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DIW Discussion Papers, No. 798

### **Provided in Cooperation with:**

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)

Suggested Citation: Caliendo, Marco; Fossen, Frank M.; Kritikos, Alexander S. (2008): The impact of risk attitudes on entrepreneurial survival, DIW Discussion Papers, No. 798, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin

This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/27322

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# **Discussion Papers**

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The Impact of Risk Attitudes on Entrepreneurial Survival

Berlin, June 2008

Opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect views of the institute.

#### **IMPRESSUM**

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DIW Berlin German Institute for Economic Research Mohrenstr. 58 10117 Berlin Tel. +49 (30) 897 89-0 Fax +49 (30) 897 89-200 http://www.diw.de

ISSN print edition 1433-0210 ISSN electronic edition 1619-4535

Available for free downloading from the DIW Berlin website.

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# The Impact of Risk Attitudes on Entrepreneurial Survival\*

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> Working Paper May 28, 2008

#### Abstract

Risk attitudes have an impact on not only the decision to become an entrepreneur but also the survival and failure rates of entrepreneurs. Whereas recent research underpins the theoretical proposition of a positive correlation between risk attitudes and the decision to become an entrepreneur, the effects on survival are not as straightforward. Psychological research posits an inverse U-shaped relationship between risk attitudes and entrepreneurial survival. On the basis of recent waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), we examine the extent to which risk attitudes influence survival rates of entrepreneurs. The empirical results confirm that persons whose risk attitudes are in the medium range survive significantly longer as entrepreneurs than do persons with particularly low or high risks.

**Keywords:** Entrepreneurship, Risk Attitudes

Survival and Failure

**JEL:** D81, J23, M13

<sup>\*</sup>The authors thank Friedel Bolle, Philipp Köllinger, Günther F. Müller, Alexander Schiersch and Viktor Steiner for valuable comments. Fossen thanks the German Research Foundation (DFG) for financial support of the project STE 681/7-1. The usual disclaimer applies.

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# 1 Introduction

Recent empirical research supports the theoretical proposition of a positive correlation between risk attitudes and the *decision* to become an entrepreneur (see, e.g., Cramer, Hartog, Jonker, and Van Praag, 2002; Caliendo, Fossen, and Kritikos, 2006). Varied studies (Stewart and Roth, 2001; Hartog, Ferrer-i Carbonell, and Jonker, 2002) further show that the population of self-employed persons tends to be less risk averse than other persons, such as those who are regularly employed. These observations lead to the crucial question addressed in this paper: Do risk attitudes also represent a defining characteristic of entrepreneurial survival? More specifically, we analyze potential correlations between risk attitudes and the *survival* and *failure rates* of entrepreneurs.

Prior economic research focuses only on the questions of whether and why nascent entrepreneurs may need to be less risk averse than other persons, such as employees, to achieve a successful start (Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979). To the best of our knowledge, the question of the extent to which individual risk attitudes might have an impact on survival rates has not been explored in economic literature. Accordingly, empirical research examines only differences in risk attitudes between the groups of self-employed and regularly employed persons.

Psychological research also pays little attention to this question, though it argues that entrepreneurs should neither take the highest nor the lowest possible but instead 'well-calculated' risks to become successful. Chell, Harworth, and Brearley (1991) suggest an inverse U-shaped relation between risk attitudes and entrepreneurial survival, where low (high) risk attitudes characterize more (less) risk-averse persons. However, insufficient empirical research links risk attitudes to the survival and failure rates of entrepreneurs. In a recent survey of the relationship between personality traits and business success, Rauch and Frese (2007) conclude that the effect of risk taking on entrepreneurial success is rather small, and this trait does not necessarily increase success probability. The inverse U-shaped relationship has not been tested either. A possible reason for this lack of empirical research is that reliable demographic data about individual risk attitudes still are missing.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>See also subsequent discussions by Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Parker (1997), Cressy (2000), Norton and Moore (2006), and Kan and Tsai (2006).

This paper aims to close this gap. We employ a representative data set, the German Socio-Economic Panel, which contained in the wave of 2004 several questions about not only subjective but also objectively measurable risk attitudes. Therefore, we conduct a rigorous test of whether the probability of entrepreneurial survival correlates with the willingness to bear certain risks. To answer this question consistently, we control for the labor status of all entrepreneurs in the sample, namely, whether they continue as self-employed or are in transition to an employed position or unemployment.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we discuss the potential inverse U-shaped relationship between risk attitudes and entrepreneurial survival. We describe the data in Section 3, with a focus on the various measures of risk attitudes, which we use in our further analysis. In Section 4, we present the econometric approach, followed in Section 5 with a discussion of the results of our analysis. We conclude in Section 6 that risk attitudes have an impact on the survival of entrepreneurs. Specifically, we observe a non linear relationship between risk attitudes and the probability of survival, which indicates that persons whose risk preferences are in the medium range survive significantly more often as entrepreneurs than do persons with particularly low or high risk preferences.

# 2 Risk Attitudes and their Impact on Entrepreneurial Success

According to Chell et al. (1991), there should be a non linear relation—more specifically, an inverse U-shaped relation—between risk attitudes and entrepreneurial survival, where low risk attitudes characterize more risk averse and high risk attitudes indicate less risk averse persons. The hypothesis we test subsequently therefore posits that among all entrepreneurs, the more risk averse and the particularly risk-seeking persons are more likely to fail as entrepreneurs than are persons whose risk-taking behavior falls within the medium range.

