@techreport{Luporini2005Relative,
abstract = {We analyze optimal compensation schedules for the directors of two plants belonging to the
same owner and producing the same good but serving geographically differentiated markets.
Since the outcome of each director depends on his own effort and on a random variable
representing market conditions, the problem takes the form of a principal multi-agent model.
We first provide appropriate extensions of the MLR and CDF conditions that ensure the
validity of the first-order approach in the single agent case. Then, we show that affiliation of
the random variables is a necessary and sufficient condition for the compensation of one
director to negatively and monotonically depend on the performance of the other.},
author = {Annalisa Luporini},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D82; D23; 330; principal-agent problems; relative performance evaluation; first-order approach; monotone likelihood ratio; affiliation; Leistungsorientierte Verg\"{u}tung; F\"{u}hrungskr\"{a}fte; Agency Theory; Organschaft; Mathematische Optimierung; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1420},
title = {Relative performance evaluation in a multi-plant firm},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18784},
year = {2005}
}
