@techreport{Mariuzzo2004merger,
abstract = {EU Merger Control Regulation No 4064/89 tended to rely on a dominance test, based on the
market share of undertakings, to indicate the level and potential changes in market power. The
use of such in differentiated product industries is questionable. New EC Merger Regulation
No 139/2004 introduces a substantive test to ensure that all post-merger scenarios posing a
threat to competition, even amongst small undertakings, are detected. We propose the use of a
simple structural approach to undertake a substantive test. We illustrate our point over 28
periods, 178 products (13 companies), for Retail Carbonated Soft Drinks. We estimate
company (product) mark-ups using a ?simple? Nested Logit model, Berry (1994) and a more
?sophisticated? model, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). While the dominance test may
fail to identify damaging mergers in differentiated products industries, this technique will not.},
author = {Franco Mariuzzo and Patrick Paul Walsh and Ciara Whelan},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {L40; L81; L25; L11; K2; 330; market shares; market power; differentiated products industries; mergers; Fusionskontrolle; Produktdifferenzierung; Marktmacht; Relevanter Markt; EU-Staaten},
language = {eng},
number = {1312},
title = {EU merger control in differentiated product industries},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18677},
year = {2004}
}
