

Lalive, Rafael

Working Paper

How do extended benefits affect unemployment duration?: A regression discontinuity approach

CESifo Working Paper, No. 1765

Provided in Cooperation with:

Ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich

Suggested Citation: Lalive, Rafael (2006) : How do extended benefits affect unemployment duration?: A regression discontinuity approach, CESifo Working Paper, No. 1765, Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25810>

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.

HOW DO EXTENDED BENEFITS AFFECT
UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION?
A REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY APPROACH

RAFAEL LALIVE

CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1765

CATEGORY 3: SOCIAL PROTECTION

JULY 2006

An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded

- *from the SSRN website:* www.SSRN.com
- *from the RePEc website:* www.RePEc.org
- *from the CESifo website:* www.CESifo-group.de

HOW DO EXTENDED BENEFITS AFFECT UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION? A REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY APPROACH

Abstract

This paper studies a program that extends the maximum duration of unemployment benefits from 30 weeks to 209 weeks. Interestingly, this program is targeted to individuals aged 50 years or older, living in certain eligible regions in Austria. In the evaluation, I use sharp discontinuities in treatment assignment at age 50 and at the border between eligible regions and control regions to identify the effect of extended benefits on unemployment duration. Results indicate that the duration of job search is prolonged by at least .09 weeks per additional week of benefits among men, whereas unemployment duration increases by at least .32 weeks per additional week of benefits among women. The salient differences between men and women are consistent with the lower minimum age for early retirement applying to women.

JEL Code: C41, J64, J65.

Keywords: benefit duration, unemployment duration, early retirement, regression discontinuity.

*Rafael Lalive
University of Zurich
Institute for Empirical Economic Research
Blümlisalpstr. 10
8006 Zurich
Switzerland
rlalive@iew.unizh.ch*

First version: February 24, 2006

This version: July 6, 2006

I would like to thank the editors, two anonymous referees, David Autor, Josef Zweimüller and seminar participants in Berne, Frankfurt an der Oder, Lausanne, and Zürich for comments on a previous version of this paper. Andreas Kuhn provided great research assistance and Ronald Schmidt helped displaying geographical information. All remaining errors are my own.

1 Introduction

Structural unemployment differs tremendously among countries at relatively similar stages of economic development. For instance, the 20 OECD member countries analyzed by Nickell and Layard (1999) are characterized by an average unemployment rate over the period 1983 to 1996 of about 8 %; but the standard deviation in unemployment rates across these countries amounts to more than 4 %. The literature on labor market institutions documents strong differences in policies that appear to contribute to unemployment with unemployment insurance being one of the most important candidate explanations. In particular, the potential duration of unemployment benefits is strongly correlated with structural unemployment (Nickell and Layard, 1999). The idea is that extended benefit duration discourages job search and thus leads to prolonged unemployment duration.

This paper proposes to identify the causal effect of extending benefits on the duration of job search using information on a unique policy change in Austria. In June 1988, the Austrian government extended the potential duration of unemployment benefits from 30 weeks to 209 weeks for job seekers aged 50 or older when entering unemployment, living for at least 6 months in certain regions of Austria, who satisfy a previous work requirement. There are several interesting aspects of this regional extended benefit program (REBP). *First*, the REBP provides a unique opportunity to study the effect of a dramatic increase in the potential benefit duration by almost 3.5 years. The existing literature on the effects of potential benefit duration on unemployment duration are primarily based on extensions of benefit duration by one or two quarters.¹

Second, the program is strictly targeted with respect to age at entry into unemployment and place of residence – two dimensions that can be readily observed in the available data. The age based identification strategy compares job seekers who are aged 50 years to job seekers who just fail the age requirement. This strategy is intuitively appealing because both groups of job seekers are basically of the same age. However, since the program was strictly applied conditional on having completed the 50th year of age, the slightly older group of job seekers has access to REBP whereas the slightly younger group of job seekers does not have access to REBP. Thus assignment to treatment takes place in a so-called ”sharp” regression discontinuity design (Hahn *et al.*, 2001). One potentially important concern with this strategy is that firms and workers could try to manipulate age at entry into unemployment. In particular, firms might be willing to offer to their employees not to lay them off until they just satisfy the age requirement.² The paper therefore proposes to focus on the second threshold, the

¹For instance, Katz and Meyer (1990) use state variation in federal supplementation of potential benefit duration by one quarter (13 week) triggered by high unemployment. Lalive *et al.* (2006) study changes in potential benefit duration in Austria by 9, and 22 weeks respectively.

²Such a reaction can invalidate the regression discontinuity assumption that average unemployment duration

border between treated and control regions, to identify the effect of REBP on unemployment duration. This geography based strategy contrasts individuals living close to both sides of the border between treated and control regions. This contrast is appealing because labor market conditions are quite similar within a tightly defined geographical area. Moreover, in contrast to age at entry into unemployment, region of residence can not be readily manipulated because workers have to move from control to treated regions well in advance of the eventual layoff.

Third, Austrian social insurance legislation allows for early retirement at age 54 years for unemployed women but only at age 59 years for unemployed men. This means that REBP can also be used to study the interactions between unemployment insurance provisions and early retirement rules. Specifically, by performing separate analyses for women and men, this paper can discuss the likely impacts of having an early retirement option after exhausting unemployment benefits among women compared to not having this option among men.

This paper contributes to two strands of the literature. The first strand is concerned with measuring the effects of potential benefit duration on unemployment duration. A selective list of contributions includes Card and Levine (2000), Hunt (1995), Katz and Meyer (1990), Lalive and Zweimüller (2004b), Moffitt (1985), Moffitt and Nicholson (1982), Winter-Ebmer (1998) and Van Ours and Vodopivec (2006). These contributions to the literature are primarily based on differences-in-differences approaches.³ The present paper goes beyond the existing literature in proposing to use the regression discontinuity approach. This design is appealing. Berger *et al.* (2005) find that the regression discontinuity design very robustly identifies the effect that would be found in a randomized experiment. The smaller second strand of the literature discusses interactions between unemployment insurance and early retirement. Heyma and Van Ours (2006) study how the early retirement option affects job finding rates among older workers in the Netherlands. Riphahn (1997) compares the determinants of transitions into unemployment and disability among older workers in German data. She concludes that critical variables such as individual health or aggregate unemployment have clearly different effects on the two forms of exit from employment. Dahl *et al.* (1999) reach a similar conclusion using Norwegian data.

The main contributions of this paper are the following. *First*, the paper studies a dramatic change in potential benefit duration. This is appealing from an economic viewpoint because it provides evidence on the maximum extent to which changing the potential benefit duration

for individuals just missing the age threshold is informative on the counterfactual duration without treatment for individuals who have just turned 50 years. See McCrary (2005) and Lee and McCrary (2005) for a discussion of manipulation in the regression discontinuity design.

³In the static labor supply literature, Lemieux and Milligan (2005) study the incentive effects of social assistance on the decision to work in a regression discontinuity design (RDD) and discuss the relationship between the RDD and the differences-in-differences approach. Moreover, Card *et al.* (2006) discuss the likely reasons for the effects of extended benefits on unemployment duration exploiting discontinuities in Austrian severance pay rules.

contributes to unemployment. Moreover, because the treatment dose is so large, a graphical analysis of the treatment effect is quite informative. *Second*, this paper identifies the effects of the same change in potential benefit duration at two thresholds – the age threshold and the border threshold. This is useful because the regression discontinuity assumption may be satisfied for the geographic analysis but not necessarily for the age based strategy. Moreover, because the effect of treatment may depend on the characteristics of individuals, this paper illustrates that the average effects identified at two thresholds do not agree because the underlying threshold populations differ. *Third*, the analysis uses rich, high quality, comprehensive data from two administrative sources, the Austrian social security database, and the Austrian unemployment insurance register. These data provide a comprehensive account of the entire work history of individuals since the year 1972. Moreover, the data record very accurately both the age at entry into unemployment and the place of residence of job seekers. These two pieces of information are crucial in implementing a convincing regression discontinuity identification strategy. *Fourth*, the data cover the universe of all unemployment spells. This allows concentrating on unemployment spells that are fairly close to the age and border thresholds thus limiting the possible biases due to misspecification. Indeed, results indicate that the effects of both age and distance border on average unemployment duration can be captured in a relatively simple manner – a model with a linear trend on both sides of the threshold. This means that the empirical analysis convincingly identifies the effect of extended benefits and early retirement rules on unemployment duration. *Fifth*, many countries are developing strategies for their pension systems to be able to cope with rapidly ageing populations. This paper argues that it may be important to focus on pathways to retirement that are generated by social assistance programs outside the pension system.

The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides background on the unemployment insurance system, on the regional extended benefit program, and on the early retirement rules in Austria. Section 3 discusses the dataset and provides descriptive statistics on the subsamples of eligible and ineligible job seekers used in the main analysis. Section 4 provides descriptive evidence on the effects of REBP on unemployment duration, on the composition of the unemployment inflow, and on the size of the unemployment inflow. Section 5 discusses identification and estimation of treatment effects in the regression discontinuity design. Section 6 provides the regression analysis of the effects of REBP on unemployment duration, and section 7 concludes this paper with a summary of our findings.

2 Background

This section discusses the Austrian unemployment insurance and early retirement rules and it provides background on the REBP. Moreover, the section discusses why the REBP may affect women differently from men.

Unemployment insurance: The design of the Austrian unemployment insurance system is encoded in a national unemployment insurance law (*Arbeitslosenversicherungsgesetz*). Before August 1989, an unemployed person could draw regular unemployment benefits (UB) for a maximum period of 30 weeks provided that he or she had paid unemployment insurance contributions for at least 156 weeks within the last 5 years.⁴ In August 1989 the potential duration of UB payments became dependent not only on previous experience but also on age at the beginning of the unemployment spell. Benefit duration for the age group 40-49 was increased to 39 weeks if the unemployed has been employed 312 weeks within the last 10 years prior to the current spell. For the age group 50 and older, UB-duration was increased to 52 weeks if the unemployed has been employed for at least 468 weeks within the last 15 years.