Because our analysis focuses on active entrepreneurs, we discuss this hypothesis not in the context of their decision to become an entrepreneur. Rather, our focal entrepreneurs already have chosen to expend a certain initial investment from among

a continuous set of investments, in which each investment pertains to a certain risk and a certain expected return. Entrepreneurs make risky investments only if these investments will lead, ex ante, to higher expected average returns than would safe investments, assuming those entrepreneurs are strictly risk averse. Accordingly, we presume that the expected average returns of investments increase with their riskiness. However, because a linear relationship between the riskiness of investments and their average returns would be unrealistic, we further assume that the expected returns of an investment are subject to decreasing returns to scale if the risk level of the investment increases.<sup>2</sup> At the same time (according to the definition of risk as a stochastic process with a known probability distribution), we suppose for the complete set of all possible investments that the variance between the lowest and the highest possible return increases with the riskiness of investments, which also implies an increasing probability of negative returns as the risk level of an investment increases.

With the assumption that the risk attitudes of entrepreneurs correlate strictly with the chosen risk levels of investments, we should observe positive correlations between risk attitudes and the variances of incomes of entrepreneurs. Furthermore, riskier investments should yield greater expected returns, because risk-averse people require a risk premium. With decreasing returns to scale of risk, more risk-averse entrepreneurs should select projects with a small amount of risk, so that the marginal risk premium for an additional unit of risk is high. Less risk-averse entrepreneurs instead choose riskier projects with a small marginal risk premium. At high levels of risk, at which expected returns do not increase anymore (or even decrease), only risk-neutral (risk-loving) entrepreneurs carry out their projects.

If these assumptions hold, it becomes straightforward to derive the consequences of the assumptions for the expected returns of investments and for the survival and failure rates of entrepreneurs. First, we must bear in mind that, if a person must decide between continuing or finishing an entrepreneurial activity, he or she may be able to earn a certain wage income, which then represents the opportunity cost of continuing to function as an entrepreneur. Second, we note that the realized returns of investments might differ from the expected average returns,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>We cannot exclude the possibility that beyond a certain risk level of an investment, expected returns are even marginally decreasing.

and the decision to continue as an entrepreneur may depend on a comparison of realized returns (not expected average returns) with alternative wage incomes, especially if and when realized losses in connection with liquidity constraints do not allow continued entrepreneurship.

Having implicitly ordered the complete spectrum of entrepreneurs from those with the lowest risk attitudes to those with the highest, we hypothesize that very risk-averse entrepreneurs who have chosen the safest possible investments are the most likely to generate returns that are less than their opportunity costs.<sup>3</sup> As a second hypothesis, if the risk level of an investment increases step by step, its expected return should exceed earnings from wage incomes (though of course low or negative returns could be realized with certain moderate probabilities). Finally, if the riskiness of investments increases dramatically, we hypothesize that it becomes increasingly unlikely that these investments will succeed in terms of positive returns. Rather, the probability increases (in comparison with investments with a medium risk level) that "nature's coin-flip" will force the entrepreneurs to realize monetary losses.<sup>4</sup> Thus, in this complete spectrum of entrepreneurs characterized by three risk categories, we should observe persons with low and high risk preference who must close down their businesses with higher probability than we will persons with a medium level of risk preference doing so.

# 3 Data Set and Risk Measurement

We base our analysis on the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), an established, representative panel survey that contains detailed information about the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>This expectation is plausible: If incomes of a very safe investment exceed earnings from wage labor, every person would become an entrepreneur and realize a sufficient income. In this context, it is fair to ask why such persons become entrepreneurs at all. We cannot answer this question. However, we also cannot exclude the possibility that these persons had lower opportunity costs at the time of their decision.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Recent research by Baron (2004) and Köllinger, Minniti, and Schade (2007) provides further explanations for why particularly risk-seeking entrepreneurs might decide to start a business venture, even if low or even negative outcomes may arise with relatively high probability. In their research, they reveal that these persons tend be overconfident in believing of being capable to exclude or reduce the probability of those low or negative returns. Moreover, the latter authors also refer to further effects increasing the probability of failure of high risk entrepreneurs. For instance, they observe an 'escalation of commitment' where this group is willing to make high risk investments for another time once they realized losses in the previous period (interestingly, this observation is confirmed in recent research in neurosciences, see Bechara and Damasio, 2005).

socio-economic situation of approximately 22,000 persons living in 12,000 house-holds in Germany.<sup>5</sup> Key to our analysis are new measures of risk attitudes that were added to the SOEP in the 2004 survey wave. Several questions deal with attitudes toward risk in general and in specific contexts, including occupation, the relevant domain for employment decisions. Respondents indicate their willingness to take risks on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (complete unwillingness) to 10 (complete willingness). Another question corresponds to conventional lottery measures and asks respondents to state how much (in categories of fifths) of 100,000 euros, which they hypothetically had won in a lottery, they would invest in a risky asset. The question indicates that there are equal chances respondents will double the amount invested or lose half of it.<sup>6</sup> In contrast with the other risk questions, which may incorporate both risk preference and risk perception, the lottery question holds the perceptions of the riskiness of a decision constant across respondents<sup>7</sup> by providing explicit stakes and probabilities.<sup>8</sup>

