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Stability of the Replicator Equation for a Single-Species with a Multi-Dimensional Continuous Trait Space

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Stability of the Replicator Equation for a Single-Species with a Multi-Dimensional Continuous Trait Space

by

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Stability of the Replicator Equation for a Single-Species with a Multi-Dimensional Continuous Trait Space*

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Abstract. The replicator equation model for the evolution of individual behaviors in a single-species with a multi-dimensional continuous trait space is developed as a dynamics on the set of probability measures. Stability of monomorphisms in this model using the weak topology is compared to more traditional methods of adaptive dynamics. For quadratic fitness functions and initial normal trait distributions, it is shown that the multi-dimensional CSS (Continuously Stable Strategy) of adaptive dynamics is often relevant for predicting stability of the measure-theoretic model but may be too strong in general. For general fitness functions and trait distributions, the CSS is related to dominance solvability which can be used to characterize local stability for a large class of trait distributions that have no gaps in their supports whereas the stronger NIS (Neighborhood Invader Strategy) concept is needed if the supports are arbitrary.

Keywords: Adaptive dynamics, CSS, NIS, replicator equation, local superiority, strategy dominance, measure dynamics, weak topology

Running Head: Replicator Equation on Multi-Dimensional Continuous Trait Space

1 Introduction

Dynamical systems on the set of probability measures over a continuous trait space have been developed as one means to predict the evolution and stability of distributions of individual behaviors in a biological species (Bomze, 1990, 1991; Oechssler and Riedel, 2001, 2002). These systems generalize the well-known replicator equation approach of dynamic evolutionary game theory (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Cressman, 2003) when the trait space is finite (i.e. when there are a finite number of pure strategies) and individuals interact in random pairwise encounters that determine their payoffs (i.e. their fitness or reproductive success). A primary objective of these theoretical models is the characterization, in terms of static payoff/fitness comparisons, of static conditions (and distributions that satisfy the conditions) that imply dynamic stability. Such conditions then allow practitioners of evolutionary game theory to describe the outcome of the evolutionary process without a detailed analysis of the underlying dynamical system.

For instance, when there are n pure strategies (so trait space is finite) and there are random pairwise encounters that contribute additively to fitness, the static equilibrium concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy defined by Maynard Smith (1982) (i.e. a strategy for which, whenever all individuals use this strategy, the population cannot be invaded by a rare mutant under the influence of natural selection) has been a huge success since the resultant heuristic static conditions have a clear biological basis. We will refer to this case as the matrix game model (Meszena et al., 2001) and the equilibrium concept as a matrix-ESS (Vincent and Cressman, 2000; Cressman and

Hofbauer, 2005) since payoffs are given through an $n \times n$ payoff matrix.¹

For continuous trait spaces, an alternative means to predict the evolutionary outcome is the *adaptive dynamics* method that has generated an enormous literature (see Abrams (2001) and the references therein) since the phrase was introduced by Hofbauer and Sigmund (1990). This method is especially useful when the resident biological species is monomorphic (i.e. when all individuals in the population are using the same strategy) and there is a one-dimensional continuous trait space. Here, adaptive dynamics predicts stability of a monomorphic equilibrium if, for all other monomorphisms that are small perturbations of this equilibrium, trait substitution through nearby mutations is only successful when this substitution moves the population closer to the equilibrium. Mathematically, the adaptive dynamics of mutation and trait substitution is modelled here by the *canonical equation* (Marrow et al., 1996), a one-dimensional dynamical system (see Section 4 below) whose stable equilibria are characterized by the static *convergence stable* conditions of Christiansen (1991) (also called the *m*-stability concept in Taylor (1989)). Combined with a further condition (often called the ESS or uninvadability condition) that guards against the monomorphism being successfully invaded by an evolving dimorphism through a process now referred to as evolutionary branching (Doebeli and Dieckmann, 2000), we obtain the solution concept of *continuously stable strategy* (CSS) introduced by Eshel (1983).

From our perspective, adaptive dynamics and its canonical equation are approximate descriptions of how the mean of the distribution of individual

¹The matrix-ESS terminology will help avoid confusion with the term ESS as it has been used in the literature with continuous trait spaces.

behaviors evolves and do not adequately model the spread of the distribution. In this paper, we use the replicator equation with a continuous trait space to model the evolution of the probability distribution (i.e. probability measure) of individual behaviors. The CSS and/or convergence stability conditions are then heuristic tools that at best can suggest when the distribution will evolve to a monomorphism (i.e. to a Dirac delta distribution in measure theoretic terminology). In fact, Cressman and Hofbauer (2005) have shown the relevance of the CSS concept (and the closely related concept of a *neighborhood invader strategy* (NIS) of Apaloo (1997)) for stability of monomorphisms in the measure dynamics of a one-dimensional continuous trait space. Specifically, a non CSS monomorphism is unstable in the measure dynamic and, conversely, a CSS is dynamically stable if the initial distribution of individual behaviors is close to the CSS and satisfies an additional technical requirement concerning the strategies present in the population (i.e. the support of this distribution).² Of particular interest in proving these results is the technique of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies that is borrowed from classical game theory and also used in the stability analysis of evolutionary game theory applied to matrix games (e.g. Samuelson and Zhang, 1992) but seems not to have been used previously in the adaptive dynamics literature.

The main purpose of this paper is then to examine whether static extensions of the one-dimensional adaptive dynamics concepts continue their relevance for the measure dynamic model when the trait space is multi-dimensional. We begin in Section 2 by briefly developing the replicator

²See Section 5 for further details of this technical requirement that successful mutant monomorphisms in the adaptive dynamics approach are available for trait substitution. Without this requirement, the stronger NIS conditions are needed to guarantee dynamic stability.

equation on a continuous trait space and introducing essential notation used throughout the paper concerning this measure dynamics and the underlying fitness functions. Sections 3 and 4 provide valuable insight by fully analyzing the replicator equation in the special case of quadratic fitness functions and normal distributions (Section 3) and then relating these results to potential static extensions of the CSS concept to multi-dimensional adaptive dynamics in Section 4 (see Theorems 4 and 5 there). Section 5 considers the general case of arbitrary fitness functions and probability distributions in the multi-dimensional setting. Unfortunately, our results here do not give as thorough a static characterization of stability for the replicator equation as that available through the one-dimensional analysis of Cressman and Hofbauer (2005). Although we are able to obtain necessary conditions related to adaptive dynamics for stability of monomorphisms in large classes of measure dynamic models as well as sufficient conditions for others, an exhaustive classification is beyond the reach of our current techniques. The final section discusses these shortcomings as it summarizes the positive aspects of our classification.

2 The Replicator Dynamics on the Space of Probability Measures

The probability measure dynamics is the extension of the replicator equation originally defined for matrix games with a finite trait space (Taylor and Jonker, 1978). In general, individuals are assumed to play a strategy s in a fixed trait space S and the population state is given by a probability measure

P on a measurable space (S, \mathcal{B}) . If $A \in \mathcal{B}$, $P(A)$ is interpreted as the proportion of individuals in the population who are using strategies in the set A .

For our model of a multi-dimensional continuous trait space, S will be a Borel subset of \mathbf{R}^n and \mathcal{B} will be the Borel subsets of S (i.e. the σ -algebra of the Borel sets of \mathbf{R}^n intersected with S and so P is a Borel measure).³ Let $\Delta(S)$ denote the set of probability measures with respect to (S, \mathcal{B}) . Since P is a Borel measure, there is a unique (relatively) closed subset of S , called the *support* of P , such that the measure of its complement is 0 but every open set that intersects it has positive measure (Royden, 1988).

The measure dynamics on $\Delta(S)$ (see (1) below) is given in terms of the fitness (or expected payoff) $\pi(s, P) = \pi(\delta_s, P)$ of an individual using strategy s when the population is in state P . Here, for a given $s \in S$, δ_s denotes the Dirac delta measure that assigns unit mass to $\{s\}$. We will assume throughout that the fitness $\pi(s, P)$ is given through a continuous real-valued payoff function $\pi : S \times S \rightarrow \mathbf{R}$ by $\pi(s, P) = \int_S \pi(s, y)P(dy)$. In particular, matrix games that assume random pairwise interactions and a finite trait space S may be put in this form.⁴ The mean payoff to a random individual in the population with state P is then $\pi(P, P) \equiv \int_S \pi(\delta_s, P)P(ds)$.

We assume the *replicator equation* (1) describes how the population state

³In fact, S will typically have further topological properties such as being convex and open (or closed with nonempty interior). The Borel subsets of \mathbf{R}^n form the smallest σ -algebra containing the open subsets of \mathbf{R}^n .

⁴In fact, Bomze and Pötscher (1989) argue that the existence of such a $\pi(s, y)$ for an arbitrary trait space S means the evolutionary game can be interpreted as being based on pairwise interactions. It is only the form of $\pi(s, P)$ that is important to us, not whether players are competing pairwise.

evolves (i.e. its solutions define trajectories P_t in $\Delta(S)$).

$$\frac{dP}{dt}(A) = \int_A (\pi(\delta_s, P) - \pi(P, P)) P(ds) \quad (1)$$

Heuristically, this dynamic increases the probability of those sets of strategies B that have a higher expected payoff than the mean payoff to a random individual in the population. It has been shown (Oechssler and Riedel, 2001) that there is a unique solution that satisfies this dynamics for all positive t given any initial probability measure P_0 with compact support when $\pi(s, y)$ is continuous.⁵ Here A is a Borel subset of S and $\frac{dP}{dt}$ at time t is defined to be $\lim_{h \rightarrow 0} \frac{P_{t+h} - P_t}{h}$ with respect to the variational norm (i.e. $\lim_{h \rightarrow 0} \sup_{B \in \mathcal{B}} \|\frac{dP}{dt}(A) - \frac{P_{t+h} - P_t}{h}(A)\| = 0$ where $\|\cdot\|$ is the variational norm as in Oechssler and Riedel (2001)). Furthermore, the support of P_t is the same as P_0 for all $t \geq 0$. A population state P^* is an equilibrium of (1) if and only if $\pi(\delta_s, P^*) - \pi(P^*, P^*) = 0$ for all $s \in \text{supp}(P^*)$.

