@techreport{Delfgaauw2004Incentives,
abstract = {Civil servants have a bad reputation of being lazy. However, citizens' personal experiences
with civil servants appear to be significantly better. We develop a model of an economy in
which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal
incentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions.
When civil servants' effort is unverifiable, lazy workers find working in the public sector
highly attractive and may crowd out workers with a public service motivation. When effort is
verifiable, the government optimally attracts motivated workers as well as the economy's
laziest workers by offering separating contracts, which are both distorted. Even though
contract distortions reduce aggregate welfare, a majority of society may be better off as public
goods come at a lower cost.},
author = {Josse Delfgaauw and Robert Dur},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {J3; H1; L3; J4; M5; 330; public sector labour markets; incentive contracts; work ethics; public service motivation; \"{O}ffentlicher Dienst; Leistungsanreiz; Anreizvertrag; Leistungsmotivation; Arbeitsethik; Theorie; Niederlande},
language = {eng},
number = {1223},
title = {Incentives and workers' motivation in the public sector},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18862},
year = {2004}
}