We use the yearly outcomes provided by those individuals who answered the risk question for the years 2000 to 2005, assuming the stability of risk attitudes at least over this relatively short period of time (see Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro, 1997, for evidence that risk attitudes remain stable over time). As in most empirical studies on entrepreneurial choice, we use self-employment as a measurable proxy of the concept of entrepreneurship. The classification of persons as self-employed stems on a survey question about the occupational status of the respondents. If respondents are employed or self-employed in more than one position, they report their status in their primary activity. We restrict the sample to persons

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>The SOEP started in 1984 as a longitudinal survey of private households and persons in West Germany and then expanded to the territory of East Germany in June 1990. The central aim of this panel study is to collect representative micro-data about persons, households, and families. It is similar to the BHPS in the United Kingdom and the PSID in the United States. A rather stable set of core questions appears every year, covering the most essential areas, such as population and demography; education, training, and qualification; labor market and occupational dynamics; earnings, income and social security; housing; health; household production; and basic orientation. For a more detailed data description, see Wagner, Frick, and Schupp (2007).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>See Table A.1 in the Appendix for the original phrases included in the risk measures.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Previous research indicates the potential for significant differences between (subjective) risk perceptions and (objectively measurable) risk preferences; see Palich and Bagby (1995).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner (2005) validate the reliability of these survey measures of risk attitudes with a field experiment with real money at stake.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>This broad definition of entrepreneurship is used frequently in psychology as well; see Stewart and Roth (2001) or Rauch and Frese (2007).

between 18 and 65 years of age who have been self-employed at least once during the sample period. Overall, we observe 7,325 person-year observations in which self-employed persons are *at risk* of exiting self-employment, and 730 exits actually occur.

#### Insert Table 1 about here

In Table 1, we provide mean values of the characteristics of those respondents who remain self-employed and those who exit. The table reveals significant differences between the groups (see the last column, which reports the p-value from a t-test of mean-equality). People exiting self-employment are more likely to be female, less educated, and younger than those who remain. The answers to the risk-related questions also differ between groups. For both kinds of risk measures, we observe that persons with a low risk profile are more likely to leave self-employment (except for people who invest nothing in the lottery question). However, to analyze the impact of risk attitudes on entrepreneurial survival, we require an econometric model that controls for relevant characteristics and covariates, as well as the duration of the self-employment, as we will present in the subsequent section.

# 4 Econometric Specification

To estimate the probability of exit from self-employment, conditional on the duration of the current spell in self-employment, we introduce a discrete time hazard rate model. We use yearly data, because the interviews occur once a year, and the covariates are not available for higher frequencies.

Respondents may experience multiple self-employment spells during the observation period. Therefore, we use the discrete non-negative random variable  $T_{ik}$  to describe the duration of the k-th spell of individual i. When a spell terminates in year t (measured from the beginning of the spell),  $T_{ik}$  takes on a value of t. The hazard rate  $\lambda_{ik}(t)$  is defined as the probability that spell k for person i ends in period t (i.e., a transition occurs) conditional on survival until the beginning of t:

$$\lambda_{ik}(t|X_i(t)) = P(T_{ik} = t|T_{ik} \ge t, X_i(t)),$$
 (1)

where  $X_i(t)$  is a vector of the characteristics and covariates of individual i in interval t. The probability of remaining self-employed in period t ("survival"), conditional on having survived until the beginning of t, is the complementary probability

$$P(T_{ik} > t | T_{ik} \ge t, X_i(t)) = 1 - \lambda_{ik}(t | X_i(t)).$$
(2)

The survivor function, which represents the unconditional probability of remaining in the current spell until the end of period t, can be written as the product of the survival probabilities in all periods before and in t:

$$S(t|X_i) = P(T_{ik} > t|X_i) = \prod_{\tau=1}^{t} (1 - \lambda_{ik}(\tau|X_i(\tau))).$$
 (3)

Consequently, the unconditional probability of a transition in period t is the probability of survival until the beginning of period t, multiplied by the hazard rate in period t:

$$P(T_{ik} = t|X_i) = \lambda_{ik}(t|X_i(t)) \prod_{\tau=1}^{t-1} (1 - \lambda_{ik}(\tau|X_i(\tau))).$$
 (4)

We employ the maximum likelihood method to estimate the model, which enables us to take into account completed spells as well as both left-censored and right-censored spells in the estimation. For a fully observed spell that ends with an exit from self-employment, the contribution to the likelihood function is given by equation (4). For a right-censored spell, the likelihood contribution is given by the survivor function (3), because we know only that the person "survived" until the end of the observation period, not when the spell will end. Combining these two cases, the likelihood contribution of a spell k of an individual i can be written as

$$L_{ik}^{\text{non left-censored}}(\text{param.}|c_i, X_i) = \left[\frac{\lambda_{ik}(t_{ik}|X_i(t_{ik}))}{1 - \lambda_{ik}(t_{ik}|X_i(t_{ik}))}\right]^{c_{ik}} \prod_{\tau=1}^{t_{ik}} (1 - \lambda_{ik}(\tau|X_i(\tau))), \quad (5)$$

where  $c_{ik}$  is a censoring indicator defined such that  $c_{ik} = 1$  if a spell is completed and 0 if a spell is right-censored.

