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Bond portfolios and two-fund seperation in the Lucas asset-pricing model

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Abstract

consols do almost as well as traders with equilibrium investment strategies. This result and would be very costly in the presence of transaction costs. We demonstrate that ment strategies. make portfolios using two-fund separation and bond laddering nearly optimal investfor spanning. In light of these results, we argue that transaction cost considerations is enhanced by adding bonds to the collection of assets even if they are not necessary investors choosing two-fund portfolios with bond ladders that approximately replicate librium bond trading volume is unrealistically large, particularly for long-term bonds. two-fund separation even with the classical preference assumptions. Furthermore, equiturity and do not span the consol, then equilibrium will deviate, often significantly, from namic Lucas-style asset models only when a consol is present. If all bonds have finite ma-The two-fund separation theorem from static portfolio analysis generalizes to dy-

Keywords: Dynamically complete markets, general equilibrium, consol, bonds, interest rate fluctuation, reinvestment risk, bond laddering

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1 Introduction

the classical preference assumptions. In particular, relative allocations of wealth across the replication strategy) equilibrium portfolios will deviate from two-fund separation even with through dynamic trading of finite-maturity bonds. In the absence of a consol (or equivalent equilibrium asset market models only when a consol is present, either explicitly or implicitly portfolio theory do not generalize to dynamic Lucas-style asset market models. The mutual see, for example, Canner et al. (1997). We show that strong separation results from static allocation between safe and risky assets should be constant over time for each investor and the market portfolio of risky assets. Even though real world portfolio decisions conditions under which they need only decide how to divide wealth between the safe asset How should investors allocate their wealth? Classic two-fund separation theory derives equilibrium analysis of asset portfolios and trading cannot represent actual markets the implications remain implausible for long-term bonds. These results show that standard particular, the deviations from two-fund separation in equity positions disappear. However has some more sensible predictions as the number of bonds and their duration increase; in long-term bonds, are implausibly large in the absence of a consol. The Lucas asset model asset markets; instead, equilibrium positions and trading volume in bonds, particularly risky assets may differ across investors because of the price risk associated with short-term fund monetary separation theorems of static portfolio analysis hold in dynamic general made in a dynamic market, the static results are often applied, implicitly saying that the We also find that the implied asset trading volume bears no relation to actual

the cost of reestablishing the bond ladder in each period is risky due to price fluctuations the longest term bond in each period and holds it until maturity. The bond ladder is like weights between the ladder and the mutual fund will differ from the weights between a a consol in that it creates a constant stream of revenue, but it differs from a consol since asset redundancy is desirable since it improves the performance of bond ladder strategies since the only transaction costs are those borne at the time the bonds are issued. Therefore the presence of transaction costs. strategies imply enormous trading volume in the bond markets which would be very costly in the idea of bond ladders as a strong response to transaction costs. Equilibrium investment of the traded assets. performance of bond ladder strategies even though the new bonds do not improve the span we find a role for redundant bonds since adding more long-term bonds will improve the maturity of the longest bond is similar to that observed in actual markets. consol and the mutual fund because of the risk in bond prices even when the time to an excellent alternative to the "equilibrium" which in turn help investors economize on transaction costs. investors in a Lucas-style asset market. A bond ladder strategy buys a fixed amount of As an alternative, we consider a common bond investment strategy – the bond ladder We find that bond ladders combined with a mutual fund of risky assets Finally, while we do not explicitly model transaction costs we motivate On the contrary, bond ladders minimize transaction costs investment strategy. In summary, we conclude However, the portfolio In addition.

strategies are particularly sensible in the presence of transaction costs. build bond ladders that approximately replicate a consol. We argue that such portfolio when investors have access to - possibly redundant - long-term bonds that allow them to trading, but that the basic two-fund separation results are valid for dynamic environments that conventional Lucas-style asset market models cannot represent actual portfolios and

cation decisions can be reduced to a two-stage process: first decide the relative allocation separation holds if an investor has HARA utility; more precisely, if an investor has turns or tastes. In particular, Cass and Stiglitz (1970) have shown that two-fund monetary separation result and its m-fund generalizations rely on special assumptions on either risky assets and the safe asset. This is called monetary separation. The two-fund monetary of assets across the risky assets, and second decide how to divide total wealth between the stein (1974) showed that if all investors have equi-cautious HARA utility, then all portfolios on his total wealth. Separation theorems have strong implications for equilibrium. Rubinutility then his allocation of wealth in risky asset i relative to risky asset j does not depend demands can be aggregated. individual's consumption in any Pareto efficient allocation is a linear function of aggregate asset. The argument is simple: if all investors have equi-cautious HARA utility then each are, in equilibrium, a convex combination of the market portfolio of risky assets and the safe consumption, investors' demands for assets have linear income expansion paths, and asset Beginning with Tobin (1958), many financial market models imply that portfolio allo-

portfolio will be a convex combination of a small number of mutual funds. as in Tobin generalizes m-fund separation theory to dynamic contexts but only weakly. only intertemporally separable preferences and shows that at each moment each investor's two-fund separation to real world investing. separation leads to far less churning, corresponding to the more common application of churning in portfolios. (1958). However, the composition of those mutual funds may change and lead to substantial These analyses use static models to prove two-fund separation theorems. Merton (1973) In this paper, we look for conditions under which mutual fund

separation to imply that investors should divide wealth among only stocks, bonds. and these assumptions are realistic enough that many argue that the implied investment policies violate the recommendations of two-fund separation, leading to an "asset allocation puzzle." money, and do so in a time-invariant manner. They then note that many investment advisors are good ones to follow in general. For example, Canner et al. (1997) interpret two-fund Even though the classic two-fund separation theorems rely on assumptions about tastes.

al. is that no trader's portfolio changes in equilibrium; that is, after an initial period of erogeneous investors and dynamically complete asset markets. The key result of Judd et model of Judd et al. (2003), which is essentially a Lucas asset pricing model with hetassuming equi-cautious HARA investor utilities. We use the heterogeneous investor asset general equilibrium models only under unrealistic assumptions about the bond market even This paper shows that the two-fund monetary separation theorems generalize to dynamic

models implying monetary separation. the time-invariant equilibrium asset allocations are consistent with the predictions of static equilibrium already has a buy-and-hold nature. The remaining key issue is then whether This is a natural model to use to study monetary separation in dynamic economies since to the target portfolio. Since stocks have infinite maturity, there is no trading of stocks bond becomes a t-1-year bond, some of those bonds are sold (or bought) to get back states. Maturation of bonds will cause some trading. Judd et al. show that each investor trading, each investor holds a constant number of units of each asset over all times and fixed end-of-period holding of each t-year maturity bond; therefore, when a t-year

two-fund separation, see for example Canner et al. (1997) and Elton and Gruber (2000). not the notion of monetary separation that many people have in mind when they talk about for sure two periods hence. The only way to hedge against the interest rate fluctuations next period, but bond price risk implies that next period's price of a one-period bond is prices), and the portfolio weights of the risky equity assets need to be altered to achieve an investor's portfolio will include some risk associated with fluctuating interest rates problem. Otherwise, if bond trading cannot implement a consol, then the bond portion of model, there is no change in equilibrium portfolios over time. So, if the span of the if a consol can be constructed from the bonds. The intuition is clear. where the conversation is about allocation between a safe asset and the market basket of combination of those two funds. While this general notion of portfolio separation holds, it is the risky portion of investors' portfolios, and find that investors will always hold a convex construct two different mutual funds, one implementing the consol and one implementing different for different investors. In some sense, portfolio separation still occurs. We can still investors have differing demands for a safe asset, those stock portfolio adjustments will be uncertain, making it impossible to choose bond investment today that will deliver a dollar one-period bond. An investor can use that bond to buy a sure delivery of one dollar the Pareto efficient allocation of consumption. This is particularly clear if there is only a includes a perfectly safe stream of payments, the dynamic problem reduces to to alter the composition, not just the magnitude, of the stock portfolio. Since different We show that the static monetary separation results hold in dynamic settings only In our dynamic the static

on the performance of simple strategies. In particular, we examine bond laddering strategies portfolio of stocks if bonds with very long maturities are constantly issued. A bond ladder is a portfolio with b units of a zero-coupon bond of each maturity. In each forces one to move away from conventional general equilibrium modeling and instead focus we find are clearly irrational for any trader with even tiny transaction costs. volume that is many orders of magnitude beyond anything sensible. The trading volumes almost all reasonable specifications of tastes and endowment processes imply bond presence of many bonds does not yield plausible equilibrium predictions; in particular We present examples showing that all investors will approximately hold the market

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period, the maturing bonds will produce cash, and the laddering strategy takes some of optimal when the number of bonds of different maturities becomes sufficiently large in bond markets. We demonstrate that bond laddering strategies will be approximately strategies, we look at models with long maturity bonds, such as the 30-year bonds we see particularly if the maximum maturity is small. To evaluate the rationality of bond laddering laddering strategy would implement a consol. and consumes the rest. If the price of the longest maturity bond were constant then this those proceeds to reestablish the ladder by buying b units of the longest maturity bond will fluctuate and the cost of reinvestment will be risky for generic asset returns processes However, bond prices (and interest rates)

plausible and more robust to transaction costs than the exact asset market equilibrium. Of two-fund separation is an approximately optimal response to equilibrium prices and is view of the problem, we find that when the market includes long maturity bonds, then trading strategies; in either case, equilibrium does not display the simple portfolio patterns have investors' equity portfolios deviating from the market basket or executing crazy bond will reexamine these problems when there is realistic heterogeneity in preferences course, all this depends critically on the HARA assumption for preferences. like those in the static two-fund separation literature. However, when we take a pragmatic classic two-fund separation results. Without a consol, equilibrium portfolios will either While the results are mixed the pattern is clear. If there is a consol then we get the Future work

there is no reason to believe that equilibrium asset prices fall into any of the special families highlights the distinction between restrictions on utility functions and restrictions on asset and Ross. Ingersoll (1987) provides a detailed overview of various separation results and fund separation holds. Russell (1980) presents a unified approach of Cass and Stiglitz Stiglitz (1970) provide conditions on agents' in the CAPM model of asset market equilibrium; see for example Black (1972). Cass and a mean-variance analysis with quadratic utility. Two-fund separation has been examined two-fund separation may be implied by investor preferences that produce portfolio separation. assumptions about asset prices since we focus on equilibrium prices and portfolios, and of portfolio separation theory. return distributions. See also Huang and Litzenberger (1988) for another textbook summary whereas Ross (1978) presents conditions on asset return distributions under which two-Tobin (1958) first presented the two-fund idea in his analysis of portfolio demand We stay away from analyses that rely on distributional We examine a Lucas-style asset market model where preferences that ensure two-fund separation

investments in fixed-income securities (for example, see Bohlin and Strickland, 2004), there the small number of assets and giving us a framework for examining bond ladder strategies model allows for a rich array of bonds, enabling us to stay away from results driven by one or two bonds and seldom pursue an equilibrium analysis. Our dynamic asset market explain the asset allocation puzzle exposited in Canner et al. (1997), generally consider only in a dynamic model. Despite the popularity of bond ladders as a strategy for managing The numerous studies of portfolio allocations, and, for example, the many attempts to

this static portfolio theory are often applied to dynamic contexts, see, for example, Canner bond ladders. To this day, and despite the early criticism by Merton (1973), the results of vestors' portfolio decisions in one-period models, which by their very nature cannot examine among many others, Tobin (1958), Cass and Stiglitz (1970), and Black (1972), examines insurprising little reference to this subject in the finance literature on modern portfolio al. (1997) or Elton and Gruber (2000). The aforementioned classical portfolio literature on two-fund separation, such

environments, but generally with partial equilibrium models and a small number of bonds the interest rate. Recent examples of this literature include Brennan and Xia (2000) and Merton (1973) and assumes exogenously specified stochastic processes for stock returns or One string of this literature builds on the general dynamic continuous-time framework of factor models to examine optimal asset allocation, see for example Campbell and Viceira Wachter (2003) among many other papers. A second string of literature uses discrete-time security markets with only four securities, only two of which are bonds. Also Campbell and to be complete. feature of these factor models is that only very few assets are needed for security markets bond-cash mix but do not examine the details of a stock or bond portfolio. A particular possible, but additional bonds would be redundant securities since markets do not include bond ladders. further analysis of particular bond portfolios would depend on quite arbitrary modeling so we can examine equilibria with a large number of non-redundant bonds. bonds and buy 3-month bonds. strange trading behavior at the beginning of each month. The 3-month bonds purchased liquidated at an infinite rate. Models that assume only 3-month and 10-year bonds imply Continuous-time models with only a short-term safe bond imply that bonds are created and models with a small number of bonds make unrealistic assumptions about bond trading costly in the presence of any transaction costs. Real bond markets have bonds of many The last decade has seen a growing literature on optimal asset allocation in stochastic previous month become 2-month bonds; therefore, the investor will liquidate these (2001) report computational results on portfolios with only 3-month and Because of the small number of bonds, the described portfolios in these This description of bond markets is unrealistic in many ways. Such trading behavior On the contrary, our model allows for a large number of exogenous states and As a result there would be continua of optimal asset allocations and so any Most of these papers focus on aspects of the optimal choice of the stock-For example, the model of Brennan and Xia (2002) can exhibit complete Analyzing more bonds in these models would certainly be Similarly for the 10-year bonds purchased in the previous Furthermore 10-year

have noted the strange portfolios implied by a fiscal authority's attempt to use bonds for assume a representative agent, the bond positions are large only because the government hedging purposes. Recent papers on government financing (Angeletos, 2002, and Buera and Nicolini, 2004) These models differ significantly from our analysis. Since these models

revenue needs. In our model, bond trading volumes are derived from individual investors asset structures with only very few bonds. For example, Buera and Nicolini (2002) report tastes and are orders of magnitude larger. Also, both papers restrict their attention to is using small fluctuations in bond prices to counter large exogenous shocks in government numerical results for models with two and four bonds. for bonds with non-consecutive maturity structures that exhibit the problems we discussed And as a result they must allow

