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Religious fundamentalism and out-group hostility among Muslims and Christians in Western Europe

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Ruud Koopmans

Religious fundamentalism and out-group hostility among Muslims and Christians in Western Europe

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Ruud Koopmans

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Discussion Paper SP VI 2014–101
WZB Berlin Social Science Center (2014)

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Introduction

In the controversies over immigration and Islam in the early 21st century, Muslims have widely become associated with religious fundamentalism. Others have argued that religiously fundamentalist attitudes characterize only a small minority of Muslims living in the West, and can be found to similar extents among adherents of other religions, including Christianity. Claims on both sides of this debate lack a sound empirical base. Little is known about the extent and determinants of religious fundamentalism among Muslims of immigrant origin, and virtually no evidence is available that allows a comparison with Christians of native stock.¹ Whether religious fundamentalism among Muslims should be considered as a relatively harmless form of strong religiosity or whether it is associated with hostility towards other groups is also an open question. Research on Christian fundamentalism has repeatedly demonstrated that there is a strong connection with out-group hostility, but no solid evidence is currently available that allows us to determine whether this also holds true for Muslims.

On the basis of a survey among Turkish and Moroccan immigrants and their offspring as well as native comparison groups in six West European countries this paper investigates four key questions:

- What is the extent of religious fundamentalism among Muslim immigrants and their offspring and how does it compare to native Christians?
- What are the socio-economic determinants of religious fundamentalism among Muslims and to what extent are they similar to those among Christians?
- Can religious fundamentalism among Muslims be distinguished from other indicators of religiosity, as research has found to be the case for Christian fundamentalism, or is it an inherent component of strong Islamic religiosity?
- What is the relationship between religious fundamentalism and hostility towards other groups and is this relationship similar among Muslims and Christians?

Religious fundamentalism: definition, determinants and relationship to out-group hostility

Origin, definition and demarcation

Religious fundamentalism is certainly not unique to Islam. The term originates in a Protestant revival movement in the early 20th century United States, which propagated a return to the “fundamentals” of the Christian faith by way of a strict adherence to, and literal interpretation of the rules of the Bible (see Marsden 1980; Woodberry and Smith 1998). Since, the term has been generalized to include similar movements that proclaim a return to religious “fundamentals” or “origins” and a strict and literal adherence to the holy texts of other religious creeds such as Judaism, Islam and Hinduism (Armstrong 2000; Almond, Appleby, and Sivas 2003). According to the most widely accepted academic definition, religious fundamentalism is:

¹ For reasons of brevity, I will sometimes use the shorthand “Muslim immigrants” to refer to the category of „Muslims of immigrant origin,“ although it includes the native-born children of immigrants. Likewise, I will sometimes refer to “Christians of native stock” as “native Christians,” without implying that all natives are Christians, or that all Christians are native-born.

“The belief that there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity; that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by the forces of evil which must be vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed today according to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and that those who believe and follow these fundamental teachings have a special relationship with the deity” (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992: 118).

Islamic fundamentalism is often used interchangeably with “Islamism” (see Kramer 2003). Others distinguish Islamic fundamentalism as „an individual orientation towards the roots of a religious creed” from Islamism that is additionally characterized by „the subordination of political decisions under the primacy of religion“ (Brettfeld and Wetzels 2007: 56, 63). Particularly in its non-academic usage and especially when referring to Islam, fundamentalism is often employed as a synonym for extremist movements, which strive to impose their religious beliefs on others by force. Some academic definitions, too, include the willingness to use religiously motivated violence as a defining characteristic of fundamentalism (e.g., Heitmeyer, Müller and Schröder 1997). This usage, however, is not in line with the most commonly used academic conceptions of fundamentalism, which define it as a set of religious attitudes, norms, and ideals. As Emerson and Hartman put it: “First, not all religiously based violence is done by fundamentalists... Second, not all fundamentalist groups are violent. In fact, most are not” (2006: 136). The question to what extent people are willing to endorse or use violent means in pursuit of fundamentalist aims should therefore be kept analytically separate, much in the same way as secular ideologies such as nationalism or socialism can be pursued either in democratic and peaceful, or in non-democratic and violent ways. The relationship of fundamentalism to extremism and violence is not the topic of this paper, although I will come back to the issue in the conclusion. I will however investigate the relationship between religious fundamentalism and hostile attitudes towards out-groups, but here too it is important to make clear in advance that these do not necessarily lead to violent behavior towards other groups.

In accordance with the prevalent academic usage of the term, I define religious fundamentalism by way of three, interrelated attitudes:

- that believers should return to the eternal and unchangeable rules laid down in the past;
- that these rules allow only one interpretation that is binding for all believers;
- that religious rules should have priority over secular laws.

Because one of the central questions of this paper is how religious fundamentalism is related to out-group hostility, I have not incorporated Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s (1992) reference to the threat posed by outside ”forces of evil” in my operational definition of fundamentalism. If the idea that the own religion is threatened by evil outsiders is already incorporated in the operationalization of fundamentalism, the relationship between it and out-group hostility would become to a considerable extent a matter of definition rather than of empirical investigation.

Fundamentalism defined along these lines should be distinguished from other forms of strong religiosity. Even though fundamentalists proclaim the need to return to a religion’s origins they are not simply traditionalists but often selectively emphasize certain aspects and interpretations of the religious tradition and combine them with equally selective aspects of

modernity. As Bruce puts it, “fundamentalism is a radical reconstruction and redeployment of a tradition for contemporary purposes” (2008: 15). Therefore, fundamentalism is generally distinguished from orthodoxy, which “reflects the *content* of what is believed rather than (as is the case with fundamentalism) the way the beliefs are held” (Laythe et al 2002: 625). Because it focuses on content, orthodoxy cannot be measured with the same instrument across religions, but is instead captured by statements such as “Jesus was born of a virgin” (from Fullerton and Hunsberger’s [1982] Christian orthodoxy scale) or “it is important for me to meticulously follow the rules of fasting” (from Brettfeld and Wetzel’s [2007] Muslim orthodoxy scale). Even within Islam, orthodoxy is difficult to define across currents, or even across genders. For Sunni Muslims, for instance, wearing a headscarf for women and regularly visiting a mosque for men, as well as practicing Ramadan for both sexes, can be seen as indicators of orthodoxy. For Alevites, however, wearing a headscarf is not a sign of religiosity, the rules and timing of their fast differ from Ramadan, and religious rituals take place mostly at people’s homes, rather than in the Alevite equivalent to the mosque, the *cem evi* (Sahin 2005). Similarly, belief in the infallibility of the Pope and the virginity of Mary are important indicators of Catholic but not of Protestant orthodoxy. Because I am here interested in comparing across religious groups, I will not analyze orthodoxy. Instead, I rely on an indicator of religiosity that can be measured similarly for Christians and Muslims, and is based on a person’s own self-assessment of their religiosity, namely the strength of religious identification. If group differences in levels of fundamentalism, as well as associations of fundamentalism with out-group hostility, disappear once we control for religious identification, we may conclude that fundamentalist attitudes are merely a correlate of strong religiosity. To the extent that such differences and associations remain, we can conclude that religious fundamentalism is a separate aspect of religiosity that distinguishes some strong believers from others.