If a spell is left-censored in the SOEP, because person i enters the panel after

spell k has already lasted  $u_{ik}$  years, we must condition on survival up to the end of period  $u_{ik}$ , which means dividing expression (5) by  $S(u_{ik})$ . Then the likelihood contribution of the spell is

$$L_{ik}(\text{parameters}|c_{i}, X_{i}) = \left[\frac{\lambda_{ik}(t_{ik}|X_{i}(t_{ik}))}{1 - \lambda_{ik}(t_{ik}|X_{i}(t_{ik}))}\right]^{c_{ik}} \frac{\prod_{\tau=1}^{t_{ik}} (1 - \lambda_{ik}(\tau|X_{i}(\tau)))}{\prod_{\tau=1}^{u_{ik}} (1 - \lambda_{ik}(\tau|X_{i}(\tau)))}$$

$$= \left[\frac{\lambda_{ik}(t_{ik}|X_{i}(t_{ik}))}{1 - \lambda_{ik}(t_{ik}|X_{i}(t_{ik}))}\right]^{c_{ik}} \prod_{\tau=u_{ik}+1}^{t_{ik}} (1 - \lambda_{ik}(\tau|X_{i}(\tau))). (6)$$

Note that this more general notation includes equation (5) for spells that are not left-censored ( $u_{ik} = 0$ ). In the SOEP, the retrospective employment history questions enable us to recover  $u_{ik}$  for self-employment spells and thereby deal with left-censoring.

The overall likelihood contribution of an individual i equals the product of the likelihood contributions of the  $K_i$  spells that the person experienced in the observation period. The sample likelihood function is the product of the individual likelihood contributions:

$$L(\text{parameters}|c, X) = \prod_{t=1}^{N} \prod_{k=1}^{K_i} L_{ik}.$$
 (7)

We define a new binary transition indicator variable  $y_{ik\tau} = 1$  if person i completes spell k in period  $\tau$ , and 0 otherwise. Then the log-likelihood function can be written in the same form as the standard log-likelihood function for a binary regression model in which  $y_{ik\tau}$  is the dependent variable and the data are organized in person-period format (cf. Jenkins, 1995).

The functional form of the hazard rate is specified as a logistic hazard model:

$$\lambda_{ik}(t|X_i(t)) = \frac{\exp(f(t) + X_i(t)\beta)}{1 + \exp(f(t) + X_i(t)\beta)},\tag{8}$$

where the function f(t) represents the dependence of the hazard rate on the spell duration (baseline hazard), specified as a polynomial function of the third degree. This model is consistent with an underlying continuous time model in which the within-interval durations follow a log-logistic distribution (Sueyoshi, 1995).

The cumulative transition probability, or failure function, is the complementary probability of the survival probability in equation (3):

$$F(t|X_i) = 1 - S(t|X_i) = 1 - \prod_{\tau=1}^{t} (1 - \lambda_{ik}(\tau|X_i(\tau))).$$
(9)

This function is of special interest in this context because it describes the probability that a persons exits self-employment during the first t years of self-employment.

## 5 Estimation Results

To estimate the main hypothesis of this paper, namely, an inverse U-shaped relationship between risk attitudes and survival, we employ two risk measures and four total sets of explanatory variables. As outcome variable, we consider employment status throughout the analysis, such that survival as a self-employed person represents the success measure, whereas a transition to regular employment or unemployment constitutes failure in self-employment.

#### Insert Table 2 about here

As we described in Section 3, respondents indicate on a 0-10 scale the extent to which they are willing to take risks in occupational choices. This kind of risk measure portrays the subjective risk attitudes of entrepreneurs. In Specification 2, we present the impact of these answers on entrepreneurial survival for each possible answer between 0 and 10. In Specification 3, we consolidate answers 0-2 in low risk, 3-7 in medium risk, and 8-10 in high risk categories. In addition to the subjective question about risk attitudes, entrepreneurs also respond to the lottery question by dividing a fixed amount between a safe and a risky investment. This question thus reveals objectively measurable risk preferences. We analyze the results of the lottery question in Specification 4. In Specification 1, we initially test the impact of several basic socio-demographic and business characteristics—which in previous research have an impact on entrepreneurial success—without including any risk measures. These control variables also appear in Specifications 2-4.

We provide the estimation results of the logit model for the whole sample and the marginal effects of the risk measures in Table 2. The interpretation of the marginal effects is straightforward: An increase (decrease) in the probability of exiting self-employment occurs if the marginal effect is positive (negative). We also interpret the economic impact of these changes in relation to the mean exit rate (about 10% in the sample, see Table 1).

Always using the lowest category as the base category (i.e., no or low risk for occupational choices in Specifications 2 and 3; no risky investment in Specification 4), we test the impact of the two risk measures on entrepreneurial survival and failure. With Specification 2, we observe that in comparison to persons who are willing to take no occupational risks at all, persons willing to take higher risks, between 1 and 8 on the 11-point scale, have a lower probability of failing as selfemployed in a given year. Persons with parameter values of 9 or 10 for occupational risks reveal no lower probability for entrepreneurial failure (compared with the base category). From an economic point of view, we emphasize that the greatest decrease in the probability of failing as entrepreneur emerges for medium risks. A risk attitude of 5 or 6 on the 11-point scale decreases the probability of failure as self-employed by 5 percentage points. Because the predicted probability of failure is approximately 12.5\% in the base category (i.e., complete unwillingness to take occupational risk), the economic impact of risk attitudes in the 5 or 6 point range is remarkable: Failure rates among these persons decline by 40% to about 7.5%. Overall, the estimation results confirm the hypothesized U-shape depicting the relationship between risk attitudes and failure rates.

