@techreport{Eggert2004Contests,
abstract = {In this paper we analyze the structure of contest equilibria with a variable number of
individuals. First we analyze a situation where the total prize depends on the number of agents
and where every single agent faces opportunity costs of investing in the contest. Second we
analyze a situation where the agents face a trade-off between productive and appropriative
investments. Here, the number of agents may also influence the productivity of productive
investments. It turns out that both types of contests may lead to opposing results concerning
the optimal number of individuals depending on the strength of size effects. Whereas in the
former case individual utility is u-shaped when the number of agents increases, the opposite
holds true for the latter case. We discuss the implications of our findings for the case of
anarchic societies and competition on markets.},
author = {Wolfgang Eggert and Martin Kolmar},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {L10; D74; 330; size effects; contests; anarchy; competition; Wettbewerbstheorie; Marktstruktur},
language = {eng},
number = {1346},
title = {Contests with size effects},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18709},
year = {2004}
}