Voluntary quitters and workers discharged for misconduct can not claim benefits until a waiting period of 4 weeks has passed. UB recipients are expected to search actively for a new job that should be within the scope of the claimant's qualifications, at least during the first months of the unemployment spell. Non-compliance with the eligibility rules is subject to benefit sanctions that can lead to the withdrawal of benefits for up to 4 weeks.

Compared to other European countries, the replacement ratio (UB relative to *gross* monthly earnings) is rather low. The amount of UB payments depends on previous earnings and, in 1990, the replacement ratio was 40.4 % for the median income earner; 48.2 % for a low-wage worker who earned half the median; and 29.6 % for a high-wage worker earning twice the median. On top, family allowances are paid. UB payments are not taxed implying that net-replacement rates are substantially higher than 40 %, and there is no experience rating of firms.

After UB payments have been exhausted, job seekers can apply for 'transfer payments for those in need' (*Notstandshilfe*).⁵ As the name indicates, these social assistance transfers are means-tested. Social assistance payments depend on the income and wealth situation of other family members and close relatives and may, in principle, last for an indefinite time period. These transfers are granted for successive periods of 39 weeks after which eligibility requirements are recurrently checked. The social assistance transfers are lower than UB and

⁴UB duration was 20 weeks for job-seekers who did not meet this requirement. This paper focuses on individuals who were entitled to at least 30 weeks of benefits.

⁵This implies that job seekers who do not meet UB eligibility criteria can apply at the beginning of their spell

can at most be 92 % of UB. In 1990, the median post-UB transfer payment was about 70 % of the median UB among job seekers who were eligible for social assistance. Note however, that individuals who are eligible for such transfers may not be comparable to individuals who collect UB because not all individuals who exhaust UB pass the means test. The majority of the unemployed (59 %) received UB whereas 26 % received social assistance transfers.

The Regional Extended Benefits Program: The background of the REBP is strongly tied to the history of the Austrian steel sector. To protect its assets after World War II from Soviet appropriation and to provide the capital needed for reconstruction, Austria nationalized its iron, steel, and oil industries, large segments of the heavy engineering and electrical industries, most of the coal mines, and the nonferrous metals industries. State owned firms in manufacturing were part of a large holding company, the *Oesterreichische Industrie AG*, OeIAG. By the mid-1970s this holding company was running into serious problems related to shrinking markets, overstaffing, too heavy concentration on outmoded smokestack industries, insufficient research and development, and low productivity. Initially, the Austrian government covered the losses by subsidies. But in 1986, after the steel industry was hit by an oil speculation scandal and failure of a U.S. steel plant project, this protectionist policy was abolished. A new management was appointed and a strict restructuring plan was implemented. This plan aimed at focusing on the holdings' core competencies. The result were layoffs due to plant closures and downsizing, particularly in the steel industry.

To mitigate the labor market problems in the concerned regions the Austrian government enacted a law that extended UB-entitlement to *209 weeks* for a specific subgroup. An unemployed worker became eligible to 209 weeks of UB if he or she satisfied, *at the beginning* of his or her unemployment spell, each of the following criteria: (i) age 50 or older; (ii) a continuous work history (780 employment weeks during the last 25 years prior to the current unemployment spell); (iii) location of residence in one of 28 selected labor market districts since at least 6 months prior to the claim; and (iv) start of a new unemployment spell after June 1988 or spell in progress in June 1988. The REBP was initially expected to be in effect until December 1991. However, the Austrian parliament decided at the end of 1991 to extend the program until August 1993 when it was eventually abolished.

The minister for social affairs, a member of the ruling party SPÖ, was in charge of selecting those regions that became eligible to the program. Records of the meetings in which the set of regions eligible to the program was decided are not open to the public. However, Lalive and Zweimüller (2004a) show that eligible regions were characterized by a strong concentration of employment in the steel sector and that there are no differences between regions in terms of unemployment. These two facts support an explanation that the program was targeted towards regions with a relatively high share of employment in the steel sector rather than

towards regions with high structural unemployment. Note that except for the REBP, all other labor market institutions do not differ across regions.

This discussion implies, first, that it might be difficult to draw reliable evidence on the effect of REBP from a global comparison of treated and control regions because these regions are characterized by a different industry structure. However, a local comparison at the border between treated and control regions can be quite informative if communities located on both sides of the border are similar in terms of industry and age structure. Second, it is clear that individuals entering unemployment from a job in the steel industry were not only facing a different unemployment insurance regime but were affected by the restructuring of the steel sector. Thus it is very difficult to isolate the effects of extended benefits on unemployment duration in the non-steel inflow. This paper therefore proposes to focus on the non-steel inflow. Note that more than 80 % of all job seekers were not previously employed in the steel sector. This means that concentrating on the non-steel inflow allows identifying the effects of extended benefits on an important sub-sample of the entire unemployment inflow.

Early Retirement Rules: Austrian social security legislation provides for regular old age pensions at age 65 for men and age 60 for women. Pension benefits depend on contributions to the pension system in the 156 months (13 years) prior to leaving the labor force, and on the total number of months contributed to the pension system.

There are two early retirement pathways available at age 60 for men and at age 55 for women. The first is provided for individuals who have a long contribution history, that is, worked for at least 420 months (35 years) prior to claiming early retirement. Also, individuals applying for this early retirement option must have worked for at least 2 out of the previous 3 years before entering early retirement. The second early retirement option is available to individuals who have spent at least 12 out of the previous 15 months claiming unemployment benefits, post-UB transfers, or special income support.

A third measure affecting older workers is *Sonderunterstützung* (special income support). This measure was originally created in January 1974 to support individuals in the mining sector who were permanently displaced just prior to becoming eligible for early retirement. The special income support program provides benefits for at most one year; benefits are 25 % higher than unemployment benefits capped from above by the pension benefit the individual is expected to receive from the pension system. In 1979, the system was extended to cover all men aged 59 years or older and women aged 54 years or older, provided they had contributed to the pension system for at least 15 out of the previous 25 years. Note that the previous contribution requirement for the special income support is identical to the contribution requirement for REBP.

Hypotheses: The effects of the REBP for men can be analyzed in the standard job search

framework where job seekers receive unemployment benefits as long as they have not exhausted the potential benefit duration. Thereafter job seekers are eligible for reduced social assistance transfers. Mortensen (1977) argues that extending the potential benefit duration in such a system tends to reduce the transition rate to regular jobs because it postpones the exhaustion of regular unemployment benefits.⁶ This reduction in the unemployment exit rate leads to prolonged unemployment duration.

In contrast to men, women have access to special income support once unemployment benefits have been exhausted. This means that in contrast to the standard job search model, eligible women are facing an upward sloping time path of benefits discouraging job search strongly.⁷ Thus, REBP is expected to prolong unemployment duration much more strongly for women than for men.

Moreover, firms and workers may even use REBP to change their early retirement strategies. Laying off an older worker who is unproductive but has been employed with the firm for a long period damages the reputation of the firm. In contrast, offering this worker an early retirement option is a way to end the employment relationship without damaging one's reputation among on-going jobs. Thus, providing early retirement is an attractive option for firms who want to keep a reputation as a long-term employer but also desire to end employment relationships that are marginally unproductive. In general, financing early retirement is costly. However, since REBP replaces at least 40 % of previous income, this strategy becomes attractive for firms who expect significant savings from ending an employment relationship but do not want to be perceived as renegeing on a promise of long-term employment. They merely need to provide severance pay to top off unemployment benefits in order to reach the level of a regular old age pension. Analyzing unemployment duration is informative on the extent to which such agreements may have taken place. Women with access to an early retirement package are certain not to leave unemployment until they reach age 54 (special income support program starts; income while unemployed is lower than special income support) or age 55 (regular early retirement program starts; income while unemployed is higher than special income support). This means that the duration of unemployment among eligible women with an early retirement option is a monotonically decreasing function of the time from age at entry into unemployment to age 54/55 years.

⁶Lalive *et al.* (2006) find that this is indeed the case for small benefit extensions.

⁷These predictions have been recently developed in the standard job search model (Hairault *et al.*, 2006).

3 Data

To assess the impact of benefit duration and early retirement rules on the duration of unemployment spells, I use longitudinal individual data from two different sources: (i) the Austrian social security database (ASSD) which contains detailed information on the individuals' age, employment, unemployment and earnings history since the year 1972, and some information on the employer like region and industry affiliation; and (ii) the Austrian unemployment register (AUR) from which I get information on the place of residence (community) and relevant socio-economic characteristics. The data cover the universe of the unemployment inflow over the period 1986 to 1995. The corresponding spells are followed up until the end of 1998.

The empirical analysis extracts information on individuals entering unemployment from a job in the non-steel sector in the time period 1/1986 until 12/1987 (before REBP) and in the time period 8/1989 until 7/1991 (during REBP). The first time period covers the situation before REBP was introduced. We restrict attention to the period after January 1986 because the Austrian unemployment register only started in 1986. Moreover, we do not include information on the period 1/1988 until 5/1988 because spells starting in this time period may already be affected by REBP.⁸ The 'during REBP' time period covers the longest possible time period where REBP is introduced but no other changes in benefit entitlement take place. (Recall that the maximum unemployment duration was changed as of August 1989.) Furthermore, the analysis disregards the fourth quarter inflow into unemployment in the year 1991 because Lalive and Zweimüller (2004a) show that the inflow into unemployment was very strongly affected just prior to the end of 1991.⁹

The analysis furthermore focuses on individuals with a 'continuous' work history. Eligibility for REBP (and special income support) requires 780 employment weeks (15 years) within the last 25 years – an actual-to-potential experience ratio of at least 0.6. Since the Austrian social security database only contains information as of January 1, 1972, we can observe at most 19.5 years prior to entry into unemployment on average. In order to keep possible misclassification low, a continuous work history is defined as a career with a ratio of actual to potential work experience (henceforth previous experience) since the year 1972 of at least 0.7. This ensures that only workers who satisfy the work experience requirement with a very high probability are included in the sample.¹⁰

⁸Note that ongoing spells are affected by REBP. However, once a job seeker has exhausted regular unemployment benefits he or she is no longer eligible for REBP. Since the potential benefit duration was at most 30 weeks prior to REBP, this sample selection ensures that REBP does not affect the 'before REBP' analysis strongly.

