@techreport{Lukach2005Optimal,
abstract = {This paper studies R&D investment decisions of a firm facing the threat of new technology entry and subject to technical uncertainty. We distinguish four scenarios: inevitable entry, entry deterrence, entry blockade, and non-credible entry threat. The entry threat stimulates the incumbent to innovate in case entry prevention is possible, but discourages R&D if entry is
inevitable. In the case of entry deterrence the incumbent successfully prevents entry by innovating. Greater technical uncertainty stimulates starting R&D and can result in implementation of more expensive research projects. The welfare analysis shows that the relation between welfare and entry cost and between welfare and uncertainty is nonmonotonic.},
author = {Ruslan Lukach and Peter M. Kort and Joseph Plasmans},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D21; C72; O31; 330; investment under uncertainty; real options; R&D; competition; Industrielle Forschung; Investition; Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit; Realoption; Potenzieller Wettbewerb; Markteintritt; Duopol; Innovationswettbewerb; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1385},
title = {Optimal R&D investment strategies with quantity competition under the threat of superior entry},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18749},
year = {2005}
}
