@techreport{Belleflamme2004Piracy,
abstract = {The effects of (private, small-scale) piracy on the pricing behavior of producers of
information goods are studied within a unified model of vertical differentiation. Although
information goods are assumed to be perfectly horizontally differentiated, demands are
interdependent because the copying technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. We
characterize the Bertrand-Nash equilibria in a duopoly. Comparing equilibrium prices to the
prices set by a multiproduct monopolist, we show that competition drives prices up and
reduces total surplus.},
author = {Paul Belleflamme and Pierre M. Picard},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {L13; L86; L82; K11; O34; 330; information goods; piracy; copyright; pricing; Digitale G\"{u}ter; Produktpiraterie; Computerkriminalit\"{a}t; Betriebliche Preispolitik; Produktdifferenzierung; Duopol; Wettbewerb; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1350},
title = {Piracy and competition},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18713},
year = {2004}
}