⁹Arguably, this can be rationalized by the fact that it was not certain whether REBP would be extended. Firms and workers therefore had a strong incentive to make use of the generous unemployment insurance rules provided by REBP.

¹⁰The data contain information on employment dating back to the late 1940s for about 30 % of all individuals (*REV Daten*). This information can be used to assess the quality of the threshold rule used in the empirical

The data contain information on the month and year of birth, and month and year of entry into unemployment. This allows calculating the age at entry into unemployment by counting the number of years and months of a persons life completed before entering unemployment. For instance, a job seeker born in June 1940 who is entering unemployment in May 1990 is aged 49 years and 11 months. In contrast, a job seeker born in the same month but entering unemployment in June 1990 is aged 50 years and 0 months.¹¹ The empirical analysis restricts attention to individuals aged 46 years to 53 years (and 11 months) at the beginning of the unemployment spell. This is the only age bracket where both women and men do not have access to early retirement on the first day of the unemployment spell. Second, because age is only recorded up to a precision of one month, we allow for clustering of the regression errors at the age cell level to account for possible specification error as suggested in Card and Lee (2006).

The second identification strategy identifies the effect of REBP at the border between treated and control regions.¹² Figure 1 shows the distribution of REBP across the 2361 communities in Austria. Interestingly, the treated regions (communities with blue shading) were all located on a contiguous area located in the Eastern part of Austria and stretching from the Northern border to the Southern border. The program covers parts of the provinces Burgenland, Carinthia (Kärnten), Lower Austria (Niederösterreich), Upper Austria (Oberösterreich), and Styria (Steiermark).

It is crucial to measure the distance of each community to the border between treated and control regions. Figure 1 shows that communities which appear to be located close to the border on the map need not be close in economic terms because they are separated by mountainous terrain (for instance in the Alpine center of Austria). We therefore use a measure that reflects travel time – an economically more relevant measure of distance between locations than air distance. Specifically, the distance to the border of community A is the number of minutes it takes to drive a car from a community across the border, i.e. to the closest community that is located on the other side of the border.¹³ This travel distance measure is


analysis. Findings indicate that 61 % of all job seekers with an actual to potential experience ratio of .6 to .7 actually fulfill the 15 out of 25 years requirement. The corresponding figure is 81 % for job seekers with a ratio of .7 to .8, it is 94 % for job seekers with a ratio of .8 to .9, and it is 99 % for job seekers with a ratio of .9 to 1. This suggests that the .7 threshold is successful in identifying eligible individuals (the average probability of being eligible exceeds 94 %). Note, however, that we can not concentrate on the sub-sample of individuals with *REV* information since this sub-sample is not a random draw from the unemployment inflow.

¹¹Note that this job seeker may have been born on June 30, 1940 but entered unemployment on June 1, 1990 missing almost one month to her or his 50th birthday. Results strongly suggest that this person was nevertheless eligible for REBP (see Figure 2). Arguably, this can be explained by the fact that the caseworkers in the unemployment insurance office only consider month and year of birth and unemployment entry when assessing a claimant's eligibility status.

¹²See Holmes (2005) and Hoxby (2000) for important geography based analyses in urban economics and the economics of education.

¹³The distance measure reflects the time required to drive from the center of community A to the center of the community on the other side of the border using the fastest road connection between these two communities under normal conditions. We obtained this information in 2000 from a commercial provider of rout planning

Figure 1: Regional distribution of REBP



superior to using air distance between communities because it accounts for possible geographic barriers (mountains, rivers) between communities that look adjacent on a map. The minimal distance from a community in the treated region to the nearest control region community is 5 minutes. We normalize travel distance from this treated community to the border to be zero because this community is, effectively, located exactly on the border between treated and control communities.¹⁴

For control region communities we perform the same calculation with the only difference that we record the negative of the travel distance by car. Thus non-negative values of the distance to border variable refer to treated communities. Negative values of the distance to border refer to control communities. The analysis identifies the effect of REBP on unemployment duration at the border between treated and control communities, i.e. at zero minutes distance to border.

The empirical analysis restricts attention to individuals living no farther than a 70 minutes car drive from the border because the density of the inflow into unemployment is very low

software in Austria (DDS Digital Services). Note that the travel distance by car measured in this paper may not properly reflect the travel distance at the beginning of the 1990s. Nevertheless, we believe that this measure of travel distance is likely to contain important information on the geographic distance between communities because there were no major changes to road infrastructure.

¹⁴Specifically, we subtract 5 minutes travel distance from each treated region community's distance to the border between regions.

in communities located further than 70 minutes car distance from the border. Furthermore, we also exclude unemployment spells that start in Vienna (a control region city located at 33 minutes from the border between treated and control regions) because Vienna is a very dominant community characterized by long unemployment duration.

The key issue in terms of identification is the location of steel plants in terms of distance to the border between treated and control regions. Even though the analysis focuses on the non-steel inflow, the steel restructuring operations may spill over to other industries. There are two main channels for spillovers. First, industries that are supplying materials to the steel industry can be affected. Second, the reduction in steel worker incomes may spill over to other industries via reduced demand for goods. The national steel holding's two largest plants are located in the city of Linz (Upper Austria), and Donawitz, located near the city of Leoben (Styria). Our data indicates that it takes 24 minutes to drive from the city of Linz to the border between treated and control regions. The distance from Donawitz to the border is even longer – 34 minutes. Arguably, this suggests that spillovers from steel do not affect estimates of the effect of REBP at the border between treated and control regions.¹⁵

Table 1 reports key background statistics on the job seekers entering unemployment from a job in the non-steel sector in the time during REBP (8/1989-7/1991), by gender, age and region of residence.¹⁶

Table 1 indicates that there are 4759 treated male individuals, that is individuals aged 50-53 years, living in treated regions (Panel A, Column 1). Average age is slightly lower than 52 years reflecting the fact that the inflow is concentrated somewhat among individuals closer to the 50 year threshold. On average, treated individuals live about a 28 minutes car drive from the border between treated and control regions. About 83 % of all men who enter unemployment are married, and about 48 % of the job seekers were previously employed in construction.¹⁷

Table 1 shows that there are 4975 men starting an unemployment spell also in treated regions but aged 46-49 years (Panel A, Column 2). Clearly, average age (48 years) in this group is lower than in the group of treated individuals. However, this first control group appears to be living at roughly similar distance to the border between treated and control regions and the younger group of job seekers living in treated regions is quite comparable to the eligible older group of job seekers in terms of the family situation. In the control communities, there are 8537 men entering unemployment in the age group 50-53 years (Table 1, Panel A,

¹⁵Note that spillovers from steel are unlikely to bias the identification strategy at the age 50 years threshold because these spillovers affect both job seekers similarly on both sides of the threshold.

¹⁶These control variables are used in the empirical analysis. In addition, the empirical analysis uses information on family situation, education, nationality, wage in previous job, skill level (white collar vs. blue collar), and previous industry to control for possible differences between treated and control spells.

¹⁷Note that the high share of construction workers in the unemployment inflow reflects strong seasonal unemployment in the construction sector rather than the relative size of this sector compared to other sectors.

Table 1: Selected Descriptive Statistics (means)

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)
Living in Age bracket	Treated region 50-53 years	Treated region 46-49 years	Control region 50-53 years
	<i>A. Men</i>		
Age (years)	51.7	48.0	51.7
Distance to border (minutes)	28.2	27.2	-39.2
Married (share)	.828	.785	.821
Construction (share)	.481	.492	.600
Number of spells	4759	4975	8537
	<i>B. Women</i>		
Age (years)	51.5	48.1	51.9
Distance to border (minutes)	27.1	26.6	-37.1
Married (share)	.780	.696	.721
Construction (share)	.030	.027	.034
Number of spells	3466	2193	3625

Source: Own calculations, based on ASSD.


Column 3).¹⁸ Average age for control region job seekers is identical to treated individuals. However, these individuals are living on average 39 minutes from the border between treated and control regions. This indicates that the average control individual is living in a community that could be quite different due to geographic location from the community of the average treated individual. Indeed, the construction sector inflow is much larger in control regions (60 %) than in treated regions (48 %). This suggests paying particular attention to how the construction share changes when approaching the border between treated and control regions. With respect to the family situation job seekers in control regions (82 % are married) are similar to job seekers in treated regions (83 % are married).

There are 3466 women entering unemployment who satisfy both the age and region of residence requirement for REBP (Table 1 Panel B Column 1). The average age among women is 51.5 years; about .3 years lower than the average age among treated men. This could be due to the fact that REBP might have been more relevant among women near the age 50 threshold compared to men. Second, about 78 % of all eligible women are married and about 3 % of these women were previously employed in the construction sector.

Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the two control groups for women (Panel B Columns 2 and 3). There are 2193 women entering unemployment in the age bracket 46-49 years in the period with REBP in treated regions (Panel B Column 2). The family situation of the job seekers who fail the age requirement is quite different from the eligible group of job seekers.

¹⁸The inflow into unemployment is larger in the control regions than in treated regions because more people live and work in control region communities than in treated regions.

Figure 2: The effect of REBP on unemployment duration for men: age threshold



Notes: Sample restricted to inflow into unemployment the period 8/1989 until 7/1991 (during REBP). Sample restricted to individuals living in treated region.
 Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Database.