Our primary aim in this paper is the investigation of the convergence and stability properties (especially related to monomorphic equilibrium population states δ_s) of the measure dynamics (1). Heuristically, dynamic stability of P^* refers to the question whether P_t stays close and/or evolves to P^* if the initial P_0 is chosen appropriately in $\Delta(S)$. From Oechssler and Riedel (2002), it is clear that the answers to the stability question depend critically on the concept of closeness of probability measures (i.e. on the topology used for the space of Borel probability measures), when the trait space is not a finite subset of \mathbf{R}^n .

⁵If $\pi(s, y)$ is not continuous or P_0 does not have compact support, one must be careful that the desired integrals are defined. The latter concern is discussed further for the normal distributions of Section 3.

We feel the *weak topology* captures best the essence of evolutionary convergence in our biological systems.⁶ This topology will mostly be applied to neighborhoods of monomorphic P^* . In general, for a probability measure P^* with finite support $\{x_1, \dots, x_m\}$, we can take ε -neighborhoods in the weak topology to be of the form

$$\{Q \in \Delta(S) : |Q(B_\varepsilon(x_i)) - P^*({x_i})| < \varepsilon \quad \forall i = 1, \dots, m\}$$

where $B_\varepsilon(x)$ is the open ball of radius ε centered at x . In particular, two monomorphisms δ_{x_1} and δ_{x_2} are within ε of each other if and only if the Euclidean distance between these points is less than ε . In the following all topological notions in $\Delta(S)$ are taken for this weak topology, unless otherwise stated.

2.1 The Fitness Function $\pi(s, y)$

For the multi-dimensional continuous trait space, we assume S is the closure of an open connected subset of \mathbf{R}^n that contains the origin in its interior. In fact, we often assume S is star-shaped with respect to the origin (i.e., if $x \in S$, then so does the line segment joining 0 to x). We are particularly interested in the stability of the monomorphism δ_0 . To this end, consider the Taylor expansion of $\pi(x, z)$ about $(0, 0) \in \mathbf{R}^{2n}$

$$\pi(x, z) = \pi(0, 0) + \nabla_1 \pi \cdot x + \nabla_2 \pi \cdot z + \frac{1}{2} [x \cdot (\nabla_{11}^2 \pi) x + 2x \cdot (\nabla_{12}^2 \pi) z + z \cdot (\nabla_{22}^2 \pi) z] + h.o.t.$$

where, for $i \in \{1, 2\}$, $\nabla_i \pi$ is the gradient vector of π at the origin in the i th variable (e.g. $(\nabla_1 \pi)_k = (\partial \pi(x, z) / \partial x_k) \Big|_{(x,z)=(0,0)}$) and $\nabla_{ij}^2 \pi$ is the $n \times n$

⁶We frequently use a “modified” weak topology as in Eshel and Sansone (2003). Here a basis for the open neighbourhoods of δ_0 are sets of probability measures that are within ε_1 in the weak topology and whose support is contained in $B_{\varepsilon_2}(0)$.

matrix with entries the appropriate second order partials.

Each monomorphism is a rest point of (1). Their stability in the (modified) weak topology requires the monomorphism be a NE of the payoff function restricted to the game with nearby strategies (e.g. 0 is such a NE if $\pi(x, 0) \leq \pi(0, 0)$ for all x sufficiently close to 0). Since 0 is an interior point, this implies the gradient $\nabla_1 \pi$ is the zero vector and $x \cdot (\nabla_{11}^2 \pi) x \leq 0$ for all $x \in \mathbf{R}^n$. In fact, we will assume the symmetric Hessian matrix $\nabla_{11}^2 \pi$ is negative definite throughout to avoid technical issues. That is, we assume 0 is a strict NE of the restricted game.⁷ Since $\nabla_{11}^2 \pi$ is symmetric, we can diagonalize it by an orthogonal transformation and then all diagonal entries $-d_k$ are negative. Furthermore, a change of variables (that replaces x_k with $\sqrt{d_k} x_k$ and takes the payoffs with respect to these new variables) allows us to assume $\nabla_{11}^2 \pi = -2I$ where I is the $n \times n$ identity matrix. Without loss of generality, the fitness function can then be written in these new coordinates as

$$\pi(x, z) = \pi(0, 0) + \nabla_2 \pi \cdot z - x \cdot x + x \cdot Bz + h.o.t. \quad (2)$$

(i.e. $\nabla_{11}^2 \pi = -2I$ and $\nabla_{12}^2 \pi = B$).

In terms of the Taylor expansion, the replicator equation (1) can then be rewritten as

$$\frac{dP}{dt}(A) = \int_S \int_S \int_A (\pi(x, z) - \pi(y, z)) P(dx) P(dy) P(dz) \quad (3)$$

⁷The condition $\pi(x, 0) < \pi(0, 0)$ is related to the concepts of uninvadability and evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) as used in adaptive dynamics (Marrow et al., 1996; Vincent et al., 1996). We especially avoid this latter terminology since the ESS description is overused in the literature and may have different interpretations for different readers. On the other hand, strict NE seems to have a universally accepted meaning.

where the integrand is given by

$$\pi(x, z) - \pi(y, z) = (y - x) \cdot [x + y - Bz + h.o.t.]. \quad (4)$$

In particular, the constant and linear terms in the fitness function are irrelevant for the dynamic analysis.

3 The Replicator Equation with Normal Distributions and Quadratic Fitness Functions

In this section, we analyze the replicator equation when the higher order terms are ignored in (4) and the initial probability measure P_0 is the (multivariate) normal distribution $N(m, C)$ with mean vector $m \in \mathbf{R}^n$ and covariance matrix $C \in \mathbf{R}^{n \times n}$. From Section 2.1, we may assume fitness has the form of the quadratic function

$$\pi(x, z) = -x \cdot x + x \cdot Bz \quad (5)$$

for $x, y \in S = \mathbf{R}^n$ and B an $n \times n$ matrix.

We proceed as follows. The first step is to show that the class of normal distributions is forward invariant under the replicator equation. Therefore, the infinite-dimensional measure dynamics is reduced to a finite-dimensional system of $n + n^2$ ordinary differential equations for the mean and covariance matrix. These facts are stated in Theorem 1 below where it is also apparent that the dynamics of the covariance matrix does not depend on the mean vector. The next step is to obtain the explicit solution (Theorem 2) for the evolution of the covariance matrix. Substitution of this solution into the dynamics for the mean results in a system of linear differential equations

with time varying coefficients. The stability analysis of this system for the equilibrium δ_0 (i.e. for the limit of the normal distributions $N(0, C)$ as C approaches the zero matrix) is summarized in Theorem 3 in terms of the matrix B .

Theorem 1 *The class of normal distributions is forward invariant under the replicator dynamics (1). Assume that the initial distribution is normal, $P_0 = N(m, C)$ for a mean vector $m \in \mathbf{R}^n$ and a covariance matrix $C \in \mathbf{R}^{n \times n}$. Then the solution of the replicator dynamics starting at P_0 is given by $P_t = N(m(t), C(t))$, where the mean and the covariance matrix solve the initial value problem*

$$m'(t) = C(t) (B - 2I) m(t) \tag{6}$$

$$C'(t) = -2C(t)C(t). \tag{7}$$

with $m(0) = m$ and $C(0) = C$.

Proof. The proof of invariance for $n = 1$ is in Oechssler and Riedel (2001). The corresponding argument for the multidimensional case is given in the Appendix as well as the proof of (6) and (7).

To gain some intuition for the proof of (6), we assume here that all P_t are normally distributed with mean $m(t)$ and diagonal covariance matrix with entries $V_i(t)$. Note that $\pi(x, P_t) = -x \cdot x + x \cdot Bm(t)$ and $\pi(P_t, P_t) = -m(t) \cdot m(t) - V(t) \cdot 1 + x \cdot Bm(t)$, where 1 denotes the summing vector $(1, 1, \dots, 1)$. Then the differential equation for the i th component of the

mean is (omitting the time variable t)

$$\begin{aligned}
m'_i &= \int_n x_i (\pi(x, P) - \pi(P, P)) P(dx) \\
&= \int_n \left(-x_i^3 + x_i \left(\sum_{k=1}^n (x_i - m_i) B_{ik} m_k \right) \right) P(dx) \\
&\quad + \sum_{j \neq i} \int_n -x_i \left(x_j^2 + \left(\sum_{k=1}^n (x_j - m_j) B_{jk} m_k \right) \right) P(dx) - m_i (-m \cdot m - V \cdot 1).
\end{aligned}$$

The third moment of a normal random variable is $\int x_i^3 P(dx) = m_i^3 + 3m_i V_i$. The covariance of x_i and $x_i - m_i$ is equal to the variance V_i . As we have assumed that the components are uncorrelated, $\int x_i (x_j - m_j) P(dx) = 0$ for $i \neq j$. Substitution of these results into the last equation for m'_i yields

$$m'_i = -2m_i V_i + V_i \sum_{k=1}^n B_{ik} m_k.$$

That is, in vector notation, we have (6). ■

Since the dynamical system (7) for the covariance matrix does not depend on the mean vector, we may study this system of differential equations on its own. The following theorem gives the explicit solution which can be easily verified.

