

Bertrand, Marianne; Kramarz, Francis

**Working Paper**

## Does Entry Regulation Hinder Job Creation? Evidence from the French Retail Industry

IZA Discussion Papers, No. 415

**Provided in Cooperation with:**

IZA – Institute of Labor Economics

*Suggested Citation:* Bertrand, Marianne; Kramarz, Francis (2002) : Does Entry Regulation Hinder Job Creation? Evidence from the French Retail Industry, IZA Discussion Papers, No. 415, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20031>

**Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:**

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

**Terms of use:**

*Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.*

*You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.*

*If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.*

IZA DP No. 415

## **Does Entry Regulation Hinder Job Creation? Evidence from the French Retail Industry**

Marianne Bertrand  
Francis Kramarz

January 2002

# Does Entry Regulation Hinder Job Creation? Evidence from the French Retail Industry

**Marianne Bertrand**

*University of Chicago, CEPR, London and NBER*

**Francis Kramarz**

*CREST-INSEE, Paris, CEPR, London and IZA, Bonn*

Discussion Paper No. 415  
January 2002

IZA

P.O. Box 7240  
D-53072 Bonn  
Germany

Tel.: +49-228-3894-0  
Fax: +49-228-3894-210  
Email: [iza@iza.org](mailto:iza@iza.org)

This Discussion Paper is issued within the framework of IZA's research area *Evaluation of Labor Market Policies and Projects*. Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the institute. Research disseminated by IZA may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions.

The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent, nonprofit limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung) supported by the Deutsche Post AG. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and visitors and doctoral programs. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. The current research program deals with (1) mobility and flexibility of labor, (2) internationalization of labor markets, (3) the welfare state and labor markets, (4) labor markets in transition countries, (5) the future of labor, (6) evaluation of labor market policies and projects and (7) general labor economics.

IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character.

## **ABSTRACT**

### **Does Entry Regulation Hinder Job Creation? Evidence from the French Retail Industry\***

Are product market and entry regulation key sources of low employment growth in many European countries? We investigate this question in the context of the French retail trade industry. Since 1974, approval by regional zoning boards has been required for the creation or extension of any large retail store in France. We exploit a unique database that provides time and region specific variation in boards' approval decisions. We show that stronger deterrence of entry by the boards, and the increase in large retail chains' concentration it induced, slowed down employment growth in France.

JEL Classification: J23, L43, L81

Keywords: Zoning regulation, retail trade, employment

Francis Kramarz  
CREST-INSEE  
Département de la Recherche  
15, bd Gabriel Péri  
92245 Malakoff  
France  
Tel.: +33 1 4117 6033  
Fax: +33 1 4117 6046  
kramarz@ensae.fr

---

\* We thank Pierre Biscourp, Jean Chiche, Christian Couton, Séverine Haller, Patrick Jault, Claire Lefèvre, Béatrice Levy, Jean-Christophe Martin, Alain Renard and Bernard Vatré for giving us access to the various databases used in this paper. We are especially grateful to Lawrence Katz (the editor) and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments. We also thank Alberto Alesina, Daron Acemoglu, Joseph Altonji, Jonathan Gruber, Sendhil Mullainathan, Sam Peltzman, Jan van Ours and seminar participants at the National Bureau of Economic Research Labor Studies Meeting (Summer 2000), the Centre for Economic Policy Research Labor Studies Meeting (Fall 2000), Northwestern University, the University of Chicago, CREST, and the University of Zurich.

# I. Introduction

Labor market institutions are the most widely accepted explanation for the employment crisis that has plagued Europe over the last 30 years. Most observers blame strong unions, rigid employment protection systems, generous levels of unemployment benefits, high minimum wages and high tax wedges for the low employment rates in many European countries. A vast body of empirical research has confirmed that labor market institutions, either directly or in combination with various macroeconomic and technological shocks, have played an important role in the lengthy depression of European labor markets.<sup>1</sup>

Another, increasingly discussed but much less widely researched, hypothesis is that product market and entry regulations have been other key factors in the slow rate of job creation in Europe.<sup>2</sup> Recent work has lent credence to this hypothesis by documenting that Europe distinguishes itself from the United States not only through its regulatory practices on the labor market side but also through many more constraints on entry and competition on the product market side. In multiple reports on Europe, the McKinsey Global Institute [1994, 1997] has emphasized the high levels of product market regulation in sectors such as services, construction or banking. In another recent study, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer [2000] document the multiple, costly and time-consuming requirements to starting a new business in many European countries. For example, they show that the startup process may take up to 66 days and 16 different legal and administrative steps in France compared to only 7 days and 4 steps in the United States.

The theoretical relevance of this hypothesis has also been established. Product market regulation has been causally linked to employment outcomes through its effect on market power and

---

<sup>1</sup> See Nickell and Layard [1999] for a review of the direct effects of labor market institutions on economic performance across OECD countries. In a recent study, Blanchard and Wolfers [2000] argue that most of the labor market constraints in Europe pre-date the rise in unemployment and that these constraints have, if anything, become less binding over a period of steady unemployment rise. These authors argue that the interaction of these pre-existing institutions with macroeconomic shocks can better explain unemployment patterns across Europe. The existing empirical evidence on a possible interaction between labor market institutions and skill-biased technological shocks is more mixed: see Nickell and Bell [1995, 1996], Card, Kramarz and Lemieux [1999], Krueger and Pischke [1997], Blau and Kahn [1996] and Kahn [2000].

<sup>2</sup> Krueger and Pischke [1997] were among the first to make this conjecture. Based on a comparative study of employment trends in the United States and various European countries, they concluded that labor market rigidities cannot fully account for the slow rate of *skilled* employment growth in Europe. The relevance of a product market explanation for Europe's employment crisis has also been stressed by Gersbach [2000].

markups.<sup>3</sup> One recent macroeconomic paper highlighting this mechanism is Blanchard and Giavazzi [2001].<sup>4</sup> These authors show that tougher product market regulation, which they model as a higher cost of entry for new firms, increases equilibrium markups and rents for incumbent firms, and lowers equilibrium sales and employment. They also study how product market regulation interacts with labor market regulation, which they model as a bargaining over rents between firms and workers. They show that the negative employment effect of product market regulation gets reinforced when labor market regulation is also present.<sup>5</sup> Similar implications have also been worked out in the context of (maybe somewhat less fashionable) disequilibrium models. Barro and Grossman [1971] present a model where the prices of goods are exogeneously fixed above equilibrium levels. Output and employment in their model are both determined by the constrained product demand and fall below competitive levels.

Despite the factual and theoretical relevance of the product market hypothesis, there has been so far a dearth of systematic empirical studies on the question.<sup>6</sup> In this paper, we propose to undertake such a study for France. We focus on what might have been the most important governmental rule to restrict entry in the French retail trade sector: commercial zoning regulation.

Introduced at the end of 1973, the “Loi D’Orientation du Commerce et de l’Artisanat,” also known as the “Loi Royer,” was originally motivated by a desire to protect small retail stores from the “unruly growth of new forms of distribution” [Ministère de l’Industrie, du Commerce et de l’Artisanat 1974]. Prior to the introduction of the Loi Royer, the major requirement before starting a new retail business in France was to obtain a building permit. Since 1974, another

---

<sup>3</sup> While this is the most obvious channel through which product market and entry regulation can be tied to employment, other channels may also exist. We mention some that might have been especially relevant in the retail trade sector in Section V.

<sup>4</sup> See also Gersbach and Schniewind [1998].

<sup>5</sup> Blanchard and Giavazzi [2001] also examine the dynamic employment effects of product and labor market deregulation as well as the political economy interactions between the two types of deregulation.

<sup>6</sup> A few papers have documented a negative correlation between product market regulation and employment performance across OECD countries. See for example Boeri, Nicoletti and Scarpetta [1999]. While these cross-country patterns are informative, they leave open the possibility that other factors, correlated to product market regulation, are driving the relationship. A larger literature has studied the labor market effects of various episodes of deregulation in the United States. See Peoples [1998] for a review of this literature. The deregulation of the airline and trucking industries have been associated with substantial employment gains. Declines in unions’ bargaining power and in prices post-deregulation have been identified as two likely channels for these employment gains. Employment gains were more modest following the deregulation of railroads, possibly due to higher natural barriers to entry in this industry.

important step has been added to the startup process. The creation or extension of any new large retail establishment has first to be approved by a *regional* zoning board composed of store owners, consumer representatives and regionally elected politicians. Between 1974 and 1998, the regional zoning boards approved only about 40 percent of the applications submitted to them each year.<sup>7</sup>

As a preliminary piece of evidence, Table 1 displays employment growth rates in the retail trade and hotels and restaurants sectors before and after the introduction of the Loi Royer. We compute average annual employment growth over the periods 1967 to 1978 and 1979 to 1998. As we discuss at greater length in Section III.A, construction delays justify the 4-year lag we impose between the time the Loi Royer was introduced and the time we allow for its effect to kick in. Hotels and restaurants, which were not targeted by the zoning regulation, constitute a natural comparison group here. Both retail trade and hotels and restaurants employ a large fraction of low-wage workers and should have been rather similarly affected by a set of labor market rules, such as minimum wage laws, that have increased the cost of hiring workers from the bottom part of the wage distribution in France.<sup>8</sup>

Table 1 shows that both sectors experience about the same rate of employment growth in the pre-period (.6 percent in retail trade compared to .8 percent in hotels and restaurants). The two sectors however diverge in the post-period. Employment growth in retail trade drops to less than .1 percent per year while it increases to 1.7 percent in hotels and restaurants. Note that the relatively faster growth of hotels and restaurants in the later period is not specific to that low-wage sector. Employment in other low-wage service sectors in France also grows relatively faster in the 1980s and 1990s than in the late 1960s and 1970s. This reflects in part the fact that low-wage sectors were hit by several large increases in the minimum wage in the first period, from which they might have somewhat recovered in the second period. Four minimum wage increases, each of more than 10 percent in real terms, occurred in France between 1968 and 1974. Retail trade, however, does

---

<sup>7</sup> While we focus on the French experience, commercial zoning laws are common in many other European countries. A study performed by the McKinsey Global Institute in 1994 shows that Germany, Italy and Spain all have in place some form of zoning regulation.

