is
optimal to have central tests of student achievement and to engage in benchmarking because it
raises the quality of teaching. This is true even if teachers? pay (defined in monetary terms) is
not performance related. If teachers value reputation, and if teaching output is measured so
that it becomes comparable, teachers will increase their effort. The theory is tested using the
German PISA-E data. Our estimates suggest that, despite the flat career profile of German
teachers, the quality of teaching tends to be higher in federal states with central exams.},
author = {Hendrik Juerges and Wolfram F. Richter and Kerstin Schneider},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {I28; 330; education; teacher quality; central examinations; yardstick competition; matching; Lehrkr\"{a}fte; Dienstleistungsqualit\"{a}t; Leistungsanreiz; Yardstick Competition; Benchmarking; Bildungsniveau; Sch\"{a}tzung; Teilstaat; Sch\"{a}tzung; Deutschland; Zentralexamen; Zentralabitur; PISA <Test>},
language = {eng},
number = {1296},
title = {Teacher quality and incentives theoretical and empirical effects of standards on teacher quality},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18934},
year = {2004}
}