Theorem 2 *For any initial positive semidefinite matrix $C(0)$, the solution of (7) is given by*

$$C(t) = C(0)(I + 2C(0)t)^{-1}. \tag{8}$$

Note that (8) is well defined for all $t \geq 0$. Alternatively, one can write the solution in the following way.

$$C(t) = O^T D(t) O$$

where O is an orthogonal matrix such that $OC(0)O^T = D$ for some diagonal matrix D (and O^T denotes the transpose of O) and $D(t)$ is the diagonal matrix with entries

$$D_{ii}(t) = \frac{D_{ii}}{1 + 2tD_{ii}}. \quad (9)$$

In particular, the covariance matrix $C(t)$ converges to the zero matrix, and $C(t) = \frac{1}{2t}I + O(\frac{1}{t^2})$ as $t \rightarrow \infty$ whenever the initial condition $C(0)$ is positive definite.

Theorem 3 (*Stability of δ_0*) Consider the replicator equation (1) restricted to the class of normal distributions with quadratic fitness functions as in (5).

1. If every eigenvalue of the matrix $B - 2I$ has negative real part, then δ_0 is globally asymptotically stable with respect to the set of initial normal distributions P_0 of the form $N(m, C)$ with positive definite symmetric covariance matrix C .

2. If some eigenvalue of $B - 2I$ has positive real part, then δ_0 is unstable. In particular, for all positive definite C there are m arbitrarily close to 0 such that along the solution with initial $P_0 = N(m, C)$ one has $\|m(t)\| \rightarrow \infty$ as $t \rightarrow \infty$.

Proof. By inserting the solution (8) into (6), the mean evolves according to the time-dependent linear differential equation

$$\frac{dm}{dt} = C(0)(I + 2C(0)t)^{-1}(B - 2I)m(t) \quad (10)$$

After changing the time scale ($2t + 1 = e^\tau$) this differential equation becomes asymptotically autonomous

$$\frac{dm}{d\tau} = (B - 2I)m(\tau) + R(\tau)m(\tau) \quad (11)$$

with exponentially decreasing remainder term $R(\tau) = (C(0) - I)(I + (e^\tau - 1)C(0))^{-1}$. Therefore the eigenvalues of $B - 2I$ determine the asymptotic behavior of $m(t)$, see e.g. Coddington and Levinson (1955, Ch. 3, Problem 35). ■

4 Multi-Dimensional Adaptive Dynamics and the Canonical Equation

As stated in the Introduction, a main purpose of this paper is to examine the relevance (for the dynamic stability of the replicator equation with multi-dimensional continuous strategy space) of static extensions of the one-dimensional stability conditions developed by adaptive dynamics (e.g. the CSS and NIS concepts). The comparisons developed in this section continue to be based on a quadratic payoff function $\pi(x, y)$.

The *canonical equation* (12) from adaptive dynamics for the evolution of a (monomorphic) population with mean m through mutation and trait substitution was developed by Dieckmann and Law (1996). Following Meszner et al. (2001) (see also Leimar, 2005), this takes the form (in our notation)

$$m'(t) = \frac{1}{2}u(m)N(m)C(m)\nabla_1\pi(x, m)|_{x=m}. \quad (12)$$

Here $u(m)$ and $N(m)$ are positive real-valued functions giving the mutation rate and the equilibrium population size respectively at mean m . These

can be ignored in analyzing the limiting behavior of the canonical equation since they do not affect the evolutionary trajectory but only the speed of evolution along this trajectory (and so $\frac{1}{2}u(m)N(m)$ will be deleted from now on). More importantly, the covariance matrix $C(m)$ (which now characterizes the expected mutational effects in different directions from m and does affect its evolution) is assumed to depend only on m . In the earlier formulation of adaptive dynamics by Hofbauer and Sigmund (1990) the symmetric and positive definite matrix $C(m)$ comes from a Riemannian metric on the trait space.

To compare (12) to the replicator dynamics, assume $m = 0$ is a strict NE in the interior of the trait space as in Section 2.1. Then $\nabla_1 \pi(x, 0)|_{x=0} = 0$ and so $m = 0$ is an interior equilibrium of (12). With the same change of variables that led to (2) in Section 2.1, the canonical equation becomes

$$m'(t) = C(m(t)) (B - 2I) m(t). \quad (13)$$

$m = 0$ is called *convergence stable* (with respect to $C(m)$) if it is asymptotically stable under (13).

A quick glance at (6) shows the canonical equation is quite closely related to the evolution of the mean for normal distributions under (1) with quadratic fitness functions. When $C(m(t)) = c(t)I$ for some positive function $c(t) > 0$, the two dynamical systems have the same trajectories for the mean although the mean evolves much slower under the replicator equation through the change in time scale (given by $2t + 1 = e^\tau$) as the covariance approaches the zero matrix. In general, the only difference mathematically is that (13) is an autonomous system of differential equations whereas (6) is not. As we will see, this difference has important consequences for multi-dimensional

trait space on how convergence stability is related to dynamic stability of (6) where the covariance matrix $C(t)$ is given explicitly in Theorem 2.

For a one-dimensional trait space, convergence stability is independent of the choice of $C(m)$. That is, $m = 0$ is asymptotically stable with respect to the canonical equation (13) for one choice of positive variance as a function of m if and only if it is for any other choice. In fact, a one-dimensional strict NE that is convergence stable is called a *Continuously Stable Strategy* (CSS), a concept introduced by Eshel (1983). Furthermore, $m = 0$ is a CSS if and only if δ_0 is asymptotically stable under (6).⁸ Unfortunately, this correspondence does not extend beyond one-dimension as illustrated by the following example.

Example 1. Consider the two-dimensional trait space \mathbf{R}^2 with quadratic fitness function (5) and

$$B = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & b \\ c & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

where b, c are both positive. By Theorem 3, δ_0 is globally asymptotically stable under (1) for the class of normal distributions if and only if the eigenvalues of $B - 2I$, $\lambda_{1,2} = -2 \pm \sqrt{bc}$, are both negative, i.e., $bc < 4$.

Example 1a. Suppose $C(m)$ is the constant symmetric matrix

$$C = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \alpha \\ \alpha & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

for all m where α is a fixed parameter satisfying $|\alpha| < 1$ so that C is positive

⁸The condition for asymptotic stability in both dynamics is that the only entry $b - 2$ of the matrix $B - 2I$ is negative (i.e. $b < 2$). Here we ignore the degenerate case with $b = 2$. Similarly, the above definition of CSS ignores the possibility that a non strict NE can be a CSS, a situation we also view as degenerate.

definite. Then $m = 0$ is globally asymptotically stable under (13) if and only if every eigenvalue of $C(B - 2I)$ has negative real part.

With $b = 1/4$ and $c = 4$, the eigenvalues of $B - 2I$ are $-1, -3$ and so δ_0 is globally asymptotically stable for the replicator dynamics restricted to the normal distributions if $|\alpha| < 1$. On the other hand, the sum of the eigenvalues of $C(B - 2I)$ is the trace $-4 + 17\alpha/4$ of

$$\begin{pmatrix} -2 + 4\alpha & 1/4 - \alpha \\ -2\alpha + 4 & \alpha/4 - 2 \end{pmatrix}.$$

Thus, some eigenvalue has positive real part if $16/17 < \alpha < 1$ and so $m = 0$ is not stable for the canonical equation (13) with constant covariance matrix parameterized by these α .

The mathematical reason for this stability difference between the replicator equation and the canonical equation (see Theorem 5 below) is that $B - 2I$ is not negative definite for $b = 1/4$ and $c = 4$ since $|b + c|$ is greater than the trace of $2I - B$. Furthermore, even if $B - 2I$ were negative definite, the asymmetry of B implies there is a continuous choice $C(m)$ depending on m for which $m = 0$ is unstable.

Example 1b. For an explicit example of this latter phenomenon, take $b = 1$ and $c = 1/2$ (so $B - 2I$ is negative definite) with

$$C(m) = \begin{pmatrix} \alpha^2 & \alpha\beta \\ \alpha\beta & \beta^2 \end{pmatrix}.$$

where $\begin{pmatrix} \alpha \\ \beta \end{pmatrix} \equiv \begin{pmatrix} -14 & 42 \\ -39 & 16 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} m_1 \\ m_2 \end{pmatrix}$. Substitution into (13) yields

$$\begin{aligned} \begin{pmatrix} m'_1 \\ m'_2 \end{pmatrix} &= \begin{pmatrix} \alpha^2 & \alpha\beta \\ \alpha\beta & \beta^2 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} -2 & 1 \\ 1/2 & -2 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} -14 & 42 \\ -39 & 16 \end{pmatrix}^{-1} \begin{pmatrix} \alpha \\ \beta \end{pmatrix} \\ &= \frac{1}{202} \begin{pmatrix} \alpha^2 & \alpha\beta \\ \alpha\beta & \beta^2 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 10 \\ -10 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \alpha \\ \beta \end{pmatrix} \\ &= \frac{\alpha^2 + \beta^2}{202} \begin{pmatrix} \alpha \\ \beta \end{pmatrix}. \end{aligned}$$

Thus,

$$\begin{pmatrix} \alpha' \\ \beta' \end{pmatrix} = \frac{\alpha^2 + \beta^2}{202} \begin{pmatrix} -14 & 42 \\ -39 & 16 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \alpha \\ \beta \end{pmatrix}$$

and so $m = 0$ is unstable for (13) since the trace of this last 2×2 matrix is positive.⁹ On the other hand, δ_0 is globally asymptotically stable for the replicator dynamics restricted to the normal distributions.