3 discusses two-fund separation theory for our dynamic model, proves that the classic static general equilibrium asset market model and the classic assumptions on preferences. Section result continues to hold when the safe asset is a consol, and argues that the classical result sufficient conditions for a small number of bonds of finite maturity to span the consol. numerical examples, which motivate and guide our further analysis. In Section 5 we develop fails when only a short-maturity bond is available. In Section 4 we present numerous of approximate equilibrium. We argue that as the number of bonds with finite maturities typically look far different from the classic two-fund prediction. Section 6 examines a notion In such economies portfolios exhibit two-fund separation for equity but bond portfolios instead of the equilibrium portfolio tends to zero. Section 7 concludes increases the welfare loss from holding a non-optimal portfolio satisfying two-fund separation The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic dynamic

2 The Asset Market Economy

 $\mathcal{Y} = \{1, 2, \dots, Y\}, Y \geq 3$, and transition matrix II. We assume a finite number of asset markets. The exogenous dividend state follows a Markov chain with finite state space We examine a standard Lucas asset pricing model with heterogeneous agents and complete $\mathcal{H} = \{1, 2, ..., H\}$ of infinitely-lived agents. There is a single perishable consumption good Each agent h has a time-separable utility function

$$U_h(c) = E\left\{\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u_h(c_t)\right\},$$

ticular parametric forms for the utility functions $u_h:\mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$. In order to attain a simple where c_t is consumption at time t. Our analysis of two-fund separation will assume parthe same for all agents, and that all agents agree on the transition matrix Π . stationary characterization of equilibrium, we assume that the discount factor $\beta \in (0,1)$ is

distribute their output each period to its owners through dividends. Investors trade shares an infinitely-lived asset ("Lucas tree") characterized by its state-dependent dividends. We that there are $J \geq 2$ stocks, $j \in \mathcal{J} \equiv \{1, 2, \dots, J\}$, traded on financial markets. A stock is of firms and other securities in order to transfer wealth across time and states. We assume denote the dividend of stock j by $d^j:\mathcal{Y}\to\mathbb{R}_+,\ j\in\mathcal{J},$ and assume that the dividend vectors d^j are linearly independent. Agent h has an initial endowment $\psi_j^{h,0}$ in stock $j\in\mathcal{J}$. The initial endowment of each agent consists only of shares in the firms. The firms

in that state, so $e_y \equiv \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} d_y^j$ for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$. We assume that all stocks have non-constant and so the social endowment in the eco: omy in state y is the sum of all firms' dividends dividends and that the social endowment ..lso has a positive variance. We assume that all stocks are in unit wet supply, that is, $\sum_{h\in\mathcal{H}} w_j^{h,0} = 1$ for all $j\in\mathcal{H}$

bonds of maturities $1,2,\ldots,K$ traded on financial markets. We assume that all finite-lived state, that is, d_y^c of the bonds. All bonds are thus in zero net supply. period, it turns into a bond of maturity k-1. Agents do not have any initial endowment bonds.) A bond of maturity k delivers one un k of the consumption good k periods in the investments since any other bond of similar n. turity is equivalent to a sum of zero-coupon bonds are zero coupon bonds. (This assumptindoes not affect any results concerning stock a consol. The consol pays one unit of the consumption good in each period in each Our model includes the possibility of two types of bonds. One type of bond we analyze If at time t an agent owns a bond of m surity k and holds this bond into the next = 1 for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$. We also study finite-lived bonds. There are K

librium see Judd et al. (2003). Two results in Jud. et al. (2003) are crucial for our analysis on the current state. Second, and more surprising, after one initial round of trading, each here. First, equilibrium is Markovian: individual consumption and asset prices depend only sition matrix are positive. individual's portfolio is constant across states and tone whenever all elements of the trancurrent state with the current dividend. Suppose that there are S states and S long-lived future dividends; in that case, the dividend process i: Markovian and we can identify the and market completeness. Suppose the current dividend summarizes all information about agent's optimal consumption policy is a function of the state and is a vector of S numseparable over time with constant discount rate (a common set of assumptions) then each securities where each security's payoff depends solely cathe current dividend. If utility is a unique optimal consumption plan; hence, the trade-once-a id-hold-forever strategy that implemented by some trade-once-and-hold-forever trading strategy. By concavity, there is portfolio through trading in the initial period. Therefore, any consumption plan can be assets. If this target portfolio is not the agent's asset endowment, then he can obtain that plan equals the returns generated by some unique fixed and $\mathit{constant}$ combination of the Slong-lived assets are S independent vectors. Therefore, any state-contingent consumption bers. If markets are dynamically complete then the state-contingent dividends from the SJudd et al. (2003) shows that this intuition generalizes to a mix: are of long- and short-lived implements the optimal consumption process must be the unic ue optimal trading strategy trading when markets are dynamically complete. assets, finding that the holding of assets of any specific matur v is constant after initial This is true for each agent and for any price process. Therefore, it must hold in equilibrium For a more detailed description of the model and a definition of financial market equi-The intuition is clear at ! follows directly from linear algebra

express equilibrium values of all variables in the model as a function of time t. Instead, we These results allow us to express equilibrium in a simple ma: ner. We do not need to

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state y. The holdings of household h consist of θ_k^h bonds of maturity k or θ_c^h consols, and k in state y, and the price of the consol is q_y^c . Similarly, p_y^j denotes the price of stock j in let c_y^h denote consumption of agent h in state y. In addition, q_y^k denotes the price of bond ψ_j^h units of stock j. If all bonds are of finite maturity then an agent's budget constraint is

$$c_y^h = \sum_{j=1}^J \psi_j^h d_y^j + \theta_1^h (1 - q_y^1) + \sum_{k=2}^K \theta_k^h (q_y^{k-1} - q_y^k). \tag{1}$$

If the economy has a consol but no short-lived bonds then the budget constraint after time

0 is

$$c_y^h = \sum_{j=1}^J v_j^{;h} d_y^j + \theta_c^h. \tag{2}$$

model these restrictions amount to the assumption of equi-cautious HARA utility functions utility function of household h. quadratic utility; and constant absolute risk aversion. We use the following notation for the for all agents. We examine three special cases of the HARA utility functions: power utility, asset requires restrictions on investors' utility functions. In our dynamic general equilibrium Cass and Stiglitz (1970) show that two-fund separation in economies with a riskless

$$u_h(c) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{1-\gamma}(c-A^h)^{1-\gamma}, & \gamma > 0, \gamma \neq 1, & c > A^h \\ \ln(c-A^h), & \gamma = 1. & c > A^h \end{cases}$$

quadratic utility functions:

$$u_h(c) = -\frac{1}{2}(B^h - c)^2$$

CARA utility functions:

$$u_h(c) = -\frac{1}{a^h} e^{-a^h c}$$

variables in the model. For ease of reference we summarize the notation for the most important parameters and

q_y^c	q_{y}^{k}	p_y^j	θ_{μ}^{c}	θ_h^h	u,h	d_y^{j}	
price of the consol in state y	price of maturity k bond in state y	price of stock j in state y	agent h's holding of the consol	agent h's holding of maturity k bond	agent h's holding of stock j	dividend of stock j in state y	

2.1 Linear Sharing Rules

exposited in Wilson, 1968) and asset market equilibrium was made in Rubinstein (1974). librium consumption. This connection between equilibrium consumption sharing rules (as The easiest way to describe equilibrium is to focus on the sharing rules that represent equition for household h in state y, c_y^h , follows a linear sharing rule if there exists real numbers We follow the same approach in our dynamic economy. We say that equilibrium consump-

 m^h, b^h so that

$$c_y^h = m^h e_y + b^h \quad \forall h \in \mathcal{H}. \ y \in \mathcal{Y}.$$

If investors have equi-cautious HARA utility, then this is true for all agents $h \in \mathcal{H}$, and $\sum_{h=1}^{H} m^h = 1$ and $\sum_{h=1}^{H} b^h = 0$ in equilibrium.

straightforward algebra we can calculate the linear sharing rules for the three families of our model. Appendix A contains a brief summary of the method. Using this approach and Judd et al. (2003) describe a Negishi approach to calculate equilibrium consumptions for some weighted sum of utilities. Let λ^h be the Negishi weight of agent h; we normalize $\lambda^1 = 1$. utility functions under consideration. By the first and second theorem of welfare economics any efficient equilibrium maximizes

For power utility functions the linear sharing rule is

$$c_y^h = e_y \cdot \left(\frac{(\lambda^h)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{\sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} (\lambda^i)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}} \right) + \left(A^h - \frac{(\lambda^h)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{\sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} (\lambda^i)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} A^i \right) = m^h e_y + b^h. \tag{3}$$

intercept, $b^h=0$, and household h consumes a constant fraction Note that for CRRA utility functions, $A^h=0$ for all $h\in\mathcal{H}$, the sharing rule has zero

$$m^h = \left(rac{(\lambda^h)^{rac{1}{\gamma}}}{\sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} (\lambda^i)^{rac{1}{\gamma}}}
ight)$$

of the total endowment. For quadratic utility functions, we obtain

$$c_{y}^{h} = e_{y} \cdot \left(\frac{(\lambda^{h})^{-1}}{\sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} (\lambda^{i})^{-1}} \right) + \left(B^{h} - \frac{(\lambda^{h})^{-1}}{\sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} (\lambda^{i})^{-1}} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} B^{i} \right). \tag{4}$$

For CARA utility functions the linear sharing rules are

$$c_y^h = e_y \cdot \frac{\tau^h}{\sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \tau^i} + \left(\tau^h \ln(\lambda^h) - \frac{\tau^h}{\sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \tau^i} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \tau^i \ln(\lambda^i)\right), \tag{5}$$

where $\tau^h = 1/a^h$ is the constant absolute risk tolerance of agent h.

3 Two-Fund Separation with a Consol

and Litzenberger (1988)) states that investors who must allocate their wealth between a In this section we review agents' portfolios in economies with a consol. Classical two-fund the different risky assets does not depend on the investor's preferences. For our dynamic in the risky mutual fund and the riskless security. But the allocation of wealth across assets. An investor's risk aversion only affects the proportions of wealth that (s)he invests number of risky assets and a riskless security should all hold the same mutual fund of risky monetary separation (see, for example, Cass and Stiglitz (1970), Ingersoll (1987), Huang general equilibrium model with several heterogeneous agents this property states that the proportions of wealth invested in any two stocks are the same for all agents in the economy

Definition 1 We say that portfolios exhibit two-fund monetary separation if

$$\frac{\psi_{j_{1}}^{h} p_{y_{2}}^{j}}{\psi_{j_{1}}^{h} p_{y_{2}}^{j'}} = \frac{\psi_{j_{1}}^{h'} p_{y_{2}}^{j}}{\psi_{j_{1}}^{h'} p_{y_{2}}^{j'}}$$

for all stocks j,j' and all agents $h,h'\in\mathcal{H}$ in all states $y\in\mathcal{Y}.$

only if each agent has a constant share of each stock in the economy, that is, $w_j^h = \psi_j^h$, for all definition immediately imply that all agents' portfolios exhibit two-fund separation if and remainder of this paper we identify two-fund monetary separation with this constant-share stocks j,j' and all agents $h\in\mathcal{H}$. This constant share typically varies across agents. In the p_y^j/p_y^j of their prices and thus depends on the state $y\in\mathcal{Y}$. property. Note that the ratio of wealth invested in any two stocks j,j' equals the ratio All stocks are in unit net supply and so market clearing and the requirement from the

time as may the interest rate. Under the assumption that agents can only trade stocks and that this is not the same as a constant interest rate since the value of a consol may vary over a consol we recover the classical two-fund monetary separation result of Cass and Stiglitz infinite-horizon dynamic economy. (1970) in our dynamic equilibrium context. The consol is the truly riskless asset in an A consol is a bond paying one unit of consumption in each period indefinitely. Notice

stocks and a consol. If all agents have equi-cautious HARA utilities then their portfolios Theorem 1 (Two-Fund Separation Theorem) Consider an economy with $J \leq Y-1$ exhibit two-fund monetary separation in an efficient equilibrium.