<sup>8</sup> As Piketty [1997] already noted, the fraction of total employment in these two sectors in France (about 10 percent) is much smaller than it is in the United States. Piketty attributes this difference to the many binding labor market constraints in France.

not appear to recover. To the contrary, employment growth nearly comes to a halt in retail trade in the last two decades. While we find the patterns in Table 1 informative, they far from establish the causal effect of the Loi Royer as they may reflect a variety of other industry-specific shocks.<sup>9</sup>

Fortunately, the specifics of the implementation of the Loi Royer allow us to develop an empirical methodology that nets out such other shocks and gets more closely at the causal effect of the regulation on retail trade employment. Specifically, the Loi Royer was administered at the level of the region, or “département.”<sup>10</sup> In contrast with the decentralization of the zoning regulation, most other governmental and legal rules in France are set nationally. One can therefore hope to study the regulation of entry in the retail trade sector in France independently of other policies and general industry shocks that might also affect job creation.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, the availability of a unique database makes it possible for us to measure the strength of entry deterrence in each region. We were able to obtain detailed information on all the applications submitted to each regional board between 1975 and 1998. For each application, we know the size and specialty of the store, the brand name of the promoter, and most importantly, whether or not the application was approved by the zoning board.

In practice, we follow two different empirical approaches. In our basic estimation strategy, we use approval rates (or number of approvals conditional on number of applications) by département over time to form a measure of the stringency of entry deterrence. While this first approach is intuitive, it rests on the assumption that applications are exogenous to the entry regulation process, an assumption that is likely to be violated in practice.<sup>12</sup> In response, we propose a second

---

<sup>9</sup>It is worth mentioning that employment growth in the U.S. retail trade sector also slowed down over the last two decades.

<sup>10</sup> In the rest of this paper, we use the word “region” and “département” interchangeably. There are 95 different départements in metropolitan France. These administrative entities were created at the time of the French revolution. Until 1982, each département was headed by a “préfet” that was appointed by the central government. After 1982, the executive power in a département moved to an elected “conseil général” and its president. In the 1990 Census, the average French département had 600,000 inhabitants. The département at the 10th (resp. 90th) decile of the size distribution had 250,000 (resp. 1,000,000) inhabitants.

<sup>11</sup> Opening hours restrictions, another form of product market regulation in the retail industry, exist in almost every European country [McKinsey Global Institute 1994]. However, the effect of this regulation is harder to evaluate as it is typically set nationally.

<sup>12</sup> In Section III.B, we provide a detailed discussion as to why applications may be either an under- or an over-estimate of the number of stores that would have been created in a laissez-faire situation.



empirical strategy that does not rely directly on applications. This second strategy is motivated by the politics of the entry regulation process. Right-wing parties in France are known to receive the political support of the self-employed and are therefore more likely to oppose entry. Because an elected politician is often the median voter on the zoning boards, these political preferences can directly influence the number of approvals in a region. Therefore, in our second empirical approach, we use the distribution of electoral votes across political parties by département as an instrument for approvals. Both empirical approaches allow us to account for fixed differences across départements as well as for aggregate time shocks. Under both approaches, we find that more stringency in entry deterrence hinders job creation. We verify that these results are robust to a series of specification checks.

We also investigate in further detail the mechanisms by which entry regulation may slow down employment growth. More specifically, we analyze the effect of the Loi Royer on the concentration of large retail chains in France and on retail prices. For this part of the analysis, we focus on the food retail sector in order to isolate a more homogeneous set of goods. We show that stronger entry deterrence increases both retailer concentration and retail prices. Moreover, we show that the higher retailer concentration induced by entry deterrence has a direct negative effect on employment in the food retail sector.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the Loi Royer in further detail and presents some descriptive statistics from the applications database. The next two sections contain our central analysis of the effect of the entry regulation on retail employment. Section III presents the OLS results. Section IV presents the instrumental variables' approach and results. Section V studies the effect of the zoning regulation on retailer concentration and retail prices. Section VI investigates broader labor market effects of the zoning regulation. We summarize and discuss future extensions in Section VII.

## II. Entry Regulation

### II.A. La Loi Royer

In December 1973, the French parliament adopted the “Loi d’Orientation du Commerce et de l’Artisanat,” commonly known as the Loi Royer [Ministère de l’Industrie, du Commerce et de l’Artisanat 1974]. The original spirit of this legislative change was to protect small shopkeepers and craftsmen in the face of a rapidly evolving large distribution market.<sup>13</sup> The law proposed to achieve this goal through various measures. Some of these measures were implemented at the national level. For example, one component of the law was to establish more fiscal equity between salaried and self-employed. The law also set up funds for financial assistance to old-aged shopkeepers and craftsmen. Such centralized reforms are difficult to study empirically as they cannot easily be separated from other policy or economic changes. In this paper, we focus on the only component of the law that was decentralized: commercial zoning regulation.

Before the introduction of the Loi Royer, opening a large store in France only required obtaining a building permit. As it is the case in the United States, environmental and urban design considerations are the major criteria behind the granting of such a permit. Since 1974, however, the creation of any new large store also has first to be approved by a regional zoning board called the “Commission Départementale d’Urbanisme Commercial.”<sup>14</sup> Each French département has its own zoning board.

The construction of any new store with a sales area of more than 1,500 square meters falls under the zoning regulation. In cities of less than 40,000 people, the regulation applies to any new store of more than 1,000 square meters. In addition, extensions of existing stores or conversions of existing buildings into retail space also have to be approved by the regional zoning boards if the resulting sales area exceeds the size thresholds above. In case of refusal by the board, a promoter has the opportunity to appeal the decision to the national Minister in charge of retail and craft.

---

<sup>13</sup> In France, butchers and bakers are referred to as “craftsmen of the mouth.”

<sup>14</sup> It is important to stress that the zoning regulation did not replace the building permit requirement but instead introduced an extra step in the startup process.

The Minister, advised by a national zoning commission called “Commission Nationale d’Urbanisme Commercial,” has the power to overturn the decision of the regional board.<sup>15</sup>

The structure of the regional boards is also heavily regulated. Boards are composed of twenty voting members. Nine members are shopkeepers and craftsmen’s representatives. Seven of these nine members must be self-employed. Two members represent consumers’ interests. The last nine members are locally elected politicians, typically city mayors. A new retail establishment is rejected if a simple majority of board members vote against it. Because consumer representatives are anecdotally believed to almost always favor entry, the median voter on these boards tends to be an elected politician. We exploit this fact later on as part of our identification strategy.

The Loi Royer is still in place today. It has been amended in several ways, all tending towards increasing its stringency. This has been primarily achieved by reducing the size thresholds and strengthening the majority requirement for approval. Unfortunately, most of these amendments occurred towards the end of our sample period, making it difficult for us to incorporate them into the identification strategy.

## II.B. Applications Database: Descriptive Statistics

The “Direction du Commerce et de l’Artisanat” (DECAS), a branch of the Ministry of Economics and Finance, maintains an exhaustive listing of all *applications* submitted to the zoning boards since the inception of the Loi Royer. For almost every application, the DECAS records the brand name of the applicant, size of the store (in square meters), specialty of the store (food or non-food with varying levels of detail depending on the year), location of the store (département and city), terms of the application (whether seeking to create a new store, expand a previously existing store or convert an existing building into retail space), and outcome of the board vote (an indicator for whether the store was approved or rejected, as well as the number of “yes” votes,

---

<sup>15</sup> While our data covers the whole universe of applications submitted to the regional boards from 1975 on, we have only limited information on the number of appeals occurring at the national level and on the outcome of these appeals. There is some anecdotal evidence that the number of appeals was high in early years but declined very rapidly over time. We know that over the period 1994 to 1998, 10 percent of all approved stores were approved at the national level.

“no” votes, and abstentions). The DECAS kindly gave us access to a copy of this listing for all applications submitted between January 1975 and December 1998.<sup>16</sup>

Simple tabulations from the DECAS data show that a little more than 16,000 applications were submitted to the zoning boards between 1975 and 1998. These applications are roughly equally divided between food and non-food retail. In terms of square meters approved, the mean annual approval rate in a département is 42 percent, with a standard deviation of 37 percent. In terms of numbers of stores, the equivalent statistics are 45 and 35 percent, respectively. This suggests that larger stores face a slightly lower probability of approval. The mean annual approval rate (in square meters) in food retail is about 30 percent, compared to 45 percent in non-food retail. The DECAS data also reveals that approval rates have been trending up over time, at an average rate of about 1.5 percent per year. A closer examination shows that most of the increase in the approval rate was concentrated in the 1990s. Average annual approval rate was about 30 percent prior to 1990 compared to about 55 percent in the later period.

Mean approval rates differ widely across départements, from a minimum of about 10 percent to a maximum of about 70 percent. It is interesting to ask whether these differences are related to specific département characteristics. We perform such a cross-sectional analysis in Table 2. We regress mean annual approval rates by département over the period 1975 to 1998 on a set of base-year (1975) département characteristics. Column 1 shows that an important cross-sectional determinant of approval rate is a département’s total population. Larger départements approve a larger share of applications. Age demographics also affect approval rates. Older départements, which we measure either as average age (column 2) or as the fraction of people over 60 years old (column 3), approve less stores on average. We also find that a more rural setting, measured either by the fraction of people living in rural areas (column 4) or by the fraction of people employed in agriculture (column 5), is associated with a lower fraction of approvals. Finally, column 6 shows that richer départements (those with higher average log weekly earnings) typically accept a higher share of applications.

---

<sup>16</sup> The applications database is described in further detail in the Data Appendix.

While approval rates appear to be related to département characteristics and time effects, it is important to note that they still vary a lot within département and year. A regression of annual département approval rates on département and year fixed effects has an adjusted  $R^2$  of only 0.29. About two thirds of the explained variance can be attributed to the time effects.<sup>17</sup>

### III. Retail Employment Effects: Basic Results

#### III.A. Empirical Methodology

Our basic empirical approach consists in using observed approvals and approval rates as measures of the stringency of the entry regulation process. This first approach relies on the assumption that applications are exogenous to the entry regulation process itself. In other words, we start by assuming that applications represent the number of stores that would have been created in the absence of entry deterrence. There are several reasons why this assumption might be violated in practice. In Section III.B, we discuss these reasons in detail as well as their implications for the validity and interpretation of this basic model. In Section IV, we propose an instrumental variable approach that attempts to isolate a more exogenous source of variation in the stringency of entry deterrence.

We propose to estimate the two following panel data regressions:

$$\log(\text{retail emp}_{it}) = \theta \log(\text{approvals})_{i(t-4)} + \psi \log(\text{applications})_{i(t-4)} + \alpha_i + \beta_t + \gamma X_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

$$\log(\text{retail emp}_{it}) = \theta \text{share approved}_{i(t-4)} + \alpha_i + \beta_t + \gamma X_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

where “retail emp<sub>it</sub>” is retail trade employment in département  $i$  and year  $t$ , “approvals<sub>i(t-4)</sub>” is the stock of approvals (in square meters) in département  $i$  up to year  $(t-4)$ , “share approved<sub>i(t-4)</sub>” is the share of applications approved in département  $i$  up to year  $(t-4)$ , “applications<sub>i(t-4)</sub>” is the stock of applications (in square meters) submitted in département  $i$  up to year  $(t-4)$ ,  $\alpha_i$  are

---

<sup>17</sup> The rather low approval rates summarized above suggest that the zoning boards did exert some power to deter entry. However, these descriptive statistics only offer a partial and imperfect insight as to how much the zoning regulation distorted entry away from a laissez-faire equilibrium. See Section III.B for a detailed discussion.

département fixed effects,  $\beta_t$  are year fixed effects,  $X_{it}$  is a vector of time-varying département characteristics and  $\epsilon_{it}$  is an error term.