We confirm these observations with Specification 3, in which we consolidate the answers to the occupational risk questions. In this specification, entrepreneurs willing to take medium risks in their occupational choices experience greater survival chances than do persons with either low or high risk attitudes. Thus, the observed inverse U-shape between risk attitudes and survival is not sensitive to this classification.

The analysis of Specification 4 reveals similar and complementary effects, such that higher failure rates provide the significant characteristic. Although people who decide to make medium-risk investments (between 40,000 and 80,000 Euros) do

not suffer higher probability of failure than those in the base category, the less risk-averse (who put all their money into the risky investment) and more risk-averse (who put only 20,000 Euros into the risky investment) respondents suffer a significantly greater probability of failing as entrepreneurs. The highest marginal effect emerges for persons who choose the highest risk in the lottery. For them, the probability of entrepreneurial failure increases by 8 percentage points, doubling from 8% (in the base category) to 16%. Overall, the results of this specification again point to a U-shaped relationship between risk preference and failure rates.<sup>10</sup>

#### Insert Figure 1 about here

Using the estimated hazard models, we further calculate the cumulative failure probabilities over several years according to the failure function of equation 9. Figure 1 depicts the cumulative failure probabilities of entrepreneurs with different risk attitudes over the duration of the self-employment spell (based on Specification 3), evaluated at the mean values of the remaining explanatory variables. For all three types of entrepreneurs, the growth in cumulative failure probabilities is greatest during the first years of self-employment, probably because of the higher failure rates in the initial years of start-up firms. Figure 1 clearly shows that the relationship between risk preferences and cumulative failure rates remains consistently U-shaped, regardless of the self-employment duration. Entrepreneurs who are willing to take medium-level risks thus have lower cumulative failure probabilities than their counterparts with low or high risk preferences.

Because our data set also enables us to analyze the impact of several basic socio-demographic and business characteristics, we present the full estimations results in Specification 1 (see Table A.3 in the Appendix). Beginning with the socio-demographic variables, we observe gender and age effects. That is, women have a higher probability of exiting self-employment, whereas younger persons have a higher probability of remaining self-employed. In line with previous research, we find a positive effect of a self-employed father. Having one does not only increase the probability to become (see, e.g., Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Caliendo et al.,

 $<sup>^{10}</sup>$ The finding that people who invest the lowest amount possible (20,000 Euros) have a higher probability of failing than those who invest nothing certainly represents a surprising kink in this shape, however.

2006) but also to remain self-employed. In a surprising result however, we discover that entrepreneurial survival may be a matter of marital status. Both married and separated persons suffer a significantly higher failure rate than singles. With respect to education and previous working experience, we find several well-known effects. Specifically, a university degree and previous working experience have significantly positive effects, whereas unemployment experience has a negative impact on the probability of remaining self-employed. Finally, we find an interesting wealth effect. Although wealth has a positive impact on the probability of business creation (see Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998), this effect disappears when it comes to business survival: Capital income had no significant impact on the probability of remaining self-employed.

Putting together the test results of Specifications 2-4, in which we control for the effects of these additional variables, we can derive a straightforward conclusion with respect to our main hypothesis: There is an inverse U-shaped relationship between risk attitudes and the survival rates of entrepreneurs.

Sensitivity Analysis: We tested the sensitivity of our results with respect to various dimensions. Using different risk measures (i.e., the willingness to take general risks or risks on financial matters instead of occupational matters) does not change the result, neither does a different classification of the three categories for low-, medium-, and high-level risk attitudes (e.g., by changing the categories from 0-2, 3-7, 8-10, to 0-3, 4-6, 7-10). In a competing risk model where we distinguish between self-employment exits to dependent employment and to unemployment, the U-shaped relationship remains stable for exits to dependent employment. The relationship also remains stable in a single-risk model allowing for unobserved heterogeneity. Detailed results are available on request by the authors.

# 6 Conclusions

In this study, we empirically analyze whether the risk attitudes of active entrepreneurs have an influence on their survival probability. For this analysis, we employ a questionnaire that was part of the 2004 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel

(SOEP) and that asked respondents about both their willingness to take risks in occupational choices, giving us insight into their subjective risk attitudes, and their hypothetical decisions about how much to invest in a safe versus a risky investment, which reveals their objectively measurable risk preferences. As we know from prior research, it is important to control for both kinds of risk measures. Moreover, the same survey indicates the occupational choices of all persons who answer the risk-related questions.

Research in economics has yet to determine whether risk attitudes have an impact on entrepreneurial survival. So far, it instead focuses only on the impact on business creation. For this reason, we adopt an approach from psychological research, which hypothesizes that we should expect an inverse U-shaped relationship between risk attitudes and survival rates, with low (high) risk attitudes characterizing more (less) risk-averse persons. Our results confirm this hypothesis: Persons with particularly low or particularly high risk attitudes fail as entrepreneurs more often than do persons with a medium-level risk attitude. This result notably holds for all kinds of risk measures. Our analysis further reveals that the economic impact of this variable is fairly strong. Specifically, the failure rates of medium-level risk takers drop by about 40% compared with those not willing to take any risk, whereas those of high risk takers almost double.

We thus conclude that risk attitudes ceteris paribus are a defining characteristic of entrepreneurship. Whereas previous research suggests that these attitudes have a significant impact on the decision to become an entrepreneur, we extend existing knowledge by showing that attitudes have a similarly strong influence on the survival and failure rates of already active entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the correlations between risk attitudes and business creation are consistently positive; we show that the relationship between risk attitudes and entrepreneurial success is inversely U-shaped.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>The validity of these findings also has been tested in a field experiment with real money.

