@techreport{Feld2004large,
abstract = {The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending
and indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its
spending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be
mitigated by different fiscal or constitutional institutions. We distinguish between two
variants of fragmented governments: cabinet size and coalition size. Theoretically, they both
describe the degree to which the costs of spending decisions are internalized by individual
decision-makers. In addition, we evaluate whether constitutional rules for executive and
legislation as well as budget rules shape the size of government and how the different rules
interact with fragmentation in determining government size. The empirical study of the role of
fragmented governments for fiscal policy outcomes is based on a panel of the 26 Swiss
cantons over the 1980-1998 period. The results indicate that the number of ministers in the
cabinet is negatively associated with fiscal discipline. Furthermore, the fiscal referendum does
effectively restrict the fiscal commons problem, but less successfully than the budget rule.},
author = {Lars P. Feld and Christoph A. Schaltegger},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {H61; E63; E61; 330; fragmentation; fiscal policy; referendums; legislative rules; budget rules; Finanzpolitik; Regierung; Regierungskoalition; Staatsquote; Haushaltskonsolidierung; Regelgebundene Politik; Referendum; Schweiz},
language = {eng},
number = {1294},
title = {Do large cabinets favor large governments? : evidence from Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18932},
year = {2004}
}