The key variables in equations (1) and (2) are “ $\log(\text{approvals})_{i(t-4)}$ ” and “ $\text{share approved}_{i(t-4)}$ ,” respectively. These variables represent our measures of entry regulation. We define a more lenient board as a board that approves more stores, conditional on the number of applications, or alternatively, as a board that approves a larger share of applications. We ask whether increases in the stock or in the fraction of approvals affect retail employment.

Based on conversations with members of DECAS, we lag both of the entry regulation variables by four years in order to allow for a reasonable construction lag.<sup>18</sup> This rather long lag results in part from the fact that a building permit must still be granted for any project newly approved by a zoning board before actual construction can begin.<sup>19</sup>

Equations (1) and (2) include year dummies as regressors to account for aggregate time shocks. These year dummies will capture any aggregate economic shock but also any policy change at the central level that might affect retail employment. As we mentioned earlier, French départements have little discretion in setting their own policies.<sup>20</sup> Importantly, départements have close to no autonomy in adopting their own labor market rules. Hence, the year dummies should adequately control for most of the other policy changes that may have occurred over the period under study. For example, any change in the minimum wage, which is set in Paris and applies uniformly to all départements, will be captured by the year dummies.<sup>21</sup>

Département fixed effects are also added as regressors in equations (1) and (2). They control

---

<sup>18</sup> For example, we use the stock of applications that was approved as of January 1st 1976 to explain retail employment in 1980. More detail on the exact construction of the entry regulation variables are provided in the Data Appendix.

<sup>19</sup> Our results are robust to using slightly shorter construction lags.

<sup>20</sup> One decentralized policy that could potentially affect retail employment are local taxes. Most important for our purpose are business taxes (“taxe professionnelle”), taxes paid by building owners (“taxe foncière sur le bâti”) and taxes paid by land owners (“taxe foncière sur le non-bâti”). Until 1982, départements had very little latitude in deciding the level of these local taxes. Both rates and bases for these taxes were set at the national level. After 1982, local tax rates were decentralized but only to a certain degree as they are still subject to a national floor and a national ceiling. Moreover, the bases for each local tax are still set at the national level.

<sup>21</sup> One could argue that even though the minimum wage is set nationally, it does not have the same impact across all départements, for example due to differential industrial composition. We will show below that our findings are robust to this critique.

for any fixed factors that might affect the level of retail employment in a given département. Such factors include the size of the département and the stock of retail capital (both large and small stores) that was in place prior to the introduction of the zoning regulation.

We will investigate the robustness of our results to the inclusion of various time varying département characteristics  $X_{it}$ . Our preferred specification will control for the age composition in a département (fraction below 21, fraction between 21 and 40, fraction between 41 and 60 and fraction above 60 years old), as well as the urban/rural structure in a département (fraction living in rural areas, fraction living in small towns, fraction living in midsize cities, and fraction living in large cities).

Finally, to make our results representative for the average French citizen, each observation in equations (1) and (2) is weighted by the share of each year's total population in the département.

The demographic and employment variables used in equation (1) and (2) are computed from the Labor Force Survey (LFS), a survey of about 60,000 households conducted annually by the French Statistical Institute (INSEE). This survey is described in further detail in the Data Appendix. We also provide summary statistics for the main variables of interest from the LFS in Appendix Table 1. It is important to note that retail employment is defined to include all individuals that report working in the retail sector, whether or not they receive strictly positive earnings. For example, the wife of a self-employed retailer that “helps” in the store is regarded as employed in the retail trade sector.

### **III.B. Discussion**

While the empirical approach presented above is simple and intuitive, its validity and interpretation are subject to the important assumption that applications are exogenous to the entry regulation process and truly measure the number of stores that would have entered in the absence of deterrence. We can see two major reasons why this assumption might be violated in practice.

First, if the application process is costly, one might expect the number of applications to be low when the expected stringency of the zoning is high. A high application cost combined with

a low probability of success may discourage some promoters from applying even though these promoters would have entered in a free entry situation. If this discouragement effect is large, it will induce measurement error in the two variables used to proxy for the stringency of entry regulation. Observed approval rates will under-estimate the true level of deterrence.

Anecdotal evidence we collected from members of DECAS suggests that the application process is costly and that this cost has trended up over time. In the earlier years, the main cost of applying was a time cost. The average delay between the submission of an application and its consideration by the zoning board is about 4 months. As time went on, additional costs have emerged. Specifically, corruption became an important factor in the 1980s. For example, promoters were often “encouraged” to subsidize some public work, such as the construction of a new road or of a municipal swimming pool, in order to grease the wheels of the approval process.<sup>22</sup> Finally, administrative costs increased substantially in the 1990s as an impact study then became mandatory for every application.

Second, because entry regulation by its very nature protects the rents of incumbent stores, it can also be argued that more applications will be submitted than the number of stores that would otherwise have been created in a laissez-faire situation. This can more easily be seen with the following example. Suppose that a city can economically sustain just one additional store and that the board rejected the first application submitted for that specific opportunity. This will encourage subsequent applications from other promoters hoping to share in the rents still available in that city. Under this scenario, our proposed measures of entry deterrence will exaggerate the true deviation from free entry in that city. If there are repeated applications for the same investment opportunity, observed approval rates will over-estimate the true level of deterrence.

It is clearly difficult for us to assess the practical importance of this last issue as we do not know the number of viable stores in each local market. However, in order to provide some suggestive evidence, we tabulated the number of applications by city over the entire period under study (from

---

<sup>22</sup> A new law was adopted in 1993 (Loi Sapin) to fight this kind of practices.



1975 to 1998).<sup>23</sup> We focused on food retailing in order to isolate a more homogeneous set of desired investments. Applications for food retail stores were submitted in about 2,300 different cities. We found that the total number of applications per city was relatively low. Only one application was submitted in about 900 cities. Another 500 cities saw only 2 applications over the period. Three quarters of the cities recorded *at most* 3 applications.

As we mentioned earlier, we propose in Section IV an alternative empirical approach that does not directly rely on applications and therefore deals with the two potential sources of bias outlined above. As we will see, our results are qualitatively similar under both approaches.<sup>24</sup>

The two issues we just discussed also have important implications for any attempt to extrapolate the long-run economic effect of entry deterrence. They make it clear that we may not dispose of a good counterfactual for what the equilibrium stock of stores would have been in a laissez-faire situation. This will make tricky any attempt to quantify the long-run economic impact of entry regulation on employment. In Section IV.E, we present several attempts at such quantification under more and less conservative scenarios.

### III.C. Results

The results of the estimation of the two basic regressions (1) and (2) are reported in Table 3. The data covers 95 départements.<sup>25</sup> Each coefficient in Table 3 is the estimated coefficient on either “log(approvals)” or “share approved” and results from a separate regression. Each column corresponds to a different set of time varying département characteristics,  $X_{it}$ . One issue when controlling for time varying département characteristics is that these may themselves be endogenous to the entry regulation process. Column 1 presents a benchmark specification where we do not include any  $X_{it}$ . In column 2, we control for the age and urban/rural composition in the département/year

---

<sup>23</sup> This exercise assumes that cities can be regarded as independent retail markets.

<sup>24</sup> While we have focused here on potential problems due to the endogeneity of applications, we discuss in Section IV another possible source of bias, namely that approvals and approval rates may be correlated to unobserved shocks to retail demand.

<sup>25</sup> Note that the panel is not balanced because it took several years for some smaller départements to have a strictly positive stock of applications and/or approvals. Our results are qualitatively unchanged when we limit the sample to a balanced panel of the largest départements.

cell. Column 3 also includes the unemployment rate in the département as an additional regressor.

We report two sets of standard errors. OLS standard errors are in parentheses. To account for serial correlation in the error term, we also report in brackets standard errors that allow for clustering of the observations by département (see Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan [2001] and Kezdi [2001]).

Rows 1 and 2 present results from the estimation of equations (1) and (2), respectively. Under both specifications, we find that fewer approvals are associated with lower retail employment. In row 1, we find that a 1 percent increase in the stock of authorized retail space leads to a .080 to .085 percent increase in retail employment, depending on the set of time-varying controls  $X_{it}$ . In row 2, we find that a 1 percentage point increase in the approval rate leads to a .16 to .18 percent increase in retail employment.

Rows 3 to 6 replicate rows 1 and 2 but try to account for the possible depreciation of the retail capital stock. In rows 3 and 4, we assume that stores approved more than 15 years prior to  $(t - 4)$  have fully depreciated by time  $t$ . In rows 5 and 6, we assume that stores approved more than 10 years prior to  $(t - 4)$  have fully depreciated by time  $t$ . We then compute the stock of approvals and approval rates based on these assumptions. In all cases, we find that fewer approvals and a lower approval rate are associated with lower retail employment.

We considered two alternative specifications of equations (1) and (2). First, to account for the possibility of sampling errors in the employment and demographic variables due to the relatively small size of the LFS survey, we re-estimated equations (1) and (2) using 3-year averages instead of yearly data. The results were unaffected. Second, we re-estimated equation (1) in first- differences rather than in deviation from the mean. This allowed us to investigate some additional timing issues. While we assume in equations (1) and (2) that it takes exactly 4 years between the approval and the actual opening of a store, we might expect in practice a more gradual effect, with some stores opening faster and some stores experiencing even longer delays. More specifically, we estimated the following regression using OLS:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \log(\text{retail emp}_{it}) &= \theta_1 \Delta \log(\text{approvals}_{i(t-5)}) + \theta_2 \Delta \log(\text{approvals}_{i(t-4)}) + \theta_3 \Delta \log(\text{approvals}_{i(t-3)}) \\ &\quad + \psi_1 \Delta \log(\text{applications}_{i(t-5)}) + \psi_2 \Delta \log(\text{applications}_{i(t-4)}) \end{aligned}$$

$$+\psi_3 \Delta \log(\text{applications}_{i(t-3)}) + \beta_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

where  $\Delta$  represents a first-difference operator and all the other variables are defined as before. The estimated coefficient on  $\Delta \log(\text{approvals}_{i(t-4)})$  was .072 and similar in magnitude to the estimated coefficient on  $\log(\text{approvals}_{i(t-4)})$  in the fixed effects estimation. That coefficient was statistically significant. The estimated coefficients on  $\Delta \log(\text{approvals}_{i(t-3)})$  and  $\Delta \log(\text{approvals}_{i(t-5)})$  were, as expected, positive (.014 and .003 respectively) but statistically insignificant.