Proof: The statement of the theorem follows directly from the budget constraint (2). Agents' sharing rules are linear, $c_y^h=m^he_y+b^h$ for all $h\in\mathcal{H},\ y\in\mathcal{Y},$ and so the budget constraints immediately yield $\theta_c^h=b^h$ and $\psi_j^h=m^h$ for all $j=1,\ldots,J.$

complete-market equilibrium even though it does not have a complete set of assets. The independent. If the number of states Y is smaller than the total number of assets, J+1, agents' portfolios are unique since $J+1\leq Y$ and the vectors d^c and d^j , $j\in\mathcal{J}$, are linearly of portfolios supporting the agents' linear sharing rules. then the dividend vectors and consol payoff are linearly dependent and there is a continuum Note that due to linear sharing rules a market with stocks and a consol implements the

rules. Observe that in the special case of CRRA utility functions, $A^h=0$ for all $h\in\mathcal{H}.$ and so the agents do not trade the consol. This is a corollary to the theorem: Whenever the intercept terms of the sharing rules are zero then agents do not trade the consol and the stock markets are dynamically complete without a bond market. However, Schmedders intercept for a generic set of agents' initial stock portfolios. That is, with the exception of a (2005) shows under the additional condition $\sum_{h\in\mathcal{H}}A^h\neq 0$ that sharing rules have a nonzero The theorem implies that we can read off agents' portfolios from their linear sharing

set of initial portfolios that has measure zero and is closed, sharing rules will have nonzero

a one-period bond cannot serve as the riskless asset in the economy and so portfolios cannot budget equation for an economy with J+1 states. J stocks and a one-period bond exhibit monetary separation. The economic intuition for this fact follows directly from the This fact that sharing rules have generically nonzero intercepts immediately implies that

$$m^h \cdot e_y + b^h = \eta^h \cdot e + \theta_1^h (1 - q_y^1)$$
 for all $h \in \mathcal{H}$. (6)

the price of the consol therefore do no affect the agent just like he is unaffected by stock the agent establishes a position in the consol at time 0 once and forever. Fluctuations in that implement equilibrium consumption. (On the contrary, in an economy with a consol, affects agents' bond and thus stock portfolios and leads to a change of the portfolio weights price of the one-period bond prohibit a solution to equations (6). The reinvestment risk of the short-term bond. Schmedders (2005) shows that, generically, fluctuations in the period. As a result they face reinvestment risk due to fluctuating equilibrium interest rates Contrary to the budget equations for an economy with a consol the bond price q_y^1 now price fluctuations. This fact allows him to hold a portfolio exhibiting two-fund monetary The agents have to reestablish their position in the short-lived bond in every

generating the safe payoff stream of a consol and the second fund generating a payoff idention follows a linear sharing rule and so an agent's portfolio effectively consists of one fund mind but instead the monetary separation between a market portfolio and a safe payoff. see for example Canner et al. (1997) and Elton and Gruber (2000). In this paper we focus Agent h holds b^h units of the first fund and m^h units of the second fund. However, when tical to aggregate dividends. Both funds have non-zero positions of stocks and of the bond exclusively on monetary separation. Obviously the agents' portfolios do satisfy a generalized separation property. Consumppeople talk about two-fund separation they don't have this generalized notion in

synthesize a consol by trading finite-maturity bonds. A related question is then whether the maturity. Thus, we are naturally led to the question whether it is possible for agents to no longer issued.) Bond markets instead enable trade in many bonds with varying finite types of consols issued in previous centuries, infinite-horizon bonds do not exist and are nonexistence of the consol and its substitution through portfolios of finite-maturity bonds we next examine equilibrium portfolios for economies with several finite-maturity bonds. has quantitatively significant effects on agents' overall portfolios. To answer these questions Real-world investors do not have access to a consol. (With the exception of some rare

4 Equilibrium Portfolios with Finite-Maturity Bonds

model. Subsequently we examine larger models. The insights from these fairly extensive We begin with a very simple example to show how we can easily compute equilibria for our examples provide useful guidance for our further analysis.

4.1 Introductory Example

respectively. The dividends of the first stock have a persistence probability of 0.8, that is, if of absolute risk aversion of 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The agents discount factor is $\beta=0.95$. Consider an economy with H=3 agents who have CARA utility functions with coefficients There are two independent stocks with identical 'high' and 'low' dividends of 1.02 and 0.98. a result of this dividend structure the economy has S=4 exogenous states of nature. The in the next period is 0.8. the current dividend level is high (low), then the probability of having a high (low) dividend dividend vectors are The corresponding probability of the second stock equals 0.6. As

$$d^1 = (1.02, 1.02, 0.98, 0.98)$$
 and $d^2 = (1.02, 0.98, 1.02, 0.98)$.

The Markov transition matrix for the exogenous dividend process is

$$\Pi = \begin{bmatrix} 0.48 & 0.32 & 0.12 & 0.08 \\ 0.32 & 0.48 & 0.08 & 0.12 \\ 0.12 & 0.08 & 0.48 & 0.32 \\ 0.08 & 0.12 & 0.32 & 0.48 \end{bmatrix}$$

The economy starts in state $y_0 = 1$. The agents' initial holdings of the two stocks

identical, so $v_j^{h,0} = \frac{1}{3}$ for h = 1, 2, 3, j = 1, 2. Using the formulas of Judd et al. (2003) (see Appendix A) we compute consumption

$$c^1 = (0.688, 0.666, 0.666, 0.644),$$

 $c^2 = (0.678, 0.667, 0.667, 0.656),$
 $c^3 = (0.674, 0.667, 0.667, 0.660).$

small. The reason for this small variance is the small dividend variance of the two stocks Note that the fluctuations of agents' consumption allocations across the four states is fairly The state-contingent stock prices are

$$p^1 = (19.43, 19.01.18.98, 18.58).$$

 $p^2 = (19.40, 18.98, 19.01, 18.60).$

complete despite the lack of a fourth asset. The price vector of the consol is Now suppose that the third asset in this economy is a consol. Note that markets are

$$q^{c} = (19.40, 18.99, 19.01, 18.61).$$

monetary separation. The economy satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1 and so agents' portfolios exhibit two-fund

$$\begin{array}{rcl} (\psi_1^1,\psi_2^1,\theta_c^1) &=& (\frac{6}{11},\frac{6}{11},-0.425),\\ (\psi_1^2,\psi_2^2,\theta_c^2) &=& (\frac{3}{11},\frac{3}{11},\ 0.121),\\ (\psi_1^3,\psi_2^3,\theta_c^3) &=& (\frac{2}{11},\frac{2}{11},\ 0.304). \end{array}$$

Now suppose markets are completed with two finite-maturity bonds. bond prices for bonds of various maturity. First we compute

$$q^{1} = (0.963, 0.946, 0.954, 0.938),$$

$$q^{2} = (0.918, 0.899, 0.906, 0.887),$$

$$q^{5} = (0.790, 0.773, 0.775, 0.758),$$

$$q^{10} = (0.612, 0.599, 0.599, 0.586),$$

$$q^{25} = (0.284, 0.277, 0.277, 0.271),$$

$$q^{50} = (0.079, 0.077, 0.077, 0.075).$$

complete the market. The most natural choice is an economy with a one- and two-period Table I and the corresponding end-of-period wealth in the four assets in Table II. combinations are chosen. For several choices of bonds we report equilibrium portfolios in bond but in the literature (see, for example, Campbell and Viceira, 2001) sometimes other The agents' equilibrium portfolios now depend on which two of these bonds are chosen to

		1 2	1 1	1	-	-	k ₁ k	-	bonds		
50 0.518		$\frac{1}{5} 0.51$	0 0.51	5 0.603	01.0	3 0 46	$\kappa_1 \kappa_2 \psi_1$		0.	-	
× 0.38	301	8 0.381	9 0.395			o 0 487 0 191	1 42				
-0.000	0 660	-0.660	-0.647	0.835		-1.029	٧1	ρ^{1}	Agent	A 1	
140.010	10 508	-13.739	-6.830	-45.582 0.230	1000	1.249	~ k2	θ^1			
0.10	0 281	0.281	0.280	0.230	0 0 0 0 0	0.295		W.2			
0.0	0.319	0.319	0.310		0 107	0.374	1	e.,	0	Ασε	
	0.188		0.104	0.104	_n 238	0.294		θ_1^2		Agent 2	
	14.101 0.201	3.912	1.040	1 0/5	12 977	-0.357		$\theta_{k_3}^2$,		
	0.201	0.201		0 201	0.141			ψ_1°	٥		
	0.299	667.0	0 000	0.290	-0.771	0.433	201	ψ_2°	2	Age	
	0.472	1 0 1	0 7 10	0.463	-0.598	0.733	0 795	θ_1°	A3	Agent 3	.
	33.427	1 C	0 897	4.885	32.605	10.000	0 802	0 k2	0.3		

Table I: Equilibrium Portfolios with Two Bonds

folios depend on the set of bonds available to the investors. Any arbitrary choice of bond that then in the next period has a remaining maturity of k-1 periods. If the model doesn't level that is not permitted by the model. (For example, an agent bought a k-period bond ral choice of bonds is a family of bonds of consecutive maturities. Otherwise an agent would maturities in the model will greatly affect equilibrium outcomes. We believe the most natube artificially forced to sell bonds whenever a bond changed its remaining maturity to a Agents' portfolios never exhibit two-fund monetary separation. The equilibrium port-

_			_			-			7	>			 _			
	-	1		1	_	,_				7.1	·		hands			
=	5	5	л ——	_	<u> </u>		71	-1	<u>ာ</u>	۲		1	<i></i>	-		
-	10.07	10.01	10 07	10.00	10 10 08	11.11	11 71	9.0	0.07		<i>2</i> /:1					
	7 40		7 40		7.66	00.10	36 45	:	υ []		2)	-	Age			
	-0.64		-0.64		-0.62		0.80		-0.99		θ_1	2	Agent	-		
	-3.90		-3.90)	$-4.18 \mid 5.45$		$-36.02 \mid 4.98$,	1.15		⁷ k ₂	01				
	-3.90 5.45	1	5.45	1	5.45	1					1.5	2,2				
	0.20	6 20	0.20	6 0 0	0.12	6 15	- 4.07	200	.60	1 5 1	2,5	300		Age		
	0	0.18	0.10	018	9.10	0.18	0.00	0 23		0.28	-	θ_1^2		Agent 2		
		$1.11 \mid 3.91$,	$1.11 \mid 3.91$,	$1.19 \mid 3.90$	($10.26 \mid 2.74$		<u>-</u> 0.33		Ø. 5	3			
		3.91		3.91		3.90		2.74		4.63		دے ا	ادد			
		5.81		5.81	1	5.62	2	-14.97 -		0.44	0 4 4	4.2	3,13	Tearn o	>	
		0.40	2	0.40	2	0.45	2	-0.30 E	0	0.11	0.71 - 0.82	2	A3		در	
		1.10	o 70	1.10	2 70 l	2.33	200	10	5 7 7 7	0.01	1082	7.3	θ^3	,		

Table II: End-of-period Wealth across Assets in State 1

in the remainder of this paper, we will only consider economies with the property that if a bond of maturity k is present, then also bonds of maturity $k-1, k-2, \ldots, 1$ will be available allow for bonds of this maturity the agent would have to close that position.) Therefore. to investors.

Equilibrium Portfolios with Many States and Bonds

with a consol are very different from those in economies with finite-maturity bonds. We saw The small example in the previous section showed that equilibrium portfolios in economies In addition, the bond portfolios did not just serve to synthesize the consol but also had to that stock portfolios varied greatly from stock portfolios prescribed by two-fund separation. unintuitive since they required rather large trades on the bond market. account for the variations in the stock portfolios. The bond portfolios appeared somewhat

structure of equilibrium portfolios that then will guide our theoretical analysis in subsequent with different maturities. The purpose of these examples is to learn more details about the of states. In order to complete markets agents now have access to larger families of bonds Now we analyze these issues further by examining economies with much larger number

We normalize stock dividends so that the expected aggregate endowment equals 1. Then subsequent examples we use $b=0.2,\ \gamma=5$ and $\beta=0.95$. The agents sharing rules are we set $m^1 = \frac{1}{2} - b$ so that both agents consume on average half of the endowment. For the $A^2 = b \text{ results in the linear sharing rules}^1 \ c^1 = m^1 \cdot e + b \cdot 1_Y \text{ and } c^2 = (1-m^1) \cdot e - b \cdot 1_Y \cdot e + b \cdot 1_Y$ We consider economies with H=2 agents with power utility functions. Setting $A^1=$

then

$$c^{1} = 0.3 \cdot e + 0.2 \cdot 1$$
y and $c^{2} = 0.7 \cdot \epsilon - 0.2 \cdot 1$ y.

instead take sharing rules as given and assume that the initial endowment is consistent with the sharing rules. There is a many-to-one relationship between endowments and consumption allocations, and it is more convenient to fix consumption rules. ¹To simplify the analysis we do not compute linear sharing rules for some given initial portfolios but

economy has only two dividend states, a "high" and a "low" state, resulting in a total of j and denote the dividend's 2×2 transition matrix by 2^{J} possible states in the economy. We define the persistence parameters ξ^{j} for each stock We consider economies with $J \in \{3,4,5,6,7\}$ independent stocks. Each stock $j \in \mathcal{J}$ in the

$$\Xi = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{2}(1+\xi^j) & \frac{1}{2}(1-\xi^j) \\ \frac{1}{2}(1-\xi^j) & \frac{1}{2}(1+\xi^j) \end{bmatrix}$$

with $\xi^j \in (0,1)$. The Markov transition matrix $\Pi = \bigotimes_{j=1}^J \Xi$ for the entire economy is a the parameter values for our examples. These parameter values cover a reasonable range of Kronecker product of the individual transition matrices, see Appendix B.2. Table III reports

0.86	0.91 0.32 0.66	0.8 0.48 0.74	0.95 0.8 0.22 0.48 0.61 0.74	8 0.77 0. 0.62 0. 5 0.81 0.	0.98 ($ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$
1.09 1.14		1.2	1.23 1.05	1.23	1.02	high d
S	•	44	ω	2	-	stock

Table III: Stock Characteristics

probabilities are chosen so that the examples display generic behavior. (We calculated persistence and variance in stock dividends. The varying dividend values and persistence endowment at 1 we always normalize the dividend vectors. For this reason we multiply the normalization is not really necessary. dividend vectors by 1/J for the economy with J stocks. However, as we show below this hundreds of examples showing qualitatively similar behavior.) To keep the expected social

two-fund separation. Table IV reports equilibrium portfolios of agent 1. complete the market. We now ask how much portfolios in such an economy deviate from The economy has J stocks and 2^J states of nature. Therefore we need 2^J-J bonds to

stocks J and so the larger the number of states 2^J and number of bonds $2^J - J$, the closer the the first 6 digits of stock holdings and slopes are already identical (to keep the table small we agents' stock portfolios get to the slope m^h of the linear sharing rules. For $J \in \{4,5,6,7\}$ first 12 bonds. The longer the maturity of the bonds the greater the deviations of holdings report fewer than 6 digits.). For J=4 the agents' holdings of the bonds of maturity 1 and addition, once holdings deviate significantly from b^h they alternate in sign². In summary, from b^h (with the exception of just the holdings of bonds with very long maturities). In match b^h for the first 6 digits. For J=5 there is a corresponding match already for the We make several observations about the agents' portfolios. The larger the number of

debt, see, for example, Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004). Buera and Nicolini report very some readers of the unrelated literature on the optimal maturity structure of noncontingent government high debt positions from numerical calculations of their model with four bonds. The reason for their highly sensitive large debt positions is the close correlation of bond prices ²The nature of these bond holdings, namely the very large positions of alternating signs, may remind

(J, K) = (J, K) = (J, K)	(4, 12) $(J,$
	0.30 w_1^1
$0.30 \mid \psi_2^1$	0.30 ψ_2^1
$0.30 v^{-1}$	0.30 \\ \vec{v'\dagger}{1}
- w	
ψ -	
- \ \psi	
	0.20
0.20 θ_2^1	0.20
	0.20
θ_9	-7.498 0.20 θ
	0.20
	6.33
	-26.23 θ.
$ 6.16 \theta_{25}^{1}$	
	-86.58 θ
	46.58

Table IV: Portfolio of Agent 1

the more states and bonds are present in the economy, the closer the stock portfolios come to two-fund separation. At the same time an agent's holdings of bonds of a fixed maturity T comes closer to the constant components of his sharing rule. These observations lead us to the conjecture that as the number of bonds increases the portfolios should approach two-fund separation for stocks (holding a portion of the market portfolio) and constant holdings of the short-maturity bonds.