The two choices of explicit parameters in Examples 1a and 1b above illustrate two methods to extend the one-dimensional CSS conditions to multi-dimensions. The more common approach (Meszena et al, 2001) is to consider $m^* \in \mathbf{R}^n$ a multi-dimensional CSS if it is a strict NE that is convergence stable with respect to any choice of constant positive definite symmetric covariance matrix C . Translating m^* to the origin, this is equivalent to asserting $C(B - 2I)$ has every eigenvalue with negative real part for all choices of C . Hines (1980b) and Cressman and Hines (1984) (see also Leimar (2005)) show this is true if and only if $B - 2I$ is negative definite, which in the above example is the condition $|b + c| < 4$. The negative definiteness of $B - 2I$

⁹ $C(m)$ is only positive semidefinite. Positive terms can be added to the diagonal of $C(m)$ to make it positive definite. If these terms are of the form $o(\alpha^2 + \beta^2)$ (i.e. they go to zero faster than $\alpha^2 + \beta^2$), they will not affect the instability of $m = 0$ under (13).

is also equivalent to (multi-dimensional) m -stability introduced by Lessard (1990).

In another approach, $m^* \in \mathbf{R}^n$ is called a multi-dimensional CSS if it is a strict NE that is convergence stable with respect to all choices of positive definite symmetric covariance matrices $C(m)$ that depend continuously on m . In fact, Leimar (2005) considers an even more restrictive notion of CSS by allowing all continuously varying $C(m)$ that are positive definite but not necessarily symmetric, a condition Leimar called *absolute convergence stability* (see also the concept of a Darwinian demon in Leimar (2001)). He then showed this condition is equivalent to $B - 2I$ being symmetric and negative definite, a similar result as that illustrated in Example 1b. The essential properties for this specific example are that $A \equiv \begin{pmatrix} -14 & 42 \\ -39 & 16 \end{pmatrix}$ has an eigenvalue of positive real part and that $A^T (B - 2I)$ is positive definite.

We will follow the first perspective and define a strict NE $m^* \in \mathbf{R}^n$ to be a multi-dimensional CSS if it is convergence stable with respect to any choice of constant positive definite symmetric covariance matrix C . There are several reasons for this. Not only is mutational covariance near a monomorphic equilibrium assumed to be constant in most treatments of adaptive dynamics (Vincent et al., 1993; Metz et al., 1996; Meszina et al., 2001), it is also a standard assumption in earlier treatments of evolution of strategy distributions from game-theoretic models where payoff functions are often assumed bilinear as in $\pi(x, y) = x \cdot By$ (Hines, 1980b).¹⁰ For us, another important reason

¹⁰See however Hines (1980a) where it is shown that non constant variances arise quite naturally and can play an important role in the stability analysis. Effects of evolving (co)variances are important in models of quantitative genetics as well (e.g. Bürger, 2000) where the mean strategy dynamics is similar to the canonical equation, although here variances are again sometimes assumed constant (Abrams, 2001).

is that this definition of CSS is the most relevant condition for dynamic stability of the general replicator equation (1) analyzed in the following section (see Theorem 15 there).

The above example and/or the proof of Theorem 3 show that dynamic stability depends critically on the evolution of the covariance matrix $C(m(t))$ and/or $C(t)$. However, if $B - 2I$ is symmetric, all concepts are equivalent. That is, we have the following.

Theorem 4 (Symmetric B) *Suppose B is symmetric. The following three statements are equivalent.*¹¹

1. δ_0 is asymptotically stable under (1) for the class of normal distributions.
2. $m = 0$ is a CSS.
3. $m = 0$ is a strict NE and strongly convergence stable.

On the other hand, if B is not symmetric, none of the statements are equivalent by Examples 1a and 1b. We then have the following theorem.

Theorem 5 *Suppose B is not symmetric and $m = 0$ is a strict NE. Then*

1. δ_0 is asymptotically stable under (1) for the class of normal distributions if and only if every eigenvalue of $B - 2I$ has negative real part.
2. $m = 0$ is a CSS if and only if $B - 2I$ is negative definite.
3. $m = 0$ is not strongly convergence stable.

Remark. By Theorem 5, the three statements in Theorem 4 are related by 3 implies 2 implies 1 for general B but not conversely. In fact the CSS condition implies more about the dynamic stability of δ_0 whether B is symmetric

¹¹These equivalences ignore degenerate possibilities. For example, we ignore situations where relevant eigenvalues have zero real part.

or not. Specifically, if $m = 0$ is a CSS, then δ_0 continues to be asymptotically stable when (1) is restricted to initial normal distributions of the form $N(m, C)$ where the covariance matrix C is only positive semidefinite and m is in the range of C . Moreover, the multi-dimensional CSS concept emerges by applying this restricted notion of asymptotic stability to all positive semidefinite covariance matrices with one-dimensional range (i.e. a line through the origin). By Theorem 3 restricted to each such line, we have an independent proof of the result (Meszena et al., 2001) (see also Lessard, 1990) that the multi-dimensional CSS concept is equivalent to the one-dimensional CSS conditions for each line through the origin.

5 Stability of Monomorphisms under the Replicator Equation

The explicit analysis of the replicator dynamics in Section 3 relies heavily on the assumptions the payoff function $\pi(x, y)$ is quadratic and the initial population is normally distributed with mean m . Such normal distributions are one way to model aggregate individual mutations for a monomorphic population at m . An underlying assumption of the replicator equation (1) is that each individual reproduces offspring with its same trait and at a rate equal to its fitness. If this reproduction of clones is subject to small shocks from m that are independent of each other, the Central Limit Theorem can be used to conclude the initial traits will be normally distributed after such a shock. So here mutation is treated indirectly by considering variations of initial conditions.

In the remainder of the paper, we consider other initial distributions (that

can also be given a mutational interpretation) and arbitrary payoff functions. We will be most interested in the stability of monomorphisms δ_{m^*} for initial distributions whose support is close to m^* to reflect the adaptive dynamics assumption that trait substitution involves only nearby mutations. This means we cannot simply use the weak topology on $\Delta(\mathbf{R}^n)$ (or on $\Delta(S)$ for that matter) since P may be close to δ_{m^*} in the weak topology and still have support all of \mathbf{R}^n (e.g. a normal distribution with mean 0 and small variance is close to δ_0 in the weak topology). Here we generalize the one-dimensional topology used by Eshel and Sansone (2003) to multi-dimensions (see also Cressman, 2005) and say P is close to P^* if P is close to P^* in the weak topology and the support of P is close to that of P^* . Applied to a monomorphism $P^* = \delta_{m^*}$, this *modified weak topology* (called the *maximal shift topology* by Eshel and Sansone (2003) when the trait space is one dimensional) simplifies since neighborhoods of δ_{m^*} become those distributions with support close to m^* . Its main advantage is that the Taylor expansion of the payoff function about the monomorphism can be used (specifically, up to quadratic terms) as a good approximation. To a large extent, this avoids problems that arise with the weak topology where one must also account for possibly large payoff effects of (admittedly rare) interactions involving an individual whose strategy is far from that of the monomorphic population.

The replicator dynamics (1) in a continuous trait space shares the same property of its analogue for a finite number of traits that traits are neither created nor completely destroyed during the course of evolution. For (1), this is equivalent to asserting $\text{supp } P_t = \text{supp } P_0$ for all $t \geq 0$. In particular, δ_{m^*} cannot be asymptotically stable in the (modified) weak topology since

any neighborhood of δ_{m^*} contains initial P_0 whose support does not contain m . Therefore, we will analyze (asymptotic) stability of δ_{m^*} with respect to initial P_0 with $m^* \in \text{supp}(P_0)$ according to the following definition that gives analogues of standard concepts from the theory of dynamical systems.

Definition 6 *Let Q be a set of probability distributions, whose support contains that of P^* , that is invariant under (1). P^* is stable (under (1) in the modified weak topology with respect to Q) if, for every modified weak neighborhood U of P^* there is another modified weak neighborhood O of P^* such that $P_t \in U$ for all $P_0 \in O \cap Q$. P^* is locally attracting if, for some modified weak neighborhood U of P^* , P_t converges to P^* in the weak topology for every $P_0 \in U \cap Q$. P^* is locally asymptotically stable if it is stable and locally attracting.*

In fact, every monomorphism $P^* = \delta_{m^*}$ is automatically stable in the modified weak topology since P is close to δ_{m^*} if and only if its support is close to m^* .¹² That is, δ_{m^*} is locally attracting in the modified weak topology if and only if δ_{m^*} is locally asymptotically stable. From now on, (asymptotic) stability of δ_{m^*} will refer to either of these two properties. Of course, this stability then depends critically on the choice of Q . For instance, in the trivial case that δ_{m^*} is the only distribution in Q with support close to $\{m^*\}$, δ_{m^*} is automatically locally asymptotically stable by default.

Sections 5.1 and 5.2 examine the stability properties of Definition 6 for two choices of Q that are more important. In either case, it is assumed that Q contains measures whose support is the closure of an open neighborhood

¹²This statement is no longer true for stability of a non monomorphic distribution P^* (for dimorphisms, see Cressman (2005)).

of $m^* = 0$ that is arbitrarily close in the Euclidean topology. Then the stability concept in Definition 6 requires at a minimum that m^* be a NE locally (i.e. $\pi(m^*, m^*) \geq \pi(x, m^*)$ for all x near m^* , see e.g. Alós-Ferrer and Ania, 2001). To avoid technical complications, we again assume throughout Section 5 that m is in fact a local strict NE as determined by the second order Taylor expansion of π . Furthermore, we assume that the trait space has been parameterized in such a way that $m^* = 0$ is in the interior of S and the Taylor expansion of $\pi(x, y)$ up to quadratic terms is given by (5). To repeat, we make the following assumption.

Assumption. $m^* = 0$ is a local strict NE (i.e. $\pi(x, 0) < \pi(0, 0)$ for all x sufficiently close (but not equal) to 0) and the Taylor expansion of $\pi(x, y)$ about $(0, 0)$ is $\pi(x, y) = -x \cdot x + x \cdot Bx$ up to second order terms.