Table 4 replicates the basic specifications of Table 3 but breaks down the retail trade sector into food (column 1) and non-food (column 2). Note that in column 1, we use applications and approvals only in the food retail sector to construct the measures of entry regulation. Similarly, in column 2, we use applications and approvals only in the non-food retail sector. Because one can reasonably argue that the unemployment rate is likely to be endogenous to the zoning process, we limit the set controls  $X_{it}$  to the age and rural/urban demographic controls. Our basic finding of a negative relationship between retail employment and approvals or approval rates holds true in both the food and non-food branches of retail trade.

Table 5 investigates the robustness of our findings in the light of various alternative economic interpretations. We focus on equation (1).<sup>26</sup> In column 1, we address a basic causality concern by asking whether *future* approvals affect current retail employment. To do so, we add the stock of approvals as of  $(t + 1)$  as a regressor. The impact of future approvals on current employment is both economically and statistically insignificant, weakening any concern of reverse causation.<sup>27</sup>

Another important question is whether the positive effect of approvals on employment persists over time. One could argue that the entry of a new megastore will create jobs in the short-run but will eventually drive out smaller retailers, say due to lower average prices in the megastore. This could result in either no or even a negative effect on employment in the longer run. Column 2 provides some evidence against this argument. In column 2, we break down the stock of approvals as

---

<sup>26</sup> We have verified that the results from equation (2) are also robust to all the specification checks below.

<sup>27</sup> We have also investigated these dynamic issues by adding as a control one-year lagged  $\log(\text{retail employment})$ . The results were qualitatively unchanged.

of  $(t-4)$  into two components: the stock of approvals as of  $(t-7)$  and the stock of approvals between  $(t-4)$  and  $(t-7)$ . If the estimated employment effects are only short term, one would expect that stores approved earlier in time would have a weaker positive effect on current employment than stores approved more recently. In fact, we find that earlier approvals have a larger effect on retail employment than later approvals. The difference between the two coefficients is however not statistically significant.

As we mention above, the year dummies included in equations (1) and (2) account for any aggregate economic and policy shocks that might affect retail employment. Among such aggregate shocks, changes in the minimum wage are especially relevant here. The retail trade industry has a disproportionately large share of low wage workers and any change in the minimum wage is likely to have a substantial impact on employment in this sector.<sup>28</sup> Because the minimum wage is set nationally, its effect on employment should be adequately captured by the year dummies as long as this effect is the same across départements. It is possible, however, that some départements are more affected than others by a given increase or decrease in the minimum wage. Specifically, one might expect the effect of the minimum wage to be stronger in a low-wage than in a high-wage département. Column 3 accounts for this concern by adding to equation (1) interactions between département fixed effects and the real minimum wage. The results are qualitatively unaffected.

Another way to verify that our entry regulation variables are not proxying for other policy or economic shocks targeted towards the less skilled is to ask whether other economic sectors with a disproportionately large fraction of low wage workers also appear to be “affected” by the zoning regulation. We do this in column 4, where we re-estimate equation (1) using the logarithm of employment in hotels and restaurants as the dependent variable. The effect of approvals on employment in the hotels and restaurants sector is neither economically nor statistically significant.

Finally, we saw in Table 2 that annual approval rates differ systematically along a set of département characteristics. For example, we saw that larger départements accept a larger fraction of applications. This raises the concern that retail employment may have evolved differentially over

---

<sup>28</sup> See for example Kramarz and Philippon [2001].

time across départements (for example, growing faster in larger départements) and that our entry regulation variables may in part be capturing such differential trends. We address this concern in column 5 where we allow retail employment to grow at a different average annual rate in each département. The estimated coefficient on approvals is statistically unchanged.

## IV. Retail Employment Effects: IV Results

### IV.A. Motivation

Our empirical strategy so far has relied on the assumption that applications are exogenous to the entry regulation and represent the number of stores that would have entered in a laissez-faire situation. Based on that assumption, we have defined a lower approval rate, or a lower stock of approvals conditional on the stock of applications, as proxies for the stringency of entry deterrence. We identified two reasons why this assumption might be violated in practice and why the OLS results above might be biased. First, discouragement effect due to a positive cost of applying and a low probability of success may bias the stock of applications downward compared to the free entry number of entrants. On the other hand, the stock of applications may be an overestimate of the number of entrants in the absence of deterrence because of the rents created by the deterrence process itself.

Abstracting away from issues surrounding the endogeneity of applications, another possible source of concern with the OLS estimation of equations (1) and (2) is that approvals and approval rates might be correlated with unobserved shocks to retail employment. This could occur if zoning boards change their approval policy as a function of economic conditions in the retail industry. For example, zoning boards may authorize more stores when they expect retail demand to grow for some exogenous reasons and fewer stores in the opposite case. If zoning boards behave as such, this will bias our estimates in equations (1) and (2) upward. Alternatively, one could imagine that the quality of applications vary with unobserved shocks to retail employment. An expected positive shock to retail demand may induce promoters with lower quality or more marginal projects to

apply. If zoning boards reject a larger fraction of such applicants, this will bias our estimates in equations (1) and (2) downwards.

The discussion above makes it clear that we need to assess the robustness of our results to a more exogenous source of variation in the stringency of entry regulation, one that does not directly rely on applications and accounts for the possible correlation between approvals and unobserved shocks to retail demand. To do so, we propose an instrumentation strategy that is based on the politics of entry regulation, a process of interest in its own right.

#### **IV.B. The Politics of Entry Regulation**

As we mentioned in Section II, the membership composition of zoning boards is such that the median voter on these boards is likely to be an elected politician. Recall that out of twenty voting members on a zoning board, nine are shopkeepers and craftsmen’s representatives (and seven of those self-employed), two are consumer representatives, and the rest are locally elected politicians. Given that consumer representatives are anecdotally known to favor of entry, incumbent shopkeepers will need the support of at least some politicians to prevent entry. One might therefore expect political representation in a given département and a given year to affect the strength of entry deterrence in that département and year.

In fact, some further institutional knowledge might help us hypothesize as to which political parties might be most opposed to the entry of large stores. In its original spirit, the Loi Royer was introduced as a way to protect small shopkeepers from larger competitors. One might thus expect the political parties who get a disproportionate share of small shopkeepers’ votes to be the strongest opponents to the creation of new large stores. As these parties try to maintain the political support of this group of electors, they may use their influence on the boards to limit entry.

In a book called “La Boutique Contre La Gauche” (“The Boutique Against the Left”), Nonna Mayer [1986] undertook a thorough investigation of the social and political behavior of small shopkeepers in France. She documents a strong political bias among small shopkeepers towards non-extremist right-wing parties. More specifically, she shows that the UDF (“Union pour la Démocratie

Française”) and the RPR (“Rassemblement Pour la République”), the two largest right-wing parties in France, receive a disproportionate fraction of shopkeepers’ votes. Such a preference for right-wing parties, Mayer comments, is rather typical among the self-employed. Self-employed typically assume that left-wing parties in France, the most prominent of which being the PS (“Parti Socialiste”), will rather protect the interest of salaried workers.

Hence, in theory at least, a good predictor of the approval of new retail space in a given département and given year is the political representation in that département and year. More elected politicians from the right of the political spectrum would imply a median voter more likely to oppose entry; more elected politicians coming from the left of the political spectrum would imply a median voter more likely to favor entry. In practice, we will use the results of national elections to the Assemblée Nationale, France’s main legislative body, to measure the representation of political parties by département.<sup>29</sup> We will use the cumulative representation of each political party in a département up to  $(t - 4)$  as instrument for the stock of approvals in that département up to  $(t - 4)$ .

While we have just argued that political representation may generate variation in entry by affecting the preferences of the median voter on the zoning boards, we further need to justify why instrumenting with political representation will solve the various endogeneity problems outlined above. First, and most importantly, the use of political representation as an instrument allows us to analyze the stringency of entry regulation *without* directly relying on applications in our empirical model. We measure the stringency of entry deterrence by the politically induced variation in the stock of approvals. This should eliminate any bias in the OLS models due to deviations of applications from the laissez-faire number of stores.

We further need to argue why political representation in a département may not be correlated to unobserved shocks to retail demand in that département. There are two specific sources of concern here. First, political business cycles models suggest that election outcomes might be driven by economic conditions. If shocks to retail employment correlate with general employment shocks in a département and election results correlate with these general employment shocks, this might induce

---

<sup>29</sup> The election data is presented in the Data Appendix.

a correlation between retail employment and political representation. One simple way to account for this empirically is to verify that our results are robust to controlling for the unemployment rate in the département. The relevance of this concern is further weakened by the fact that current political representation is not part of the identification strategy; only representation up to year  $(t - 4)$  is used as an instrument. For political business cycles to drive our results, one would require rather sophisticated voters who would be able to predict shocks to retail demand four years in advance and consequently adjust their voting behavior. In practice, we will also control for political representation in years  $t$  to  $(t - 3)$  to further alleviate any political business cycles concern.

Another source of concern is that political representation might capture local policies other than zoning. Fortunately, as we already stressed several times above, the decentralization of the zoning regulation is rather exceptional in France where local politicians have only very limited policy discretion. Also, the additional controls for political representation in years  $t$  to  $(t - 3)$  should also account for the possibility of other more recent local policy changes. More generally, we will test the validity of the political instruments by performing an over-identification test.

#### IV.C. First-Stage Regressions

Table 6 presents the first-stage regressions. We propose two different sets of instruments. The first set (columns 1 and 3) focuses on the political representation of the major political parties only, i.e. the RPR and the UDF on the right wing and the PS on the left wing. Note that because the UDF and the RPR formed a coalition during some of the elections in the 1980s, we cannot systematically separate them in the empirical analysis. The second set (columns 2 and 4) includes the political representation of all parties, major and minor. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 are the logarithm of the total stock of approvals up to year  $(t - 4)$ . The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is the logarithm of the 10-year stock of approvals up to year  $(t - 4)$ . We construct the political instruments accordingly. For example, Fraction PS in column 1 is the cumulated fraction of votes going to the Socialist Party from 1975 until  $(t - 4)$ .<sup>30</sup> All regressions include, in

---

<sup>30</sup> See Data Appendix for further detail on the construction of the political variables.



addition to the political variables, year fixed effects, département fixed effects as well as controls for the age and rural/urban demographics in the département. The missing category among the political variables in columns 1 and 3 is the fraction of votes going to all minor parties, abstentions and null votes. The missing category in columns 2 and 4 is the fraction of abstentions and null votes.