Whereas 78 % of the eligible women are married, only 70 % of the women below the age 50 threshold are married. In terms of identification, it is important to see whether this difference occurs at the age threshold. The second control group comprises the 3625 women who do not live in treated regions but satisfy the age requirement (Panel B Column 3). Note that average age in this group is 51.9 which is slightly higher than the average age in the treated group is 51.5 years. Moreover, the fraction married in the control group is again somewhat lower (72 %) than in the treated group (78 %).

4 Descriptive Evidence on the Effects of REBP


This section reports descriptive evidence on the effects of REBP on unemployment duration, on the effects of age and distance to border before REBP was introduced, and on the effects of REBP on inflow composition and on inflow size.

Results for Men: Figure 2 reports descriptive evidence on the effect of REBP on average unemployment duration (measured in weeks) among men. Note that average unemployment duration is not affected by right censoring because spells are observed until the end of 1998.¹⁹

Figure 2 reports average unemployment duration by age at entry into unemployment for

¹⁹Fewer than 1% of all unemployment spells are right censored in the data.

Figure 3: The effect of REBP on unemployment duration for men: border threshold



Notes: Sample restricted to inflow into unemployment the period 8/1989 until 7/1991 (during REBP). Sample is restricted to individuals aged 50 years or older.
 Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Database.


each age quarter from 46 years and 1 quarter to 53 years and 4 quarters. The evidence is based on 9734 individuals living in treated regions, i.e. 4759 treated individuals aged 50 years and older and 4975 control individuals aged 46 to 49 years. All figures superimpose the fit of a linear regression allowing for a discontinuity at the threshold and linear trends in the assignment variable (age or distance to border) on both sides of the threshold (see section 5 for further discussion on estimation).

Control individuals remain unemployed for 13 weeks on average. In contrast, average unemployment duration exceeds 26 weeks in almost all age cells for individuals aged 50 years or older. There is a significant discontinuity in average unemployment duration that occurs between individuals aged 49 years and 4 quarters and individuals aged 50 years and 1 quarter. This suggests that there is a strong effect of REBP on the average duration of unemployment spells.

Figure 3 identifies the effect of REBP by comparing individuals living on both sides of the border between treated and control regions. This figure is based on 13296 individuals who are 50 years or older at the beginning of their unemployment spell, i.e. the 4759 treated individuals (who live in treated regions) and the 8537 control individuals (who live in control regions).²⁰

²⁰The figure reports average unemployment duration for each distance to border cell of width 5 minutes, i.e. the first cell reporting average unemployment duration in communities located 65-69 minutes from the border

Figure 4: The effects of age and distance before REBP: men



Notes: Sample restricted to inflow into unemployment in the period 1/1986 until 12/1987 (before REBP). Sample for age identification is restricted to treated region. Sample for border identification is restricted to individuals aged 50 years or older. Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Database.

Average unemployment duration is roughly 13 weeks in the control regions (negative values of distance to border). Furthermore, unemployment duration appears to decrease slightly when approaching the border between treated and control regions. In contrast, as soon as we enter the the treated region, average unemployment duration increases significantly to more than 26 weeks. This suggests, again, that REBP strongly increases average unemployment duration among men living close to the border between treated and control regions. In line with control regions, there is a negative relationship between average unemployment duration and distance to border in treated regions.

The evidence in Figures 2 and 3 suggest that there are important discontinuities in the duration of unemployment at age 50 and at the border between treated and control regions. Have these discontinuities been caused by REBP? This is true only if the counterfactual average duration without REBP varies smoothly with age and distance to border. In particular, jumps in unemployment duration at age 50 and at the border that occur for reasons other than benefit eligibility have to be ruled out. I therefore investigate whether average duration of unemployment varies smoothly before REBP was introduced. Figure 4 reports average unemployment duration as a function of age and distance to border in the period from 1/1986 until 12/1987, i.e. 2.5 years to .5 years before REBP was introduced.

Figure 4A reports the effects of age on unemployment duration. Men who are 46 years old remain unemployed for about 13 weeks on average. As age increases, so does average unemployment duration. Men who are 53 years old when registering at the unemployment office between treated and control regions (-67.6 minutes), the second cell reporting evidence for communities at 60-64 minutes distance (-62.5 minutes), ..., and the last cell reporting evidence for the community located 55 to 69 minutes from the border (62.5 minutes). Note that the cells at distance 10 to 14 minutes, 5 to 9 minutes to the border from the control region side, and the cells 0 to 4 minutes, and 5 to 9 minutes distance to the border on the treated region side are aggregated because the cells close to the border are based on fewer than 150 spells. For the same reason, the descriptive analysis aggregates the cells 55-59 minutes, 60-64 minutes, and 65-69 minutes distance to border into one cell. Note, however, that the econometric analysis is based on the continuous distance to border measure.

are expected to be unemployed for about 16 weeks. Importantly, there are some differences in terms of average unemployment duration at the age 50 threshold. Men who are in the age bracket 49 years and 4 quarters are unemployed for roughly 14 weeks. In contrast, men who have just celebrated their 50th birthday remain unemployed for 17 weeks on average, and the linear regression suggests that this difference is statistically significant. This evidence thus suggests that it may be important to account for pre-existing differences in average unemployment duration at the age 50 years threshold.


Figure 4B assesses how average unemployment duration varies with distance to border. Before REBP, average unemployment duration is about 13 weeks in control region communities at 70 minutes distance to the border. Duration of job search increases monotonically from less than 13 weeks to about 20 weeks when approaching the border between treated and control regions. Importantly, there is no significant difference in average unemployment duration on both sides of the border. The evidence in Figure 4B thus suggests that identifying the effect of REBP by contrasting average unemployment duration in communities located at both sides of the border is a meaningful identification strategy.

For this identification strategy to be valid, however, the composition of the inflow pool needs to be balanced at the age and border threshold in the period with REBP. Two important characteristics are marital status and previous employment in construction. *Marital status* is important primarily because it is related to the potential level of the social assistance transfers. The idea is that married individuals are more likely to live with a working spouse. Since means testing focuses on household rather than individual income, the likelihood that married individuals will receive social assistance is lower. This suggests that married individuals remain unemployed shorter than non-married individuals all else equal. *Construction* employment is important because it proxies for seasonal unemployment which reflects unemployment due to a temporary rather than a permanent layoff. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on these important background characteristics and shows that the share married is not balanced with respect to age and the construction share is not balanced between treated and control regions. Figure 5 therefore assesses how the composition of the inflow into unemployment varies with age and distance to border.

Focusing on men entering unemployment in treated regions in the age bracket 45-53 years, Figure 5A reveals that marital status indeed appears to be correlated with age. In the age bracket 46-48 years, the share married increases from about 75 % to about 80 %. Importantly, there is no discontinuity at the age 50 threshold. Roughly 80 % of all job seekers who are aged 50 years and 1 quarter are married. The share married increases from 80 % to about 86 % in the age bracket 50 to 53.

Figure 5B discusses inflow composition with respect to previous employment in construc-

Figure 5: The Composition of the Unemployment Inflow: men



Notes: Sample restricted to inflow into unemployment in the period 8/1989 until 7/1991 (during REBP). Sample for age identification is restricted to treated region. Sample for border identification is restricted to individuals aged 50 years or older.
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Database.

tion as a function of distance to border. In control regions, the share previously employed in construction is about 60 % irrespective of distance to the border between treated and control regions. Just on the other side of the border, the share previously employed in construction decreases quite strongly but insignificantly to 53 %. The share previously employed in construction decreases further as distance to border increases and reaches a level of less than 40 % in communities located at distance 40 minutes to the border. Moving further away from the border, we find that the construction share increases again to about 50 %.

A final concern with the identification strategy refers to how likely it is that firms and individuals manipulate their location on either side of the threshold. While it is clearly difficult to manipulate one's age, it is very well possible that firms and individuals can manipulate the *age at entry into unemployment*. Figure 6 therefore assesses whether the relative size of the inflow into unemployment is affected by the REBP.²¹


Figure 6A reports relative inflow for the age based identification strategy among men. Relative inflow is the likelihood ratio of age, i.e. the ratio of the density of age in treated regions to the density of age in control regions.²² Figure 6A indicates that the likelihood ratio is close to 1 throughout the entire support suggesting that there is no concentration of the inflow at a particular age bracket. This suggests that manipulation of the age at entry into unemployment does not occur among men.

Figure 6B reports relative inflow for the border based identification strategy. Relative inflow is the likelihood ratio of distance to border, i.e. the ratio between the density of distance to

²¹It would be desirable to report the unemployment inflow rate, that is, the number of spells entering unemployment relative to employment. Our employment data, however, are based on the location of the previous employer rather than of the location of the individual's residence. This means that it is not possible to calculate unemployment risk appropriately. Note that relative inflow is, however, informative on inflow risk (unemployment inflow divided by employment) if the age structure of employment is identical in treated and control regions up to a constant.

²²Specifically, the density in treated (control) regions is the ratio of the number of spells observed in each age bracket relative to the total number of spells in treated (control) regions. Each point in Figure 6A is the ratio between these two densities.

Figure 6: Inflow effects due to REBP: men



Notes: Age: relative inflow is the ratio of the density of age in the treated region to the density of age in the control region. Border: relative inflow is the ratio of the density of distance to border in the age bracket 50-53 years to the corresponding density in the age bracket 46-49 years. Sample restricted to inflow into unemployment in the period 8/1989 until 7/1991 (during REBP). Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Database.


border in the age bracket 50-53 years to the density of distance to border in the age bracket 46-49 years. In control communities, relative inflow is 1 indicating that the number of older workers entering unemployment is almost identical to the number of younger workers. Relative inflow is also close to 1 in treated communities located no farther than 30 minutes from the border. Relative inflow becomes more noisy in communities located 35 minutes and more from the border reflecting the fact that these distance to border cells are relatively small. Again, there appears to be no manipulation of location of residence.