To check this conjecture we next examine the deviations of the equilibrium portfolios from two-fund separation more closely. In order to measure these deviations, define

$$\Delta^S \equiv \max_{j=1,2,\dots,J} |\psi_j^1 - m^1|$$

ration portfolio where we maximize the difference across all stocks (due to market-clearing to be the maximal deviation of agents' equilibrium stock holdings from the two-fund sepait suffices to calculate the difference for the first agent). Similarly, we define

$$\Delta^k \equiv |\theta_k^1 - b^1|$$

to be the maximal difference between agents' holdings in bond k and the intercepts of their linear sharing rules. We regard this as the deviation from two-fund separation since, if the

market contained a bond of maturity T for all T (a condition equivalent to a consol) then maturities and lead to no trading in bonds. two fund separation would have an individual hold the same number b^h of bonds of all

and are practically the same when there are several stocks and many states and bonds. are clear. First, the equilibrium stock portfolios are close to classic two-fund separation reports deviations in bond positions for some selected longer maturity bonds. The results short-maturity bonds but then explode as we increase the number of stocks and bonds. Second, the deviations in the bond portfolios from two-fund separation are negligible for separation predictions In particular, the bonds with very long maturities differ significantly from the two-fund Table V reports deviations in stock holdings and the first five bonds, and Table VI

7	6	G	42	J	
121	58	27	12	κ	
2.0 (-222)	58 9.6 (-88)	$27 \mid 3.5 \; (-33)$	$12 \mid 4.5 (-9)$	$K = \Delta^S$	
4.9 (-214)	4.2 (-85)) 6.3 (-34)	1.3 (-9)	Δ^1	
1.8 (-209)	3.1 (-81)	8.3(-31)	3.5(-8)	D2	,
$121 \mid 2.0 \; (-222) \mid 4.9 \; (-214) 1.8 \; (-209) 3.0 \; (-205) 3.2 \; (-201) 2.4 \; (-197)$	1.1 (-77)		2.0(-6)	\[\sum_{2} \]	
3.2 (-201)	2.1(-74)		1.1 (-4) 3.7 (-3)		4
7.4 (-197)	3.0 (-/1)	1.0 (-22)	1.6 (-0)	3 1 2	> 5

Table V: Deviations in Stock Holdings and First Five Bonds from Two-Fund Separation

58	57	56	50	40	27	26	25	20	12	11	10	7	6	₹.
	ı	ŧ	I	-	145.8	423.4	555.6	5.37	5.4 (-9)	1.5(-10)	3.0 (-12)	5.3(-18)	3.5(-20)	(5, 27)
998.2	4627.2	10178	1179.3	3.7 (-5)	2.4 (-22)	5.3(-24)	1.1 (-25)	7.5 (-35)	2.9 (-52)	9.9 (-55)	2.9 (-57)	2.4(-65)	3.0 (-68)	(6, 58)
1.7 (-59)	2.3(-61)	3.0 (-63)	4.3 (-75)	1.0 (-96)	9.1 (-129)	2.0 (-131)	3.9 (-134)	3.5 (-148)	8.9 (-173)	4.5(-176)	2.0 (-179)	6.3 (-190)	1.4 (-193)	(7, 121)

Table VI: Deviations in Bond Holdings from Two-Fund Separation

budget equations (1). Although these equations are linear, solving them numerically is very Remark: Computing the results in Tables V and VI requires us to solve the agents

cannot solve them using a regular linear equation solver on a computer using 16 decimal This fact makes the equilibrium equations nearly singular and thus difficult to solve. One digits of precision. To handle this difficulty, we used Mathematica with up to 1024 decimal The prices of bonds with very long maturity k are nearly perfectly correlated.

stream. But the equilibrium holdings of long bonds are highly volatile, implying that bonds with short maturity are close to the value of the safe portion of the consumption the stock portfolios are extremely close to satisfying two-fund separation. The holdings of investors are making dramatically large trades in long bonds in each period. Our results are surprisingly invariant to the size of the stock dividends and the utility parameter γ : And again, despite the crazy structure of the bond portfolios, we observe the recurring theme that the agents use the finite-maturity bonds to generate the safe portion of their We tried many different examples and always had the same results: with many bonds.

lead to these portfolios. Recall that agent h's budget constraint in an economy with finiteconsumption stream. We can learn some details by closely examining the underlying budget equations, which

$$c_{y}^{h} = \sum_{j=1}^{J} \psi_{j}^{h} d_{y}^{j} + \theta_{1}^{h} (1 - q_{y}^{1}) + \sum_{k=2}^{K} \theta_{k}^{h} (q_{y}^{k-1} - q_{y}^{k}).$$
 (7)

Suppose the agent's consumption allocation follows the linear sharing rule $c^h=m^h\cdot \epsilon + b^h 1$ y: and that there are enough bonds so that markets lead to an efficient equilibrium implementthere must exist stock weights $\psi^h_j \equiv \eta^h$ for all $j \in \mathcal{J}$ such that the budget constraint can ing this consumption rule. If the agent's portfolio also exhibits two-fund separation, then

be withten as

$$m^h \cdot e \div b^h 1_{Y} = \eta^h \cdot e + \theta_1^h (1_{Y} - q^1) + \sum_{k=2}^K \theta_k^h (q^{k-1} - q^k).$$
 (8)

Rearranging (8) yields

$$(m^{h} - \eta^{h}) \cdot e + (b^{h} - \theta_{1}^{h}) \cdot 1_{Y} + \sum_{k=1}^{K-1} (\theta_{k}^{h} - \theta_{k+1}^{h}) q^{k} + \theta_{K}^{h} q^{K} = 0.$$
 ()

sufficiently large, for all practical purposes $m^h \approx \eta^h$ and $b^h \approx \theta_1^h$. For example, in As we have seen in our numerical examples, once the number of states and bonds g economy with J=5 stocks and K=27 bonds the two deviations are $\Delta^S<10^{-32}$

 $\Delta^1 < 10^{-33}$. Thus, equations (9) lead to

$$\sum_{k=1}^{K-1} (\theta_k^h - \theta_{k+1}^h) q^k + \theta_K^h q^K \approx 0.$$
 1(1)

We show in Appendix A that the price of a bond of maturity k is

$$q_y^k = \frac{\beta^k(\Pi^k)_y.P}{u_1'(c_y^1)} = \frac{\beta^k \sum_{z=1}^Y (\Pi^k)_{yz} P_z}{u_1'(c_y^1)}$$

these expressions into equations (10) and denoting the vector of relative prices $P/u_1'(c_y^1)$ by where $P = (u_1'(c_y^1))_{y \in \mathcal{Y}}$ is the vector of prices $u_1'(c_y^1)$ for consumption in state y. Substituting

$$\left(\sum_{k=1}^{K-1} (\theta_k^h - \theta_{k+1}^h)(\beta \Pi)^k + \theta_K^h(\beta \Pi)^K\right) R \approx 0. \tag{11}$$

approximate equation to hold is that the matrix sum (in the large brackets) is approximately This approximate equation must hold for all agents $h \in \mathcal{H}$. A sufficient conditions for this

$$\sum_{k=1}^{K-1} (\theta_k^h - \theta_{k+1}^h) (\beta \Pi)^k + \theta_K^h (\beta \Pi)^{K} \approx 0.$$
 (12)

is that the asset prices matter very little for the portfolio decisions. The stock prices do on the transition matrix Π (and the discount factor β). A consequence of this observation side is smaller than 10^{-31} and many elements are zero. This matrix equation solely depends In our example with J=5 and K=27 the largest element in the matrix on the left-hand the bond portfolios. The agent's utility functions really only matter for determining the period. And the state price ratios, the elements of R, also have no first-order effects on not appear in the budget equations since agents do not trade the stocks after the initial and the discount factor β . And the portfolios that have this property have positions in bonds linear sharing rules in equilibrium. In the end, the bond positions $\theta_k^h, \ k=1,\ldots,K,$ must of short maturity that get extremely close to portfolios exhibiting two-fund separation. (approximately) satisfy a system of equations that only depends on the transition matrix Π

under which (i) exact separation between the stock and bond market holds, (ii) stock (a portion of the market portfolio). These observations lead us to the analysis of conditions stock portfolio becomes extremely close to the portfolio prescribed by two-fund separation market once the number of states and bonds becomes sufficiently large. In addition, the portfolios display exactly the (static) nature of constant holdings across all stocks, and (iii) portfolio of finite-maturity bonds exactly spans the consol. We examine these issues in Our examples show an approximate separation between the stock market and the bond next section.

Multiple Finite-Maturity Bonds Span the Consol

 g_{\uparrow} nerically impossible if we have too few bonds. Recall equation (9), the rearranged budget $\mathfrak{L}_{\mathbb{C}}$: action for agent h given his linear sharing rule. est we motivate the necessity of special conditions and argue that two-fund separation is

$$(m^h - \eta^h) \cdot e + (b^h - \theta_1^h) \cdot 1_Y + \sum_{k=1}^{K-1} (\theta_k^h - \theta_{k+1}^h) q^k + \theta_{K}^h q^K = 0.$$
 (13)

satisfied for general economies. For example, if the total number of stocks and bonds J+Kin this fashion. Equation (13) states that the K+2 vectors e,1, and g^1,\ldots,g^K in \mathbb{R}^Y are linearly dependent are $J \geq 3$ stocks then the system (9) has more equations than unknowns. Using a genericity equals the number of states Y (so markets are generically dynamically complete), and there solutions unless parameters lie in some measure zero space. argument along the lines of those in Schmedders (2005) we can show equations (9) have no If the number of states Y exceeds K+2 then this condition cannot be

economically reasonable conditions that do lead to two-fund separation in such economies with only finite-maturity bonds we may ask whether there are special (non-generic) We then generalize the insights from this simple class of economies to broader ones. We next develop such sufficient conditions and begin with economies having i.i.d. dividends Although agents' portfolios typically do not exhibit two-fund separation in economies

5.1 Equilibrium Portfolios with IID Dividends

two-fund separation even if there are only two bonds. We examine a simple case in which equations (9) do have a solution and portfolios exhibit

state-independent, so all rows of the transition matrix II are identical. and $Y \geq J+2$ dividend states. Suppose further that the Markov transition probabilities are Proposition 1 Consider an economy with J stocks, a one-period and a two-period bond an efficient equilibrium equi-cautious HARA utility functions then agents' portfolios satisfy monetary separation in If all agents

that the price of the two-period bond satisfies $q^2 = \beta q^1$, that is, the prices of the two bonds **Proof:** Under the assumption that all states are i.i.d. the Euler equations (23. 24) imply perfectly correlated. Then condition (9) of agent h becomes

$$(m^h - \eta^h) \cdot \epsilon + (b^h - \theta_1^h) \cdot 1_Y + (\theta_1^h - \theta_2^h)q^1 + \theta_2^h \beta q^1 = 0.$$

which is equivalent to

$$(m^h - \eta^h) \cdot \epsilon + (b^h - \theta_1^h) \cdot 1_Y + (\theta_1^h - (1 - \beta)\theta_2^h)q^1 = 0.$$

These equations have the unique solution

$$\eta^h=m^h,\quad \theta^h_1=b^h,\quad \theta^h_2=\frac{b^h}{1-\beta}\;.$$

the two price vectors q_1 and q_2 are linearly dependent. rate fluctuation does not prohibit the agents from holding portfolios exhibiting two-fund dividend transition probabilities the two bonds are sufficient to span the consol. The interest separation Under the condition of Proposition 1 the system (9) has a very special solution since The key fact is that for i.i.d

 b^h of his linear sharing rule becomes, see the example in Section 4. the risky two-period bond. The more risk-averse agent h is, the larger the intercept term not violate two-fund separation. The holding of the two (risky) bonds yields exactly the agents hold more risky bonds relative to stocks than less risk-averse agents. This fact does constant part of the linear sharing rule. Note that under the assumptions of Proposition 1 agents have a position of $\theta_2^h = \frac{b^h}{1-\beta}$ in So more risk-averse

serve the purpose of creating the safe portion of their respective consumption streams. And elaboration. Even though the short-lived bonds are risky the agents' positions in these bonds must hold larger bond positions. In this model, therefore, bonds should not be viewed as light of this observation the asset allocation "puzzle" More risk-averse agents should indeed invest a larger portion of their wealth in bonds. among equally wealthy agents the more risk-averse ones with a larger safe portion b^h This last point is a recurring theme in the remainder of our paper and deserves further of the risky portfolio, but as part of a portfolio generating a safe payoff stream. of Canner et al. (1997) disappears

5.2 Spanning the Consol

agents' portfolios to satisfy two-fund separation is that the finite-maturity bonds span the consumption stream. Then a stock portfolio exhibiting two-fund separation, namely holdconsol. In that case the payoff of the bond portfolio delivers the safe part b^h of an agent's The discussion of economies with i.i.d. dividends revealed that a sufficient condition for and we relegate it to Appendix B.1. we need the following technical lemma. Its proof doesn't provide any economic intuition to more general Markov chains of dividends. For the presentation of such a generalization This observation leads us naturally to the question whether we can generalize this insight ings of size m^h of all stocks, delivers the risky part $m^h e$ of the agent's consumption stream.

