@techreport{Lalive2004changes,
abstract = {This paper studies how changes in the two key parameters of unemployment insurance \textendash{} the
benefit replacement rate (RR) and the potential duration of benefits (PBD) \textendash{} affect the
duration of unemployment. In 1989, the Austrian government made unemployment insurance
more generous by changing, simultaneously, the maximum duration of regular unemployment
benefits and the earnings replacement ratio. We find that increasing the replacement ratio has
much weaker disincentive effects than increasing the maximum duration of benefits. We use
these results to split up the total costs to unemployment insurance funds into costs due to
changes in the unemployment insurance system and costs due to behavioral responses of
unemployed workers. Results indicate that costs due to behavioural responses are substantial.},
author = {Rafael Lalive and Jan C. van Ours and Josef Zweim\"{u}ller},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {J64; J65; C41; 330; maximum benefit duration; replacement rate; unemployment duration; unemployment insurance; policy change; Arbeitslosenversicherung; Reform; Arbeitslosigkeit; Dauer; Sch\"{a}tzung; \"{O}sterreich},
language = {eng},
number = {1337},
title = {How changes in financial incentives affect the duration of unemployment},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18701},
year = {2004}
}