Results for Women: Figure 7 concentrates on women entering unemployment in treated regions in the age bracket 46 to 53 years and it displays three striking facts.²³ First, there is a very salient increase in unemployment duration at the age 50 threshold. Whereas the women who are slightly younger than the threshold leave unemployment on average after about 16 weeks, women who are slightly older than the threshold do not exit unemployment for more than 130 weeks on average. Thus, there appears to be a strongly significant increase in unemployment duration by at least 110 weeks. Second, in the age bracket 50 to 53 years, there is a very strong decrease in average unemployment duration from more than 130 weeks (age 50 years and 1 quarter) to less than 52 weeks (age 53 years and 4 quarters). This evidence is consistent with an interpretation that a substantial fraction of eligible women remain unemployed until they turn 54, the minimum age required in the special income support program.²⁴ Third, in contrast to men, there appears to be a decline in average unemployment duration from about 26 weeks at age 48 to about 16 weeks at age 49.

²³Note that the y-axis for women covers the first three years in an unemployment spell rather than merely the first year as for men. Women who are 46 years old remain unemployed for about 20 weeks on average; this is somewhat longer than average unemployment duration among men in the same age bracket (see Figure 2). This can be explained by seasonal (construction sector) unemployment being much more relevant for men than for women.

²⁴Note, however, that it is not true that all women at the age 50 threshold are using REBP as an early retirement pathway. If this were the case the average duration of unemployment would have to exceed 200 weeks for women entering unemployment at age 50 instead of reaching a level of 141 weeks.

Figure 7: The effect of REBP on unemployment duration for women: age threshold




Notes: Sample restricted to inflow into unemployment the period 8/1989 until 7/1991 (during REBP). Sample is restricted to individuals living in treated region.
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Database.

Figure 8 uses variation in distance to border among women aged 50 years or older to identify the effect of REBP. There is hardly any variation in the duration of job search as one approaches the border between treated and control regions from the control region side. Average unemployment duration oscillates around 26 weeks, i.e. almost twice the average for men (see Figure 3). However, as one crosses the border between treated communities and control communities, unemployment duration increases significantly from 26 weeks to a level of 78 weeks, i.e. an increase by exactly one year. Thus, there appears to be a tremendous increase in average unemployment duration associated with REBP. Note that the effect of REBP at the border is much weaker than the effect of REBP at age 50 years.

Using pre-program data for women, we find that there is neither a significant discontinuity in expected unemployment duration at the age 50 threshold nor at the border between treated and control regions. Moreover, inflow composition does not appear differ at the border between treated and control regions; the share married does not significantly differ on both sides of the border. In contrast, inflow composition appears to be significantly affected at the age threshold. Women aged 50 years are significantly and quantitatively importantly (6.5 percentage points) more likely to be married than women who just fail the age threshold.

Figure 9 discusses the effects of REBP on the relative size of the inflow among women.

Figure 8: The effect of REBP on unemployment duration for women: border threshold



Notes: Sample restricted to inflow into unemployment the period 8/1989 until 7/1991 (during REBP). Sample is restricted to individuals aged 50 years or older.
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Database.


There is a striking spike in the number of women entering unemployment exactly at age 50 years and 1 quarter in treated regions relative to control regions (Figure 9A). Whereas relative inflow is around 1 in the age group 45-49 years, relative inflow peaks at almost 3 in the age cell 50 years and 1 quarter.²⁵ With increasing age, however, relative inflow drops strongly and reaches a level of about 1 in the age bracket 51 to 52 years. Relative inflow is below 1 in the age group 53 years.²⁶ The fact that the inflow size is affected strongly by REBP suggests that the age based identification strategy could be affected by inflow effects.

Interestingly, in contrast to the age based identification strategy, the border based identification strategy appears to be much less strongly affected by inflow size effects (Figure 9B). Relative inflow increases monotonically and quite smoothly from control communities at distance 70 minutes from the border to treated communities at distance 20 minutes from the border from a likelihood ratio of about .6 to a likelihood ratio of 1. On the other side of the border, relative inflow is about 1.2 which is only slightly and insignificantly higher than rela-

²⁵Specifically, in control regions there 256 spells in the age bracket 50 years and 1 quarter. In treated regions, there are 596 (!) spells in the age bracket 50 years and 1 quarter. Relative inflow is $.105=596/5659$ (total age 46-49 inflow in treated regions) divided by $.036=256/7063$ (total age 46-49 inflow in control regions). There is no evidence that these spells are due to the closing of one large plant.

²⁶This is due to the fact that the size of the inflow increases quite strongly at age 53 years in control regions, i.e. the age when women in control regions can also use the unemployment benefit system as a pathway to early retirement because potential benefit duration is one year.

Figure 9: Inflow effects due to REBP: women



Notes: Age: relative inflow is the ratio of the density of age in the treated region to the density of age in the control region. Border: relative inflow is the ratio of the density of distance to border in the age bracket 50-53 years to the corresponding density in the age bracket 46-49 years. Sample restricted to inflow into unemployment in the period 8/1989 until 7/1991 (during REBP). Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Database.

tive inflow in control communities providing information on the counterfactual unemployment duration without REBP. This suggests that the border based identification strategy is less affected by the effects of REBP on the size of the unemployment inflow.

Taken together, these descriptive analyses suggest that an estimation strategy that measures the discontinuity at the threshold identifies the causal effect of extended benefits on unemployment duration at both thresholds for men and at the border threshold for women.²⁷

5 Identification and Estimation

The goal of the regression discontinuity approach is to measure the discontinuity in expected unemployment duration at the assignment threshold S_0 (age 50 years or distance to border 0 minutes). Because the design in the REBP context is sharp, this discontinuity identifies the average causal effect for the threshold population of job seekers if the expected non-treatment unemployment duration is continuous at the threshold (Hahn *et al.*, 2001).

I have provided three pieces of evidence that allow discussing the validity of this identifying assumption in the previous section. *First*, I have provided evidence on how expected unem-

²⁷Firms can not respond at the border threshold because workers have to be living for at least 6 months in treated regions. Yet, firms also do not appear to delay laying off a 49 year old until she or he is 50 years old. This can be understood by considering the theory behind a layoff. A firm induces a layoff if the expected contribution (i.e. productivity minus total costs) of a particular worker to firm profit is negative. Suppose the firm realizes at date t that worker i – aged 49 years and 11 months – contribution to firm profit is negative. The firm thus has a strong incentive to fire the worker at date t . In contrast, the worker's expected utility would be improved if the firm delayed the layoff from date t to date $t + 1$ because the worker would be eligible for 209 weeks of extended benefits instead of 39 weeks. This means that there are gains from trade. These gains can be realized if the worker could propose to the firm that he or she will take a wage cut that is sufficient for expected contribution to the firm's profit to be non-negative. In the present context, however, such a trade is highly unlikely to take place for at least two reasons. First, the worker is only slightly better off in the system with extended benefits because extended benefits are valuable for workers who exhaust unemployment benefits. In the Austrian context, only 1 out of 14 workers in treated regions exhaust 39 weeks of benefits. Second, even if the gains from trade were large, it is not possible for workers and firms to implement a temporary wage cut because unions would not agree with such a deal. This means that it is not possible for workers and firms to delay entry into unemployment.

ployment duration varies with S in the time period before REBP was introduced. This allows assessing whether continuity of the non-treatment outcome is fulfilled without the program. However, introducing the program may invalidate evidence before the program was introduced. In particular, firms and workers may agree to postpone entry into unemployment until the eligibility criteria have been satisfied. I therefore provide, *second*, evidence that allows assessing whether important background characteristics such as marital status or previous employment in construction are balanced at the assignment threshold. *Third*, I also provide evidence on the effects of REBP on the relative density of the assignment variable S in the inflow into unemployment in Figures 6 and 9. The idea is straightforward. Non-continuity of the density of S indicates that firms and workers react to REBP. This reaction can induce a bias in the regression discontinuity estimates if additional layoffs are selective, i.e. have different counterfactual unemployment duration. Figure 9A suggests that there is an abnormal reaction at the age threshold for women. The absence of a dip just before age 50 suggests, however, that this reaction has not been caused by firms wanting to provide an early retirement option to women whom they expect to remain long-term unemployed. Section 6 addresses the age threshold reaction by providing results for a sub-group of women with information on previous unemployment duration. This allows assessing whether there is selection bias within this sub-group.

The focus of RDD estimation is on identifying the discontinuity in average unemployment duration Y at the assignment threshold S_0 . Specifically, I use the following linear regression

$$Y_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 D_i + \beta_0 (S_i - S_0) + \beta_1 D_i (S_i - S_0) + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

The parameter α_1 measures the average causal effect of REBP on unemployment duration at the assignment threshold S_0 . The parameters β_0 and β_1 capture the direct effects of the assignment variable S on average unemployment duration.²⁸

The crucial issue in RDD estimation is the specification of the correlation between the outcome Y and the assignment variable S . This paper proposes two ways of assessing whether the two-sided linear model specification (1) is appropriate. The first sensitivity analysis augments the regression with quadratic and cubic terms in $(S - S_0)$. This is a parametric method of assessing the sensitivity of our results. Second, I discuss sensitivity to functional form applying a semiparametric version of model (1) to the data (Porter, 2003). Intuitively, the local linear regression weighs data points such that information close to the threshold gets more weight

²⁸Note that the data on S – age at entry into unemployment and distance to border between treated and control regions – is not measured on a continuous scale. This introduces a specification error into model (1). Random specification error introduces heteroscedasticity in the variance-covariance matrix of the error term and can be addressed by clustering on the cells of S that are observed in the data (Card and Lee, 2006).

than information further away from the threshold.²⁹

The empirical analysis also addresses two additional concerns. First, the assumption of continuity may not hold even before REBP was introduced. The sensitivity of the results based on model (1) can be assessed by using information before REBP was introduced.³⁰ Second, it is possible to improve the efficiency of the estimates by including observed characteristics into the regression. The sensitivity analysis therefore adds all observed characteristics to the basic model (1).