Controlling for religiosity is also important for interpreting differences between Christians and Muslims. Several studies have shown that, compared to the majority population, Muslim immigrants more often define themselves as religious and identify more strongly with their religion (Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel 2009; Connor 2010; Ersanilli 2010). If fundamentalism is mainly a function of the strength of religious attachment, not controlling for the latter could lead to misattribution of group differences. What appears to be a group difference between Muslims and Christians might then better be seen as a difference between strong believers and those for whom religion is not such a central part of their identities and daily lives, which happens to be the case more often among European Christians.

Applicability to Islam

To date, the large majority of academic studies on religious fundamentalism refer to Christianity and to American Protestantism in particular. As recent as 1992, a major cross-national comparative study on religious fundamentalism “in East and West” consisted entirely of chapters on Christian fundamentalism and contained only one index reference to Islam (Misztal and Shupe 1992). Since, academic interest in Islamic fundamentalism has risen, mainly in the form of studies of fundamentalist ideologies, parties, movements and terrorist groups in countries where Islam is the dominant religion (e.g., Choueiri 2010; Davidson 2013; Roy 1996; Tibi 1998). There are however almost no studies of religious fundamentalism among Muslim immigrants in the West – I will discuss a few exceptions below – and in particular there is a lack of studies that allow direct comparisons of the extent, causes, and consequences of fundamentalism among Muslims and Christians.

The extension of the term fundamentalism from its original usage to Islam has not been uncontested. On the one hand, there are those, like Edward Said, who do not object against the term as such, but against the fact that it “has come to be associated almost automatically with Islam, although it has a flourishing, usually elided relationship with Christianity, Judaism, and Hinduism. The deliberately created associations between Islam and fundamentalism ensure that the average reader comes to see Islam and fundamentalism as essentially the same thing” (Said 1997: xvi). Against this argument that fundamentalist interpretations of Islam should not be equated with the religion as a whole, others such as Bernard Lewis have argued that, when we apply the predominant definitions of fundamentalism, Islam in its current manifestation is inherently fundamentalist:

“‘Fundamentalist’ is a Christian term. It seems to have come into use in the early years of this century, and denotes certain Protestant churches and organizations, more particularly those that maintain the literal divine origin and inerrancy of the Bible. In this they oppose the liberal and modernist theologians, who tend to a more critical, historical view of Scripture. Among Muslim theologians there is as yet no such liberal or modernist approach to the Qur’an, and all Muslims, in their attitude to the text of the Qur’an, are in principle at least fundamentalists” (Lewis 1988: 117).

Rather than entering into, ultimately theological, debates about whether Islam is inherently pluralistic or fundamentalist, I prefer to approach the issue empirically by investigating the attitudes of European Muslims and Christians towards their respective religions. This, rather than any theological approach, will allow us to determine whether most or only few European Muslims adhere to fundamentalist interpretations of their creed, whether such fundamentalist attitudes are more than just a correlate of strong Islamic religiosity, and whether fundamentalism is less, more, or just as widespread among European Christians.

Determinants of religious fundamentalism among Muslim immigrants

Fundamentalism is generally seen as a reaction to secularization and modernization:

“Fundamentalism is the rational response of traditionally religious people to social, political and economic changes that downgrade and constrain the role of religion in the public world. Liberals may find the tone of fundamentalist polemic offensive, but fundamentalists have not exaggerated the extent to which modern cultures threaten what they hold dear” (Bruce 2008: 120).

In line with this, many studies on Christian fundamentalism have found that it has its support base disproportionately among those occupying class and status positions on the losing side of modernization processes, e.g., among those with lower income, education, and occupational prestige (e.g., Demerath 1965; Lienesch 1982; Coreno 2002). If these findings are transferable to Muslims, this would lead us to expect relatively high levels of fundamentalism among Muslims of immigrant origin in Western Europe, because of their generally low socio-economic status. In comparing levels of fundamentalism between Christians and Muslims it is therefore important to control for differences in socio-economic status between the two groups.

Theorizing on immigrant acculturation provides another reason why levels of fundamentalism may be higher among Muslim immigrants. According to the “reactive ethnicity” perspective (Portes and Rumbaut 2001), immigrants and their offspring may under conditions of blocked upward mobility, legal exclusion and social discrimination reaffirm their ties and identification with their ethnic in-group. This may also take the form of “reactive religiosity,” i.e. a stronger attachment to immigrant religions as a result of exclusion and discrimination (Fleischmann and Phalet 2012). Research on first and second-generation immigrants in Europe has thus far mostly failed to support the reactive ethnicity and religiosity hypotheses (Diehl and Schnell 2006; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010; Fleischmann and Phalet 2012; but see Connor 2010 for a contrary finding).

To assess the merits of reactive religiosity as an explanation for variations in Islamic fundamentalism I will investigate first, whether on the individual level fundamentalism is associated with perceived discrimination, and second whether levels of fundamentalism are higher in countries that institutionally exclude Muslims from religious rights, e.g. by restrictions on the wearing of headscarves, halal slaughtering of animals or mosque construction. Among the six countries investigated here, France and Germany have been most reluctant in granting Muslims religious rights, while the Netherlands provide the widest range of such rights, with Austria, Sweden and Belgium ranging in between (Fleischmann and Phalet 2012; Koopmans 2013). Alternatively, one may interpret Islamic fundamentalism not so much as a reaction to exclusion from religious rights in particular, but to more general patterns of legal exclusion of immigrants, including for instance high hurdles to naturalization or a lack of anti-discrimination policies. Such more general immigrant rights are captured by the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)², which classifies Sweden as the most inclusive of the six countries studied here, followed by the Netherlands and Belgium. Germany and France provide fewer rights to immigrants, and Austria does so the least.

Fundamentalism and out-group hostility

Research on Christian fundamentalism has consistently documented that it is strongly associated with prejudices and hostility towards various out-groups, including homosexuals (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Laythe et al. 2002), members of other religious groups (Altemeyer 2003), Jews (Glock and Stark 1966; Eisinga, Konig, and Scheepers 1995), and various other ethnic and racial minorities (McFarland 1989; Altemeyer 2003; Laythe et al. 2002; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992). More generally, Christian fundamentalism correlates very highly – in the domain of .70 – with scales tapping right-wing authoritarianism, to such an extent that it “can be viewed as a religious manifestation of right-wing authoritarianism” (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2005: 391). Various studies that control for other measures of Christian religiosity, such as orthodoxy and church attendance, have found that religiosity as such, or even orthodox religiosity are not or only weakly associated with out-group hostility once fundamentalism is controlled for, suggesting that fundamentalism is indeed the decisive factor behind the linkage between strong religiosity and prejudice (e.g., Kirkpatrick, Hood and Hartz 1991; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992).

