@techreport{Simonovits2004Designing,
abstract = {The traditional approach to flexible retirement (e.g. NDC) neglects the impact of asymmetric
information on actuarial fairness (neutrality). The mechanism design approach (e.g. Diamond,
2003) gives up the requirement of neutrality and looks for a redistributive second-best
benefit-retirement-age schedule. Trying to combine the two approaches, the present paper
determines the neutral (redistribution-free) second-best solution. This neutral solution is,
however, often Pareto-dominated by the redistributive one.},
author = {Andr\'{a}s Simonovits},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D82; H55; D91; 330; flexible retirement; asymmetric information; actuarial fairness (neutrality); mechanism design; Flexible Altersgrenze; Versicherungstechnik; Asymmetrische Information; Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion; Second Best; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1370},
title = {Designing benefit rules for flexible retirement with or without redistribution},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18733},
year = {2004}
}