6 Econometric Results

This section presents the econometric estimates of the effects of REBP on unemployment duration. Table 2 presents results for men, based on the age threshold in Panel A, and based on the border threshold in Panel B. The first Column reports estimates that contrast average unemployment duration on both sides of the age threshold. Results indicate that unemployment duration is 14.6 weeks longer among men in the age bracket 50-53 years compared to men aged 46-49 years. The second Column reports the results from the basic model (1). Results indicate that REBP prolongs unemployment duration by 14.8 weeks rather than 14.6 weeks. Moreover, Figure 2 shows that the basic model fits the threshold data points well.

Because there is not necessarily a linear trend in the outcome, column 3 in Table 2 reports results based on a cubic specification (again on both sides of the threshold). Results indicate that the effect of REBP is weaker than in the basic model (11.2 weeks as opposed to 14.8 weeks). Column 4 in Table 2 reports results that use Epanechnikov kernel weights to give more weight to observations that are close to the age 50 threshold. The local linear estimate of the effect of REBP on unemployment duration is 12.7 weeks, again lower than the basic model estimate of 14.8 weeks.³¹ Column 5 accounts for possible pre-existing differences in unemployment

²⁹Specifically, the local linear estimates are obtained by

$$\underset{\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \beta_0, \beta_1}{\operatorname{argmin}} \sum_{i=1}^N [Y_i - \alpha_0 - \alpha_1 D_i - \beta_0 (S_i - S_0) - \beta_1 D_i (S_i - S_0)]^2 K_h(S_i - S_0) \quad (2)$$

where $K_h(u) = 3/4(1 - (u/h)^2)I(|u| < h)$ is the Epanechnikov kernel, and h is the bandwidth. Note the basic model (1) is a special case of the model (2) obtained by setting the bandwidth to ∞ , i.e. weighting all observations equally. In the empirical analysis, I set the bandwidth to 2 years at the age threshold and to 30 minutes at the border threshold. This ensures that about one half of all the observations from model (1) are used in model (2). I also investigate sensitivity of estimates to bandwidth choice. Specifically, I also use bandwidths 1 year or 3 years for the age strategy and bandwidths 20 minutes or 40 minutes for the border strategy.

³⁰Specifically, the model

$$\begin{aligned} Y_i &= \alpha_0 T_i + \alpha_1 T_i D_i + \beta_0 T_i (S_i - S_0) + \beta_1 T_i D_i (S_i - S_0) + \\ &+ \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 D_i + \gamma_2 (S_i - S_0) + \gamma_3 D_i (S_i - S_0) + \epsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

is estimated where $T_i = 1$ if the unemployment spell starts in the "during REBP" period, and $T_i = 0$ otherwise. Again, the parameter α_1 provides the before-during-RDD (BD-RDD) estimate of the effect of REBP on unemployment duration.

³¹The local linear regression reported in Table 2 uses a bandwidth of 2 years. Estimates are not sensitive to

Table 2: Men: The effect of extended benefit duration on unemployment duration

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Age threshold</i>						
Treatment effect	14.605 (1.070) ^{***}	14.798 (1.928) ^{***}	11.153 (3.475) ^{***}	12.715 (2.577) ^{***}	11.356 (2.254) ^{***}	13.831 (1.851) ^{***}
Polynomial order	0	1	3	1	1	1
Bandwidth (years)	∞	∞	∞	2	∞	∞
BD-RDD	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Control variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	9734	9734	9734	5382	19460	9734
R^2	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.06
<i>B. Border threshold</i>						
Treatment effect	13.902 (1.646) ^{***}	13.622 (2.988) ^{***}	15.496 (9.530)	12.538 (6.037) ^{**}	11.750 (3.096) ^{***}	12.039 (2.493) ^{***}
Polynomial order	0	1	3	1	1	1
Bandwidth (minutes)	∞	∞	∞	30	∞	∞
BD-RDD	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Control variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	13296	13296	13296	5762	25341	13296
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.08

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on age and distance to border). * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. BD-RDD refers to model (3) that uses information on the period before REBP to control for pre-existing discontinuities at the age and border threshold.

Source: Own calculations, based on ASSD.

duration at the age 50 threshold by using information before REBP was introduced. Results suggest that REBP prolongs unemployment by about 11.3 weeks – a weaker effect than in the basic model. Column 6 absorbs random variation by adding observed characteristics. Results suggest that REBP prolongs unemployment duration by 13.8 weeks.

The second identification strategy compares men entering unemployment living on both sides of the border between treated and control regions (Table 2, Panel B). Contrasting treated and control regions produces a prima facie treatment effect of about 13.9 weeks of REBP on average unemployment duration (column 1). Adding a linear trend in distance to region – as in the basic model (1) – indicates that REBP leads to an increase in unemployment duration by 13.6 weeks rather than 13.9 weeks. Again, fitting the quite non-linear trend observed in the raw data with a linear trend captures the situation at the threshold quite well (see Figure 3. Adding a quadratic and cubic term in distance to border leads to a stronger, albeit insignificant, estimate of the effect of REBP on unemployment duration (column 3). The local linear estimate of the corresponding effect is 12.6 weeks (column 4)– weaker than the basic model estimate of 13.6 weeks.³² Accounting for pre-existing differences in unemployment changes in the bandwidth (effect is 12.594 with a 1 year bandwidth, and 13.467 with a 3 years bandwidth).

³²The local linear regression reported in Table 2 uses a bandwidth of 30 minutes. Estimates are somewhat sensitive to changes in the bandwidth (effect is 16.328 with a 20 minutes bandwidth, and 11.785 with a 40 minutes bandwidth).

duration at the border suggests that REBP prolongs unemployment duration by 11.8 weeks (column 5), and adding observed characteristics suggests that REBP prolongs unemployment duration by about 12.0 weeks.

Turning to results for women (Table 3), I now discuss results based on the age strategy (panel A) and the border strategy (panel B). Table 3 shows that contrasting women aged 50-53 years with women aged 46-49 years produces a *prima facie* effect of REBP on unemployment duration of 68.2 weeks (column 1). This effect is, however, downward biased since unemployment duration decreases strongly with age among women aged 50 or older. Adding a two-sided linear trend produces an estimate of about 109.6 weeks in the basic model specification (column 2). The simple identification strategy is in line with the raw data below the threshold but it is below average unemployment duration at age 50 and 1 quarters (see Figure 7). A model that adds quadratic and cubic terms in age to the basic model (1) produces a much stronger effect of REBP of 125.7 weeks (column 3). The local linear estimate of the effect of REBP on unemployment duration is 121.8 weeks – almost in line with the cubic model estimate of 125.7 weeks but again larger than the basic model estimate.³³ The BD-RDD analysis produces an estimate of the effect of REBP on unemployment duration of 109.4 weeks which is exactly in line with the basic model estimate (column 5). Moreover, adding control variables to this specification tends to reduce the treatment effect by about 7 weeks, from 109.6 weeks to 102.6 weeks (column 6).


Note that the particular feature of the age identification strategy is that the unemployment inflow near the age 50 years threshold is strongly affected by REBP (Figure 9). This means that average unemployment duration below the age 50 threshold is not informative on the counterfactual situation for the age 50 unemployment inflow. One way of addressing this concern is to find pre-program information on the average unemployment duration for women who are aged 50-53 years during REBP. This is possible for women who have been repeatedly unemployed women. Figure 10A reports the average first unemployment spell duration in the pre-program period conditional on age attained at the start of the during-program spell.³⁴ There is no quantitatively important discontinuity in unemployment duration at the threshold for repeatedly unemployed women. The linear regression indicates that unemployment duration is 2.8 weeks longer (with *std.err.* 1.5 weeks) for women aged 50 years compared to women aged 49 years and 11 months.

Figure 10B plots average during-program duration for the sample of women with infor-

³³The local linear regression reported in Table 3 uses a bandwidth of 2 years. Estimates are not sensitive to changes in the bandwidth (effect is 123.503 with a 1 year bandwidth, and 119.981 with a 3 years bandwidth).

³⁴Clearly, for individuals aged 46-47 the chances are very small that such information is available because the data set is limited to the age group 46-53 years. There are 1,279 out of 5,6459 spells present in this analysis; 978 out of 3,466 spells for women age 50 years or older; 279 out of 2,193 spells for women age 49 or younger.

Figure 10: Results for repeatedly unemployed women



Notes: Pre-program refers to women with pre-program unemployment duration information. During-Program refers to the same women when REBP in force.
 Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Database.

mation on pre-program duration. There is a strong and significant increase in unemployment duration at the threshold. While repeatedly unemployed women age 50 years are expected to remain unemployed for about 85 weeks, the counterfactual unemployment duration without extended benefits is only 11 weeks. Thus, extended benefits appear to increase average unemployment duration by 74.8 weeks (std. err. 6.5 weeks). This estimate of the causal effect is weaker than all of the estimates reported in Table 3 Panel A. There are at least two explanations for this weaker effect. On one hand, effects reported previously could be biased. On the other hand, the repeatedly unemployed subgroup could be less responsive to extended benefits in general. It is possible to assess the second explanation by studying repeatedly unemployed men. The average causal effect of extended benefits for repeatedly unemployed men is 8.6 weeks (std. err. 3.2 weeks). This effect is smaller than the average causal effect for all men; repeatedly unemployed men are less responsive to extended benefits than the average job seeker. This implies that identification strategy using information on repeatedly unemployed women identifies a *lower bound* of 74.8 weeks for the average causal effect of extended benefits for all women.