Only a few studies investigate to what extent the relationship between fundamentalism and out-group hostility can also be found in non-Christian religious traditions. Hunsberger’s

² See <http://www.mipex.eu/>, accessed 2 January 2014.

(1996) study comparing four religious groups in Toronto, Canada showed that levels of religious fundamentalism were highest among Muslims, lowest among Jews, and intermediary among Christians and Hindus. Within all four groups, fundamentalism correlated strongly (between .42 and .74) with right-wing authoritarianism and negative attitudes towards homosexuals. These findings are however based on very low numbers of non-Christian respondents (n=21 for Muslims and Hindus; n=32 for Jews) and are not controlled for any background variables. In another study, Hunsberger, Owusu and Duck (1999) compared Christian and Muslim university students in Ghana. Levels of religious fundamentalism were almost identical across the two groups and strongly and significantly correlated with right-wing authoritarianism, but more strongly so among the Muslim group. Here too, however, controls for background variables were absent and case numbers were low (n=57 for the Muslim group).

Previous research on fundamentalism and out-group hostility among European Muslims

Evidence on the extent of fundamentalism and out-group hostility among Muslims of immigrant origin in Europe is fragmentary, and usually does not allow a comparison with the non-Muslim or Christian population. For Germany, a study in the mid-1990s (Heitmeyer, Müller and Schröder 1997) among young people of Turkish origin revealed that 49 percent agreed with the statement “reform and modernization of the faith should be rejected.” This pre 9/11 study also documented widespread feelings that Islam was under threat from Western and Zionist enemies: 60% affirmed that “the war in Bosnia shows that the West wants to destroy Islam” and 33% that “Zionism threatens Islam.”

Similar results were reported in another study (Brettfeld and Wetzels 2007) a decade later, which showed that between one third and almost half of German Muslims agree with statements measuring religious fundamentalism, such as “those who do not follow the rules of the Quran literally, are not true Muslims” (32%); “people who modernize Islam, destroy the true teachings” (43%); and “following the prescriptions of my religion is more important for me than democracy” (47%). The study also reveals a high level of rejection of Christian and Western morality among Muslims: 56% agreed that “in Germany one can see clearly, that Christian religions are not capable of securing morality,” and 71% affirmed that “the sexual morality of Western societies is completely degenerate.”

Roex, van Stiphout and Tillie’s (2011) study among Dutch Muslims found 43% support for the statement “the rules of God are for me more important than the Dutch laws,” a very similar percentage as in the “Muslims in Germany” study. Many Dutch Muslims also have what the authors call a “dichotomous worldview”: 71% affirm that they sometimes “have the feeling that the world consists only of groups that are diametrically opposed.” Only 17% however affirmed the statement “Western countries are out to destroy Islam.” Unfortunately, none of these German and Dutch studies offer comparisons to native Christian’s view on religion or to native’s views of Muslims and other out-groups.

Such comparisons were made in another study of young Muslims in the age group of 14-32 years in Germany (Frindte et al. 2011). Unfortunately the study only provides scale averages and no percentages for single items, but throughout it finds significantly higher levels of fundamentalism, prejudice against Jews, and authoritarianism among young Muslims compared to non-Muslim Germans of the same age group, which remain when controlling for socio-economic background variables.

Data and operationalization

Data

The data used in this paper are drawn from a survey conducted in 2008 among people of Turkish origin as well as a comparison group of native stock in six West European countries: Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, and Sweden. In the first four of these countries also people of Moroccan origin were interviewed; in Austria and Sweden immigration from Morocco has been very limited and targeting this small population was not practically feasible. People of Turkish and Moroccan origin were chosen because these are the two most important countries of origin of Muslims in Western Europe. Those of Turkish origin are the largest Muslim group in Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, and Sweden, and they are the second and fourth-largest group in Belgium and France, respectively. Those of Moroccan origin are the most important Muslim group in Belgium, the second-largest in the Netherlands and France, and the third-largest in Germany. Together, the groups investigated comprise roughly two thirds of the Muslim populations of Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium, about 40 percent of Muslims in Austria (where Muslims from the former Yugoslavia are an important group), one third of Muslims in France (where Muslims of Algerian origin are particularly important), and only about ten percent of Muslims in Sweden (where the Muslim population is relatively evenly distributed across many origin groups).³ The data used in this paper are therefore not representative for the whole Muslim population in the countries of study, especially not for Austria, France, and Sweden.

The focus on the two most important Muslim groups in Western Europe does however enable more valid cross-national comparisons. A sample from the whole Muslim population in each of the countries would have meant comparing a French sample dominated by Muslims of Algerian origin to a German sample dominated by people originating in Turkey, which would not have enabled us to determine whether any differences found are due to France and Germany as destination countries, or to Algeria and Turkey as countries of origin. Half of the samples, moreover, are drawn from people originating in two rural origin regions in Turkey and Morocco, respectively Central and East Anatolia, and Northern Morocco (the former Spanish protectorate). The sampling strategy thus aims to control as much as possible for compositional differences in immigration flows.

In cross-national comparative research a difficult choice has to be made between using the same sampling strategy in all countries, or alternatively, opting for the best available sampling method in each individual country. Because each sampling strategy carries a bias, using different sampling strategies across countries can compromise comparability of the data. Population records tend to offer the best sampling frame because they have a high coverage rate. Though the Netherlands and Sweden keep population records that contain information on the ethnic background of people, the other countries in this study do not. To prevent introducing confounding variance by mixing sampling strategies, the same sampling strategy was used for this survey in all countries: onomastic (first and family name-based) sampling from telephone directories, using a large number of typical Turkish, Moroccan and native names as search strings (see Humpert and Schneiderheinze 2000).

³ See <http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/>, accessed 7 January 2014.

Both landlines and mobile numbers were included. Interviews were conducted by computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) in the language of the country of study, or in Turkish or Moroccan-Arabic, depending on the interviewee's preference. Quota for gender, age, calling time, and immigrant generation (first, second, and in-between generation) were used to ensure representativeness within and comparability across groups. In all multivariate regressions reported below, I will control for sampling variables (landline or mobile number; calling time –weekdays versus evenings and weekends; regional subsample) in order to ensure that sampling differences do not bias the estimates for groups or countries. For further detailed information on sampling procedures and response rates, see Ersanilli and Koopmans (2013).

The survey was intended to measure a wide range of aspects of immigrant integration, as well as native responses to immigration. The number of questions devoted to any single topic, such as fundamentalism or out-group hostility, is therefore relatively limited. Anyway, the use of the multiple-item scales that have been used in psychological research with very small groups of respondents is not practicable in survey research. The advantage of the broad nature of the survey is however that we can assess fundamentalism and out-group hostility for large groups of immigrants and across several countries, and are able to include a range of relevant correlates as controls.