5.1 Dynamic Stability, Local Superiority and NIS

In this section, we seek the strongest type of stability possible by taking $Q = Q_0 := \{P \in \Delta(S) : 0 \in \text{supp } P\}$. Consider the trajectory in $\Delta(S)$ for initial P_0 with support $\{0, x\}$ and $x \in S$. The replicator equation (1) for such P_0 is

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dP}{dt}(\{0\}) &= P(\{0\}) (\pi(\delta_0, P) - \pi(P, P)) \\ &= P(\{0\})P(\{x\}) [(\pi(0, 0) - \pi(x, 0)) P(\{0\}) + (\pi(0, x) - \pi(x, x)) P(\{x\})] \\ &= P(\{0\})P(\{x\}) [x \cdot x P(\{0\}) + (x \cdot x - x \cdot Bx) P(\{x\})] + h.o.t \end{aligned} \tag{14}$$

If $x \cdot x - x \cdot Bx < 0$ for some $x \neq 0$, then $\frac{dP}{dt}(\{0\}) < 0$ if x is sufficiently close to 0 and $P(\{x\})$ is sufficiently close to 1. Since 0 is in the interior of S , we

may assume $x \in S$. Thus, P_t does not converge to δ_0 in the modified weak topology and so δ_0 is not asymptotically stable.

That is, asymptotic stability of δ_0 implies $B - I$ is negative definite.¹³ This negative definite condition is similar to the CSS condition of adaptive dynamics (see Theorem 5 of Section 4). In fact, it is more closely related to the static condition called a *neighborhood invader strategy* (NIS) (McKelvey and Apaloo, 1995; Apaloo, 1997).¹⁴ The trait 0 is NIS if it has higher payoff against all nearby monomorphic populations δ_x than the expected payoff of x . That is, 0 is NIS if

$$\pi(0, x) > \pi(x, x) \quad (15)$$

for all other $x \in \mathbf{R}^n$ in a neighborhood of 0. From the Taylor expansion of a general payoff function $\pi(x, y)$ about $(0, 0)$, this becomes

$$\nabla_2 \pi \cdot x + \frac{1}{2} x \cdot (\nabla_{22}^2 \pi) x > \nabla_1 \pi \cdot x + \nabla_2 \pi \cdot x + \frac{1}{2} [x \cdot (\nabla_{11}^2 \pi) x + 2x \cdot (\nabla_{12}^2 \pi) x + x \cdot (\nabla_{22}^2 \pi) x] + h.o.t..$$

Since 0 is in the interior of S , $\nabla_1 \pi \cdot x = 0$ and so the NIS condition is that

$$x \cdot (\nabla_{11}^2 \pi) x + 2x \cdot (\nabla_{12}^2 \pi) x < 0.$$

By reparameterizing our trait space so that π is given by (2) (i.e. $\nabla_{11}^2 = -2I$ and $\nabla_{12}^2 = B$), the local strict NE 0 is NIS if and only if $B - I$ is negative definite. Furthermore, from (15) combined with the fact that

¹³Throughout Section 5, we again ignore degenerate possibilities. Thus, here we assume $B - I$ is not negative semidefinite. There is a partial converse as well; namely, if $B - I$ is negative definite (i.e. $x \cdot x - x \cdot Bx > 0$ for all x), then δ_0 is locally asymptotically stable with respect to the set Q of all dimorphic P with support containing 0.

¹⁴An NIS is also known as a *good invader* (Kisdi and Meszena, 1995) and as satisfying (multi-dimensional) m^* -stability (Lessard, 1990). For a one-dimensional trait space, Eshel and Sansone (2003) proved the NIS condition is necessary for asymptotic stability of δ_0 .

$\pi(0, 0) > \pi(x, 0)$ for all other $x \in \mathbf{R}^n$ in a neighborhood of 0, $B - I$ is negative definite if and only if 0 strictly dominates all other nearby x in the two-strategy game based on the trait space $\{0, x\}$. This game-theoretic characterization that

$$\pi(0, z) > \pi(x, z)$$

for all $z \in \{0, x\}$ is important for comparison to the analogous characterization of the CSS condition in Section 5.2 (see equation (16) there).

Another game-theoretic characterization with stability consequences is given in terms of the following definition introduced by Cressman (2005) for continuous strategy spaces. Local superiority is closely connected to the concept of *evolutionarily robust* (Oechssler and Riedel, 2002) (also called *locally superior with respect to the weak topology* by Cressman and Hofbauer (2005)) whereby $\pi(P^*, P) > \pi(P, P)$ for all P sufficiently close to P^* in the weak topology. Local superiority of a monomorphism according to the following definition is then taken with respect to the modified weak topology.

Definition 7 *The monomorphism $P^* = \delta_{m^*}$ is locally superior if, for all other P with support sufficiently close to m^* , $\pi(P^*, P) > \pi(P, P)$.*¹⁵

The following result summarizes the above discussion.

¹⁵Cressman (2005), who analyzed this concept for any P^* with finite support, used the phrase “neighborhood superior” in place of locally superior to avoid the ambiguity whether local referred to the modified weak topology or to the (Hausdorff) distance between supports. For monomorphic P^* , the two interpretations of local are identical.

Theorem 8 *The following four statements are equivalent under our above Assumption for Section 5.*

1. δ_0 is locally superior.
2. 0 is an NIS.
3. 0 strictly dominates all other nearby strategies x in the two-strategy game based on the trait space $\{0, x\}$.
4. $B - I$ is negative definite.

The only non obvious implication in the above Proposition is that the first statement is implied by any one of the other three statements. This proof is Theorem 1 in Cressman (2005). An NIS need not be locally superior if quadratic terms in the Taylor expansion do not determine the NIS conditions. Oechssler and Riedel (2002) provide the counterexample $\pi(x, y) = (x - y)^4 - 2x^4$ with a one-dimensional trait space (see also Eshel and Sansone (2003)).

Intuitively, a locally superior P^* should be locally attracting since P^* has a higher than average payoff at every nearby population state P .¹⁶ Unfortunately, we are only able to prove the following partial result for general payoff functions.

Theorem 9 *If δ_0 is locally superior and P_0 has compact support sufficiently close to 0 and containing 0, then δ_0 is an ω -limit point of P_t .¹⁷*

¹⁶For a finite trait space S , this intuition is equivalent to the notion of an evolutionarily stable strategy (i.e. a matrix-ESS) by Maynard Smith (1982). Furthermore, it is well-known a matrix-ESS is locally asymptotically stable for the replicator equation on a finite trait space.

¹⁷ δ_0 is locally attracting with respect to Q_0 if and only if δ_0 is the unique ω -limit point of P_t for all such $P_0 \in Q_0$.

Proof. The mapping $\sigma : (x, P) \rightarrow \pi(x, P) - \pi(P, P)$ is jointly continuous in x (Euclidean topology) and P (weak topology). As δ_0 is locally superior, we have $\sigma(0, P) > 0$ for all $P \neq \delta_0$ whose support is within an ε_0 ball of 0. If δ_0 is not a limit point in the weak topology of an initial P_0 with such support, then there is an open neighborhood of δ_0 that includes no P_t for all t sufficiently large. The set of all P outside this neighborhood with support within the ε_0 ball is compact in the weak topology. By continuity in P , we have $\sigma(0, P) \geq \kappa > 0$ for all such P and some κ . By continuity in x , we can find some $\varepsilon_1 > 0$ such that we have $\min \sigma(x, P) \geq \frac{\kappa}{2} > 0$ for all $|x| \leq \varepsilon_1$. But this implies

$$\frac{P'(t)(U)}{P(t)(U)} \geq \frac{\kappa}{2},$$

for the ball $U = \{x \in S : |x| \leq \varepsilon_1\}$. Then $P(t)(U) \uparrow \infty$, which is a contradiction. ■

In the special case of symmetric payoff functions (i.e. $\pi(x, y) = \pi(y, x)$), we have the following result, similar to Theorem 4 in Cressman and Hofbauer (2005).

Theorem 10 *Suppose $\pi(x, y)$ is a symmetric payoff function (in particular, B is symmetric).¹⁸ Then δ_0 is locally asymptotically stable with respect to the set Q_0 of all measures with 0 in their support if and only if δ_0 is locally superior.*

Proof. From Oechssler and Riedel (2002), we have the following two facts. Symmetry implies the mean fitness $\pi(P, P)$ is a strict local Lyapunov

¹⁸We may assume $\pi(x, y)$ has the form $\pi(x, y) = -x \cdot x + x \cdot By - y \cdot y + h.o.t.$ since the terms $\pi(0, 0) + \nabla_2 \pi \cdot y$ and $-y \cdot y$ (cf. (2)) are irrelevant for the replicator equation.

function and local superiority of δ_0 implies $\pi(P, P)$ has a strict local maximum at δ_0 . Furthermore, local superiority plus Lyapunov stability with respect to the weak topology implies local asymptotic stability (Cressman and Hofbauer, 2005, Theorem 2).¹⁹ This completes the proof that δ_0 is locally asymptotically stable if δ_0 is locally superior. The converse follows from the stability analysis of (14) and Theorem 8. ■

Remark. Attempts to extend Theorem 10 to general $\pi(x, y)$ have an interesting history. Oechssler and Riedel (2002) conjecture that Theorem 10 remains true for the weak topology when π is not symmetric (see their concept of evolutionarily robust). Eshel and Sansone (2003) provide a proof of Theorem 10 for general $\pi(x, y)$ if the trait space is one dimensional (although we have been unable to follow all the details of this proof). If Q is taken as the set of all measures with $P(\{0\}) > 0$, Theorem 10 was proven by Bomze (1990) for $\pi(x, y) = \phi(x)$, by Oechssler and Riedel (2002) for symmetric $\pi(x, y)$ and by Cressman (2005) for general $\pi(x, y)$.