Table 6 verifies that political representation in a département is an important determinant of approvals. More specifically, the first-stage regressions confirm the expected divide between RPR/UDF and PS. Consider column 1, for example. A 1 percent increase in the political representation of the RPR and UDF decreases the stock of approvals by .05 percent. A 1 percent increase in the PS representation increases the stock of approvals by .31 percent. The difference between the estimated effects for PS and RPR-UDF representation is statistically significant in all specifications. This sharp contrast between the RPR-UDF and PS is stable across all specifications. The picture is a little murkier and less stable when it comes to the influence of the minor political parties. One interesting finding is that increased representation by the green party seems to be associated with a stronger deterrence of entry, even though the coefficient is imprecisely estimated. Finally, note that the political variables are jointly significant for each of the first-stage regressions in Table 6.

#### IV.D. Second-Stage Regressions

Table 7 displays the effect of entry regulation on retail employment in the IV model. All regressions include year fixed effects, département fixed effects and the usual vector of age and rural/urban demographic variables. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Columns 1 and 4 display the basic specifications, the first-stages of which are columns 1 and 4 of Table 6 respectively. In all cases, we find a positive relationship between retail employment and the stock of approvals. The results are very similar under both sets of instruments and qualitatively similar to the OLS results in Table 3. The estimated effects of entry regulation on employment are about 50 (columns 1 and 2) to 100 (columns 3 and 4) percent larger here than under the OLS models. The  $\chi^2$  over-

identification test at the bottom of Table 7 does not reject the null hypothesis of orthogonality of the IV residuals to the instruments.

In column 5, we replicate column 2 but add a control for the current unemployment rate in the département. The point estimate is unchanged. In column 6, we add, in addition to the unemployment rate, controls for the current, one-year, two-year and three-year lagged political representation in the département. The introduction of these controls reduces the estimated coefficient on  $\log(\text{approvals})$  (.104 versus .127). Column 7 replicates column 6 but uses the logarithm of employment in hotels and restaurants as a dependent variable. We find no effect of entry regulation, as predicted by political representation, on employment in hotels and restaurants. This last result suggests that the instruments are unlikely to capture other policy changes targeted towards the less skilled.

#### **IV.E. Magnitude of Effect**

How important are these effects? How larger would retail employment be today had free entry occurred? As we discussed earlier, there is no full-proof way for us to answer these questions. Unfortunately, the applications database, while very rich, does not provide an obvious counterfactual for what the number of stores would have been free of regulation. We however try to give below possible orders of magnitude under more and less conservative sets of assumptions.

If one is willing to assume that cities represent independent retail markets, one can use the distribution of applications and approvals by city to provide a lower bound on the size of the effect. As we mention earlier, the main reason why we might suspect the stock of applications to be an over-estimate of the laissez-faire number of stores is if multiple applications are submitted over time for the same investment opportunity. One could therefore estimate a lower bound of the long-run employment effect of deterrence by assuming that, had free entry occurred: (1) exactly one extra store would have been constructed in all the cities where applications were submitted but none was successful and (2) exactly one extra store would have been constructed in all the cities where additional applications were submitted following the last approval. While this exercise is difficult

to carry out for non-food retail (given the diversity of investment projects represented there), one can perform this exercise in the food sector. About 500 of the 2,300 cities where applications were recorded in the food retail sector ended up without any approval by the end of the sample period. In addition, we computed that new applications occurred in about 200 extra cities following the last approval. Hence, under that conservative scenario, about 700 extra stores would have been constructed free of deterrence. Assuming that all stores have the same size, this would correspond to about a 30 percent increase in the stock of approvals in food retailing.<sup>31</sup> Given an elasticity of employment to approvals of about .1 (see Table 4), this would imply a 3 percent increase in food retail employment.

A second, somewhat less conservative, quantification exercise can be carried out for the entire retail sector. We assess the effect of moving a département from the first quartile of the approval rate distribution (about 30 percent) to the third quartile of that distribution (about 50 percent). Such a move corresponds to about a two third increase in the stock of approvals. Given an elasticity of employment to approvals of about .1 (a conservative average of the OLS and IV estimates), this would imply about a 7 percent increase in retail employment.

Finally, one could assume at the other extreme that all applications truly represent stores that would have been constructed had free entry occurred. With an average approval rate of 40 percent, this would imply a 150 percent increase in the stock of approvals and a 15 percent increase in retail employment. It is important to note that even this scenario is not an absolute upper bound for the impact of entry regulation as it assumes away any discouragement effects.

## V. Retailer Concentration and Retail Prices

In this section, we investigate some specific mechanisms by which the Loi Royer may have hindered employment. One plausible causal channel is through concentration and prices. Fewer approvals by the zoning boards may have increased large retailers' market power, leading to higher markups,

---

<sup>31</sup> About 8,000 applications were submitted in food retailing and the approval rate in that sector was a little less than 30 percent.

lower sales and lower employment. As we discussed in the introduction, this mechanism is central to most of the theoretical work on the link between product market regulation and employment. However, there might be other, more industry specific, mechanisms. First, high concentration may hurt employment through other channels than its impact on prices and sales. Concentration may also slow product differentiation among large retailers. In the retail industry, more product differentiation may lead to the development of higher value, more labor intensive stores (McKinsey Global Institute [1997]). In the US food retail sector for example, high quality chains have developed in parallel with lower quality ones. Because the high quality chains compete less on prices but more on the multiple services that they provide to customers, they are typically more labor intensive.

Also, the Loi Royer may have hindered employment growth independently of any impact on retailer concentration. For example, some authors have noted the importance of positive spillover effects in retail trade, whereby the creation of a large anchor store induces enough customer traffic to encourage the creation of additional stores (and jobs). Using evidence on rents paid by anchors and non-anchor stores in U.S. shopping malls, Pashigian [1998] showed that the positive externalities created by anchor stores can be quite substantial. The Loi Royer, by restraining the creation of large anchor stores may have prevented such positive spillover effects from occurring.<sup>32</sup> Finally, the regulation of entry in a service sector such as retail trade may lead to trading off employment for customers' time. Limiting the number of stores forces customers to face longer commuting time to the closest supermarket and longer waiting times once inside the store. In other words, with less large stores available to shop at, customers' time becomes a more important input in the retail industry production function and operates as a substitute for retail employment.

While all the channels above would deserve empirical investigation, data limitations seriously limit the scope of this exercise. Instead, we focus in this section on the effect of the Loi Royer on the concentration of large retail chains in France and on retail prices.

Supermarkets and megastores in France operate in a rather concentrated market environment.<sup>33</sup>

---

<sup>32</sup> It is interesting to note that while restaurants may also benefit from the development of anchor stores and malls, we did not find any apparent spillover of the zoning regulation into the hotels and restaurants sector.

<sup>33</sup> A megastore is defined as a store with over 2,500 square meters of retail space. A supermarket is defined as a

In a recent study, Dobson and Waterson [1999] report that, in 1997, sales of the top 5 chains in France represented 31 percent of total sales in the retail industry. In food retail, the market share of the top 5 retailers increased from 42 to 52 percent between 1988 and 1996. As a comparison, the market share of the top five food retailers in the United Kingdom, which has the most concentrated retail industry in Europe, went from 53 to 64 percent over the same time period. Dobson and Waterson [1999] also show that retailer concentration across European countries is positively correlated to price indices.

It has been anecdotally suggested that the Loi Royer, under the guise of protecting small shopkeepers, was de facto used to limit product market competition among large retail chains and might thus have played a non negligible role in the development of such a concentrated retail environment in France. More specifically, incumbent stores are said to exert influence on the zoning boards to restrain the entry of competing chains and thereby protect their local market power.<sup>34</sup> We used the applications database to more formally test this story. We again focused on food retailing in order to isolate a more uniform industrial sector. Using city-level data, we showed that the probability of approval for a new applicant was about 5 percent lower when the applicant had a different brand name than a store previously approved in that city.<sup>35</sup>

More generally, we show in Table 8 that the stringency of deterrence is positively related to the concentration of large retail chains and to retail prices. Again, we concentrate on the food retail sector. We start with our analysis of concentration effects (columns 1 to 3). We use the brand names of approved food stores in the applications database to construct three different measures of retailer concentration at the département/year level: the market share of the largest retailer (1-firm concentration ratio), the market share of the two largest retailers (2-firm concentration ratio), and the herfindhal index. One substantial measurement problem with these concentration measures is that they do not account for supermarkets and megastores' presence prior to the

---

store with between 400 and 2,500 square meters of retail space.

<sup>34</sup> Personal conversation, DECAS. Remember that representatives for the local supermarkets and megastores are also appointed to the zoning boards.

<sup>35</sup> These results are available from the authors upon request.

inception of the zoning regulation, a piece of information that is not available to us.<sup>36</sup> However, these concentration measures should at least inform us as to how the zoning regulation shaped the structure of competition among approved stores. All regressions in Table 8 include year and département fixed effects as well as the usual vector of demographic characteristics. We correlate the three concentration measures to the contemporaneous stock of approvals (row 1) and to the contemporaneous share approved (row 2). We find that all three measures of concentration are strongly positively related to the strength of entry deterrence. Increases in either the number or the fraction of approvals reduce the concentration of large retail chains.

In column 4, we study the effect of the Loi Royer on retail prices in the food sector. This study is unfortunately subject to serious data limitations. Consumer price indices do not exist at the département level in France. However, we were able to obtain from INSEE, the French Statistical Institute, micro level price data from 1994 to 1998. This is the data collected to compute the CPI in France.<sup>37</sup> Each data point corresponds to the retail price of a specific product in a specific store at a given point in time. From the full sample of products represented, we selected approximately a hundred food products labelled “homogeneous” by INSEE, i.e. products for which there is little scope for quality differentiation.<sup>38</sup>

We regress  $\log(\text{price})$  on the two four-year lagged measures of entry regulation. Each regression includes dummy variables for the specific products, dummy variables for store types, year fixed effects, département fixed effects and the usual set of age and urban/rural demographic controls. The standard errors reported in parentheses allow for group effects at the département-year level; those reported in brackets allow for group effects at the département level. We find that food prices go down when zoning boards authorize more entry.<sup>39</sup>

It is interesting to compare the estimated elasticity of prices to approvals to that of employment

---

<sup>36</sup> This measurement problem is somewhat minimized by the fact that supermarkets and megastores' market shares were rather small in the early 70s. In 1970, megastores' market share was 3.6 percent; supermarkets' market share was 9 percent. These shares respectively were up to 33 percent and 28.3 percent in 1997 [Allain and Chambolle 1999]

<sup>37</sup> See Data Appendix for a more detailed description for the price database.