Lemma 1 Suppose the $Y \times Y$ transition matrix $\Pi >> 0$ governing the Markov chain of exogenous states in the economy has only real eigenvalues. Further assume that Π is diagonalizable and has L $(\leq Y)$ distinct eigenvalues. Then the following statements are

- (1) If all eigenvalues are nonzero then the matrix equation $I_Y + \sum_{k=1}^L a_k \ \Pi^k$ unique solution (a_1^*, \dots, a_L^*) . Moreover, $\sum_{k=1}^L a_k^* = -1$. 10 has a
- (2) If zero is an eigenvalue of Π then the matrix equation $\sum_{k=1}^{L} a_k \Pi^k = 0$ has a nontrivial solution. Moreover, any solution (a_1^*, \dots, a_L^*) satisfies $\sum_{k=1}^L a_k^* = 0$.

of exogenous states in the economy has only real eigenvalues. Further assume that Π is of maturities $k = 1, 2, \dots, L$ diagonalizable and has L $(\leq Y)$ distinct eigenvalues. Then the consol is spanned by bonds **Theorem 2** Suppose the $Y \times Y$ transition matrix $\Pi >> 0$ governing the Markov chain

Proof: If L bonds of maturity $k = 1, 2, \dots, L$ span the consol then there must be a portfolio

 $(\theta_1, \ldots, \theta_L)$ of these bonds such that

$$1_Y = \theta_1(1_Y - q^1) + \sum_{k=2}^{L} \theta_k(q^{k-1} - q^k). \tag{14}$$

This system of equations is equivalent to

$$(1 - \theta_1) \cdot 1_{Y} + \sum_{k=1}^{L-1} (\theta_k - \theta_{k+1}) q^k + \theta_L q^L = 0.$$
 (15)

Recall that the price of a bond of maturity k is

$$q_y^k = \frac{\beta^k(\Pi^k)_y.P}{u_1'(c_y^1)} = \frac{\beta^k \sum_{z=1}^{Y} (\Pi^k)_{yz} P_z}{u_1'(c_y^1)},$$

these expressions into equations (15) and denoting the vector of relative prices $P/u_1'(c_y^1)$ by where $P = (u_1'(c_y^1))_{y \in \mathcal{Y}}$ is the vector of prices $u_1'(c_y^1)$ for consumption in state y. Substituting

R we obtain

$$\left((1 - \theta_1) I_{Y} + \sum_{k=1}^{L-1} (\theta_k - \theta_{k+1}) (\beta \Pi)^k + \theta_L (\beta \Pi)^L \right) R = 0, \tag{16}$$

where I_Y denotes the $Y \times Y$ identity matrix. A sufficient condition for these equations to have a solution is that the matrix equation

$$(1 - \theta_1)I_{Y'} + \sum_{k=1}^{L-1} \left((\theta_k - \theta_{k+1})\beta^k \right) \Pi^k + (\theta_L \beta^L) \Pi^L = 0$$
 (17)

has a solution. If Π has only nonzero eigenvalues, then that fact follows from part (1) of this case $\theta_1 = 1$. \square Lemma 1. If Π has a zero eigenvalue, then that fact follows from part (2) of Lemma 1. In

rem's assumptions. The proof depicts why a small number of finite-maturity bonds spans Section 4.2 precise for economies with the special transition matrices satisfying the theodependent of the actual prices P, the initial endowments, and the dynamic evolution of the consol when Π is diagonalizable. The spanning issues reduce to properties of Π , inthe distribution of wealth. While this may appear strange, it follows from the fact that mined by Π , not marginal utility. This fact reduces the spanning issue (equation 14) to the investors' Euler equations tell us that the relative prices of zero coupon bonds are deterdo you need in order to span $I=\Pi^0$. In the case where Π is diagonalizable (our examples algebraic properties of Π (equation 17); in particular, the issue is how many powers of Π below show that to be a reasonable assumption), Lemma 1 ensures that the number of distinct eigenvalues is the minimal number to accomplish that span The proof of Theorem 2 makes the intuitive and approximate reasoning at the end of

The following corollary to Theorem 2 characterizes equilibrium portfolios

the assumptions of Theorem 2. Suppose further that all agents have equi-cautious HARA Corollary 1 [Corollary to Theorem 2] Suppose the economy's transition matrix Π satisfies efficient equilibrium in which agents' portfolios satisfy monetary separation. Moreover, the bond portfolios in this equilibrium satisfy the following properties. If there are bonds of maturities k = 1, 2, ..., L in the economy then there is an

(a) If the transition matrix Π has only nonzero eigenvalues, then agent h's holdings of the bonds of maturity $j = 1, 2, \dots, L$ are

$$\theta_j^h = \frac{b^h}{M_a} \left(\sum_{k=j}^L \beta^{L-k} a_k^* \right)$$

where $M_a=\beta^L+\sum_{k=1}^L\beta^{L-k}a_k^*$ and $(a_1^*,a_2^*,\ldots,a_L^*)$ is the unique solution to the matrix equation $I_Y+\sum_{k=1}^La_k$ $\Pi^k=0$.

(b) If the transition matrix Π has a zero eigenvalue, then agent h holds $heta_1^h=b^h$ and has holdings of the bonds of maturity $j=1,2,\ldots,L$ of

$$\theta_j^h = \frac{b^h}{M_b} \left(\sum_{k=j}^L \beta^{L-k} a_k^* \right)$$

where $M_b = \sum_{k=1}^L \beta^{L-k} a_k^*$ and $(a_1^*, a_2^*, \dots, a_L^*)$ is a nontrivial solution to the matrix equation $\sum_{k=1}^L a_k \Pi^k = 0$.

of Corollary 1 leads us to a number of observations. Appendix B.1 contains the proof of this corollary. A close examination of the statements

- 1. Proposition 1 is a simple consequence of Corollary 1, Part (b). With i.i.d. beliefs the Markov transition matrix II has only L=2 distinct eigenvalues, namely 1 and 0. Case the pair $a^\star=(a_1^\star,a_2^\star)=(-1,1)$ is a solution to the matrix equation of Lemma 1, Part (b) then states that 2 bonds are sufficient to span the consol. Moreover, since $\Pi=\Pi^2$ (2) leading to $M_b=1-\beta$ and so to portfolio holdings of $\theta_1^h=b^h$ and $\theta_1^h=\frac{b^h}{1-\beta}$.
- Another extreme case is a transition matrix Π with the maximal number of L=Ydistinct eigenvalues. In that case the sufficient condition of Theorem 2 and Corollary 1states Y . Of course, then the economy with J stocks would have a total of J+Ystates that the number of bonds needed to span the consol is exactly the number of the manifold of equilibrium portfolios. indeterminate. The portfolio exhibiting two-fund separation is then just one point in assets, which exceeds the number of states Y. As a result optimal portfolios will be
- As $\beta \to 1$ it follows that $M_a \to 0$ and $M_b \to 0$. It can also be easily seen that $\left(\sum_{k=j}^L \beta^{L-k} a_k^*\right) \to 0$ for all j. Thus, $|\theta_j| \to \infty$ for all j in case (a) and all $j \geq 2$ in case (b). That is, as the discount factor tends to 1 the bond holdings spanning the consol become unboundedly large

4. Observe that an agent's bond holdings are proportional to the constant portion of the agent's consumption stream. So, if for two agents $b^2 > b^1 > 0$ then the second agent will have larger positions (in absolute value) of all bonds in the economy.

we examine some economically motivated applications of the results from this

5.3 Identical Persistence Across Stocks and States

 $j \in \mathcal{J}$ in the economy has the same number D of dividend states. Since the individual divand has l distinct eigenvalues. The Markov transition matrix Π for the economy is then idend processes are independent there is a total of $Y = D^J$ possible states in this economy. Consider an economy with J stocks that have independent dividend processes. Each stock the J-fold Kronecker product (see Appendix B.2) of the individual transition matrix for the Ξ, are identical.³ The dividends may vary across stocks, but the stocks $D \times D$ dividend transition matrices dividend states of an individual stock. $\Pi = \Xi \otimes \Xi \otimes \cdots \otimes \Xi = \bigotimes_{j=1}^{J} \Xi_{-}$ We assume that Ξ has only real nonzero eigenvalues, is diagonalizable.

bonds of maturities $k=1,2,\ldots,L$ span the consol, where $L=\binom{J+l-1}{l-1}$. In the presence of \equiv having only real nonzero eigenvalues. The matrix \equiv has l distinct eigenvalues. have D (stock-dependent) dividend states with identical diagonalizable transition matrices **Theorem 3** Consider an economy (as just described) with J independent stocks that each equilibrium in which agents' portfolios satisfy two-fund separation. these L bonds, and if all agents have equi-cautious HARA utilities, there exists an efficient

Proof: Lemma 2 in Appendix B.2 states that the matrix $\Pi = \bigotimes_{j=1}^{J} \Xi$ has only real nonzero lary 1 then imply the statements of the theorem. \square eigenvalues, $L = {J+l-1 \choose l-1}$ of which are distinct, and is diagonalizable. Theorem 2 and Corol-

two dividend states, a "high" and a "low" state. The high and the low dividends may vary dividend's 2×2 transition matrix by across stocks, but the dividend processes have a common transition matrix. We denote the We illustrate Theorem 3 with an example. Each stock $j \in \mathcal{J}$ in the economy has only

$$\Xi = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{2}(1+\xi_H) & \frac{1}{2}(1-\xi_H) \\ \frac{1}{2}(1-\xi_L) & \frac{1}{2}(1+\xi_L) \end{bmatrix}$$

1. The Markov transition matrix $\Pi = \bigotimes_{j=1}^{J} \Xi$ for the entire economy has only real nonzero with $\xi_H, \xi_L \in (0, 1)$. This matrix Ξ has D=2 distinct eigenvalues, 1 and $\xi = (\xi_H + \xi_L)/2 < 1$ eigenvalues, J+1 of which are distinct. The eigenvalues are $1.\xi,\xi^2,\ldots,\xi^J$.

The matrices do not have to be identical. 3 Actually, it would be sufficient for all the individual transition matrices to have the same eigenvalues

in Appendix B.2.) Therefore, we calculate their numerical values for a few selected values completeness, we display the closed-form solution for $(a_1^*, \dots, a_{J+1}^*)$ for small values of J closed-form solutions for the individual bond holdings, but they are difficult to assess. (For bonds in the portfolio that spans the consol. The formulas of Corollary 1, Part (a). yield the consol for $\beta = 0.95$ and $\beta = 0.99$, respectively. Tables VII and VIII display the portfolios of finite-maturity bonds that span one unit of In this economy J + 1 bonds span the consol. We now examine the weights of the

-44.29 15.20 -0.92 56.69 -50.67 17.22 60.27 -54.06		25.91				θ_6
-44.29 15.20 56.69 -50.67		-4.86	25.90			θ_5
-44.29 15.20		1.23	-4.85	25.86		θ_4
11.07 -0.44	49.96	1.00	1.23	-4.80	25.67	θ_3
11 67 0 44	-33.10	1.00	0.998	1.22	-4.57	θ_2
0.28 1.05 1.00	6.35	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.18	θ_1
3	2	51	4	ω	2	J
0.5			2	0.2		20

Table VII: Bond Portfolio Spanning one Unit of the Consol, $\beta=0.95$

330.34				131.12				θ_6
-313.51	320.12			-31.13	131.07			θ_5
98.15	-293.91	300.31		2.32	-31.08	130.87		θ_4
-11.01	86.02	-257.14	263.15	0.99	2.31	-30.82	129.83	θ_3
1.59	-8.01	64.79	-192.76	1.00	0.99	2.26	-29.55	θ_2
0.99	1.30	-3.51		1.00	1.00	0.99	2.01	θ_1
5	4	ω	2	Ü	4	ω	2	J
	51	0.5			5	0.2		\sim

Table VIII: Bond Portfolio Spanning one Unit of the Consol, $\beta = 0.99$

of bonds with short maturity are close to 1, the spanned position of the consol. But holdings larger (in absolute value) weights on these vectors that also have to alternate in sign. more and more collinear as k grows. The reason for the (weird) form of the portfolio is that the bond price vectors q^k become these positions become even larger. The same is true when the discount factor increases. of bonds with higher maturity are much larger and some bonds are even held in a short The portfolios look similar to our computed results in the previous section. The holdings Moreover, as the eigenvalue stemming from the persistence parameters grows The spanning condition then requires increasingly

number of stocks. J, (and bonds, J+1) grows. The same is true, albeit at a slower pace We observe that the weight for the one-period bond converges quickly to 1, as the

for the other bond weights. The weights are given by the formula of Corollary 1, Part (a).

$$\theta_j = \frac{1}{M_a} \left(\sum_{k=j}^{J+1} \beta^{(J+1)-k} a_k^* \right) = \frac{\sum_{k=j}^{J+1} \beta^{(J+1)-k} a_k^*}{\beta^{J+1} + \sum_{k=1}^{J+1} \beta^{(J+1)-k} a_k^*}.$$

ratio θ_2 also tends to 1. We can make similar arguments for the other bond positions. For the ratio tends to 1. For j=2 the difference is $\beta^{J+1}+\beta^Ja_1^*$ which tends to zero and so the Note that for j=1 the denominator exceeds the numerator by β^{J+1} and so, as J grows. a better understanding of the portfolio structure we examine what happens when we let etacan compute the ratios of the bond weights. tend to 1. As we observed before, M_a tends to 0 and the portfolio must explode. But we

Proposition 2 The ratio of bond weights in the portfolio of finite-maturity bonds spanning the consol as β tends to 1 is as follows (for $J \in \{2, 3, 4, 5\}$).