5.2 Dynamic Stability, Dominance Solvability and CSS

Section 5.1 illustrates the importance of the static NIS concept for stability of the replicator dynamics (1). We now turn to the relevance of the CSS concept. From the adaptive dynamics perspective, the dynamics (14) models trait substitution from x to 0 in one step, whereas the canonical equation is

¹⁹Oechssler and Riedel (2002) and Cressman and Hofbauer (2005) both consider stability with respect to the weak topology. However, the results we require from these references continue to hold for the modified weak topology. It is essential that the Lyapunov stability through $\pi(P, P)$ is with respect to the weak topology in order to use Cressman and Hofbauer (2005) since, as mentioned earlier, every monomorphism is (Lyapunov) stable with respect to the modified weak topology.

built on the premise that mutation and trait substitution is a gradual process whereby x evolves to 0 in a sequence of many steps.

For a one-dimensional trait space, the canonical equation requires all traits between 0 and x be available for substitution and so we now assume the support of P_0 contains this interval. The heuristic condition (Eshel, 1983) for a strict NE at 0 to be a CSS amounts to replacing inequality (15) with

$$\pi(y, x) > \pi(x, x) \tag{16}$$

whenever y is close to x and between 0 and x . The Taylor expansion of $\pi(x, y)$ about $(0, 0)$ now yields a local strict NE satisfies (16) if and only if $b < 2$ where b is the only entry of the 1×1 matrix B in (5).

Cressman and Hofbauer (2005) were able to use an iterated strategy domination argument to show that, for any $|b| < 2$, δ_0 will be locally asymptotically stable with respect to the modified weak topology when initial P_0 are restricted to distributions whose support is a (sufficiently small) interval S containing 0.²⁰ Specifically, they showed the game with the continuum of traits in S is strictly dominance solvable (see Definition 11 below) to the trait 0. By this process, each trait $x \in S$ that is strictly dominated by another trait $y \in S$ is eliminated and then each remaining trait that is strictly dominated (in the reduced game with the resultant trait space) by another remaining trait is eliminated, etc. If every trait except 0 is eventually eliminated by this countable process, standard techniques extended from finite

²⁰Combining this with Section 5.1 for $b < 1$ (i.e. for $B - I$ negative definite), we have that δ_0 is asymptotically stable with respect to the modified weak topology when initial P_0 are restricted to distributions whose support contains an open interval about 0 if and only if 0 is CSS. Unless π is symmetric, this equivalence uses the result of Eshel and Sansone (2003) mentioned in the Remark at the end of Section 5.1.

trait space (Samuelson and Zhang, 1992) shows δ_0 is locally asymptotically stable with respect to the replicator equation under this iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (Cressman and Hofbauer, 2005) (see also Heifetz et al. (2003) and the proof of Theorem 12 below).

In this section, we extend this argument to a multi-dimensional setting, starting with the concept of dominance solvability similar to that introduced by Moulin (1984).

Definition 11 *The game with compact trait space S is strictly dominance solvable to $x^* \in S$ if there is a countable nested sequence of closed subsets S_i in S with $S_{i+1} \subset S_i$ and $S_0 = S$ satisfying*

i) for every $i \geq 0$ and every $x \in \overline{S_i \setminus S_{i+1}}$, there exists a $y \in S_i$ such that $\pi(y, z) > \pi(x, z)$ for all $z \in S_i$

ii) $\bigcap_{i=0}^{\infty} S_i = \{x^\}$.*

Theorem 12 *If the game with compact trait space $S \subset \mathbf{R}^n$ is strictly dominance solvable to $x^* \in S$, then P_t converges to δ_{x^*} in the weak topology for each initial distribution P_0 with full support S .*

Proof. It is sufficient to show by induction on i that $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} P_t(S \setminus S_i) = 0$ for all $i \geq 1$. Given $x_0 \in S \setminus S_1$, there exists a $y_0 \in S$ such that $\pi(y_0, z) > \pi(x_0, z)$ for all $z \in S$. By continuity of π , there are open neighborhoods $U(x_0)$ and $U(y_0)$ of x_0 and y_0 respectively so that

$$\pi(y, z) - \pi(x, z) \geq K > 0$$

for all $x \in U(x_0), y \in U(y_0)$ and $z \in S$. Since $\text{supp}(P_t) = S$, both $P_t(U(x_0))$ and $P_t(U(y_0))$ are positive. From (1), an application of the quotient rule

yields

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d}{dt} \left(\frac{P_t(U(y_0))}{P_t(U(x_0))} \right) &= \frac{1}{P_t(U(x_0))^2} \int_S \left[\int_{U(x_0)} \int_{U(y_0)} (\pi(y, z) - \pi(x, z)) P_t(dx) P_t(dy) \right] P_t(dz) \\ &\geq K \frac{P_t(U(y_0))}{P_t(U(x_0))} \end{aligned}$$

Thus $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{P_t(U(y_0))}{P_t(U(x_0))} = \infty$ and, in particular, $P_t(U(x_0))$ converges to 0. Since $\overline{S \setminus S_1}$ is compact, it is covered by finitely many $U(x_0)$ and so $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} P_t(S \setminus S_1) = 0$.

Now assume $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} P_t(S \setminus S_i) = 0$. As above, for every $x_0 \in \overline{S_i \setminus S_{i+1}}$, there exists a $y_0 \in S_i$ such that $\pi(y_0, z) > \pi(x_0, z)$ for all $z \in S_i$. By continuity of π , there are open neighborhoods $U(x_0)$ and $U(y_0)$ of x_0 and y_0 respectively so that

$$\pi(y, z) - \pi(x, z) \geq K > 0$$

for all $x \in U(x_0), y \in U(y_0)$ and $z \in S_i$. Let $k \equiv \max\{|\pi(y, z) - \pi(x, z)| : x, y, z \in S\}$. Then

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d}{dt} \left(\frac{P_t(U(y_0))}{P_t(U(x_0))} \right) &= \frac{1}{P_t(U(x_0))^2} \int_{S \setminus S_i} \left[\int_{U(x_0)} \int_{U(y_0)} (\pi(y, z) - \pi(x, z)) P_t(dx) P_t(dy) \right] P_t(dz) \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{P_t(U(x_0))^2} \int_{S_i} \left[\int_{U(x_0)} \int_{U(y_0)} (\pi(y, z) - \pi(x, z)) P_t(dx) P_t(dy) \right] P_t(dz) \\ &\geq [-k P_t(S \setminus S_i) + K P_t(S_i)] \frac{P_t(U(y_0))}{P_t(U(x_0))} \\ &> 0 \end{aligned}$$

for t sufficiently large since $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} P_t(S \setminus S_i) = 0$ and $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} P_t(S_i) = 1$. The proof continues as above to yield $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} P_t(S_i \setminus S_{i+1}) = 0$ and so $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} P_t(S \setminus$

$S_{i+1}) = 0 = \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} P_t(S \setminus S_i) + \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} P_t(S_i \setminus S_{i+1}) = 0$ for all $i \geq 1$.
Therefore, $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} P_t(S \setminus S_i) = 0$ and so P_t converges weakly to δ_0 . ■

The most straightforward application of this theory to our multi-dimensional setting is through the following theorem when B is symmetric (and the trait space is parameterized so that the payoff function has the form (5) up to quadratic terms). A set $S \subset \mathbf{R}^n$ is called *star-shaped about 0* if it contains the line segment from 0 to x for every $x \in S$. Hence for $n = 1$, S is an interval containing 0. Let Q^* be the set of all probability measures in $\Delta(S)$ whose support is star-shaped about 0.

Theorem 13 *Suppose B is symmetric. The games restricted to all compact trait spaces $S \subset \mathbf{R}^n$ that are star-shaped about 0 and sufficiently close to 0 are strictly dominance solvable if and only if $\|B\| < 2$.²¹ Furthermore, if $\|B\| < 2$, then δ_0 is locally asymptotically stable for the replicator equation (1) with respect to Q^* .*

Proof. Suppose that $\|B\| > 2$. By the symmetry of B , there exists a (non-zero) eigenvector x_0 such that its corresponding eigenvalue is $\pm\|B\|$. Consider the star-shaped compact trait spaces $S \subset \mathbf{R}^n$ of the form $\{cx_0 : |c| \leq \varepsilon\}$ for some $\varepsilon > 0$. That is, S is the line segment through the origin joining $-\varepsilon x_0$ to εx_0 . We claim no $x \in S$ can be eliminated through strict domination by another $y \in S$ if ε is sufficiently small. To see this, we parameterize our trait space so that it is a subset of \mathbf{R} (i.e. parameterized

²¹Here $\|B\|$ is the operator norm of B (i.e. $\|B\| \equiv \sup_{\|x\|=1} \|Bx\|$ where $\|x\|$ is the Euclidean length of x). We ignore the degenerate possibility $\|B\| = 2$. Strict dominance solvability for all games with trait space S sufficiently close to x^* is closely related to the concept of *locally strictly dominance solvable* defined by Moulin (1984).

by a scalar x) with $x_0 = 1$. We then have $Bx_0 = bx_0$ where $|b| > 2$. From (4), we have

$$\pi(x, z) - \pi(y, z) = (y - x)[x + y - bz + h.o.t.]$$

where the higher order terms are at least of degree two in the variables x, y, z . Since $|x| \leq \varepsilon$, $|y| \leq \varepsilon$ and $|b| > 2$, when ε is sufficiently small the expression $x + y - bz + h.o.t.$ is positive for all $x, y \in S$ by either choosing z as $-\varepsilon$ or ε appropriately and negative for all $x, y \in S$ by choosing the alternate z . That is, for all $x, y \in S$, there is a $z \in S$ with $\pi(x, z) - \pi(y, z) \geq 0$ and so $x \in S$ cannot be strictly dominated by any $y \in S$.