Dependent variables

Religious fundamentalism

The three attitudinal aspects of religious fundamentalism mentioned above are operationalized by the following statements that were presented to native respondents who indicated that they were Christians and to respondents of Turkish and Moroccan origin who indicated they were Muslims:

“Christians [Muslims] should return to the roots of Christianity [Islam]”

“There is only one interpretation of the Bible [the Quran] and every Christian [Muslim] must stick to that”

“The rules of the Bible [the Quran] are more important to me than the laws of [survey country]”

Answer categories were agree, disagree or don't know/refusal to answer. Agreement was coded as the fundamentalist response. Because arguably agreement to any of these items taken alone does not yet make one a fundamentalist, I also report the percentage of respondents who agreed to all three items as a more adequate criterion for classifying a respondent as adhering to a fundamentalist belief system. For the multivariate regression analyses, I use a summary scale of religious fundamentalism (with disagree and don't know/refusal collapsed as the non-fundamentalist response) with a Cronbach's alpha of .76.

Out-group hostility

To measure out-group hostility, I use three statements that measure rejection of homosexuals and Jews, as well as mirroring items for Muslims and natives that tap the degree to which respondents view the other group as a hostile threat to their own group:

“I don’t want to have homosexuals as friends”

“Jews cannot be trusted”

“Muslims aim to destroy Western culture” [for natives]

“Western countries aim to destroy Islam” [for persons of Turkish or Moroccan origin]

The latter two items refer to Western rather than Christian culture and countries because “Islam versus the West” rather than “Islam versus Christianity” is the dominant frame within the clash of civilizations vocabulary. Moreover, these out-group hostility questions were asked not only to Christian and Muslim believers, but also to non-religious respondents for whom the “Islam versus the West” phrasing is more appropriate. Answer categories were again agree, disagree, and don’t know/refusal, with agreement as the out-group hostility response. Again, I additionally report percentages of respondents who agreed to all three statements. For the multivariate regression analyses an out-group hostility scale was constructed (with disagree and don’t know/refusal collapsed as the non-hostile response), which has a Cronbach’s alpha of .66.

Independent variables

Ethno-religious groups

The analysis excludes those respondents who did not adhere to any religion (3% of the immigrant and 30% of the native sample).⁴ Christians of Moroccan (n=8) or Turkish (n=59) origin, as well as Muslims of native stock (n=3) were also excluded from the analysis because they are too small in number.⁵ Thus, all Muslims included in the analysis are of immigrant origin, and all Christians are of native origin. The category of Muslims of immigrant origin is defined as all those who mention Islam as the religion to which they adhere, and who are either themselves born abroad or have at least one parent born abroad. Christians of native stock are those who say they adhere to Christianity and who are both themselves native-born and have two native-born parents.

⁴ The filter question for religious affiliation was “what is your religion?,” with “none” or “I am an atheist” as possible answer categories. This leads to a somewhat higher percentage of people who affiliate with a religion than the filter question that has been used in some other surveys: “do you consider yourself religious?” with answer categories “yes” or “no,” followed in the case of a “yes” answer by the question to which religion the respondent belongs. The disadvantage of the latter is that the filter question mixes religious affiliation and identification. Persons who do not consider themselves to be very religious may be inclined to say “no” to the filter question, in which case they are treated as non-religious although when asked directly “what is your religion?” they may indicate a Christian or Muslim affiliation rather than classifying themselves as atheists or non-believers.

⁵ The same applies to the small group of native adherents of other religions than Christianity or Islam (n=14).

Among Christians, I distinguish three groups: Catholics; mainline Protestants; and non-mainstream Protestants from denominations such as Seventh-Day Adventists, Baptists, Jehovah's Witnesses and Pentecostals. Research on Christian fundamentalism in the United States leads us to expect higher levels of fundamentalism among non-mainstream Protestant groups. The Moroccan Muslims in our sample all belong to the Sunnite branch of Islam, but the Turkish sample includes a substantial number of Alevites, a liberal minority current within Turkish Shia Islam, and a small group of other Muslims, mainly non-Alevite Shiites. Ethnically, the Moroccan group comprises Arabs and Berbers, and the Turkish group Turkish and Kurdish ethnics. However, preliminary analyses showed that these ethnic distinctions are not significantly associated with fundamentalism and I have therefore not included them in the analyses reported below.

Religious identification

Religious identification is a scale variable with a Cronbach's alpha of .89, composed of the following three items, each with answer categories "not at all" (1), "barely" (2) "a bit" (3), "largely" (4), and "completely" (5):

"To what extent do you feel Christian [Muslim]?"

"To what extent do you feel connected to Christians [Muslims]?"

"To what extent are you proud of being a Christian [Muslim]?"

Demographic and socio-economic control variables

Country of residence: dummy variables for the six countries of study. Austria is the reference category because it has the highest levels of fundamentalism and out-group hostility;

Age: in years;

Immigrant generation: Foreign-born Turks and Moroccans (0) versus their offspring born in the country of immigration (1). In the multivariate analyses only age is used, because age and generation are highly collinear and age turned out to be the stronger determinant.

Gender: male (0) or female (1);

Marital status: unmarried (0) or married (1);

Employment status: gainfully employed (1) or not (0).

Job status: for those currently or formerly employed, job statuses were coded using the linear ISEI index (Ganzeboom 1992). Those who were never employed were assigned the lowest job status;

Home ownership: living in owned (1) versus rental (0) housing.

Level of education: the highest achieved level, coded according to the ISCED⁶ classification into: only primary education or less (1; the reference category), lower secondary education or vocational training (2), upper secondary education or vocational training (3), tertiary education (4).

⁶ See <http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international-standard-classification-of-education.aspx>; accessed 13 February 2014.

The literature on Christian fundamentalism leads us to expect a negative association between fundamentalism and socio-economic status. Employment, a high job status, home ownership, and higher education should therefore be associated with lower levels of fundamentalism.⁷

Perceived discrimination

To investigate the reactive religiosity thesis among Muslims, I include a scale (Cronbach's alpha .72) composed of two indicators of perceived discrimination. The first asks generally "Can you tell me how often you feel discriminated in [survey country] because of your origin or religion?" with answer categories "never," "almost never," "sometimes," "often," and "always." The second measure consists of the summed affirmative answers to six specific questions asking whether the respondent has ever felt discriminated against "when looking for a job or at work," "when looking for housing," "when going out in clubs and cafes," "in school," "by the police," or "by a public service institution, social service or the municipality."

Sampling variables

In all analyses I include as controls dummies for mobile phone (1) versus landline (0) numbers; whether respondents were interviewed as part of the representative sample (0) or as part of the oversamples for East and Central Anatolia or Northern Morocco (1); and whether respondents were interviewed during the daytime (0) or during evenings and weekends (1). To save space, I will not display the results for these sampling variables. The oversample variable had no significant relationship to fundamentalism. Christians reached on a mobile number were slightly less fundamentalist, as were both Christians and Muslims interviewed during evenings or weekends. Both results are plausible since mobile phone use and being difficult to reach during the daytime can be seen as indicators of a more modern, active lifestyle.