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# Tables and Figures

Table 1: Mean Characteristics of Self-Employed/Exits from Self-Employment (SOEP 2000-2005) and t-Test of Equal Means

	Remaining in	Exiting from	
	Self-Employment	Self-Employment	p-value
female	0.330	0.534	0.000
highschool	0.406	0.353	0.006
apprenticeship	0.364	0.411	0.012
highertechncol	0.287	0.249	0.031
university	0.359	0.274	0.000
age (in years)	45.88	43.77	0.000
workexp10 (in years)	1.997	1.668	0.000
unemexp10 (in years)	0.038	0.081	0.000
disabled	0.035	0.038	0.668
german	0.940	0.910	0.002
fatherse	0.179	0.111	0.000
capitalinc (in Euros)	5.957	4.718	0.290
nchild	0.707	0.827	0.002
married	0.694	0.700	0.733
divorced	0.099	0.095	0.690
Risk Measures			
Occ. Risk Low (0-2)	0.178	0.209	0.052
Occ. Risk Medium (3-7)	0.633	0.625	0.692
Occ. Risk High (8-10)	0.189	0.166	0.152
Lottery 0€	0.567	0.534	0.098
Lottery 20k€	0.161	0.211	0.001
Lottery 40k€	0.149	0.164	0.299
Lottery 60k€	0.085	0.054	0.006
Lottery 80k€	0.022	0.013	0.145
Lottery 100k€	0.016	0.024	0.154
PY-Observations	6,595	730	

*Note:* The numbers indicate the fractions in the sample for which the variable is true (unless stated otherwise). p-values refer to t-tests of mean equality in the variables between both groups. See Tables A.1 and A.2 for a detailed description of the variables.


Table 2: Exit Probability from Self-Employment: Logit Estimation Results - Marginal Effects (SOEP 2000-2005)

