@techreport{Moraga-Gonzalez2004Anti,
abstract = {We examine an export game where two firms (home and foreign), located in two different
countries, produce vertically differentiated products. The foreign firm is the most efficient in
terms of R&D costs of quality development and the foreign country is relatively larger and
endowed with a relatively higher income. The unique (risk-dominant) Nash equilibrium
involves intra-industry trade where the foreign producer manufactures a good of higher
quality than the domestic firm. This equilibrium is characterized by unilateral dumping by the
foreign firm into the domestic economy. Two instruments of anti-dumping (AD) policy are
examined, namely, a price undertaking (PU) and an anti-dumping duty. We show that, when
firms? cost asymmetries are low and countries differ substantially in size, a PU leads to a
quality reversal in the international market, which gives a rationale for the domestic
government to enact AD law. We also establish an equivalence result between the effects of
an AD duty and a PU.},
author = {Jos\'{e} Luis Moraga-Gonz\'{a}lez and Jean-Marie Viaene},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {F13; F12; 330; anti-dumping duty; intra-industry trade; price undertaking; product quality; quality reversals; Antidumping; Intraindustrieller Handel; Spieltheorie; Produktqualit\"{a}t; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1365},
title = {Anti-dumping, intra-industry trade and quality reversals},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18728},
year = {2004}
}
