@techreport{Holmlund2004Sickness,
abstract = {The paper presents a model that allows a unified analysis of sickness absence and search
unemployment. Sickness appears as random shocks to individual utility functions, interacts
with individual searchand labor supply decisions and triggers movements across labor force
states. The employed worker prefers absence for sufficiently severe sickness and the
unemployed worker may prefer nonparticipation if the disutility of search is amplified by
sickness. The decisions governing labor force transitions are influenced by social insurance
benefits available for sick or unemployed workers. We examine how these benefits affect
individual decisions on absence and search and the implications for employment,
unemployment and nonparticipation. The normative analysis of the socially optimal benefit
structure suggests that there is, in general, a case for benefit di.erentiation across states of
non-work. In particular, there is a case for a benefit structure that rewards active job search.},
author = {Bertil Holmlund},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {J65; J64; J21; 330; sickness absence; search; unemployment; sickness benefits; unemployment benefits; Fehlzeit; Krankheit; Arbeitsuche; Arbeitslosenversicherung; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1227},
title = {Sickness absence and search unemployment},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18866},
year = {2004}
}