Results

Religious fundamentalism

Figure 1 shows that religious fundamentalism is not a marginal phenomenon among Western European Muslims. Taking together the foreign-born and native-born immigrant generations, almost 60 per cent agree that Muslims should return to the roots of Islam, 75 per cent think there is only one interpretation of the Quran possible, which is binding for every Muslim, and 65 per cent say that religious rules are more important to them than the laws of the country in which they live. Consistent fundamentalist attitudes, with agreement to all three statements, are found among 44 per cent. Levels are somewhat lower among the second generation. Not displayed in the figure, fundamentalist attitudes are slightly less prevalent among Sunni Muslims with a Turkish (45% agreement to all three statements) compared to a Moroccan (50%) background. Turkish Alevites display much lower levels of fundamentalism (15%).

⁷ Additionally, the survey contains information on income, but this variable, as is usual in surveys, has a high non-response. Preliminary analyses show that it has a significant negative impact on fundamentalism, net of the other socio-economic variables. However, its inclusion does not lead to any significant changes in the coefficients of religious group or country differences. In view of the missing value problem I have therefore excluded income from the analysis.

Figure 1: Religious fundamentalism among Christians and first and second-generation Muslims in Western Europe (in %)




Figure 1 also shows that religious fundamentalism is much more prevalent among European Muslims than among Christian natives. Among Christians agreement to the single statements ranges between 13 and 21 per cent and less than 4 per cent agree with all three items. In line with what is known about Christian fundamentalism, levels of agreement are slightly higher (4% agreeing with all statements) among mainline Protestants than among Catholics (3%), and most pronounced (12%) among the adherents of non-mainstream Protestant groups. However, even among these groups support for fundamentalist attitudes remains much below the levels found among Sunni Muslims. Turkish Alevites’ view on the role of religion is however more similar to that of native Christians than of Sunni Muslims.

These group differences could be a result of the different demographic and socio-economic profiles of Muslims and Christians. Table 1 investigates this by way of multivariate regressions. Model 1 is the baseline model of group differences, only controlled for the sampling variables. These results replicate the descriptive findings just discussed. Catholics and mainline Protestants display the lowest levels of fundamentalism, non-mainstream Protestants and Alevites form the middle group with somewhat higher levels of fundamentalism, and Sunnite Muslims have by far the strongest fundamentalist attitudes – a full point more on the three-point scale than Alevites and non-mainstream Protestants and 1.5 points more than mainline Protestants and Catholics. Model 2 adds the demographic and socio-economic control variables, as well as country dummies. There are no significant differences between the genders and between married or unmarried people, but older people tend to be more fundamentalist, though the effect size is small: .06 points on the three-point scale for every ten years of age. The socio-economic variables are all significant and confirm that fundamentalist attitudes are associated with socio-economic marginalization: those who are not employed, have a lower job status, have lower levels of education and live in rented housing display significantly higher levels of fundamentalism. The effect sizes are however not very large. The most important of the socio-economic variables is education, for which

the regression estimates imply that the level of fundamentalism among persons with only primary school is .72 higher than among those with a university education. There are also some significant country differences: German and Swedish, and to a lesser extent Dutch respondents are less fundamentalist than those from Austria, the reference category.

Table 1: Multivariate regression of religious fundamentalism among Christians and Muslims in Western Europe (unstandardized regression coefficients and significance levels)

	All groups Model 1	All groups Model 2	All groups Model 3	Christians	Muslims
Group reference: Catholics	-	-	-	-	-
Mainline Protestants	-.06 (.228)	.25 (.000)	.20 (.000)	.08 (.123)	-
Non-mainstream Protestants	.36 (.001)	.39 (.000)	.32 (.000)	.40 (.000)	-
Turkish Alevites	.44 (.000)	.47 (.000)	.36 (.000)	-	-.55 (.000)
Turkish Sunnites	1.44 (.000)	1.42 (.000)	.96 (.000)	-	-.13 (.000)
Other Turkish Muslims	1.03 (.000)	1.01 (.000)	.71 (.000)	-	-.35 (.058)
Moroccan Sunnites	1.56 (.000)	1.60 (.000)	1.09 (.000)	-	Reference
Age (*10)	-	.06 (.000)	.02 (.011)	.09 (.000)	-.01 (.713)
Female	-	.02 (.391)	-.02 (.399)	-.06 (.076)	.01 (.713)
Married	-	-.05 (.076)	-.05 (.060)	-.08 (.033)	-.01 (.720)
Education level (ISCED)	-	-.18 (.000)	-.17 (.000)	-.11 (.000)	-.19 (.000)
Employed	-	-.09 (.003)	-.06 (.035)	-.07 (.087)	-.01 (.814)
Professional status (* 10; ISEI)	-	-.05 (.000)	-.04 (.000)	-.01 (.194)	-.07 (.000)
Home ownership	-	-.10 (.000)	-.10 (.000)	.05 (.185)	-.11 (.001)
Country reference: Austria	-	-	-	-	-
Germany	-	-.50 (.000)	-.40 (.000)	-.15 (.030)	-.52 (.000)
France	-	-.05 (.319)	.04 (.453)	-.01 (.866)	-.03 (.616)
Netherlands	-	-.17 (.001)	-.12 (.010)	-.19 (.004)	-.15 (.029)
Belgium	-	-.00 (.931)	.06 (.170)	-.07 (.234)	.04 (.552)
Sweden	-	-.52 (.000)	-.37 (.000)	-.33 (.000)	-.35 (.000)
Religious identification	-	-	.37 (.000)	.22 (.000)	.53 (.000)
Perceived discrimination	-	-	-	-	.03 (.075)
Sampling controls (mobile phone; calling time, regional oversample)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R ²	.344	.413	.470	.225	.255
N	5748	5748	5748	1945	3803


However, these control variables hardly at all affect the religious group differences, which remain virtually identical to those in model 1. The only noteworthy change is that controlling for demography, cross-national variation, and socio-economic status, mainline Protestants become significantly more fundamentalist than Catholics, but the difference is not large in size (.25). The weight of group differences compared to demographic and socio-economic variables is also illustrated by the fact that in spite of the inclusion of a large number of explanatory variables the explained variance only increases modestly from model 1 to model 2, from .35 to .41.

These results indicate that the difference between Sunnite Muslims, on the one hand, and Christians and Alevites, on the other, cannot be attributed to compositional differences. The different levels of religiosity of these groups offer an alternative explanation. Model 3 explores this possibility and shows that religious identification is an important predictor of fundamentalism. Each point higher on the five-point religious identification scale is associated with a .37 increase on the fundamentalism scale and inclusion of religious identification raises the explained variance to .47. Moreover, unlike the demographic and socio-economic variables, religious identification contributes to the explanation of group differences. While the coefficients for the Christian groups and the Alevites remain similar to those in model 2, the effect sizes for Sunnite Muslims are reduced by one third. Still, the largest part of the differences between Sunnites and the other religious groups cannot be explained by different levels of religiosity.