Turning to the results obtained when contrasting unemployment duration for women living on both sides of the border between treated and control regions (Table 3, Panel B), we find that unemployment lasts 62.6 weeks longer in treated regions compared to control regions (column 1). Adding a two sided linear trend reduces the estimated treatment effect to 50.6 weeks (column 2). Fitting a cubic polynomial on both sides of the border reduces the estimate of the treatment effect somewhat (estimate is 46.4 weeks) but doing so reduces the precision of the estimate considerably (standard error increases from 6.0 weeks to 15.8 weeks; Column 3). The local linear estimate of the effect of REBP on unemployment duration is 43.3 weeks (column 4), again slightly weaker than the basic model estimate of 50.6 weeks.³⁵ Accounting for

³⁵The local linear regression reported in Table 3 uses a bandwidth of 30 minutes. Estimates are not at all

Table 3: Women: The effect of extending benefit duration into early retirement

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Age threshold</i>						
Treatment effect	68.158 (6.317) ^{***}	109.645 (4.927) ^{***}	125.716 (4.873) ^{***}	121.830 (4.786) ^{***}	109.338 (5.292) ^{***}	102.584 (4.270) ^{***}
Polynomial order	0	1	3	1	1	1
Bandwidth (years)	∞	∞	∞	2	∞	∞
BD-RDD	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Control variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	5659	5659	5659	3436	9911	5659
R^2	0.14	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.27	0.26
<i>B. Border threshold</i>						
Treatment effect	62.554 (2.973) ^{***}	50.580 (6.031) ^{***}	46.356 (15.793) ^{***}	43.324 (10.136) ^{***}	54.046 (5.929) ^{***}	44.856 (5.423) ^{***}
Polynomial order	0	1	3	1	1	1
Bandwidth (minutes)	∞	∞	∞	30	∞	∞
BD-RDD	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Control variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	7091	7091	7091	3643	11497	7091
R^2	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.10	0.20	0.20

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on age and distance to border). * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. BD-RDD refers to model (3) that uses information on the period before REBP to control for pre-existing discontinuities at the age and border threshold.

Source: Own calculations, based on ASSD.

pre-existing differences in unemployment duration at the border between treated and control regions produces a slightly larger treatment effect of 54.0 weeks.³⁶ Adding control variables to the linear specification suggests that REBP tends to increase unemployment duration by about 44.9 weeks (column 6). Interestingly, we again find that the relatively simple specification with a two sided linear trend appears to capture the discontinuity in the raw data rather well (see Figure 8).

7 Conclusions

Austria implemented in the late 1980s and early 1990s a unique program that provides 209 weeks of unemployment benefit duration but only to individuals aged 50 years or older who have been living in certain parts of Austria and satisfy a work requirement. Because the program was strictly targeted with respect to age and region, this paper proposes to evaluate sensitive to changes in the bandwidth (effect is 44.576 with a 20 minutes bandwidth, and 43.534 with a 40 minutes bandwidth).

³⁶Note that there is a positive difference in unemployment duration between the treated and control communities at the border. Thus, one would expect the BD-RDD estimate in column 5 to be weaker than the levels estimate in Column 2. However, note that the BD-RDD estimate uses information from all communities to calculate the pre-existing differences. Applying the basic model to data before REBP suggests that the difference in unemployment duration before REBP was introduced is negative (-3.5 weeks).

the effects of this program using a regression discontinuity design. The basic idea is that job seekers who just fail the age or residence requirement may provide useful information on the counterfactual situation for eligible workers who just satisfy the requirement. Moreover, because women have access to early retirement at age 54 years but men have access to early retirement only at age 59 years, this program also offers a unique opportunity to learn about the interactions between the pension system and unemployment insurance.

Results for men indicate that extended benefit duration increases unemployment duration. The identification strategy at the age threshold measures the effects of an increase from 39 weeks to 209 weeks – by 170 weeks. The duration of job search is prolonged by about 14.8 weeks by this treatment. The identification strategy that compares job seekers living on both sides of the border between treated and control regions identifies the effect of a treatment with slightly smaller dose, an increase by 3 years, from 52 weeks to 209 weeks. The estimated effect on unemployment is slightly smaller, 13.6 weeks rather than 14.8 weeks. Taking the ratio of effect and treatment dose, we find that each week of extended benefits produces about .09 additional weeks of unemployment duration or equivalently that it takes about 11 weeks of benefit duration to add one week of unemployment duration.³⁷

Comparing our findings for women and men, the following patterns emerge. First, we find that the effects of REBP for women are much larger than the effects of REBP for men. The lower bound on the effect of REBP on unemployment duration at the age threshold is 74.8 weeks for women – about 5 times the effect for men. The effect of REBP for women on living on the border between treated and control regions is 50.6 weeks – almost 4 times the effect for men. Second, the effect of REBP at the age threshold is much larger than the effect at the border threshold. Arguably, this is because the population treated at the age threshold has to wait much longer to reach the early retirement age of 54 years than the population treated at the border threshold. Because treated women at the border are 51.5 years old, the average distance to early retirement is shorter (2.5 years) for the border strategy than for the age strategy (4.0 years). Taking the ratio of the causal effect to distance to early retirement (in weeks), indicates that women tend to remain unemployed about 20 weeks longer for every year of benefit duration that provides a direct pathway into early retirement.³⁸ Thus Austrian unemployment insurance provided a quantitatively important pathway into early retirement.

³⁷Note that our results agree with the findings in Card and Levine (2000) and are somewhat larger than the result in Lalive and Zweimüller (2004b). The findings reported in this paper may differ from Lalive and Zweimüller (2004b) for at least two reasons. First, Lalive and Zweimüller (2004b) apply a differences-in-differences identification strategy that measures the overall effect of treatment on the treated rather than the effect of treatment at the threshold. Second, simulations in Lalive and Zweimüller (2004b) apply to a reference individual rather than the average unemployment duration of eligible individuals.

³⁸Interestingly, the standardized affects agree very much at the age threshold ($74.8 \text{ weeks} / (4 \text{ years} * 52 \text{ weeks} / \text{year}) = .360$) and at the border threshold ($50.6 \text{ weeks} / (2.5 \text{ years} * 52 \text{ weeks} / \text{year}) = .391$). This suggests that the lower bound of 74.8 weeks at the age threshold is close to the actual causal effect for all women.

References

- Berger, M., Galdo, J., and Smith, J. (2005). Estimating the Selection Bias of the Regression Discontinuity Design using a Tie-Break Experiment. Discussion paper, Syracuse University.
- Besley, T. and Case, A. (2000). Unnatural Experiments? Estimating the Incidence of Endogenous Policies. *Economic Journal*, **110**(467), 672–694.
- Card, D., Chetty, R., and Weber, A. (2006). Unemployment Benefits, Income Effects, and Search Outcomes: Evidence from A Discontinuity in the Austrian Severance Pay System. Mimeo, UC Berkeley.
- Card, D. E. and Lee, D. S. (2006). Regression Discontinuity Inference with Specification Error. *Journal of Econometrics*, page forthcoming.
- Card, D. E. and Levine, P. B. (2000). Extended Benefits and the Duration of UI Spells: Evidence from the New Jersey Extended Benefit Program. *Journal of Public Economics*, **78**(1), 107–138.
- Dahl, S.-A., Nielssen, O. A., and Vaage, K. (1999). Work or Retirement? Exit Routs for Norwegian Elderly. Discussion paper no. 32, IZA.
- Hahn, J., Todd, P., and van der Klaauw, W. (2001). Identification and Estimation of Treatment Effects with a Regression-Discontinuity Design. *Econometrica*, **69**(1), 201–209.
- Hairault, J.-O., Langot, F., and Sopraseuth, T. (2006). The Interaction between Retirement and Job Search: A Global Approach to Older Workers Employment. Discussion paper no. 1984, IZA.
- Heyma, A. and Van Ours, J. C. (2006). How eligibility criteria and entitlement characteristics of unemployment benefits affect job finding rates of elerly workers. Working paper, Tilburg University.
- Holmes, T. J. (2005). The Location of Sales Offices and the Attraction of Cities. *Journal of Political Economy*, **113**(3), 551–581.
- Hoxby, C. M. (2000). Does Competition among Public Schools Benefit Students and Taxpayers? *American Economic Review*, **90**(5), 1209–1238.
- Hunt, J. (1995). The Effect of Unemployment Compensation on Unemployment Duration in Germany. *Journal of Labor Economics*, **13**(2), 88–120.
- Katz, L. and Meyer, B. (1990). The Impact of the Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefits on the Duration of Unemployment. *Journal of Public Economics*, **41**(1), 45–72.
- Lalive, R. and Zweimüller, J. (2004a). Benefit Entitlement and the Labor Market: Evidence from a Large-Scale Policy Change. In J. Agell, M. Keen, and A. Weichenrieder, editors, *Labor Market Institutions and Public Policy*, pages 63–100. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Lalive, R. and Zweimüller, J. (2004b). Benefit Entitlement and Unemployment Duration: The Role of Policy Endogeneity. *Journal of Public Economics*, **88**(12), 2587–2616.
- Lalive, R., van Ours, J. C., and Zweimüller, J. (2006). How Changes in Financial Incentives Affect the Duration of Unemployment. *Review of Economic Studies*, page forthcoming.
- Lee, D. and McCrary, J. (2005). Crime, Punishment and Myopia. Working paper no. 11491, NBER.
- Lemieux, T. and Milligan, K. (2005). Incentive effects of social assistance: A regression discontinuity approach. Working paper, University of British Columbia.
- McCrary, J. (2005). Manipulation of the Running Variable in the Regression Discontinuity Design. Mimeo, University of Michigan.
- Moffitt, R. A. (1985). Unemployment Insurance and the Distribution of Unemployment Spells. *Journal of Econometrics*, **28**(1), 85–101.
- Moffitt, R. A. and Nicholson, W. (1982). The Effect of Unemployment Insurance on Unemployment: The Case of Federal Supplemental Benefits. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, **64**(1), 1–11.
- Mortensen, D. (1977). Unemployment Insurance and Job Search Decisions. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, **30**(4), 505–517.
- Nickell, S. and Layard, R. (1999). Labor Market Institutions and Economic Performance. In O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, editors, *Handbook of Labor Economics*, Vol. 3, pages 1801– 1863. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

- Porter, J. (2003). Estimation in the Regression Discontinuity Model. Working paper, Harvard University.
- Riphahn, R. T. (1997). Disability retirement and unemployment – substitute pathways for labour force exit? An empirical test for the caes of Germany. *Applied Economics*, **29**(4), 551–561.
- Van Ours, J. C. and Vodopivec, M. (2006). How Shortening the Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefits Entitlement Affects the Duration of Unemployment: Evidence from a Natural Experiment. *Journal of Labor Economics*, page forthcoming.
- Winter-Ebmer, R. (1998). Potential Unemployment Benefit Duration and Spell Length: Lessons from a Quasi-Experiment in Austria. *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics*, **60**(1), 33–45.