10/01	θ_c/θ_1	θ_5/θ_1	θ_4/θ_1	θ_3/θ_1	θ_2/θ_1	J
				~1 √1	$-\frac{1+\xi}{\xi^2}$	2
			- [8	1+\xx\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\	- 1+5+52	ω
		<u>रो</u> ठ	$-\frac{1+\xi+\xi^2+\xi^3}{\xi^9}$	$\frac{1+\xi+2\xi^2+\xi^3+\xi^4}{\xi^7}$	1+8+8+4	4
	- 215	$\frac{1+\xi+\xi^2+\xi^3+\xi^4}{\xi^{14}}$	$\frac{1+\xi+2\xi^2+2\xi^3+2\xi^4+\xi^5+\xi^5}{\xi^{12}}$	1+\xi + 2\xi^2 + 2\xi + 2\xi + \xi \cdot \xi	- 25	1+6+62+63+64

Table IX: Weight Ratios as $\beta \to 1$

Proof: The ratios are given by $\lim_{\beta \to 1} \frac{\theta_2}{\theta_1}$, where θ_j , $j \in \mathcal{J}$ is given by Corollary 1. \square

portfolios of Tables VII and VIII. The weights have alternating signs and are very large portfolios patterns for bonds of longer maturity in Tables VII and VIII. the discount factor β , in the portfolio formulas and so cause the economically weird looking This leads to the (large) ratios of alternating signs. These ratios appear, only mitigated by The numbers in Table IX point at the cause for the changing sign pattern in the bond

Approximately Optimal Portfolios with Bond Ladders

of short-maturity bonds. but the holdings of long bonds will differ substantially from a will hold a fraction of the market portfolio of stocks, an approximately constant holding The previous section argued that models with many bonds will imply that each investor constant portfolio and involve large amounts of trading. The implications for long bonds

are not intuitive. Also, if there were small transaction costs these large trades in bonds come very close to implementing equilibrium utility. would be substantially reduced. In this section, we examine whether simple strategies can

Bond Ladders and Asymptotic Two-fund Separation

are enough bonds then equilibrium will be Pareto efficient but equilibrium portfolios may two-fund separation. Real-world bond markets offer bonds across many maturities. If there For general economies, a small number of finite-maturity bonds will be insufficient to obtain equilibrium consumption allocations. The question is how close can such a market come to bonds then some assets will be redundant and there will be many portfolios that implement deviate from the simple ones recommended by mutual fund separation. If there are many that a portfolio with constant stock holdings and constant bond holdings (consistent with producing classic separation results for the equilibrium portfolios. The next theorem states since the bond portfolio is reestablished at each state no matter what the bond prices (and number of bonds tends to infinity. This portfolio is an example of the laddering strategy the linear sharing rules) yields the equilibrium consumption allocation in the limit as the interest rates) are.

 $b^h \cdot 1_Y$, $h \in \mathcal{H}$. Define the portfolios **Theorem 4** Assume that there are Y states, J stocks and that the investors have equiand that consumption in an efficient equilibrium follows the linear sharing rules $c^{
m h}=m^{
m h}e+$ cautious HARA utility functions. Suppose that the economy \mathcal{E}^B has B finite-maturity bonds.

$$\begin{aligned} \psi^h_j &= m^h, & \forall j = 1, \dots, J, \\ \theta^h_k &= b^h, & \forall k. \end{aligned}$$

Then in the limit as B increases

$$\lim_{B \to \infty} \left(\sum_{j=1}^J \psi_j^h d_y^j + \theta_1^h (1 - q_y^1) + \sum_{k=2}^B \theta_k^h (q_y^{k-1} - q_y^k) \right) = c_y^h.$$

Y, and so the bond price vectors will be linearly dependent. As a result optimal portfo-**Remark:** As B increases the number of assets J+B will exceed the fixed number of states, namely one satisfying two-fund separation and bond laddering. (To avoid indeterminate keep the number of states and assets identical.) optimal portfolios we could increase the number of states in the limit process in order to lios will be indeterminate. Note that the theorem only examines one particular portfolio,

B is large enough so that the equilibrium in \mathcal{E}^B implements the consumption sharing rules **Proof:** Asset prices for bonds and stocks will not depend on B since we are assuming that $=m^he+b^h\cdot 1_Y$ for all B. The budget constraint (1) yields the consumption allocation

that is implied by a portfolio with $w_j^h = m^h \ \forall j = 1, \dots, J, \ \theta_k^h = b^h \ \forall k = 1, \dots, B$, namely

$$\begin{split} c_y^h &= \sum_{j=1}^J w_j^h d_y^j + \theta_1^h (1 - q_y^1) + \sum_{k=2}^B \theta_k^h (q_y^{k-1} - q_y^k) \\ &= \sum_{j=1}^J m^h d_y^j + b^h (1 - q_y^1) + \sum_{k=2}^B b^h (q_y^{k-1} - q_y^k) \\ &= m^h \epsilon_y + b^h - b^h q_y^B \,. \end{split}$$

 $q_y^B \to 0$ as $B \to \infty$ since $\beta^B \to 0$. Thus, $c_y^h \to m^h e_y + b^h$ and the statement of the theorem The price q_y^B of bond B is given by the formula (25), see Appendix A. Because $\beta < 1$.

opposed to using the optimal portfolio. approximation we calculate the changes in agents' welfare from using such a portfolio as rities $1, 2, \dots, B$ is approximately optimal once B becomes sufficiently large. To check this sic portfolio from static separation theory will come arbitrarily close to implementing the two-fund separation and a constant portfolio of a large finite number B of bonds of matuequilibrium sharing rule. This result leads us to the conjecture that a portfolio satisfying Theorem 4 states that if we have a large number of finite-maturity bonds then the clas-

6.2 Welfare Measure for Portfolios

consumption of agent h in state $y \in \mathcal{Y}$. Next define Define a utility vector v^h by $v^h_y = u^h(c^h_y)$ for a consumption vector c^h , where c^h_y is the

$$V^h(c^h) = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \beta^i \Pi^i v^h = [I - \beta \Pi]^{-1} v^h$$

be the consumption equivalent of agent h's equilibrium consumption, which is defined by objective function value over the infinite horizon equals $V^h_{y_0}(c^h)$. Now we can define $C^{h,\star}_{y_0}$ to to be the vector of (total) utility values. If the economy starts in state y₀ then an agent's

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u^h (C_{y_0}^{h,*}) = V_{y_0}^h (m^h \epsilon + b^h \cdot 1_Y) \iff C_{y_0}^{h,*} = (u^h)^{-1} \left((1 - \beta) V_{y_0}^h (m^h \epsilon + b^h \cdot 1_Y) \right).$$

solving the maximization problem Similarly, we define a consumption equivalent $C_{y_0}^{h,B}$ for the consumption process that agent laddering strategy for bonds of maturity $1,2,\ldots,B$. The agent determines this portfolio by h can achieve by holding a portfolio that satisfies two-fund separation and uses a bond

$$\max_{\{m,b\}} V_{y_0}^h(me+b\cdot 1_{Y^*}) \quad \text{s.t. } \left([I_S-\beta\Pi]^{-1}(P\otimes ((me+b\cdot 1_{Y^*})-c^{h.B}))\right)_{y_0}=0.$$

an optimal stock weight \hat{m}^h and bond holdings \hat{b}^h subject to satisfying the infinite-horizon The agent is restricted to a two-fund strategy and a bond ladder but is allowed to choose

which is optimal given the restrictions imposed on the agent. by given by the equilibrium prices. We denote the consumption equivalent from this portfolio, budget constraint (see equation (19) in Appendix A). The prices in the budget constraint are

$$C_{y_0}^{h,B} = (u^h)^{-1} \left((1-\beta) V_{y_0}^h (\hat{m}^h e + \hat{b}^h \cdot 1_Y)) \right).$$

of the agent's initial endowment of stocks. For this purpose we also define a consumption need to calculate supporting initial stock endowments $\psi^{h,0}$ by solving the budget equations. equivalent $C_{y_0}^{h,0}$ for the consumption vector that would result from constant initial stock portfolio we compute the welfare gain of each of these two portfolios relative to the welfare For the welfare comparison of the portfolio with a bond ladder to an agent's equilibrium holdings $\psi^{h,0}\equiv\psi^{h,0}_j$ for all $j\in\mathcal{J}$. Since in our examples we took sharing rules as given we

$$\left([I_S - \beta \Pi]^{-1}(P \otimes ((m^h e + b^h \cdot 1_Y) - \psi^{h,0} e))\right)_{y_0} = 0, \ h = 1, \dots, H.$$

sumption equivalent from this initial portfolio by Again the prices in the budget equation are the equilibrium prices. We denote the con-

$$C_{y_0}^{h,0} = (u^h)^{-1} \left((1-\beta) V_{y_0}^h(\psi^{h,0}e) \right).$$

portfolio is then given by The welfare loss of the portfolio with constant bond holdings \hat{b}^h relative to the optimal

$$\Delta C_{y_0}^h = 1 - \frac{C_{y_0}^{h.B} - C_{y_0}^{h.0}}{C_{y_0}^{h,*} - C_{y_0}^{h.0}} = \frac{C_{y_0}^{h.*} - C_{y_0}^{h.B}}{C_{y_0}^{h.*} - C_{y_0}^{h.0}}$$

6.3 Portfolios with Bond Ladders

We use the power utility functions from Section 4.2 with the resulting linear sharing rules results to our previous examples we choose some of the same model specifications as before We calculate welfare losses for approximately optimal portfolios. In order to connect our

$$c^1 = \left(\frac{1}{2} - b\right) \cdot e + b \cdot 1_Y$$
 and $c^2 = \left(\frac{1}{2} + b\right) \cdot e - b \cdot 1_Y$

1 and both agents consume on average half of the endowment. The dividend vectors of the As before, we normalize stock dividends so that the expected aggregate endowment equals J=4 independent stocks are as follows.

low d 0.95 0.92 0	high d 1.05 1.08 1	stock 1 2
0.88	1.12	ယ
0.85	1.15	4

for all four stocks are those of Section 5.3, that is, all four stocks have identical 2×2 We let the economy start in state $y_0 = 7$ (since $c_7^1 = c_7^2 = 0.5$). The transition probabilities Theorem 3 and Tables VII and VIII. with J+1=5 bonds. The equilibrium portfolios for this economy then follow directly from transition matrices. Our analysis in Section 5.3 then implies that markets are complete

precision. Numbers that are too close to computer machine precis κ_1 to be meaningful are bond ladder of length B. (We performed these welfare calculation upwards) across agents, $\Delta C = \max_{h \in \{1,2\}} \Delta C_1^h$, from holding a tv the utility parameters b and γ . Tables X reports the maximal welfa e loss (always rounded stock's dividend state of 0.6 (see Section 5.3). The discount factor is $\beta = 0.95$. We vary not reported and instead replaced by " ≈ 0 ".) For our first set of examples we set $\xi = 0.2$ and so have a persitence probability for a -fund portfolio with a with standard double

100	50	30	10	Ç,	2	-	$B\backslash b$	ږ
≈ 0	≈ 0	≈ 0	8.3(-13)	2.4 (-10)	5.0(-6)	1.4(-4)	0.05	
≈ 0	≈ 0	6.3(-13)	1.1 (-13)	2.4 (-10)	5.0(-6)	1.4(-4)	0.3	
1.2(-6)	1.6(-4)	$6.3 \; (-13) \; \middle \; 7.7 \; (-4) \; \middle \; 7.7 \; (-4) \; \middle \; 5.1 \; (-3) \; \middle \; 5.1 \; (-3) \; \middle \; 4.2 \; (-2) \; \; 4.7 \; (-2)$	$1.1 \; (-13) \; \middle \; 2.6 \; (-3) \; \middle \; 2.6 \; (-3) \; \middle \; 1.2 \; (-2) \; \middle \; 1.5 \; (-2) \; \middle \; 6.7 \; (-2) \; \middle \; 7.5 \; (-2)$	$3.2 (-3) \ \ 3.2 (-3) \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \$	3.0 (-3) 3.0 (-3) 1.3 (-2)	1.4 (-3) 1.4 (-3) 7.2 (-3) 7.2	0.05	(1)
1.2 (-6) 1.2 (-6) 1.3 (-5) 1	1.6(-4)	7.7 (-4)	2.6 (-3)	3.2(-3)	3.0 (-3)	1.4(-3)	0.3	ω
1.3(-5)	1.4(-3)	5.1(-3)	1.2(-2)	1.4(-2)	1.3(-2)	7.2(-3)	0.05	
1 -5)	1. (-3)	5.: (-3)	1.2(-2)	1.4 (-2)	1.3 - 2)	-3)	(3	
-5) 2.7 (-4) 2.8 (-4)	1.6 (-4) 1.6 (-4) 1.4 (-3) 1. (-3) 1.7 (-2) 1.9 (-2)	4.2(-2)	6.7(-2)	7.1 (-2)	-2) 6.7 (-2)	4.3 (-2) 4.8 (-2)	0.05	1
2.8(-4)	1.9(-2)	4.7 (-2)	7.5 (-2)	8.1 (-2)	7.5(-2)	4.8(-2)	0.3	10

