@techreport{Daido2005Pygmalion,
abstract = {We attempt to formulate and explain two types of self-fulfilling prophecy, called the
Pygmalion effect (if a supervisor thinks her subordinates will succeed, they are more likely to
succeed) and the Galatea effect (if a person thinks he will succeed, he is more likely to
succeed). To this purpose, we extend a simple agency model with moral hazard and limited
liability by introducing a model of reference dependent preferences (RDP) by K?szegi and
Rabin (2004). We show that the agent with high expectations about his performance can be
induced to choose high effort with low-powered incentives. We then show that the principal?s
expectation has an important role as an equilibrium selection device.},
author = {Kohei Daido and Hideshi Itoh},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {M12; M54; M52; D82; B49; 330; self-fulfilling prophecy; Pygmalion effect; Galatea effect; reference dependent preferences; agency model; moral hazard; Agency Theory; Leistungsanreiz; Leistungsmotivation; Nutzen; Moral Hazard; Beschr\"{a}nkte Haftung; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1444},
title = {The Pygmalion effect : an agency model with reference dependent preferences},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18808},
year = {2005}
}