Spec. 2       Spec. 3       Spec. 4         Occupational Risk 0 (Reference)	3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4		,	
Risk 1039 Risk 2048** Risk 3031 Risk 4033 Risk 5053** Risk 6054** Risk 7041** Risk 8052** Risk 9013 Risk 10031  Occ. Risk Low (0-2, Reference) Occ. Risk Medium (3-7)017* Occ. Risk High (8-10)012  Lottery $0 \in (\text{Reference})$ Lottery $20 k \in $ Lottery $40 k \in $ Lottery $40 k \in $ Lottery $80 k \in $ Lottery $100 k \in $ Lottery $100 k \in $ Control Variables(a) Yes Yes Yes $100 k \in $ Control Variables(a) Yes Yes Yes $100 k \in $ $100 k \in $ Control Variables(a) Yes Yes Yes $100 k \in $		Spec. 2	Spec. 3	Spec. 4
Risk 2048** Risk 3031 Risk 4033 Risk 5053** Risk 6054** Risk 7041** Risk 8052** Risk 9013 Risk 10031  Occ. Risk Low (0-2, Reference) Occ. Risk Medium (3-7)017* Occ. Risk High (8-10)012  Lottery 0€ (Reference) Lottery 20k€ 0.005 Lottery 40k€ 0.005 Lottery 40k€016 Lottery 80k€016 Lottery 80k€017 Lottery 100k€ 0.078*  Control Variables(a) Yes Yes Yes e(r2-p) 0.103 0.1 0.1	Occupational Risk 0 (Reference)			
Risk 3031 Risk 4033 Risk 5053** Risk 6054** Risk 7041** Risk 8052** Risk 9013 Risk 10031  Occ. Risk Low (0-2, Reference) Occ. Risk Medium (3-7)012  Lottery 0€ (Reference) Lottery 20k€ 0.005 Lottery 40k€ 0.005 Lottery 60k€016 Lottery 80k€017 Lottery 100k€ 7es Yes Yes e(r2-p) 0.103 0.1 0.1	Risk 1	039		
Risk 4      033         Risk 5      053**         Risk 6      054**         Risk 7      041**         Risk 8      052**         Risk 9      013         Risk 10      031         Occ. Risk Low (0-2, Reference)      017*         Occ. Risk Medium (3-7)      017*         Occ. Risk High (8-10)      012         Lottery 0€ (Reference)       0.009*         Lottery 20k€       0.005         Lottery 40k€       0.005         Lottery 80k€      016         Lottery 100k€      017         Control Variables <sup>(a)</sup> Yes       Yes         Control Variables <sup>(a)</sup> Yes       Yes	Risk 2	048**		
Risk 5	Risk 3	031		
Risk 6054** Risk 7041** Risk 8052** Risk 9013 Risk 10031  Occ. Risk Low (0-2, Reference) Occ. Risk Medium (3-7)017* Occ. Risk High (8-10)012  Lottery 0€ (Reference) Lottery 20k€ 0.005 Lottery 40k€ 0.005 Lottery 60k€016 Lottery 80k€017 Lottery 100k€ 0.078*  Control Variables(a) Yes Yes Yes e(r2-p) 0.103 0.1 0.1	Risk 4	033		
Risk 7041** Risk 8052** Risk 9013 Risk 10031  Occ. Risk Low (0-2, Reference) Occ. Risk Medium (3-7)017* Occ. Risk High (8-10)012  Lottery 0€ (Reference) Lottery 20k€ 0.019* Lottery 40k€ 0.005 Lottery 60k€016 Lottery 80k€017 Lottery 100k€ 0.078*  Control Variables(a) Yes Yes Yes e(r2-p) 0.103 0.1 0.1	Risk 5	053**		
Risk 8      052**         Risk 9      013         Risk 10      031         Occ. Risk Low (0-2, Reference)      017*         Occ. Risk Medium (3-7)      017*         Occ. Risk High (8-10)      012         Lottery $0 \in$ (Reference)       0.019*         Lottery $20k \in$ 0.005         Lottery $40k \in$ 0.005         Lottery $60k \in$ 016         Lottery $80k \in$ 017         Lottery $100k \in$ 0.078*         Control Variables <sup>(a)</sup> Yes       Yes         e(r2-p)       0.103       0.1       0.1	Risk 6	054**		
Risk 9      013         Risk 10      031         Occ. Risk Low (0-2, Reference)      017*         Occ. Risk Medium (3-7)      012         Lottery 0€ (Reference)      012         Lottery 20k€       0.019*         Lottery 40k€       0.005         Lottery 60k€      016         Lottery 80k€      017         Lottery 100k€       0.078*         Control Variables(a)       Yes       Yes         e(r2-p)       0.103       0.1       0.1	Risk 7	041**		
Risk 10      031         Occ. Risk Low (0-2, Reference)      017*         Occ. Risk Medium (3-7)      012*         Lottery 0€ (Reference)      012         Lottery 20k€       0.019*         Lottery 40k€       0.005         Lottery 60k€      016         Lottery 80k€      017         Lottery 100k€       0.078*         Control Variables(a)       Yes       Yes         e(r2-p)       0.103       0.1       0.1	Risk 8	052**		
Occ. Risk Low (0-2, Reference)      017*         Occ. Risk Medium (3-7)      012         Lottery 0€ (Reference)      012         Lottery 20k€       0.019*         Lottery 40k€       0.005         Lottery 60k€      016         Lottery 80k€      017         Lottery 100k€       0.078*         Control Variables(a)       Yes       Yes         e(r2-p)       0.103       0.1       0.1	Risk 9	013		
Occ. Risk Medium (3-7)      017*         Occ. Risk High (8-10)      012         Lottery 0€ (Reference)       0.019*         Lottery 20k€       0.005         Lottery 40k€      016         Lottery 80k€      017         Lottery 100k€       0.078*         Control Variables <sup>(a)</sup> Yes       Yes         e(r2-p)       0.103       0.1       0.1	Risk 10	031		
Occ. Risk High (8-10)      012         Lottery 0€ (Reference)       0.019*         Lottery 20k€       0.005         Lottery 40k€      016         Lottery 80k€      017         Lottery 100k€       0.078*         Control Variables(a)       Yes       Yes         e(r2-p)       0.103       0.1       0.1	Occ. Risk Low (0-2, Reference)			
Lottery 0€ (Reference)         Lottery 20k€ $0.019*$ Lottery 40k€ $0.005$ Lottery 60k€ $016$ Lottery 80k€ $017$ Lottery 100k€ $0.078*$ Control Variables(a)       Yes       Yes         e(r2-p) $0.103$ $0.1$ $0.1$	Occ. Risk Medium (3-7)		017*	
Lottery $20k$ € $0.019*$ Lottery $40k$ € $0.005$ Lottery $60k$ € $016$ Lottery $80k$ € $017$ Lottery $100k$ € $0.078*$ Control Variables <sup>(a)</sup> Yes       Yes         e(r2-p) $0.103$ $0.1$ $0.1$	Occ. Risk High (8-10)		012	
Lottery $40k$ €       0.005         Lottery $60k$ €      016         Lottery $80k$ €      017         Lottery $100k$ €       0.078*         Control Variables <sup>(a)</sup> Yes       Yes         e(r2-p)       0.103       0.1       0.1	Lottery 0€ (Reference)			
Lottery 60k€      016         Lottery 80k€      017         Lottery 100k€       0.078*         Control Variables(a)       Yes       Yes         e(r2-p)       0.103       0.1       0.1	Lottery 20k€			$0.019^{*}$
Lottery 80k€      017         Lottery 100k€       0.078*         Control Variables(a)       Yes       Yes         e(r2-p)       0.103       0.1       0.1	Lottery 40k€			0.005
Lottery $100k$ € $0.078*$ Control Variables <sup>(a)</sup> Yes Yes Yes  e(r2-p) $0.103$ $0.1$ $0.1$	Lottery 60k€			016
$\begin{array}{c cccc} \hline \text{Control Variables}^{(a)} & \text{Yes} & \text{Yes} \\ \hline e(r2\text{-p}) & 0.103 & 0.1 & 0.1 \\ \hline \end{array}$	Lottery 80k€			017
e(r2-p) 0.103 0.1 0.1	Lottery 100k€			0.078*
· - /	Control Variables <sup>(a)</sup>	Yes	Yes	Yes
e(ll) -1620.695 -1626.385 -1654.817	· - /		0.1	0.1
	e(ll)	-1620.695	-1626.385	-1654.817

Notes: \*\*\*/\*\*/\* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% levels.

<sup>(</sup>a) See Table A.3 for a full list of included explanatory variables.

Figure 1: Cumulative failure probabilities for entrepreneurs with different risk attitudes



*Notes:* The calculation of the cumulative failure probabilities is based on the estimation results presented in Table A.3 (Specification 3).