Table X: Welfare Loss from Bond Ladder (=0.2)

states and the standard deviation of these prices. gets long enough the welfare losses decrease monotonically to zero. Observe that welfare time the length of the bond ladder is still too short for the laniting behavior of Theorem 4 is very different from the equilibrium portfolio in the holding of these bonds. At the same The longer the time to maturity of the longest bond the ladder strategies even though the new bonds do not improve the span of the traded assets the markets. completeness. losses continue to decrease even after sufficiently many bon is are present to ensure market to set in. the contrary, a bond ladder of length 5, for example, forces: I stfolio upon an agent that bond holding that is not too far off from the equilibrium he 1 holdings for bonds of other short maturity. A trivial bond ledrium portfolios exhibit holdings close to b for the one-period \mathbf{b}^{c} a creases. However, the losses do not decrease monotonically to ϵ smaller welfare losses of the bond ladder. As expected the relative welfare losses decrease to zero as ι - number B of bonds in-These facts result in the increased welfare loss for $\gamma \geq 3$. Once the ladder The addition of more long-term bonds im roves the performance of bond With J=4 stocks and Y=16 states only 12 bonds are needed to complete The derivasing reinvestment risk results maller are both its prices across 5 of approximately b. On r of length 1 prescribes a out already very different Recall that the equilib-

ings of stocks and the consol in an economy with a coasal. The agent's holdings deviate the table shows the coefficients of the linear sharing rue, which correspond to the hold-Table XI reports the restricted portfolio weights (\hat{m}_{-}, b^{1}) for agent 1. The last row in

$(m^1.b)$	100	50	30	10	υı	12	1	$B\backslash b$	٠,
(.45 ,.05)	(.450, .050)	(.454, .050)	(.461, .050)	(.480, .050)	(.489050)	(.495, .052)	(.497, .062)	0.05	
$(m^1.b) \ \ (.45\ ,.05\) \ \ (.2\ ,.3\) \ \ (.45\ ,.05\) \ \ (.2\ ,.3\) \ \ (.45\ ,.05\) \ \ (.2\3\) \ \ (.45\ ,.05\) \ \ (.2\3\)$	$(.450,.050) (.202,.300) (\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ $	(.223, .300)	(.265, .300)	(.380, .300)	(.433, .300)	(.470, .311.	(.482, .370)	0.3	
(,5 ,.05)	(\$51, .049)	(460, .043)	173, .035)	.91, .023)	96, .020)	198, .019)	.499, .021)	0.05	cu
(.2 ,.3)	(.205, .297)	(.260, .260)	(.336, .210)	(.447, .137)	(.476, .118)	(.492, .111)	(.496, .129)	0.3	
(.45,.05)	(.451, .049)	(.465, .038)	(.479, .027)	$(.447, .137) \mid (.495, .015)$	(.476, .118) (.498, .012)	(.500, .012)	(.500, .013)	0.05	
(.23)	(.209, .293)	(.290, .229)	(73,.035) $(.336,.210)$ $(.479,.027)$ $(.376,.161)$	(.469, .088)		(.492,.019) $(.492,.111)$ $(.500,.012)$ $(.498,.067)$ $(.501,.005)$	(.500, .077)	0.3	
(.45 ,.05)	(.453, .047)	(160,.043) (.260,.260) (.465,.038) (.290,.229) (.474,.029) (.346,.172)	(.488, .016)	(.498, .007)	(.500, .006)	(.501, .005)	(.499, .021) $(.496, .129)$ $(.500, .013)$ $(.500, .077)$ $(.501, .006)$ $(.507, .036)$	0.05	1
(.23)	(.218284)	(.346, .172)	(.432, .095)		(.501, .034)	(.505, .031)	(.507, .036)	0.3	0

Table XI: (\hat{m}^1, \hat{b}^1) for Table X

caused by the reinvestmer risk in the longest bond. So, even though a ladder of, for examexample, if $\gamma=5,\ b=0$ 3 and B=30, the holdings are $(\hat{m}^1,\hat{b}^1)=(.376..161)$ instead of $(m^1,b)=(.2,.3)$ even though the welfare loss is only just above 0.5%. This deviation is considerably from these pefficients even when the welfare loss is already very small. For weights different from the ple, 30 bonds comes very tock and consol weights to do so. ose to implementing the equilibrium allocation it uses portfolio

does not result in qualitatively different results. completion we report in A. pendix C results for a larger level of the persistence parameter $(\xi=0.5)$. The results do not change qualitatively. Similarly, changing the discount factor We recalculated all $\mathfrak m$ nbers in Tables X and XI for various sets of parameters. For

of the traded assets. And although we did not explicitly model transaction costs we motivate performance of bond ladder strategies even though the new bonds do not improve the span an important role for redund at bonds since adding more long-term bonds improves the to maturity of the longest bond is similar to that observed in actual markets. We observe between the mutual fund and a consol because of the risk in bond prices even when the time portfolio weights between $\mathsf{t} \mapsto \mathsf{m} \mathsf{u} \mathsf{t} \mathsf{u} \mathsf{n} \mathsf{d}$ fund and the bond ladder differ from the weights assets gives investors almost the same welfare as the equilibrium investment strategy. The the construction of bond ladder improves the performance of bong ladder strategies which in turn help investors economize contrary, bond ladders minimize vransaction costs since the only transaction costs are those in the bond markets which would be very costly in the presence of transaction costs. On the borne at the time the bonds err issued. In summary, holding a partfolio of a bond ladder together with a mutual fund of risky As we have seen, equilit ::um investment strategies imply enormous trading volume as a sensible investment approach in the face of transaction Therefore, asset redundancy is desirable since it

7 Conclusion

consol is present, either explicitly or implicitly through dynamic trading of finite-maturity rium model and found that the static results fail to generalize to a dynamic world unless a We have reexamined the classical two-fund separation theory in a dynamic general equilibportfolios that imply unrealistically large trading volumes in bonds. typically exhibit an approximate separation of equity and bond markets but equilibrium If a consol does not exist then economies with families of finite-maturity bonds

investment strategy for fixed-income investments. Welfare losses from (non-equilibrium) portfolios exhibiting classic asset allocations (with bond ladders mimicking a consol) apladdering nearly optimal investment strategies in dynamic markets. that transaction cost considerations make portfolios using two-fund separation and bond proach zero as the length of the bond ladder increases. In light of these results, we argue We then analyzed the welfare properties of portfolios with bond ladders, a popular

Appendix

\triangleright Equilibrium in Dynamically Complete Markets

cient equilibria in our model. Efficient equilibria exhibit time-homogeneous consumption We use the Negishi approach (Negishi (1960)) of Judd et al. (2003) to characterize effion the last shock y. Define the vector $P=\left(u_1'(c_y^1)\right)_{y\in\mathcal{Y}}\in\mathbb{R}^S_{++}$ to be the vector of prices for consumption across states $y\in\mathcal{Y}$. We denote the $S\times S$ identity matrix by I_S , Negishi processes and asset prices, that is, consumption allocations and asset prices only depend weights by λ^h , $h=2,\ldots,H$, and use \otimes to denote element-wise multiplication of vectors.

consumption vectors must satisfy the following equations. If the economy starts in the state $y_0 \in \mathcal{Y}$ at period t = 0, then the Negishi weights and

$$u'_1(c_y^1) - \lambda^h u'_h(c_y^h) = 0, h = 2, \dots H, y \in \mathcal{Y},$$
 (18)

$$\left([I_{S} - \beta \Pi]^{-1} (P \otimes (c^{h} - \sum_{j=1}^{J} \psi_{j}^{h,0} d^{j}))\right)_{y_{0}} = 0, h = 2, \dots, H,$$

$$\sum_{h=1}^{H} c_{y}^{h} - e_{y} = 0, y \in \mathcal{Y}.$$
(20)

asset prices and portfolio holdings. The price vector of a stock j is given by Once we have computed the consumption vectors we can give closed-form solutions for

$$q^{j} \otimes P = [I_{S} - \beta \Pi]^{-1} \beta \Pi(P \otimes d^{j}). \tag{21}$$

Similarly, the price of a consol is given by

$$q^{c} \otimes P = [I_{S} - \beta \Pi]^{-1} \beta \Pi P. \tag{22}$$

the one-period bond in state y is We calculate the price of finite-maturity bonds in a recursive fashion. First, the price of

$$q_y^1 = \frac{\beta \Pi_y \cdot P}{u_1'(c_y^1)} = \frac{\beta \sum_{z=1}^{Y} \Pi_{yz} P_z}{u_1'(c_y^1)}, \tag{23}$$

where Π_y denotes row y of the matrix Π . Then the price of the bond of maturity k is

$$q_y^k = \frac{\beta \Pi_{y:}(P \otimes q^{k-1})}{u_1'(c_y^1)} = \frac{\beta \sum_{z=1}^Y \Pi_{yz} P_z q_z^{k-1}}{u_1'(c_y^1)},$$
 (24)

Repeated substitution yields the bond price formula

$$q_y^k = \frac{\beta^k (\Pi^k)_y \cdot P}{u_1'(c_y^1)} = \frac{\beta^k \sum_{z=1}^Y (\Pi^k)_{yz} P_z}{u_1'(c_y^1)}.$$
 (25)

B Technical Details

B.1 Additional Proofs

is a transition matrix $\lambda_1=1$. Since Π is diagonalizable and nonsingular, $\Pi=C\Lambda C^{-1}$ where C is invertible and Λ is diagonal containing only, but all of, the eigenvalues λ_t . Furthermore. **Proof of Lemma 1:** Let $\lambda_1 \geq \lambda_2 \geq \ldots \geq \lambda_Y$ be the eigenvalues of the matrix Π . Since Π $C^{-1}\Pi^kC=\Lambda^k$ for any $k=1,2,\ldots$ (see, for example, Simon and Blume (1994, Theorem

by C from the right leads to the equivalent system. Statement (1). Multiplying the statement's matrix equation by C^{-1} from the left and

$$\sum_{k=1}^{L} a_k \ \Lambda^k = -I_{Y}.$$

the L-dimensional linear system Λ is diagonal and has only L distinct entries. As a result this last system is equivalent to

$$M \cdot (a_1, \dots, a_L)^T = -(1_Y)^T,$$

where 1_Y is the Y-dimensional row vector of all ones and

$$M = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & \cdots & 1 \\ \lambda_2 & (\lambda_2)^2 & \cdots & (\lambda_2)^L \\ \lambda_3 & (\lambda_3)^2 & \cdots & (\lambda_3)^L \\ & & \ddots & \\ & \lambda_L & (\lambda_L)^2 & \cdots & (\lambda_L)^L \end{bmatrix}$$

since all eigenvalues are nonzero. Thus, the original matrix equation has a unique solution. k contains the corresponding (distinct) eigenvalues of Π^k . The matrix M has full rank Lwhere we assume w.l.o.g. that $\lambda_1=1,\lambda_2,\ldots,\lambda_L$ are the L distinct eigenvalues of Π . Column

Note that the first equation requires $\sum_{k=1}^{L} a_k = -1$.

by C from the right implies, Statement (2). Multiplying the statement's matrix equation by C^{-1} from the left and

$$\sum_{k=1}^{L} a_k \ \Lambda^k = 0.$$

is equivalent to the (L-1)-dimensional linear system The diagonal matrix Λ has only L-1 distinct nonzero entries. As a result this last system

$$M'\cdot (a_1,\ldots,a_L)^T=0.$$

where

$$M' = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & \cdots & 1 \\ \lambda_2 & (\lambda_2)^2 & \cdots & (\lambda_2)^L \\ \lambda_3 & (\lambda_3)^2 & \cdots & (\lambda_3)^L \\ & \ddots & & & \ddots \\ & \lambda_{L-1} & (\lambda_{L-1})^2 & \cdots & (\lambda_{L-1})^L \end{bmatrix}.$$

where we assume w.l.o.g. that $\lambda_1=1,\lambda_2,\ldots,\lambda_{L-1}$ are the L-1 distinct nonzero eigenvalues of Π . The matrix M' has full row rank L-1. Thus, the original matrix equation must have Note that the first equation requires $\sum_{k=1}^{L} a_k = 0$. \square a nontrivial solution. (In fact, the system has a one-dimensional linear solution manifold.)

constraint (8) becomes **Proof of Corollary 1:** In an economy with bonds of maturities $k = 1, 2, \dots, L$, budget

$$m^h \cdot e + b^h 1_Y = \eta^h \cdot e + \theta_1^h (1_Y - q^1) + \sum_{k=2}^L \theta_k^h (q^{k-1} - q^k).$$
 (26)

 m^{h} .) For this condition to hold agent h's bond portfolio must satisfy condition is only sufficient but not necessary since there could be other stock weights $ar{\eta}^h
eq$ A sufficient condition for two-fund separation is $m^h=\eta^h$ for all agents $h\in\mathcal{H}.$ (This

$$b^{h}1_{Y} = \theta_{1}^{h}(1_{Y} - q^{1}) + \sum_{k=2}^{L} \theta_{k}^{h}(q^{k-1} - q^{k}), \tag{27}$$

that is, the L bonds must span the consol. That fact follows from Theorem 2.