<sup>38</sup> For confidentiality reasons, INSEE does not allow us to reveal a list of the sampled products.

<sup>39</sup> Bertrand et al. [2000] present complementary evidence on retail prices and entry deterrence at the city level. In that paper, we also analyze the differential effect of megastores and supermarkets entry for retail prices.

(Table 4, column 1 and 2). The elasticity of price appears smaller. The estimated coefficients in the price regressions are about a fifth to a third of the estimated coefficients in the employment regressions. This would imply unreasonably high price elasticity of food demand for prices to be the sole causal channel here. This suggests that some of the other mechanisms outlined above may also be at play. Concentration may hurt employment through other channels than price and entry regulation may hurt employment through other mechanisms than its impact on retailer concentration. One important caveat, though, is that the price and employment sensitivities are computed over different sample periods. Because the panel length for the price data is much shorter than for the employment data, one may not want to push this inference exercise too far.<sup>40</sup>

In Table 9, we directly assess the impact of retailer concentration on employment. We correlate employment in food retailing to the three concentration measures described above. Each regression includes the usual set of controls. As expected, we find that employment is strongly negatively correlated to each concentration measure (columns 2, 4 and 6). We also try to separate the effect of entry regulation and retailer concentration. In columns 3, 5 and 7, we allow for both a measure of entry deterrence ( $\log(\text{approvals}_{t-4})$ ) and a measure of retailer concentration in the same regression. We find that both measures are negatively related to employment.

It is interesting to note that the direct effect of entry deterrence on employment (row 1) drops by about 20 percent when we include a concentration measure in the regression but that this effect stays economically and statistically significant. Again, this suggests that the impact of entry deterrence on retailer concentration, while it does appear to be an important channel for the employment effects, might not be the only one. There is however one important caveat to this statement. Départements might not be the right geographical unit to study the impact of concentration. Instead, the analysis above should best be carried out in smaller geographic units. Unfortunately, the LFS survey is too small for us to compute employment levels, say, at the city level.

---

<sup>40</sup> We re-estimated the employment elasticities over the shorter time period (1994 to 1998). They did appear smaller in magnitude but were too imprecisely estimated to justify any inference based on them.

## VI. Other Labor Market Outcomes

In Table 10, we study the effect of the entry regulation on a broader set of labor market outcomes. Each coefficient in Table 10 corresponds to a separate regression. We estimate the basic empirical model (equation (1) in column 1 and the IV model in column 2. In the IV model, we also control for the current, one-year, two-year and three-lagged political representation in the département.

We start by assessing the effect of the Loi Royer on overall employment in the département (row 1). The specific question we want to address here is whether the apparent effect on retail employment represents simply a redistribution of employment across industrial sectors or whether overall employment did indeed change as a result of the zoning regulation. The estimated coefficient on “ $\log(\text{approvals})_{i(t-4)}$ ” in column 1 is positive but statistically insignificant. Because retail employment constitutes about 7.5 percent of total employment in France, the point estimate (.004) suggests a slightly less than proportional increase in total employment.<sup>41</sup> The IV estimate in column 2 is less noisy. The point estimate is also positive and suggests a more than proportional increase in overall employment.<sup>42</sup>

The second dependent variable we consider is weekly earnings for salaried workers in the retail industry (row 2).<sup>43</sup> There is a large U.S. literature on the effect of product market deregulation on industry wages. Workers in the trucking industry experienced a substantial decline in earnings post-deregulation [Rose 1987]. Earnings also declined after the deregulation of the airline industry [Card 1986, Card 1997] and of the banking industry [Black and Strahan, forthcoming], although more modestly.<sup>44</sup> These negative earnings effects have been attributed in part to a decline in workers’ bargaining power and in part to a decline in the size of the rents to be shared between

---

<sup>41</sup> Note that, in a regression not reported here, we broke down earlier and later approvals as we did in column 2 of Table 5. Interestingly, we found a stronger, more than proportional, effect of earlier approvals on overall employment, consistent with possible spillovers of the entry regulation onto other industrial sectors. This estimate was however again very imprecise.

<sup>42</sup> In regressions not reported here, we tried to assess the sensitivity of employment in specific industrial sectors to the zoning regulation. While the estimates were all very noisy, there was an apparent positive sensitivity to approvals in some manufacturing sectors, especially food processing and consumer goods manufacturing.

<sup>43</sup> This variable is available in the LFS data starting in 1982.

<sup>44</sup> In contrast, there was close to no earnings decline following the deregulation of the railroad industry. A more complete literature review is available in Peoples [1998]. See also Fortin and Lemieux [1997] for a review of the effect of deregulation (among other institutional changes) on the increase in income inequality in the United States.



firms and workers post deregulation. It is not clear how large these effects could be in the French retail sector. Indeed, because a large fraction of retail workers are paid at or around the minimum wage, there is little scope for downward wage flexibility following increases in approvals. In practice, we find a negative relationship between wages and approvals. The effect is however statistically insignificant. The point estimate suggests that the elasticity of wages with respect to approvals is about a fifth of the elasticity of employment in the IV model.

We next focus on the relative employment of two groups that are, a priori, most likely to be affected by changes in retail trade: women and youth. In row 3, we show that less entry deterrence reduces the fraction of male workers in the retail industry. The effect is however not statistically significant in the IV model and only marginally significant in the basic model. There are several possible interpretations for this negative sign. First, it is consistent with the presence of taste discrimination against women in the retail industry, a discrimination that is easier to sustain in the absence of intense competitive pressures [Becker 1957].<sup>45</sup> An alternative interpretation is that large stores offer more flexible work schedules and positions (such as cashier jobs) and may therefore attract a larger fraction of female workers.

In row 4, we assess the effect of entry regulation on the general labor market performance of women. Interestingly, we find that the fraction of men in overall employment also decreases as entry deterrence falls. The effect is only statistically significant in the IV model. The magnitude of this effect, compared to that for retail employment only (row 3), indicates that entry regulation might hurt female employment in other sectors than retail trade. As we suggested earlier, one plausible interpretation for this effect is that freer entry has reduced shopping time and eased the transition of some women into the labor force.

In rows 5 and 6, we investigate whether youth employment was also affected by the Loi Royer. We consider the effect of approvals on the fraction of young workers (less than 20 years old) both in retail employment (row 5) and in overall employment (row 6). Maybe somewhat surprisingly,

---

<sup>45</sup> In a related paper, Black and Strahan [forthcoming] find that the deregulation of state level restrictions on bank expansion in the United States led to a reduction in the male-female earnings gap in the banking industry.

we find no consistent effect of the zoning regulation on the relative employment of the youth.

Finally, row 7 displays the effect of the regulation on the fraction of retail workers that are employed in small establishments (less than 10 workers). Recall that the original motivation behind the Loi Royer was to protect small mom-and-pop stores from the rapid growth of larger retail establishments. Not surprisingly, the findings in row 7, especially the IV results, suggests that entry regulation indeed helped protect smaller retailers' market share.

## VII. Summary and Conclusion

Our findings suggest that the zoning regulation introduced in France in the early 1970s to restrain the development of large retail stores has had a negative impact on employment. The slow employment growth witnessed in the French retail sector over the last two or three decades may therefore not only be the result of labor market rigidities. Instead, barriers to entry and high levels of concentration among large retail chains may have also played a significant role.

Although the results in this paper are specific to the retail trade sector in France, we believe that the lesson we learned is of much more general interest. Specifically, countries fighting sluggish rates of job creation may be misguided in thinking that their employment problem will be fully solved once they reform their labor markets. Instead, elimination of entry regulation and other forms of product market restrictions may provide an additional mechanism to bolster employment growth.

This lesson is, we believe, especially relevant when one considers the political economy of reforms. Labor market deregulation has proven to be extremely difficult to implement in continental Europe. Labor market reforms are perceived as a direct threat by most incumbent workers and rarely receive the support of a majority of voters. Product market reforms, on the other hand, may not carry such strong negative connotation in the public opinion and may therefore be easier to introduce.

We hope to extend this paper in several directions in the future. First, a careful and systematic

study of profitability margins in the retail industry in the United States and European countries would complement the evidence we have put together so far. Second, while we have focused on the retail industry, product market restrictions have been placed in other industrial sectors and deserve as much scrutiny. Finally, while we have shown that product market regulation affects job creation, it is not the only relevant form of non-labor market distortions. For example, financial markets also operate under much more constraints in Europe than in the United States. Studying whether such capital market regulations have also hindered firm creation and employment growth is another priority for future research.

## VIII. Data Appendix

**Labor Force Data:** In March of every year the French statistical institute (INSEE) conducts a Labor Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is a household survey. Each individual in a household is asked a set of standard questions that are repeated in every LFS. Roughly 60,000 households are interviewed every year. We restrict our attention to all so-called “département de France Métropolitaine,” i.e. we exclude the Antilles, La Réunion and other maritime provinces. We however include Corsica. There are 95 such départements. Although the structure of the questionnaire changed in 1975, 1982, and 1990, most variables of interest are available across survey years. The only exception is earnings information, which became available in the LFS only starting in 1982. The LFS includes a 4-digit industry code (the Nomenclature d’Activités et de Produits -NAP- up to 1992 and the Nomenclature d’Activités Française -NAF- starting in 1993), which we use to measure employment in different industrial sectors. We use sampling weights to construct the variables of interest by département-year cell. Means and standard deviations for the main variables of interest are reported in Appendix Table 1.

**Applications Database:** The “Direction du Commerce et de l’Artisanat” (DECAS) at the Ministry of Economics and Finance has maintained an exhaustive listing of all applications submitted to any zoning board since the inception of the Loi Royer. DECAS has given us access to that listing for the period 1975 to 1998. The records were kept on paper from 1975 to 1986 and in an electronic format thereafter. We created an electronic version of the 1975 to 1986 files. 16,278 different applications were submitted during that period. For almost every application, the DECAS data records the brand name of the applicant, size of the store (in square meters), specialty of the store (food or non-food with varying detail depending on the year), the location of the store (département and city), terms of the application (whether seeking to create or expand a previously existing store), and the outcome of the commission vote (an indicator for whether the store was authorized or rejected, as well as the number of “yes” votes, number of “no” votes, and number of abstentions).