# A Additional Tables

Table A.1: Detailed Description of the Risk Measures

Variable Label	Description			
Hypothetical risky investment after winning 100 thousand Euros in the lottery <sup>(a)</sup>				
Lottery 0€	Dummy for individuals who would invest nothing. Omitted category.			
Lottery 20k€	Dummy for individuals who would invest 20 thousand Euros.			
Lottery 40k€	Dummy for individuals who would invest 40 thousand Euros.			
Lottery 60k€	Dummy for individuals who would invest 60 thousand Euros.			
Lottery 80k€	Dummy for individuals who would invest 80 thousand Euros.			
Lottery 100k€	Dummy for individuals who would invest 100 thousand Euros.			
Willingness to take risk	${f s}$ in occupation $^{({f b})}$			
Occ. Risk Low (0-2)	Dummy for individuals who indicated 0-2 on 11-point scale, omitted category.			
Occ. Risk Medium (3-7)	Dummy for individuals who indicated 3-7 on 11-point scale.			
Occ. Risk High (8-10)	Dummy for individuals who indicated 8-10 on 11-point scale.			

<sup>(</sup>a) The original SOEP question for the hypothetical investment is: Please consider what you would do in the following situation:

Imagine that you had won 100,000 Euros in the lottery. Almost immediately after you collect the winnings, you receive the following financial offer from a reputable bank, the conditions of which are as follows: There is the chance to double the money within two years. It is equally possible that you could lose half of the amount invested. You have the opportunity to invest the full amount, part of the amount or reject the offer.

What share of your lottery winnings would you be prepared to invest in this financially risky, yet lucrative investment? 100.000 Euros, 80.000 Euros, 60.000 Euros, 40.000 Euros, 20.000 Euros, Nothing, I would decline the offer."

How is it in your occupation?.

<sup>(</sup>b) The original SOEP questions for the different areas are: People can behave differently in different situations. How would you rate your willingness to take risks in the following areas? Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 means: 'risk averse' and the value 10 means: 'fully prepared to take risks'.

Table A.2: Detailed Description of the Variables

T7	
Variable Label	Description
female	Dummy for females
east	Dummy for individuals who live in East-Germany
highschool	Dummy for individuals who have a high school degree ("Fachhochschulreife" or
	"Abitur")
apprenticeship	Dummy for individuals who finished an apprenticeship ("Lehre")
highertechncol	Dummy for individuals who finished a higher technical college or similar
university	Dummy for individuals who have a university degree
age	Age of individual
agesqr	Age squared
$workexp10^{(a)}$	Years of work experience, divided by 10.
$unemexp10^{(a)}$	Years of unemployment experience, divided by 10.
disabled	Dummy for handicapped / physically challenged individuals
german	Dummy for German nationality
nchild	Number of children under 17 in the household
married	Dummy for married and not separated individuals. Omitted category for marital
	status is "single"/"widowed".
separated	Dummy for married, but separated individuals
divorced	Dummy for divorced individuals
fatherse	Dummy for individuals whose father is/was self-employed
capitalinc	Income from interests, dividends and renting out in t (reported retrospectively in
•	t+1) in 1000 Euros.
duration <sup>(a)</sup>	Tenure of current self-employment spell
duration-sq	$duration^2$
duration-cu	$duration^3$

<sup>(</sup>a) Uses information from the lifetime employment history in the SOEP.

Notes: Dummy variables equal 1 if condition holds and 0 otherwise.

Table A.3: Exit Probability from Self-Employment: Logit Estimation Results - Coefficients (SOEP 2000-2005)

	Spec. 1	Spec. 2	Spec. 3	Spec. 4
duration	282***	284***	284***	288***
duration-sq	0.014***	0.015***	0.015***	0.015***
duration-cu	0002***	0002***	0002***	0002***
female	0.574***	$0.53^{***}$	$0.535^{***}$	0.553***
highschool	022	057	070	078
apprenticeship	0.132	0.175	0.184	0.2
highertechncol	058	072	078	052
university	316**	341**	332**	276**
age	086**	082**	082**	094**
agesq	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
workexp10	359***	438***	439***	429***
unemexp10	1.337***	1.250***	1.232***	1.260***
disabled	0.028	077	033	029
german	182	226	233	173
fatherse	333**	324**	326**	312**
capitalinc	00006	0007	0006	0005
nchild	0.017	0.033	0.023	0.019
married	0.363**	0.344**	0.336**	0.355**
separated	0.481*	0.564*	0.548*	0.527*
divorced	0.28	0.248	0.235	0.222
d2001	358**	366**	369**	414**
d2002	102	193	202	248
d2003	223	269*	283*	287*
d2004	113	225	232	287*
d2005	305**	386**	395**	433***
Occupational Risk 0 (Reference)				
Risk 1		412		
Risk 2		544**		
Risk 3		322		
Risk 4		344		
Risk 5		612***		
Risk 6		626***		
Risk 7		448**		
Risk 8		594***		
Risk 9		128		
Risk 10		323		
Occ. Risk Low (0-2, Reference)		.020		
Occ. Risk Medium (3-7)			213*	
Occ. Risk High (8-10)			147	
Lottery 0€ (Reference)			,	
Lottery 20k€				0.231*
Lottery 40k€				0.062
Lottery 60k€				232
				249
Lottery 80k€				0.76**
Lottery 80k€ Lottery 100k€				
Lottery 100k€	5999	5300	5300	
	5999 0.092	5300 0.103	5300 0.099	5354 0.1

Notes:~\*\*\*/\*\*/\* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% levels.