@techreport{Konrad2005Silent,
abstract = {If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce
asymmetric externalities into the all-pay auction framework. If the strongest firm owns a large
share in the second strongest firm, this may make the strongest firm abstain from bidding. As
a consequence, equilibrium profits of both firms may increase, but the prize may be allocated
less efficiently. The reverse ownership structure is also likely to increase the profits of the
firms involved in the ownership relationship but without these negative efficiency effects.},
author = {Kai A. Konrad},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {L11; D44; L41; 330; all-pay auctions; externalities; contests; silent minority shareholdings; ownership structure; Auktionstheorie; Wettbewerb; Stille Gesellschaft; Eigent\"{u}merstruktur; Wirtschaftliche Effizienz; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1473},
title = {Silent interests and all-pay auctions},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18837},
year = {2005}
}
