@techreport{Riedel2004Immediate,
abstract = {The present note analyzes the Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auction with arbitrarily many
bidders with decreasing marginal valuations under complete information. We show that the
game is solvable by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies if the efficient
allocation assigns at least one unit to every player and if bid increments are sufficiently small.
In that unique equilibrium, bidders immediately reduce their demand to the efficient
allocation, and the auction ends in the first round of bidding.},
author = {Frank Riedel and Elmar Wolfstetter},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D45; D44; 330; Simultaneous Ascending Auction; weak dominance; multi-unit auctions; game theory; Auktionstheorie; Vollkommene Information; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1315},
title = {Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending bid auctions},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18680},
year = {2004}
}
