@techreport{Borck2003Competition,
abstract = {This note studies the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model with tax competition. Regions may tax mobile capital or immobile labor. Individuals differ with respect to their relative endowments of labor and capital. Even though a lump sum tax is available, the equilibrium capital tax in a jurisdiction may be positive. In a symmetric equilibrium, this will be true if the median capital endowment is smaller than average.},
address = {Berlin},
author = {Rainald Borck},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D72; H77; 330; tax competition; voting; Steuerwettbewerb; Steuersystem; Public Choice; Abstimmungsregel; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {335},
publisher = {Deutsches Institut f\"{u}r Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)},
title = {Tax Competition and the Choice of Tax Structure in a Majority Voting Model},
type = {DIW-Diskussionspapiere},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18071},
year = {2003}
}
