@techreport{Berger2004should,
abstract = {The likely extension of the euro area has triggered a debate on the organization of the ECB, in
particular on the apparent mismatch between relative economic size and voting rights in the
Council. We present a simple model of optimal representation in a federal central bank
addressing this question. Optimal voting weights reflect two opposing forces: the wish to
insulate common monetary policy from changing preferences at the national level, and the
attempt to avoid an overly active or passive reaction to idiosyncratic national economic
shocks. A perfect match between economic size and voting rights is rarely optimal, and
neither is the ?one country, one vote principle?. Empirically, there are indications that the
pattern of over- and under-representation of member countries in the ECB Council might be
extreme by the standards of the US Fed and German Bundesbank and not always optimal.},
author = {Helge Berger and Till Mueller},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {E52; D72; F33; E58; 330; Central Bank; Federal Central Bank; Currency Union; optimal representation; voting; ECB; Zentralbank; Europ\"{a}ische Wirtschafts- und W\"{a}hrungsunion; Abstimmungsregel; Landesgr\"{o}sse; Geldpolitik; Theorie; EU-Staaten},
language = {eng},
number = {1344},
title = {How should large and small countries be represented in a currency union?},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18707},
year = {2004}
}