Now suppose $\|B\| < 2$. Let $d \equiv \max_{z \in S} \|z\|$. Suppose $x_0 \in S$ and $\|x_0\|$ is close to d . From (4) with $y_0 = (1 - \varepsilon)x_0 \in S$,

$$\begin{aligned} \pi(y_0, z) - \pi(x_0, z) &= \varepsilon [(2 - \varepsilon)\|x_0\|^2 - x_0 \cdot Bz + h.o.t.] \\ &> \frac{\varepsilon}{2} [2\|x_0\|^2 - \|x_0\|\|Bz\|] \\ &> \frac{\varepsilon}{4} \frac{\|x_0\|^2}{2} [2 - \|B\|] > 0. \end{aligned}$$

for all $z \in S$. That is, y_0 strictly dominates x_0 . By continuity of π , y_0 strictly dominates x for all x near x_0 . Define $A(\alpha, \beta)$ with $0 \leq \alpha < \beta < d$ as those elements of S in the annulus $\{y \in S : d - \beta \leq \|y\| \leq d - \alpha\}$. Each $A(\alpha, \beta)$ is compact and nonempty by the definition of d and the fact S is star-shaped. Thus, for some $\delta > 0$, each $x \in A(0, \delta)$ is strictly dominated and so we can take $S_1 = \{y \in S : \|y\| \leq d - \delta\}$. We now iterate this argument and obtain our sequence S_i of nested sets as the intersection of S with a disk centered at 0 whose radius tends to 0 as $i \rightarrow \infty$.

We next show δ_0 is asymptotically stable if $\|B\| < 2$. By the argument used in the preceding paragraph, we can apply Theorem 12 and conclude

that P_t converges to δ_0 in the weak topology whenever P_0 has star-shaped support sufficiently close to 0. That is, δ_0 is locally attracting with respect to Q^* . ■

Notice that 0 is a CSS if $\|B\| < 2$ since we then have

$$x \cdot (B - 2I)x < \|B\|\|x\|^2 - 2\|x\|^2 < 0$$

for nonzero x (i.e. $B - 2I$ is negative definite). The condition $\|B\| < 2$ also has an interesting connection to the Cournot tatonnement process of Moulin (1984). To see this clearly, let us ignore the non quadratic terms in (5). For our single-species model, the Cournot process is the sequence of best replies $y_{i+1} \equiv \arg \max\{\pi(x, y_i) : x \in \mathbf{R}^n\}$ which is given by $y_{i+1} = \frac{1}{2}By_i$. This discrete-time tatonnement process converges to 0 if and only if the eigenvalues of $\frac{1}{2}B$ all have modulus less than 1. For symmetric B , this is equivalent to $\|B\| < 2$.

When $\|B\| < 2$ but B is not symmetric, the proof of Theorem 13 still shows that the games restricted to all trait spaces $S \subset \mathbf{R}^n$ that are star-shaped about 0 and sufficiently close to 0 are strictly dominance solvable if $\|B\| < 2$ (and so δ_0 is still locally asymptotically stable with respect to Q^*). However, there are other choices of B with $\|B\| > 2$ for which the associated games are strictly dominance solvable (see Section 5.3). The reason for this is that we do not need to use Euclidean distance as in the above proof (which led to the nested sequence of trait spaces being disks). The essential inequality there was that, for non zero y_0 ,

$$y_0 \cdot Bz < 2y_0 \cdot y_0 \tag{17}$$

for all z in the disk $\{z|z \cdot z \leq y_0 \cdot y_0\}$. These regions can be replaced by others that are compact and star-shaped. For instance, if D is a positive definite symmetric matrix, we will have strict dominance solvability if $y_0 \cdot Bz < 2y_0 \cdot y_0$ for all z in the disk $z \in \{z|z \cdot Dz \leq y_0 \cdot Dy_0\}$. Since (17) is linear in z , we can restrict to the boundary $\{z|z \cdot Dz = y_0 \cdot Dy_0\}$.

The following lemma is used in the proof of Theorem 15 below that generalizes Theorem 13 to non symmetric B .

Lemma 14 *If D is a positive definite symmetric matrix, the maximum of $y_0 \cdot Bz$ subject to $\{z|z \cdot Dz = y_0 \cdot Dy_0\}$ is $\sqrt{y_0 \cdot Dy_0} \sqrt{B^T y_0 \cdot D^{-1} B^T y_0}$ and this occurs at $z_0 = \frac{\sqrt{y_0 \cdot Dy_0}}{\sqrt{B^T y_0 \cdot D^{-1} B^T y_0}} D^{-1} B^T y_0$ if $B^T y_0 \neq 0$.*

Proof. If $B^T y_0 = 0$, there is nothing to prove so assume $B^T y_0 \neq 0$. The result may be shown by using Lagrange multipliers or by the following algebraic method. Let \sqrt{D} be the positive definite square root of D . Then

$$\begin{aligned}
y_0 \cdot Bz &= y_0 \cdot B \sqrt{D}^{-1} \sqrt{D} z \\
&= \sqrt{D}^{-1} B^T y_0 \cdot \sqrt{D} z \\
&\leq \sqrt{\sqrt{D}^{-1} B^T y_0 \cdot \sqrt{D}^{-1} B^T y_0} \sqrt{\sqrt{D} z \cdot \sqrt{D} z} \\
&= \sqrt{B^T y_0 \cdot D^{-1} B^T y_0} \sqrt{z \cdot Dz} \\
&= \sqrt{B^T y_0 \cdot D^{-1} B^T y_0} \sqrt{y_0 \cdot Dy_0}.
\end{aligned}$$

It is straightforward to verify z_0 satisfies the requirements. ■

Theorem 15 *Suppose there exists a positive definite symmetric matrix D such that, for all $y \neq 0$,*

$$(y \cdot Dy) (B^T y \cdot D^{-1} B^T y) < 4(y \cdot y)^2. \quad (18)$$

The games restricted to all compact trait spaces $S \subset \mathbf{R}^n$ that are star-shaped about 0 and sufficiently close to 0 are strictly dominance solvable and δ_0 is locally asymptotically stable with respect to Q^ for the replicator equation (1). If δ_0 is locally asymptotically stable in this sense, then 0 is CSS.*

Proof. By Lemma 14, a straightforward generalization of the relevant parts of the proof of Theorem 13 yields the first result. Now suppose 0 is not CSS. Then $B - 2I$ is not negative definite and so there is a non zero x such that $x \cdot (B - 2I)x > 0$. Take S as the one-dimensional bounded interval in the direction x that includes 0 in its interior. Note that S is star-shaped. By Cressman and Hofbauer (2005), δ_0 is not locally asymptotically stable in the modified weak topology with respect to Q^* . ■

Remark. If D is chosen as a (positive) multiple of the identity matrix in Theorem 15, then (18) is equivalent to $\|B^T y\| < 2\|y\|$. Since $\|B\| = \|B^T\|$, Theorem 15 shows that the statement of Theorem 13 is valid when $\|B\| < 2$ and B is non symmetric.

Conversely, if B is symmetric with $\|B\| > 2$, then $B^T y = \lambda y$ for some y and $|\lambda| > 2$. Since $(y \cdot Dy) (y \cdot D^{-1} y) \geq (y \cdot y)^2$ for all positive definite symmetric matrices D , we have $(y \cdot Dy) (B^T y \cdot D^{-1} B^T y) > 4(y \cdot y)^2$ and so Theorem 15 does not expand the set of payoff functions with B symmetric for which we have a proof that δ_0 is locally asymptotically stable.

5.3 Two-Dimensional Trait Space

Using Theorems 13 and 15 on dominance solvability, we are able to determine a large class of 2×2 matrices B for which δ_0 is asymptotically stable for the replicator equation (1) in the modified weak topology with respect to Q^* . For this, we use the fact that every 2×2 matrix is orthogonally similar to a matrix of the form

$$B = \begin{bmatrix} a & b \\ c & a \end{bmatrix}. \quad (19)$$

That is, there is a rotation O such that $O^T B O$ has this form. Note that such a transformation does not affect the form of the fitness function (2) nor the symmetry of B .

Theorem 16 *If B is given by (19), then the games restricted to all compact trait spaces $S \subset \mathbf{R}^2$ that are star-shaped about 0 and sufficiently close to 0 are strictly dominance solvable if*

$$|b| + |c| < 2(2 - |a|). \quad (20)$$

In this case, δ_0 is locally asymptotically stable with respect to Q^ for the replicator equation (1).*

Proof. Suppose $|b| + |c| < 2(2 - |a|)$. Take the matrix $D = \begin{bmatrix} |a| + |c| & 0 \\ 0 & |a| + |b| \end{bmatrix}$ in (18).²² The left-hand side of (18) is then

$$\left[\frac{(ay_1 + cy_2)^2}{|a| + |c|} + \frac{(by_1 + ay_2)^2}{|a| + |b|} \right] [(|a| + |c|) (y_1)^2 + (|a| + |b|) (y_2)^2]$$

²²If $|a| + |c| = 0$, then $B = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & b \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$. Take $D = \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon & 0 \\ 0 & |b| \end{bmatrix}$ for $\varepsilon > 0$. If $|b| < 4$, there is an $\varepsilon > 0$ such that (18) holds.

which is less than or equal to

$$\left[\frac{(|ay_1| + |cy_2|)^2}{|a| + |c|} + \frac{(|by_1| + |ay_2|)^2}{|a| + |b|} \right] [(|a| + |c|)(y_1)^2 + (|a| + |b|)(y_2)^2].$$

By considering the cases where $|y_1| \leq |y_2|$ and $|y_1| \geq |y_2|$ separately, it is straightforward to show that this last expression is increasing in $|c|$ for fixed y_1, y_2 and $|b|$. Thus we can replace $|c|$ by $2(2 - |a|) - |b|$. Furthermore, for fixed $|b|$ and $y_2 = ky_1$ for $k > 0$, the right-hand side of (18) minus this last expression has an absolute maximum when $k = 1$. For $k = 1$, the value is zero and so the games are strictly dominance solvable by Theorem 15. ■

If B is symmetric, (20) becomes $|a| + |b| < 2$ which is the condition of Theorem 13 since $\|B\| = |a| + |b| < 2$. On the other hand, by Theorem 16, there are non symmetric B 's for which δ_0 is locally asymptotically stable but $\|B\| > 2$. For instance, δ_0 is locally asymptotically stable for $B = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & b \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$ if $|b| < 4$ but $\left\| \begin{bmatrix} 0 & b \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \right\| = |b|$. Finally, it is straightforward to confirm that condition (20) implies the eigenvalues $a \pm \sqrt{bc}$ of B satisfy $|a \pm \sqrt{bc}| < 2$. Thus the best reply Cournot tatonnement process (Moulin, 1984) again converges to zero although it is no longer true that $\|x_{t+1}\| < \|x_t\|$.