We use the DECAS data to compute stocks of applications and approvals by département/year cell. More specifically, the different variables used in our empirical analysis are defined as follows:

- $\text{Log}(\text{approvals})_t$  is the logarithm of the stock of approvals (in square meters) from January 1st 1975 up to January 1st of year  $t$  in a given département. For example,  $\text{log}(\text{approvals})_t$  when  $t = 1990$  is the logarithm of the sum of all approvals between January 1st 1975 and January 1st 1990.
- $\text{Log}(\text{applications})_t$  is the logarithm of the stock of applications (in square meters) from January 1st 1975 up to January 1st of year  $t$  in a given département. For example,  $\text{log}(\text{applications})_t$  when  $t = 1990$  is the logarithm of the sum of all applications between January 1st 1975 and January 1st 1990.
- $\text{Share approved}_t$  is the ratio of stock of approvals (in square meters) from January 1st 1975 up to January 1st  $t$  to the stock of applications (in square meters) over the same period in a given département.

We also constructed 10-year and 15-year stocks to allow for possible depreciation of the retail capital stock. For example,  $\text{log}(10\text{-year approvals})_t$  is the logarithm of the stock of approvals (in square meters) from January 1st of year  $\max(1975, (t - 10))$  up to January 1st of year  $t$  in a given département. Hence, when  $t = 1990$ ,  $\text{log}(10\text{-year approvals})_t$  is the logarithm of the sum of all approvals between January 1st 1980 and January 1st 1990. Finally, we also computed all the variables above separately for food and non-food retailing.

We also used the DECAS data (and the information it provides about applicants' brand names) to compute three measures of retailer concentration in food retailing. These measures are defined as follows:

- 1-firm concentration ratio $_t$  is the share of the biggest chain in the stock of approvals up to year  $t$  in a given département.

- 2-firm concentration ratio $_t$  is the share of the two biggest chains in the stock of approvals up to year  $t$  in a given département.
- Herfindhal index is the sum of the squares of the market shares in the stock of approvals up to year  $t$ .

Means and standard deviations for these variables as well as for annual approval rates are presented in Appendix Table 2.

**CEVIPOF Election Files:** The “Centre d’Etudes de la Vie Politique Française” (CEVIPOF) is a research institute that focuses on the political practices of French citizens. It maintains a database on all national elections to the Assemblée Nationale, France’s main legislative body. The CEVIPOF records the breakdown of votes by département for each of the major French political parties. From the right to the left of the political spectrum, these major political parties are: the “extreme right,” various small right-wing parties labelled as “various right,” the “Rassemblement Pour la République” (RPR ,and its other denominations in various election years), the “Union pour la Démocratie Française” (UDF, and its other denominations in the various election years), the “Parti Socialiste” (PS, and its other denominations in the various election years), other small left-wing parties labeled as “various left,” and the “extreme left,” which mostly accounts for the communist party. Finally, the data also isolates the green party as an independent entity. In our empirical strategy, we group together the two major right-wing parties in France, UDF and RPR. These two parties formed a coalition during some of the elections of the 1980s and cannot be systematically separated over the period under study.

Legislative elections in France typically have two rounds. Under French voting law, only the subset of political parties that have performed well enough in the first round are allowed to stay on for the second round. In this paper, we will focus on the results of the first round since they best reflect voters’ preferences in a given year and département. Elections took place in 1973, 1978, 1981, 1986, 1988, 1993, and 1997.

We use the CEVIPOF data to construct our instruments. For example, cumulated fraction  $PS_t$

is the sum of the fraction of votes going to the PS each year from 1975 up to year  $t$  in a given département. For years in between elections, we use the results of the most recent election. All the other instruments are constructed accordingly.

Means and standard deviations for the instruments as well as annual representations of each party are reported in Appendix Table 3.

**Price Database:** INSEE releases every month a Consumer Price Index (CPI). This index is computed from a list of prices recorded in a sample of retail stores in metropolitan France. We obtained access to the full sample of prices observed between June 1994 to December 1998. From that sample, we selected approximately a hundred food products labelled “homogeneous” by INSEE, i.e. products for which there is little scope for quality differentiation. For each price, we know the date, the exact location of the retail store (city, département), the type of store (hypermarkets, supermarkets, discounters, “superettes,” “magasins populaires,” farmers markets or traditional shops). For our analysis, we collapse the monthly data to the annual level. We use as dependent variable the average price of a specific product in a specific store in a given year. In order to preserve the index from possible manipulations, INSEE does not permit us to reveal the exact nature of the products included in our analysis. Our sample contains 90,344 product/store/year observations.

University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, National Bureau of Economic Research, and  
Centre for Economic and Policy Research

Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique, Centre for Economic and Policy Research, and  
Institute for the Study of Labor

## REFERENCES

- Allain, Marie-Laure and Claire Chambolle, "Retailer's Buying Power in France," Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique Working Paper, 1999.
- Barro, Robert and Herschel Grossman, "A General Disequilibrium Model of Income and Employment," *American Economic Review*, LXI (1971), 82-93.
- Becker, Gary, *The Economics of Discrimination* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1957).
- Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo and Sendhil Mullainathan, "How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?" Mimeo, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, 2001.
- Bertrand, Marianne, Pierre Biscourp, Séverine Haller and Francis Kramarz, "Dispersion des Prix de Vente au Détail, Hétérogénéité des Formes de Vente et Structure de la Concurrence: Une Analyse Empirique sur Données Individuelles," Mimeo, CREST, 2000.
- Black, Sandra and Philip Strahan, "The Division of Spoils: Rent Sharing and Discrimination in a Regulated Industry," *American Economic Review*, XCI (2001), 814-831.
- Blanchard, Olivier and Justin Wolfers, "The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence," *Economic Journal*, CX (2000), C1-C33.
- Blanchard, Olivier and Francesco Giavazzi, "Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation and Deregulation in Goods and Labor Markets," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 8120, 2001.
- Blau, Francine and Lawrence Kahn, "International Differences in Male Wage Inequality: Institutions Versus Market Forces," *Journal of Political Economy*, CIV (1996), 791-837.
- Boeri, Tito, Giuseppe Nicoletti and Stefano Scarpetta, "Regulation and Labour Market Performance," IGER Working Paper No. 158, 1999.
- Card, David, Francis Kramarz, and Thomas Lemieux, "Changes in the Relative Structure of Wages and Employment: A Comparison of the United States, Canada, and France," *Canadian Journal of Economics*, XXXII (1999), 843-877.
- Card, David, "The Impact of Deregulation on the Employment and Wages of Airline Mechanics,"



*Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, XXXIX (1986), 527-538.

Card, David, "Deregulation and Labor Earnings in the Airline Industry," in *Regulatory Reforms and Labor Markets*, James People, editor (Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1997).

Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, "The Regulation of Entry," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 7892, 2000.

Dobson, Paul and Michael Waterson, "Retailer Power: Recent Developments and Policy Implications," *Economic Policy*, XXVIII (1999), 135-164.

Fortin, Nicole, and Thomas Lemieux, "Institutional Changes and Rising Wage Inequality: Is There a Linkage?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, XI (1997), 75-96.

Gersbach, Hans, "Promoting Product Market Competition to Reduce Unemployment in Europe: An Alternative Approach?" *Kyklos*, LIII (2000), 117-133.

Gersbach, Hans and Achim Schniewind, "Product Market Reforms to Reduce Unemployment in Europe: Who Could Be Against Them?" University of Heidelberg Working Paper, 1998.

Kahn, Lawrence, "Wage Inequality, Collective Bargaining and Relative Employment 1985-1994: Evidence from 15 OECD Countries," *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, LXXXII (2000), 564-579.

Kezdi, Gabor, "Robust Standard Errors in Fixed-Effects Panel Models," Mimeo, University of Michigan, 2001.

Kramarz, Francis and Thomas Philippon, "The Impact of Differential Payroll Tax Subsidies on Minimum Wage Employment," *Journal of Public Economics*, LXXXII (2001), 115-146.

Krueger, Alan and Jorn-Steffen Pischke, "Observations and Conjectures on the U.S. Employment Miracle," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 6146, 1997.

McKinsey Global Institute, *Employment Performance* (Washington, DC: McKinsey&Company, 1994).

McKinsey Global Institute, *Supprimer les Entraves à la Croissance et à l'Emploi en France et en Allemagne* (Washington, DC: McKinsey&Company, 1997).

Mayer, Nonna, *La Boutique Contre La Gauche* (Paris, France: Presses de la Fondation Nationale

des Sciences Politiques, 1986).

Ministère de l'Industrie, du Commerce et de l'Artisanat, *Loi D'Orientation du Commerce et de l'Artisanat* (1974).

Nickell, Stephen and Richard Layard, "Labour Market Institutions and Economic Performance," in *Handbook of Labor Economics*, Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, editors (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: North Holland, 1999).

Nickell, Stephen and Brian Bell, "The Collapse in Demand for the Unskilled and Unemployment Across the OECD," *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, XI (1995), 40-62.

Nickell, Stephen and Brian Bell, "Changes in the Distribution of Wages and Unemployment in OECD Countries," *American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings*, LXXXII (1996), 302-308.

Pashigian, Peter, "Contracts, Externalities and Incentives in Shopping Malls: An Empirical Analysis," University of Chicago Graduate School of Business Working Paper, 1998.

Peoples, James, "Deregulation and the Labor Market," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, XII (1998), 111-130.

Piketty, Thomas, "Les Créations d'EmpLoi en France et aux Etats-Unis: 'Services de Proximité Contre 'Petits Boulots'," Notes de la Fondation Saint-Simon, 1997.

Rose, Nancy, "Labor Rent-Sharing and Regulation: Evidence from the Trucking Industry," *Journal of Political Economy*, XCV (1987), 1146-1178.

**TABLE I**  
**Average Annual Employment Growth Rates (1967-1998)**

---

---

Sector:	Retail Trade	Hotels and Restaurants
Period:		
1967-1978	.006	.008
1979-1998	.001	.017

---

---

a. Sources: Banques de Donnees Macroeconomiques (BDM), 1967 to 1998.

**TABLE II**  
**Determinants of Approval Rates Across Départements**

---



---

*Dependent Variable: mean annual approval rate by département (1975-1998)*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Determinants:	Log total population	Average age	Fraction over 60 years old	Fraction working in agriculture	Fraction living in rural areas	Average log weekly earnings
	.119 (.014)	-.022 (.004)	-.997 (.198)	-.568 (.104)	-.304 (.059)	.431 (.120)
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.431	.220	.206	.235	.212	.112

---



---

- a. Sources: French LFS, 1975 and 1982; DECAS Applications Database, 1975 to 1998.
- b. Each column corresponds to a different regression. All regressions are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are in parentheses.
- c. All the département characteristics are measured in 1975 except for weekly earnings which are only available in the LFS starting in 1982 and are measured in that year.
- d. Sample size in all regressions is 95.