of equations to have a solution is that the matrix equation In the proof of Theorem 2 we showed that a sufficient condition for the previous system

$$(b^h - \theta_1^h)I_Y + \sum_{k=1}^{L-1} (\theta_k^h - \theta_{k+1}^h)(\beta\Pi)^k + \theta_L^h(\beta\Pi)^L = 0.$$
 (28)

tions $I_Y + \sum_{k=1}^L a_k \Pi^k = 0$ (Lemma 1. Part (1)) by β^L to obtain $\beta^L I_Y + \sum_{k=1}^L \beta^{L-k} a_k^*$ $(\beta\Pi)^k = 1$ has a solution. Note that the coefficients satisfy $(b^h - \theta_1^h) + \sum_{k=1}^{L-1} (\theta_k^h - \theta_{k+1}^h) + \theta_L^h = b^h$. Case (a). Suppose the transition matrix Π has only nonzero eigenvalues. Multiply equa-

0 and define the sum of the (new) coefficients to be $M_a = \beta^L + \sum_{k=1}^L \beta^{L-k} a_k^*$. Then multiplying through by $\frac{b^h}{M_a}$ yields the expression

$$\left(\frac{b^{h}}{M_{a}}\beta^{L}\right)I_{Y} + \sum_{k=1}^{L} \left(\frac{b^{h}}{M_{a}}\beta^{L-k}a_{k}^{*}\right)(\beta\Pi)^{k} = 0, \tag{29}$$

in equations (28) and (29) gives the expressions of the corollary. where the sum of the coefficients $\frac{b^h}{M_a}(\beta^L + \sum_{k=1}^L \beta^{L-k} a_k^*)$ equals b^h . Matching the coefficients

Case (b). Suppose the transition matrix Π has a zero eigenvalue. Multiply equations $\sum_{k=1}^{L} a_k \Pi^k = 0$ (Lemma 1, Part (2)) by β^L to obtain $\sum_{k=1}^{L} \beta^{L-k} a_k^*$ ($\beta\Pi$)^k = 0 and define the sum of the (new) coefficients to be $M_b = \sum_{k=1}^{L} \beta^{L-k} a_k^*$. Then multiplying through by $\frac{b^h}{M_b}$ yields the expression

$$\sum_{k=1}^{L} \left(\frac{b^h}{M_b} \beta^{L-k} a_k^* \right) (\beta \Pi)^k = 0, \tag{30}$$

where the sum of the coefficients $\sum_{k=1}^{L} \frac{b^h}{M_b} \beta^{L-k} a_k^*$ equals b^h . Matching the coefficients in equations (28) and (30) yields $\theta_1^h = b^h$ and the other expressions of the corollary. \square

3.2 Kronecker Products

 $A \bigotimes B$ is defined as the $nm \times pq$ matrix Let A be an n imes p matrix and B be an m imes q matrix. Then the Kronecker or direct product

$$A \bigotimes B = \begin{bmatrix} a_{11}B & a_{12}B & \cdots & a_{1p}B \\ a_{21}B & a_{22}B & \cdots & a_{2p}B \\ \vdots & & \vdots & & \vdots \\ a_{n1}B & a_{n2}B & \cdots & a_{np}B \end{bmatrix}$$

purposes we need the following properties. Langville and Stewart (2004) list many useful properties of the Kronecker product. For our

- If A and B are stochastic (Markov matrices) then $A \bigotimes B$ is stochastic
- $2. \ \operatorname{rank}(A \bigotimes B) = \operatorname{rank}(A) \operatorname{rank}(B).$
- Let A and B be two square matrices. Let λ (μ) be an eigenvalue of A (B) and x_A (x_B) is the corresponding eigenvector. Every eigenvalue of Abe the corresponding eigenvector. Then $\lambda\mu$ is an eigenvalue of $A\otimes B$ and $x_A\otimes x_B$ eigenvalues of A and B $\bigotimes_{\mathcal{B}}$
- 4. If A and B are diagonalizable then $A \bigotimes B$ is diagonalizable

5.
$$(PDP^{-1}) \otimes (PDP^{-1}) = (P \otimes P)(D \otimes D)(P^{-1} \otimes P^{-1})$$

Property 1 of Kronecker products implies that Π is a stochastic matrix (Markov transition fold Kronecker products of $D \times D$ transition matrices Ξ , so $\Pi = \Xi \otimes \Xi \otimes \cdots \otimes \Xi = \bigotimes_{j=1}^{J} \Xi$. properties of Kronecker products. matrix). The following properties of Π follow from the characteristics of Ξ and the listed In Sections 4.2 and 5.3 we defined economies with special transition matrices that are J-

Lemma 2 Let the transition matrix Π be a J-fold Kronecker product of the matrix Ξ , which has the following properties. has only real nonzero eigenvalues, is diagonalizable, and has l distinct eigenvalues. Then Π

- 1. $rank(\Pi) = (rank(\Xi))^{J}$.
- The matrix Π has D^J real nonzero eigenvalues, $\binom{J+l+1}{l-1}$ of which are distinct
- 3. The matrix Π is diagonalizable, that is, the eigenvector matrix C of Π has full rank

In Sections 4.2 and 5.3 we encountered the special case of the 2×2 transition matrix by

$$\Xi = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{2}(1+\xi_H) & \frac{1}{2}(1-\xi_H) \\ \frac{1}{2}(1-\xi_L) & \frac{1}{2}(1+\xi_L) \end{bmatrix}$$

1. For the computation of bond portfolios we need to find $(a_1^*, a_2^*, \dots, a_{J+1}^*)$ where with $\xi_H, \xi_L \in (0,1)$. This matrix Ξ has D=2 distinct eigenvalues, 1 and $\xi=(\xi_H+\xi_L)/2 < 1$

$$(a_1^*, a_2^*, \dots, a_{J+1}^*)^T = -M^{-1} \cdot 1_{J+1}$$

and

$$M = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & \cdots & 1 \\ \xi & \xi^2 & \cdots & \xi^{J+1} \\ \xi^2 & \xi^4 & \cdots & \xi^{2(J+1)} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \xi^J & \xi^{2J} & \cdots & \xi^{J(J+1)} \end{bmatrix}.$$

ica. For J=2 the unique weights $a^{\bullet}=(a_1^{\bullet},a_2^{\bullet},a_3^{\bullet})$ are as follows. We give the solution for J=2,3,4,5 and leave all other cases to the reader and Mathemat-

$$a = \left(-\frac{1+\xi+\xi^2}{\xi^2}, \frac{1+\xi+\xi^2}{\xi^3}, -\frac{1}{\xi^3}\right).$$

And for J=3 the unique weights $a^*=\left(a_1^*,a_2^*,a_3^*,a_4^*\right)$ are

$$a = \left(-\frac{1+\xi+\xi^2+\xi^3}{\xi^3}, -\frac{1+\xi+2\xi^2+\xi^3+\xi^4}{\xi^5}, -\frac{1+\xi+\xi^2+\xi^3}{\xi^6}, \frac{1}{\xi^6}\right)$$

For J=4 the unique weights $a^*=(a_1^*,a_2^*,a_3^*,a_4^*,a_5^*)$ are

$$1 = \left(\frac{1+\xi+\xi^2+\xi^3+\xi^4}{\xi^4}, \frac{1+\xi+2\xi^2+2\xi^3+2\xi^4+\xi^5+\xi^6}{\xi^7}, \frac{1+\xi+2\xi^2+2\xi^3+2\xi^4+\xi^5+\xi^6}{\xi^7}, \frac{1+\xi+2\xi^2+2\xi^3+2\xi^4+\xi^5+\xi^6}{\xi^{10}}, \frac{1+\xi+2\xi^2+\xi^3+2\xi^4+\xi^5+\xi^6}{\xi^{10}}, \frac{1+\xi+\xi^2+\xi^3+\xi^4}{\xi^{10}}, \frac{1}{\xi^{10}} \right).$$

Finally, for J=5 the unique weights $a^*=(a_1^*,a_2^*,a_3^*,a_4^*,a_5^*,a_6^*)$ are

$$a = \left(-\frac{1+\xi+\xi^2+\xi^3+\xi^4+\xi^5}{\xi^5}, \frac{1+\xi+2\xi^2+2\xi^3+3\xi^4+2\xi^5+2\xi^6+\xi^7+\xi^8}{\xi^9}, \frac{1+\xi+2\xi^2+3\xi^3+3\xi^4+3\xi^5+3\xi^6+2\xi^7+\xi^8+\xi^9}{\xi^{12}}, \frac{1+\xi+2\xi^2+2\xi^3+3\xi^4+2\xi^5+2\xi^6+\xi^7+\xi^8}{\xi^{14}}, \frac{1+\xi+\xi^2+\xi^3+\xi^4+\xi^5}{\xi^{15}}, \frac{1}{\xi^{15}} \right)$$

C Additional Results for Section 6.2

precision to be meaningful are not reported and instead replaced by " ≈ 0 ".) any qualitatively different results. (Again numbers that are too close to computer machine and XI when the persistence parameter is $\xi=0.5$. This parameter change does not result in For the examples in Section 6.2, Tables XII and XII report the analog results for Tables X

100	50	30	10	51	13	Ь	$B\backslash b$	-2
≈ 0	≈ 0	1.2(-11)	1.3(-9)	2.2(-6)	1.9(-4)	7.8(-4)	0.05	
≈ 0	≈ 0	8.8(-14) 7.7(-4)	1.4 (-9)	2.3(-6)	1.9 (-4)	7.9(-4)	0.3	
1.2(-6)	1.6(-4)	7.7 (-4)	2.6(-3)	2.8(-3)	8.6 (-4)	5.3 (-6)	0.05	
1.2(-6)	1.6(-4)	7.7(-4) 5.1(-3)	2.6 (-3) 2.6 (-3) 1.2 (-2) 1.2 (-2) 6.7 (-2)	2.8(-3)	8.6 (-4) 5.6 (-3) 5.6 (-3)	5.3(-6)	0.3	3
1.3 (-5)	1.4 (-3)	5.1(-3)	1.2(-2)	1.3 (-2)	5.6(-3)	9.0 (-4)	0.05	
1.3(-5)	1.4(-3)	5.1(-3)	1.2(-2)	1.3(-2)	5.6(-3)	9.0 (-4)	0.3	01
1.2 (-6) $1.2 (-6)$ $1.3 (-5)$ $1.3 (-5)$ $2.7 (-4)$ $2.8 (-4)$	1.6 (-4) 1.4 (-3) 1.4 (-3) 1.7 (-2) 1.9 (-2)	5.1(-3) 4.2(-2) 4.7(-2)	6.7 (-2)	2.8 (-3) 1.3 (-2) 1.3 (-2) 6.6 (-2) 7.4 (-2)	3.6 (-2) 3.9 (-2)	5.3 (-6) $5.3 (-6)$ $9.0 (-4)$ $9.0 (-4)$ $1.2 (-2)$ $1.3 (-2)$	0.05	
2.8(-4)	1.9 (-2)	4.7 (-2)	7.5 (-2)	7.4(-2)	3.9 (-2)	1.3(-2)	0.3	10

Table XII: Welfare Loss from Bond Ladder ($\xi = 0.5$)

(m^1,b^1)	100	50	30	10	ڻ.	12	1	$B \setminus b$	7
$(m^1,b^1) \ \ (.45\ ,.05\) \ \ (.2\ ,.3\) \ \ \ (.45\ ,.05\) \ \ (.2\ ,.3\) \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \$	(.450, .050)	(.454, .050)	.461, .050)	.480, .050)	(.489, .051)	(.494, .064)	(.496, .095)	0.05	
(.2 , .3)	(.450,.050) (.202,.300) (.451,.049) (.205,.297) (.451,.049) (.209293) (.453,.047) (.218284)	(.223300)	(.265, .300)	(.380, .300)	(.431, .307)	(.463387)	(.496, .095) (.472, .570) (.499, .034) (.492, .203) (.500, .205) (.498, .123) (.501, .010)	0.3	
(.45 ,.05)	(.451, .049)	(.460, .043)	(.473,.035) $(.336,.210)$ $(.479,.027)$	(.491, .023)	(.496, .020)	(.498,.024)	(.499, .034)	0.05	
(.2 , .3)	(.205, .297)	(.260, .260)	(.336, .210)	(.447, .137)	(.475, .121) (.498, .012)	(.489,.141)	(.492, .203)	0.3	ω
(.45 ,.05)	(.451, .049)	(.465, .038)	(.479, .027)	$(.447,.137) \mid (.495,.015)$	(.498, .012)	(.499,.014)	(.500, .205)	0.05	
(.2 ,.3)	(.209293)	(.290, .229)	(.376, .161)	(.469, .088)	(.487, .075)	(.496, .086)	(.498, .123)	0.3	G.
(.45 ; .05)	(.453, .047)	(.460, .043) $(.260, .260)$ $(.465, .038)$ $(.290, .229)$ $(.474, .029)$ $(.345, .172)$	$(.376, .161) \mid (.488, .016)$	(.498, .007)	(.500, .006)	(.501, .007)	(.501, .010)	0.05	
(.2 ,.3)	(.218, .284)	(.345, .172)	(.431,.095)	(.491, .042)	(.500, .035)	(.505, .041)	(.506, .060)	0.3	10

Table XIII: (\hat{m}^1, \hat{b}^1) for Table XII

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