In models 1 to 3 we assumed that the predictors of fundamentalism are similar for Christians and Muslims. Models 4 and 5 allow us to test this assumption by way of separate regressions for the two groups. Model 5 in addition includes the perceived discrimination scale for Muslims. The results show that among Christians and Muslims we largely find the same socio-economic patterns: in both groups, fundamentalism is associated with lower socio-economic status. A noteworthy difference is however that while among Christians fundamentalism significantly increases with age, there is no significant relationship with age among Muslims. If we include the distinction between first and second generation instead of age in the regression for Muslims, it is also insignificant. The modest differences between the Muslim generations that we saw in Figure 1 can therefore be explained as a result of the fact that the second generation has on average achieved a higher socio-economic status than their parents.

Another noteworthy difference between Christians and Muslims is the strength of the association between religious identification and fundamentalism. Although the association is highly significant in both groups, the effect size is much larger among Muslims (.53) than among Christians (.22). Nevertheless, strong religiosity offers only a partial explanation for group differences in fundamentalism. Figure 2 illustrates this by comparing the percentages of respondents giving consistently fundamentalist responses (agreement to all three fundamentalism items) separately for strongly and less religious Christians, Alevites and Sunnites. As strongly religious I define those with an average score on the five-point religious identification scale of four or higher, i.e. those who strongly or very strongly identify as Christians or Muslims, which is the case for 40 percent of Christians, 61 percent of Alevites and 92 percent of Sunnites.

Figure 2: Religious fundamentalism among Christians, Alevites and Sunnites by level of religiosity (agreement to all three fundamentalism items; in %)



The figure shows that levels of fundamentalism are low across the three religious groups among those with weak religious identification. Even among strongly religious Christians, only one third or less agree with each of the three fundamentalism items and only eight percent agree with all three. Among strongly religious Alevites, too, religious fundamentalism is a minority position, with only 21 percent agreeing to all three items. Among strongly religious Sunnites, however, fundamentalist ideas are more widespread, with 50 percent agreeing to all three and between 60-80 percent agreeing to the separate items. Still, even among strongly religious Sunnites religious fundamentalism is by no means universal. Ten percent of them agree with none of the three statements, and another 15 percent support only one of them.


Returning to Table 1, model 5 allows us to assess the reactive religiosity thesis. In line with earlier research, we find little support for it. Perceived discrimination is only marginally (at the .10 level) significant as a predictor of religious fundamentalism among Muslims and the effect size is very small (an increase of .03 on the scale of fundamentalism for a one standard deviation increase in perceived discrimination). Moreover, the pattern of country differences defies interpretation in terms of reactive religiosity, as Germany, together with France the country that offers Muslims the least rights, has the lowest level of Muslim religious fundamentalism. Conversely, Belgium has a comparatively high level of fundamentalism in spite of relatively generous policies regarding both Muslim rights and immigrant rights more general. An interpretation of country differences in terms of the strength of right-wing populist parties, whose negative statements about immigration and Islam could provoke reactive religiosity, would make more sense, as these parties are weak in both Sweden and Germany compared to the other four countries. However, this explanation has to deal with the fact that political debates about Muslims are not necessarily more negative where such parties are strong. A recent study of such debates in several European countries shows that they were particularly negative in Germany, where politicians from mainstream political parties have advocated similar positions as those taken by populist parties elsewhere (Carol and Koopmans 2013). More generally, if policies and debates affect fundamentalism one would expect the effect to pass through increased perceptions of discrimination. However, whether

we include or exclude perceived discrimination from model 5 leaves the country coefficients virtually unaltered. Instead, the strong similarity of the cross-country differences among Christians and Muslims (compare models 4 and 5) suggests that Muslims assimilate to the type of religiosity prevalent among the Christian majority in the countries where they live. Where native Christians have comparatively low levels of religious fundamentalism, as in Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands, Muslim immigrants also tend to be less fundamentalist. This finding is in line with other findings that have demonstrated an association between host society and immigrant religiosity (Van Tubergen 2006; Van Tubergen and Sindradottir 2011).

Out-group hostility

We now turn to the linkage between religious fundamentalism and out-group hostility. Figure 3 shows for Christians as well as first and second-generation Muslims the levels of support for the three out-group hostility items, as well as the percentage who agree with all three items. Out-group hostility is not negligible among native Christians: nine percent of them are overtly anti-Semitic and believe that Jews cannot be trusted, and eleven percent reject homosexuals as friends. Muslims draw more hostility from Christians, with 23 percent believing that Muslims aim to destroy Western culture. Only few Christians display hostility against all three groups (1.6%). Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan origin show much higher levels of out-group hostility: 57 percent reject homosexual friends, 45 percent do not trust Jews, and 54 percent see the West as an enemy out to destroy Islam. Hostility towards all three out-groups is present among 26 percent of the Muslim respondents.

Figure 3: Out-group hostility among Christians and first and second-generation Muslims in Western Europe (in %)



Again, however, there are significant differences within the Muslim group. The second generation is somewhat less hostile towards gays (48% versus 60% for the first generation) and Jews (39% versus 47% for the first generation), but hostility towards the West is equally high in both generations. Not displayed in the figure, Alevites have lower levels of out-group hostility than Sunnite Turks, especially where anti-Semitism (29% against 52% among Sunnite Turks) and anti-Western attitudes (37% against 62% among Sunnite Turks) are concerned. Within the Sunnite group, national origin also matters, with Turkish Sunnites being more hostile towards all three out-groups than their Moroccan counterparts, again mostly so regarding Jews (37% hostile responses among Moroccan Sunnites) and the West (44% among Moroccan Sunnites).

Table 2 : Multivariate regression of out-group hostility among Christians and Muslims in Western Europe (unstandardized regression coefficients and significance levels)

