@techreport{Li2004Partnership,
abstract = {We study a partnership that anticipates its possible dissolution. In our model, partnerships
form in order to take advantage of complementary skills; although new opportunities may
arise that make partners? skills useless. We characterize the optimal, incentive-compatible
partnership contract that can be implemented by a simple call option, and then analyze the
commonly used buy?sell provision. We show that this dissolution rule gives rise to
inefficiency, either in the form of excessive dissolutions combined with underinvestment or
efficient dissolutions combined with overinvestment. However, supplementing the buy?sell
provision with the right to veto may restore efficiency.},
author = {Jianpei Li and Elmar Wolfstetter},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {L24; J12; D82; K12; C78; 330; Partnerschaftsgesellschaft; Anreizvertrag; Realoption; Qualifikation; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1325},
title = {Partnership dissolution, complementarity, and investment incentives},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18690},
year = {2004}
}