CESifo Working Paper Series

(for full list see www.cesifo-group.de)

- 1701 Christian Groth, Karl-Josef Koch and Thomas M. Steger, Rethinking the Concept of Long-Run Economic Growth, April 2006
- 1702 Dirk Schindler and Guttorm Schjelderup, Company Tax Reform in Europe and its Effect on Collusive Behavior, April 2006
- 1703 Françoise Forges and Enrico Minelli, Afriat's Theorem for General Budget Sets, April 2006
- 1704 M. Hashem Pesaran, Ron P. Smith, Takashi Yamagata and Liudmyla Hvozdyk, Pairwise Tests of Purchasing Power Parity Using Aggregate and Disaggregate Price Measures, April 2006
- 1705 Piero Gottardi and Felix Kubler, Social Security and Risk Sharing, April 2006
- 1706 Giacomo Corneo and Christina M. Fong, What's the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice?, April 2006
- 1707 Andreas Knabe, Ronnie Schoeb and Joachim Weimann, Marginal Employment Subsidization: A New Concept and a Reappraisal, April 2006
- 1708 Hans-Werner Sinn, The Pathological Export Boom and the Bazaar Effect - How to Solve the German Puzzle, April 2006
- 1709 Helge Berger and Stephan Danninger, The Employment Effects of Labor and Product Markets Deregulation and their Implications for Structural Reform, May 2006
- 1710 Michael Ehrmann and Marcel Fratzscher, Global Financial Transmission of Monetary Policy Shocks, May 2006
- 1711 Carsten Eckel and Hartmut Egger, Wage Bargaining and Multinational Firms in General Equilibrium, May 2006
- 1712 Mathias Hoffmann, Proprietary Income, Entrepreneurial Risk, and the Predictability of U.S. Stock Returns, May 2006
- 1713 Marc-Andreas Muendler and Sascha O. Becker, Margins of Multinational Labor Substitution, May 2006
- 1714 Surajeet Chakravarty and W. Bentley MacLeod, Construction Contracts (or "How to Get the Right Building at the Right Price?"), May 2006
- 1715 David Encaoua and Yassine Lefouili, Choosing Intellectual Protection: Imitation, Patent Strength and Licensing, May 2006

- 1716 Chris van Klaveren, Bernard van Praag and Henriette Maassen van den Brink, Empirical Estimation Results of a Collective Household Time Allocation Model, May 2006
- 1717 Paul De Grauwe and Agnieszka Markiewicz, Learning to Forecast the Exchange Rate: Two Competing Approaches, May 2006
- 1718 Sijbren Cnossen, Tobacco Taxation in the European Union, May 2006
- 1719 Marcel Gérard and Fernando Ruiz, Interjurisdictional Competition for Higher Education and Firms, May 2006
- 1720 Ronald McKinnon and Gunther Schnabl, China's Exchange Rate and International Adjustment in Wages, Prices, and Interest Rates: Japan Déjà Vu?, May 2006
- 1721 Paolo M. Panteghini, The Capital Structure of Multinational Companies under Tax Competition, May 2006
- 1722 Johannes Becker, Clemens Fuest and Thomas Hemmelgarn, Corporate Tax Reform and Foreign Direct Investment in Germany – Evidence from Firm-Level Data, May 2006
- 1723 Christian Kleiber, Martin Sexauer and Klaus Waelde, Bequests, Taxation and the Distribution of Wealth in a General Equilibrium Model, May 2006
- 1724 Axel Dreher and Jan-Egbert Sturm, Do IMF and World Bank Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly?, May 2006
- 1725 Swapan K. Bhattacharya and Biswa N. Bhattacharyay, Prospects of Regional Cooperation in Trade, Investment and Finance in Asia: An Empirical Analysis on BIMSTEC Countries and Japan, May 2006
- 1726 Philippe Choné and Laurent Linnemer, Assessing Horizontal Mergers under Uncertain Efficiency Gains, May 2006
- 1727 Daniel Houser and Thomas Stratmann, Selling Favors in the Lab: Experiments on Campaign Finance Reform, May 2006
- 1728 E. Maarten Bosker, Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen and Marc Schramm, A Century of Shocks: The Evolution of the German City Size Distribution 1925 – 1999, May 2006
- 1729 Clive Bell and Hans Gersbach, Growth and Enduring Epidemic Diseases, May 2006
- 1730 W. Bentley MacLeod, Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts, May 2006
- 1731 Jan K. Brueckner and Ricardo Flores-Fillol, Airline Schedule Competition: Product-Quality Choice in a Duopoly Model, May 2006
- 1732 Kerstin Bernoth and Guntram B. Wolff, Fool the Markets? Creative Accounting, Fiscal Transparency and Sovereign Risk Premia, May 2006

- 1733 Emmanuelle Auriol and Pierre M. Picard, Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly, May 2006
- 1734 Guglielmo Maria Caporale and Luis A. Gil-Alana, Modelling Structural Breaks in the US, UK and Japanese Unemployment Rates, May 2006
- 1735 Emily J. Blanchard, Reevaluating the Role of Trade Agreements: Does Investment Globalization Make the WTO Obsolete?, May 2006
- 1736 Per Engström and Bertil Holmlund, Tax Evasion and Self-Employment in a High-Tax Country: Evidence from Sweden, May 2006
- 1737 Erkki Koskela and Mikko Puhakka, Cycles and Indeterminacy in Overlapping Generations Economies with Stone-Geary Preferences, May 2006
- 1738 Saku Aura and Thomas Davidoff, Supply Constraints and Housing Prices, May 2006
- 1739 Balázs Égert and Ronald MacDonald, Monetary Transmission Mechanism in Transition Economies: Surveying the Surveyable, June 2006
- 1740 Ben J. Heijdra and Ward E. Romp, Ageing and Growth in the Small Open Economy, June 2006
- 1741 Robert Fenge and Volker Meier, Subsidies for Wages and Infrastructure: How to Restrain Undesired Immigration, June 2006
- 1742 Robert S. Chirinko and Debdulal Mallick, The Elasticity of Derived Demand, Factor Substitution and Product Demand: Corrections to Hicks' Formula and Marshall's Four Rules, June 2006
- 1743 Harry P. Bowen, Haris Munandar and Jean-Marie Viaene, Evidence and Implications of Zipf's Law for Integrated Economies, June 2006
- 1744 Markku Lanne and Helmut Luetkepohl, Identifying Monetary Policy Shocks via Changes in Volatility, June 2006
- 1745 Timo Trimborn, Karl-Josef Koch and Thomas M. Steger, Multi-Dimensional Transitional Dynamics: A Simple Numerical Procedure, June 2006
- 1746 Vivek H. Dehejia and Yiagadeesen Samy, Labor Standards and Economic Integration in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis, June 2006
- 1747 Carlo Altavilla and Paul De Grauwe, Forecasting and Combining Competing Models of Exchange Rate Determination, June 2006
- 1748 Olaf Posch and Klaus Waelde, Natural Volatility, Welfare and Taxation, June 2006
- 1749 Christian Holzner, Volker Meier and Martin Werding, Workfare, Monitoring, and Efficiency Wages, June 2006

- 1750 Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen and Charles van Marrewijk, Agglomeration and Aid, June 2006
- 1751 Robert Fenge and Jakob von Weizsäcker, Mixing Bismarck and Child Pension Systems: An Optimum Taxation Approach, June 2006
- 1752 Helge Berger and Michael Neugart, Labor Courts, Nomination Bias, and Unemployment in Germany, June 2006
- 1753 Chris van Klaveren, Bernard van Praag and Henriette Maassen van den Brink, A Collective Household Model of Time Allocation - a Comparison of Native Dutch and Immigrant Households in the Netherlands, June 2006
- 1754 Marko Koethenbueger, Ex-Post Redistribution in a Federation: Implications for Corrective Policy, July 2006
- 1755 Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm and Heinrich Ursprung, The Impact of Globalization on the Composition of Government Expenditures: Evidence from Panel Data, July 2006
- 1756 Richard Schmidtke, Private Provision of a Complementary Public Good, July 2006
- 1757 J. Atsu Amegashie, Intentions and Social Interactions, July 2006
- 1758 Alessandro Balestrino, Tax Avoidance, Endogenous Social Norms, and the Comparison Income Effect, July 2006
- 1759 Øystein Thøgersen, Intergenerational Risk Sharing by Means of Pay-as-you-go Programs – an Investigation of Alternative Mechanisms, July 2006
- 1760 Pascalis Raimondos-Møller and Alan D. Woodland, Steepest Ascent Tariff Reforms, July 2006
- 1761 Ronald MacDonald and Cezary Wojcik, Catching-up, Inflation Differentials and Credit Booms in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union: Some Implications for EMU and new EU Member States, July 2006
- 1762 Robert Dur, Status-Seeking in Criminal Subcultures and the Double Dividend of Zero-Tolerance, July 2006
- 1763 Christa Hainz, Business Groups in Emerging Markets – Financial Control and Sequential Investment, July 2006
- 1764 Didier Laussel and Raymond Riezman, Fixed Transport Costs and International Trade, July 2006
- 1765 Rafael Lalive, How do Extended Benefits Affect Unemployment Duration? A Regression Discontinuity Approach, July 2006