Summary. Take $\pi(x, z) = -x \cdot x + x \cdot Bz$ and $B = \begin{bmatrix} a & b \\ c & a \end{bmatrix}$.

For B symmetric, 0 is

- i) NIS if and only if $a < 1$ and $|b| < |1 - a|$
- ii) CSS if and only if $a < 2$ and $|b| < |2 - a|$
- iii) dominance solvable if and only if $|a| + |b| < 2$.

For B non symmetric, 0 is

- i) NIS if and only if $a < 1$ and $|b + c| < 2|1 - a|$
- ii) CSS if and only if $a < 2$ and $|b + c| < 2|2 - a|$
- iii) dominance solvable if $|b| + |c| < 2(2 - |a|)$.

Condition (20) is equivalent to strict dominance solvability when B is non symmetric and $bc \geq 0$ (i.e. b and c have the same sign). To see this, Theorem 13 applied to the one-dimensional trait space $S = \{t(1, 1) : |t| \leq 1\}$ yields the necessary condition $|2a + b + c| < 4$ for strict dominance solvability and to the one-dimensional trait space $S = \{t(1, -1) : |t| \leq 1\}$ yields $|2a - b - c| < 4$. Thus, $|2a| + |b + c| < 4$. On the other hand, $\|B\| = \sqrt{1 + b^2}$ for $B = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & b \\ -b & 1 \end{bmatrix}$ and so the game is strictly dominance solvable if $|b| < \sqrt{3}$ even though $|2a| + |b| + |c|$ may be arbitrarily close to $2 + 2\sqrt{3} > 4$.

In fact, the exact condition for strict dominance solvability to 0 is unknown for non symmetric B . It is also an open question whether the CSS condition is sufficient for asymptotic stability of δ_0 with respect to Q^* .

6 Discussion

As stated in the Introduction, we feel the adaptive dynamics model to predict stability of monomorphisms by emphasizing the evolution of the population mean strategy misses the effects of the spread of the distribution of individual behaviors. The replicator equation on a continuous trait space is our preferred method to include these effects. The basic issue we consider is then whether the static CSS and NIS concepts for monomorphic stability of one-dimensional adaptive dynamics predict stability of the replicator equa-

tion when generalized to multi-dimensions. An initial obstacle to analyzing this issue is that universally accepted static extensions are not agreed upon in the adaptive dynamics approach since stability of the canonical equation now depends on the relative rates mutations occur in different directions (in technical terms, on the mutations' covariance matrix).

One assumption is that the covariance matrix will evolve very slowly (if at all) and so can be taken as essentially constant (Vincent et al., 1993), a method that has also been used effectively much earlier in the matrix game model (Hines, 1980a). With arbitrary (but fixed) covariance, monomorphic stability with respect to both the canonical equation and to the potential evolution of dimorphisms leads to the CSS conditions in each direction through the monomorphism (Meszena et al., 2001). We take this as our multi-dimensional CSS concept. On the other hand, if the relative rates of mutation are not constant but can change at different points along the evolutionary path to have their most extreme effect (Leimar, 2001, 2005), much stronger stability conditions than being a CSS in each direction are needed in the adaptive dynamics approach (see Section 4).

In light of the above discussion, the analytic results of Section 3 are quite surprising. By Theorem 3 there, when individual behaviors are initially normally distributed and fitnesses are approximated by their second order Taylor expansions about a monomorphism, then even the weaker CSS conditions are too strong (see Theorem 5 there for the precise statement) to characterize stability since the distribution's covariance evolves slowly to having equal effect in all directions. Although this result raises legitimate concerns about current adaptive dynamics approaches for multi-dimensional

trait space, the presence of strategies at the tails of the normal distribution does not match the usual assumption that mutations only occur near the monomorphic equilibrium.

For this reason, Section 5 concentrates on behavioral distributions with compact support contained in a small neighborhood of a monomorphism m^* .²³ In this setting and with no more restrictions on the support of the initial distribution, we show in Section 5.1 that the multi-dimensional NIS is the most relevant concept for stability of δ_{m^*} under the replicator equation (Theorems 8, 9 and 10), generalizing results of Eshel and Sansone (2003) and Cressman (2005). When distributions are restricted to those whose supports are compact intervals in each direction from m^* , we show in Section 5.2 the relevance of the CSS conditions by clarifying the relationship between CSS and strategy dominance in the multi-dimensional model. As explained there, stability of the measure dynamics via strategy domination corresponds to stability of the Cournot tatonnement process with a continuum of strategies (Moulin, 1984), a discrete-time dynamic whereby rational decision makers choose the optimal strategy in the next time period given current population behavior. This connection continues the long tradition of classical game-theoretic methods providing valuable insight into the eventual outcome of behavioral evolution under the replicator equation (and vice versa).

Finally, Section 5.3 summarizes how our results apply to two-dimensional trait spaces, an important special case that highlights the added difficulties that arise when trait space has an extra degree of freedom compared to the analysis of Cressman and Hofbauer (2005) where trait space is one-

²³For technical reasons, this support must also include m^* .

dimensional.

Appendix

Proof of Theorem 1. The proof that the class of normal distributions is invariant under replicator dynamics is in Oechssler and Riedel (2001) for $n = 1$. A similar method works for many dimensions and it establishes the system of ordinary differential equation (6) and (7) at the same time. In the following, we provide a different proof by using moment generating functions. As this method has potential use in other contexts as well, we start with a general exposition here.

Take a probability measure P with mean m and covariance matrix C and a vector $\lambda \in \mathbf{R}^n$. Define the Laplace transform

$$L(\lambda; P) = \int \exp(-\lambda^T x) P(dx),$$

and its logarithm

$$M(\lambda; P) = \log L(\lambda; P).$$

L can be extended to finite signed measures in a straightforward way. It is well known (and follows immediately through differentiation under the integral) that

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \lambda_i} M(\lambda; P)|_{\lambda=0} = -m_i$$

and

$$\frac{\partial^2}{\partial \lambda_i \partial \lambda_j} M(\lambda; P)|_{\lambda=0} = C_{ij}.$$

Thus, M generates the mean through the gradient and the covariance matrix through its Hessian. Therefore, we can obtain differential equations

for the mean and the covariance matrix by differentiating the moment generating function M . Normal distributions $N(m, C)$ are characterized by $M(\lambda, N(m, C)) = -\lambda^T m + \frac{1}{2}\lambda^T C \lambda$.

Let $P(t)$ be a trajectory of replicator dynamics in the following. It is useful to associate with the measures $P(t)$ the probability measures $P_\lambda(t)$ as given by

$$P_\lambda(t)(\Gamma) = \frac{1}{L(\lambda; P(t))} \int_{\Gamma} \exp(-\lambda^T x) P(t)(dx).$$

Note that

$$\frac{d}{dt} M(\lambda; P(t)) = \frac{L(\lambda; P'(t))}{L(\lambda; P(t))}.$$

By definition of replicator dynamics

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d}{dt} M(\lambda; P(t)) &= \frac{1}{L(\lambda; P(t))} \int \exp(-\lambda^T x) [\pi(x, P(t)) - \pi(P(t), P(t))] P(t)(dx) \\ &= \frac{1}{L(\lambda; P(t))} \int \exp(-\lambda^T x) \pi(x, P(t)) P(t)(dx) - \pi(P(t), P(t)) \\ &= \pi(P_\lambda(t), P(t)) - \pi(P(t), P(t)). \end{aligned}$$

From this, we get the following relations for the mean and the covariance matrix:

$$\begin{aligned} m'_i(t) &= -\frac{\partial}{\partial \lambda_i} \pi(P_\lambda(t), P(t)) \Big|_{\lambda=0} \\ C'_{ij}(t) &= \frac{\partial^2}{\partial \lambda_i \partial \lambda_j} \pi(P_\lambda(t), P(t)) \Big|_{\lambda=0} \end{aligned}$$

We will now apply these relationships to the case of normal distributions. As is well known (and can be seen via completing a square), if $P = N(m, C)$, then $P_\lambda = N(m - C\lambda, C)$. Thus, for the quadratic payoff function $\pi(x, y) = x \cdot Ax + x \cdot By$,

$$\pi(P_\lambda, P) = (m - C\lambda)^T A(m - C\lambda) + \sum_{i,j=1}^n A_{ij} C_{ij} + (m - C\lambda)^T Bm.$$

Since this is quadratic in λ , the set of normal distributions is invariant, and by comparing with $\frac{d}{dt}M(\lambda; P(t)) = -\lambda m'(t) + \frac{1}{2}\lambda^T C'(t)\lambda$, we get the desired differential equations

$$m'(t) = C(t)(2A + B)m(t) \quad (21)$$

$$C'(t) = 2C(t)AC(t) \quad (22)$$

which reduces in the special case $A = -I$ to (6) and (7). ■

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