	All groups model 1	All groups model 2	All groups model 3	Christians	Muslims
Group reference: Catholics	-	-	-	-	-
Mainline Protestants	-.07 (.191)	.24 (.000)	.10 (.042)	-.03 (.548)	-
Non-mainstream Protestants	.04 (.735)	.11 (.332)	-.08 (.412)	.05 (.551)	-
Turkish Alevites	.54 (.000)	.54 (.000)	.33 (.000)	-	.25 (.003)
Turkish Sunnites	1.31 (.000)	1.28 (.000)	.62 (.000)	-	.44 (.000)
Other Turkish Muslims	.96 (.000)	.97 (.000)	.51 (.001)	-	.37 (.030)
Moroccan Sunnites	.84 (.000)	.90 (.000)	.20 (.000)	-	Reference
Age (*10)	-	.05 (.000)	.02 (.016)	.08 (.000)	-.01 (.551)
Female	-	-.11 (.000)	-.11 (.000)	-.11 (.001)	-.13 (.000)
Married	-	.02 (.466)	.04 (.181)	-.03 (.386)	.10 (.022)
Education level (ISCED)	-	-.16 (.000)	-.08 (.000)	-.10 (.000)	-.07 (.001)
Employed	-	-.08 (.006)	-.04 (.158)	-.05 (.130)	-.03 (.444)
Professional status (* 10; ISEI)	-	-.06 (.000)	-.04 (.000)	-.01 (.229)	-.05 (.000)
Home ownership	-	.04 (.211)	-.02 (.555)	-.01 (.836)	-.00 (.890)
Country reference: Austria	-	-	-	-	-
Germany	-	-.42 (.000)	-.17 (.001)	-.14 (.032)	-.16 (.031)
France	-	-.13 (.011)	-.10 (.041)	-.07 (.198)	-.16 (.023)
Netherlands	-	-.28 (.000)	-.20 (.000)	-.21 (.001)	-.22 (.001)
Belgium	-	.06 (.211)	.07 (.137)	-.07 (.197)	.09 (.215)
Sweden	-	-.48 (.000)	-.23 (.000)	-.09 (.231)	-.28 (.000)
Religious fundamentalism	-	-	.43 (.000)	.19 (.000)	.48 (.000)
Religious identification	-	-	.03 (.091)	.00 (.796)	.08 (.001)
Sampling controls (mobile phone; calling time, regional over-sample)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R ²	.281	.357	.491	.176	.380
N	4804	4804	4804	1686	3118


Here too, we must of course make sure that group differences are not due to different demographic and socio-economic compositions, since xenophobia is known to be higher among socio-economically deprived groups. Table 2 shows the results of multivariate regressions. The first model shows the raw group differences and indicates that among the

three Christian groups out-group hostility does not differ significantly. All Muslim groups display significantly higher levels of out-group hostility, least so the Alevites, and most so the Turkish Sunnites, who score 1.3 points higher on the three-point out-group hostility scale than Christians. Model 2 shows that older people and males are more hostile towards out-groups and confirms the familiar relationship with socio-economic marginalization: the lower-educated, the unemployed, and those with lower-status jobs display significantly higher levels of out-group hostility. These findings add however, as in the case of the analysis of fundamentalism above, relatively little to the explained variance. Moreover, they are of very little help in clarifying the group differences, which remain virtually the same as in model 1. In model 3, we explore the relationship between out-group hostility and religious fundamentalism. In two ways, the results confirm what we know from earlier research on Christian fundamentalism. First, religious fundamentalism is powerfully related to out-group hostility. Second, religiosity as such is, if we control for fundamentalism, only very weakly (and only marginally significantly) related to out-group hostility. Due to the strong impact of fundamentalism, the increase in explained variance is substantial, from .36 in model 2 to .49 in model 3. Most importantly, the higher levels of fundamentalism among the Muslim groups explain about half of the difference in out-group hostility between the Turkish groups and Christians, and virtually all of the difference between Christians and Moroccan Sunnites, as indicated by the strongly reduced size of the group coefficients.

Models 4 and 5 show that these patterns are largely similar in separate analyses for Christians and Muslims. However, fundamentalism is a much stronger predictor of out-group hostility among Muslims. This is also the main reason why the explained variance is more than twice as high among Muslims (.38) than among Christians (.18). Further, while among Christians religious identification is unrelated to out-group hostility once fundamentalism is controlled for, it remains a significant predictor for Muslims, although the effect size is much smaller than the one of fundamentalism.

That fundamentalism is the decisive factor behind out-group hostility among both Christians and Muslims is visualized in Figure 4, which plots the levels of hostility towards the three out-groups separately for not very religious respondents (those with religious identification lower than 4 on the 5-point scale); very religious respondents without a full-fledged fundamentalist belief system (those identifying strongly or very strongly with their religion but agreeing with at most 2 of the 3 fundamentalism items); and finally strongly religious and fundamentalist believers (who agree with all 3 fundamentalism items). For both Christians and Muslims, the differences in out-group hostility between those with weak or strong, non-fundamentalist religiosity are quite modest. There is a stark difference, by contrast, within the category of strong believers between those with or without a consistent fundamentalist belief system. Among Christians, levels of hostility against gays and Jews are twice as high among fundamentalist strong believers, and hostility towards Muslims increases from 25 percent among those who are highly religious but non-fundamentalist to 57 percent among fundamentalists. Among Muslims, we find the same pattern, albeit on a higher base level of hostility. Hostility towards gays and the West is below 50 percent, and against Jews even below 30 percent among strongly religious, but non-fundamentalist Muslims. Among fundamentalist Muslims, however, levels of hostility towards all three groups rise above 70 percent.

Figure 4: Hostility towards out-groups among Christians and Muslims as a function of religiosity and fundamentalism



Conclusions and discussion

The first question investigated in this paper was descriptive: What is the extent of religious fundamentalism among Muslim immigrants and their offspring and how does it compare to native Christians? The assertion that fundamentalism is a marginal phenomenon among Muslims in the West is not confirmed by this study. Majorities of up to three quarters of Muslim respondents affirmed that Muslims should return to the roots of the faith, that there is only one interpretation of the Quran that is binding for all believers, and that for them religious rules are more important than secular laws. Somewhat less than half of them agreed with all three statements. However, there was also a minority of almost one third of Muslims who rejected all statements or agreed with at most one of them. Fundamentalist attitudinal structures are therefore widespread, but certainly not universal among European Muslims.

These figures are rough indications of levels of fundamentalism among Muslims in Western Europe. To begin with, the study does not cover all of Western Europe although with the exception of the United Kingdom and Spain, it does include the most important countries of Muslim immigration, and particularly France and Germany, the two countries with by far the largest Muslim populations in Western Europe. The study is also limited to Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan origin. While these are the two most important origin countries of

Western European Muslims, other important populations, such as those from the former Yugoslavia, Algeria, and Pakistan, are not represented in this study. However, it is not likely that Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan origin deviate strongly from the mainstream of European Muslims. A recent study comparing Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan to those of ex-Yugoslav and Pakistani origin indicates that religious identification and observance are highest among Muslims of Pakistani and lowest among those of ex-Yugoslav origin, with those of Turkish and Moroccan origin in an intermediary position (Tillie et al. 2012).

The second research question asked whether the socio-economic correlates of religious fundamentalism among European Muslims resemble those that we know from research on Christian fundamentalism. This was indeed the case, as those with Christian as well as Islamic fundamentalist attitudes were found to be disproportionately drawn from socio-economically marginalized strata, e.g., from among those with lower education, without employment and in lower-status jobs. Among Christians, fundamentalist attitudes were also more prevalent among older generations, but among Muslims age or membership of the (native-born) second generation were not significantly related to fundamentalism once education and labor-market status were taken into account. While these demographic and socio-economic variables explain variation between those with stronger and weaker fundamentalist attitudes within both religious groups, they do not reduce the large difference in levels of fundamentalism between Muslim immigrants and native Christians. Within the Muslim group they moreover do not explain the much lower level of fundamentalism among Alevites, a Shiite branch of Turkish Islam. The much higher level of support for fundamentalist beliefs among Sunnite Muslims does not seem to be due to immigration-related experiences of exclusion as argued by theories of reactive ethnicity and religiosity. Cross-nationally, levels of Muslim fundamentalism did not correlate with levels of legal exclusion of Islam, and were in fact lowest in Germany, the country among the six studied here with the strongest institutional discrimination against Islam. Moreover, on the individual level, there was only a very weak and marginally significant relationship between fundamentalism and perceived discrimination.

