@techreport{Crifo2004Incentives,
abstract = {In our model, an agent produces an outcome by a costly effort and then distributes it among
heterogeneous users. The agent?s payoff is the weighted sum of the users? shares and the
coefficient reflecting their heterogeneity. When the agent neglects users? heterogeneity the
game leads to an anonymous allocation. Otherwise, the equilibrium distribution is non-
egalitarian but more efficient. Low performing agents reduce inequality among users by
delivering an egalitarian service, while intermediate or high performing agents tend to prefer
(but not always) delivering an unequal service, thereby breaking the anonymity principle.
Incentives do matter regarding the crowding effect toward users.},
author = {Patricia Crifo and Jean-Louis Rulli\`{e}re},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {L32; J45; J33; C9; M5; 330; incentives; anonymity principle; egalitarian tasks allocation; principal agent user relationship; crowding-out effect; \"{O}ffentliche Dienstleistung; Dienstleistungsqualit\"{a}t; Leistungsorientierte Verg\"{u}tung; Agency Theory; Crowding out; Verbraucher; Spieltheorie; Theorie; Pencil-Pusher Game},
language = {eng},
number = {1316},
title = {Incentives and anonymity principle : crowding out toward users},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18681},
year = {2004}
}