It would be foolish to interpret these findings as evidence of a fundamental and immutable difference between (liberal) Christianity and (fundamentalist) Islam. First of all, even in this study, some Christians – predominantly found among non-mainline Protestants – display consistent fundamentalist worldviews. Second, many Muslim immigrants – most Alevites as well as a substantial number of Sunnites – do not subscribe to such views. Thirdly, these results for Western Europe do not necessarily generalize to other parts of the world, both because Europe's Muslim populations were disproportionately recruited from conservative rural regions in the countries of origin, and because European Christians tend to be less strongly religious and socially conservative than those in other parts of the world. Evidence from the United States, for instance, suggests that the difference between Muslims and Christians is much smaller there: 28 percent of US Christians and 37 percent of US Muslims affirm that “there is only one true way to interpret the teachings of [Islam/Christianity]” (Pew Research Center 2011: 10). Among US Christians 40 percent and among US Muslims 50 percent holds that the Bible, respectively the Quran is “literally, word for word” the word of God (Pew research Center 2007: 23). US Muslims thus hold more pluralist views on religion than their European counterparts, of whom 75 percent recognize only one, binding-for-all interpretation of the Quran. This is related to the fact that, much unlike the European Muslim immigrant population, the one in the US is predominantly middle class and highly educated (Pew Research Center 2007). At the same time, US Christians more often hold

fundamentalist views than their European counterparts, of whom only 17 percent recognize only one, binding interpretation of the Bible. This is in particular due to the much higher share of Evangelical Protestants in the United States, among whom the belief in Biblical literalism is particularly high, whereas US mainline Protestants and Catholics are more similar to European Christians (see Gillum 2013). In Europe, therefore, a strongly secularized native population is confronted with a religiously conservative Muslim population, resulting in a large gap in religious attitudes between Muslims and natives. This is likely to be an important reason – next to the larger numbers and lower socio-economic status of Muslims – why Muslims and Islam have become much more politically contested in Europe than in North America.

Thirdly, this study asked to what extent religious fundamentalism among European Muslims is an inherent component of strong Islamic religiosity, or whether – as research has found to be the case for Christians – it is a distinct phenomenon. Although the strength of religious identification and fundamentalist attitudes are significantly correlated among both Christians and Muslims, there are also many strongly religious people in both groups who do not adhere to fundamentalist worldviews. This is most clearly the case among Christians and Alevites where even the most religious respondents express little support for fundamentalist beliefs (respectively 8% and 21% agree with all three statements measuring fundamentalism). But also among Muslims only 50 percent of the most religious subgroup agree with all three statements, and 15 percent reject them altogether. To be strongly religious therefore does not necessarily imply fundamentalist belief structures in either of the religious groups, even though the association between the two is stronger among Sunnite Muslims.

The final research question asked whether the strong connection between religious fundamentalism and out-group hostility that has repeatedly been demonstrated for Christian fundamentalism can also be found among European Muslims. Again, the answer was confirmatory. Among both religious groups, religious fundamentalism is by far the strongest predictor of hostility against gays, Jews and respectively Muslims (for Christians) or the West (for Muslims). Strong religiosity as such is in both groups not (among Christians) or only mildly (among Muslims) associated with out-group hostility, but when it is combined with fundamentalist religious beliefs, hostility against all three out-groups sours. Among Christians, rejection of homosexuals is very limited among strongly religious people without fundamentalist beliefs, but among fundamentalist Christians, more than 30 percent reject homosexuals as friends. Anti-semitism is also twice as widespread among fundamentalist Christians, of whom almost twenty percent think that Jews cannot be trusted. Muslims are the main object of Christian fundamentalist hostility: almost 60 percent of Christian fundamentalists believe that Muslims are out to destroy Western culture, against less than 25 percent of other Christians. Among Muslims, rejection of out-groups is generally higher than among Christians, but it is a minority position among those without fundamentalist beliefs. Among Muslims with fundamentalist attitudes by contrast, more than 70 percent reject homosexuals as friends, think that Jews cannot be trusted, and see the West as an enemy out to destroy Islam. Thus, there is not only a significant amount of Islamophobia among European native publics, but also a widespread phenomenon of “Occidentophobia” among European Muslims.

Hostile attitudes towards other groups should not be equated with the willingness to employ physical violence. But the combination of a fundamentalist belief in the absolute truth and righteousness of the own cause, hostility and mistrust towards other groups, and a sense of

threat based in the belief that others are out to destroy one's own group may motivate a minority to act upon such beliefs. Among European natives, hostility against Muslims has driven the rise of anti-immigrant parties and has at times taken violent forms, as in a recently uncovered series of murders of Turkish immigrants in Germany by a neo-Nazi underground group. Among Muslims in the West, too, some are willing to employ violence for the sake of their faith. The statement that "suicide bombing or other violence against civilians is justified to defend Islam from its enemies" is affirmed by eight percent of US Muslims (Pew Research 2011: 65), while in France, the United Kingdom, and Germany respectively 16, 15 and 7 percent say that "violence against civilian targets can sometimes be justified" (Pew Research Center 2006: 4). A Dutch study indicates that similar responses are obtained when respondents are explicitly asked about their personal willingness to employ violence: 11 percent of Dutch Muslims say that "there are situations in which it is for me from the point of view of my religion acceptable that I use violence" (Roex, van Stiphout, and Tillie 2010). Obviously, even from such hypothetical statements of the willingness to use violence it is still a long way to its actual employment. Nevertheless, religious fundamentalism, intertwined with out-group hostility seems to be a crucial component in the brew that leads some down that path.

While the current study has refrained from exploring the linkage between religious fundamentalism, out-group hostility, and political radicalism and violence explicitly, this is a clear desideratum for future research. In such research, too, the focus should not just be on Muslims, but also on natives. Otherwise one is left with figures such as those just cited that indicate levels of support for violence among Muslims without giving us an idea of how many Christians or natives would be willing to employ violence to defend their own group and its values. Widening the scope of investigation to Muslim immigrants in other countries and with different ethnic backgrounds is also necessary. Particularly studies covering the United Kingdom and other Anglo-Saxon countries would extend the scope of inquiry, because their Muslim populations are dominated by other groups than Turks and Maghrebians. Increasing the scope of investigation will probably only add further to an important finding of the current study, namely that religious fundamentalism is not an inherent feature of Islamic religiosity, but just as is the case among Christians, a variable to be explored in its causes and consequences.

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