**TABLE III**  
**Effect of Entry Regulation on Retail Employment**  
**Basic Results**

<i>Dependent variable: log(retail employment)</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Additional Controls:	None	Age demog. Rural/urban demog.	Age demog. Rural/urban demog. Unemployment rate
log(approvals) <sub>(t-4)</sub> (in square meters)	.085 (.018) [.026]	.080 (.018) [.025]	.080 (.017) [.025]
share approved <sub>(t-4)</sub>	.182 (.049) [.064]	.169 (.047) [.061]	.163 (.047) [.060]
log(15-year approvals) <sub>(t-4)</sub> (in square meters)	.088 (.017) [.026]	.080 (.017) [.025]	.080 (.017) [.025]
15-year share approved <sub>(t-4)</sub>	.191 (.047) [.064]	.175 (.046) [.061]	.166 (.045) [.061]
log(10-year approvals) <sub>(t-4)</sub> (in square meters)	.070 (.015) [.021]	.063 (.015) [.021]	.062 (.014) [.021]
10-year share approved <sub>(t-4)</sub>	.167 (.041) [.057]	.151 (.040) [.054]	.141 (.040) [.055]

- a. Source: French LFS, 1980 to 1998; DECAS Applications Database, 1975 to 1998.
- b. Each coefficient corresponds to a separate regression. All regressions include year and département fixed effects. Rows 1, 3 and 5 also include as a control the logarithm of the stock of applications up to year  $(t - 4)$  (all years, 15-year and 10-year, respectively).
- c. “Age demographics” include fraction under 20, between 21 and 40, between 41 and 60 and above 60 years old in the département in year  $t$ . “Urban/rural demographics” include fraction living in rural areas, in cities of less than 20,000 people, in cities of between 20,000 and 200,000 people, and in cities of more than 200,000 people in the département in year  $t$ . “Unemployment rate” is the unemployment rate in the département in year  $t$ .
- d. Observations are weighted by the share of each year’s total population in the département.
- e. OLS Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors that allow for clustering of the observations at the département level are in brackets.
- f. Sample size in all regressions is 1,683.

**TABLE IV**  
**Effect of Entry Regulation on Retail Employment:**  
**Food Retail and Non-Food Retail**

	(1)	(2)
<i>Dependent variable:</i>	<i>log(food retail employment)</i>	<i>log(non-food retail employment)</i>
log(approvals) <sub>(t-4)</sub> (in square meters)	.106 (.018) [.040]	.061 (.023) [.034]
share approved <sub>(t-4)</sub>	.125 (.067) [.125]	.163 (.057) [.079]

- a. Source: French LFS, 1980 to 1998; DECAS “Applications Database,” 1975 to 1998.
- b. Each coefficient corresponds to a separate regression. All regressions include year fixed effects, département fixed effects and age and urban/rural demographic controls. “Age demographics” include fraction under 20, between 21 and 40, between 41 and 60 and above 60 years old in the département in year  $t$ . “Urban/rural demographics” include fraction living in rural areas, in cities of less than 20,000 people, in cities of between 20,000 and 200,000 people, and in cities of more than 200,000 people in the département in year  $t$ . Row 1 also includes as a control the logarithm of the stock of applications up to year  $(t - 4)$ .
- c. Approvals, applications and share approved are for food retail in all regressions in column 1, non-food retail in column 2.
- d. Observations are weighted by the share of each year’s total population in the département.
- e. OLS Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors that allow for clustering of the observations at the département level are in brackets.

**TABLE V**  
**Effect of Entry Regulation on Retail Employment:**  
**Robustness Results**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Dependent variable:</i>				<i>log(hotels &amp; restaurants employment)</i>	<i>log(retail employment)</i>
	<i>log(retail employment)</i>				
log(approvals) <sub>(t-4)</sub> (in square meters)	.086 (.018) [.027]	—	.053 (.028) [.029]	.005 (.023) [.044]	.054 (.022) [.029]
log(approvals) <sub>(t+1)</sub> (in square meters)	-.003 (.022) [.034]	—	—	—	—
log(approvals) <sub>(t-7)</sub> (in square meters)	—	.105 (.028) [.044]	—	—	—
log(approvals) <sub>(t-4)</sub> -log(approvals) <sub>(t-7)</sub>	—	.076 (.028) [.046]	—	—	—
département F.E.*log(minimum wage)	no	no	yes	no	no
département F.E.*year	no	no	no	no	yes
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.936	.935	.943	.869	.945
N	1,588	1,403	1,604	1,683	1,683

- a. Source: French LFS, 1980 to 1998; DECAS Applications Database, 1975 to 1998.
- b. Each coefficient corresponds to a separate regression. All regressions include year fixed effects, département fixed effects, the logarithm of the stock of applications up to year  $(t-4)$ , and age and urban/rural demographic controls. “Age demographics” include fraction under 20, between 21 and 40, between 41 and 60 and above 60 years old in the département in year  $t$ . “Urban/rural demographics” include fraction living in rural areas, in cities of less than 20,000 people, in cities of between 20,000 and 200,000 people, and in cities of more than 200,000 people in the département in year  $t$ .
- c. Observations are weighted by the share of each year’s total population in the département.
- d. OLS Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors that allow for clustering of the observations at the département level are in brackets.

**TABLE VI**  
**First-Stage Regressions:**  
**Effect of Political Representation on Approvals**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Dependent Variable:</i>	$\log(\text{approvals})_{t-4}$		$\log(\text{10-year approvals})_{t-4}$	
cumulated fraction RPR-UDF $_{(t-4)}$	-.047 (.026) [.110]	.083 (.101) [.279]	-.222 (.046) [.189]	.147 (.126) [.338]
cumulated fraction PS $_{(t-4)}$	.318 (.037) [.142]	.447 (.116) [.340]	.522 (.064) [.246]	.909 (.158) [.530]
cumulated fraction various right $_{(t-4)}$	—	.502 (.127) [.323]	—	.555 (.144) [.376]
cumulated fraction various left $_{(t-4)}$	—	-.545 (.295) [.622]	—	.658 (.234) [.642]
cumulated fraction extreme-right $_{(t-4)}$	—	.329 (.162) [.387]	—	.472 (.209) [.558]
cumulated fraction extreme-left $_{(t-4)}$	—	.101 (.104) [.266]	—	.360 (.135) [.450]
cumulated fraction green party $_{(t-4)}$	—	-.544 (.258) [.783]	—	-.152 (.327) [1.023]
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.912	.913	.853	.855
F-Stat. for the nullity of instruments (p-value)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
F-Stat. for RPR-UDF=PS (p-value)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)

- a. Source: French LFS, 1980 to 1998; DECAS Applications Database, 1975 to 1998; CEVIPOF Election Files, 1975 to 1998.
- b. All regressions also include year fixed effects, département fixed effects, the logarithm of the stock of applications up to year  $(t - 4)$ , and age and urban/rural demographic controls. “Age demographics” include fraction under 20, between 21 and 40, between 41 and 60 and above 60 years old in the département in year  $t$ . “Urban/rural demographics” include fraction living in rural areas, in cities of less than 20,000 people, in cities of between 20,000 and 200,000 people, and in cities of more than 200,000 people in the département in year  $t$ .
- c. “cumulated fraction PS $_{(t-4)}$ ” in columns 1 and 2 is the cumulated fraction of votes going to the PS party from 1975 up to year  $(t - 4)$ . “cumulated fraction PS $_{(t-4)}$ ” in columns 3 and 4 is the 10-year cumulated fraction of votes going to the PS party from 1975 to up to year  $(t - 4)$ . All the other political variables are constructed accordingly. See Data Appendix for further detail.
- d. Observations are weighted by the share of each year’s total population in the département.
- e. OLS Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors that allow for clustering of the observations at the département level are in brackets.
- f. Sample size in all regressions is 1,683.



**TABLE VII**  
**Effect of Entry Regulation on Retail Employment:**  
**IV Results**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	
<i>Dependent variable:</i>			<i>log(retail employment)</i>				<i>log(hotels &amp; restaurants employment)</i>	
	IV1	IV2	IV1	IV2	IV2	IV2	IV2	
log(approvals) <sub>(t-4)</sub> (in square meters)	.132 (.054) [.057]	.134 (.047) [.049]	—	—	.127 (.046) [.047]	.104 (.038) [.039]	.000 (.063) [.068]	
log(10-year approvals) <sub>(t-4)</sub> (in square meters)	—	—	.122 (.043) [.047]	.123 (.039) [.043]	—	—	—	
political composition ( <i>t</i> , <i>t</i> - 1, <i>t</i> - 2 and <i>t</i> - 3)	no	no	no	no	no	yes	yes	
unemployment rate	no	no	no	no	yes	yes	no	
$\chi^2$ Over-identification test (p-value)	(.477)	(.901)	(1.00)	(.626)	(.694)	(.969)	(.143)	

- a. Source: French LFS, 1980 to 1998; DECAS Applications Database, 1975 to 1998; CEVIPOF Election Files, 1975 to 1998.
- b. Each regression is estimated using IV. In IV1, the instruments are “cumulated fraction RPR-UDF<sub>(t-4)</sub>” and “cumulated fraction PS<sub>(t-4)</sub>.” In IV2, the instruments are “cumulated fraction RPR-UDF<sub>(t-4)</sub>,” “cumulated fraction PS(*t* - 4),” “cumulated fraction various right<sub>(t-4)</sub>,” “cumulated fraction various left<sub>(t-4)</sub>,” “cumulated fraction extreme-right<sub>(t-4)</sub>,” “cumulated fraction extreme-left<sub>(t-4)</sub>” and “cumulated fraction green party<sub>(t-4)</sub>.” “cumulated fraction PS<sub>(t-4)</sub>” is the cumulated fraction of votes going to the PS party from 1975 up to year (*t* - 4). All the other political variables are constructed accordingly. See Data Appendix for further detail.
- c. All regressions also include year fixed effects, département fixed effects, the logarithm of the stock of applications up to year (*t* - 4), and age and urban/rural demographic controls. “Age demographics” include fraction under 20, between 21 and 40, between 41 and 60 and above 60 years old in the département in year *t*. “Urban/rural demographics” include fraction living in rural areas, in cities of less than 20,000 people, in cities of between 20,000 and 200,000 people, and in cities of more than 200,000 people in the département in year *t*. “Unemployment rate” is the unemployment rate in the département in year *t*. “Political composition (*t*, *t* - 1, *t* - 2 and *t* - 3)” is a vector of representations for each political party in the département in year *t*, (*t* - 1), (*t* - 2) and (*t* - 3).
- d. Observations are weighted by the share of each year’s total population in the département.
- e. Standard errors are in parentheses. Robust standard errors are in brackets.
- f. Sample size in all regressions is 1,683.

**TABLE VIII**  
**Effect of Entry Regulation on Concentration and Prices:**  
**Evidence from Food Retail**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Dependent variable:</i>	<i>1-firm concentration ratio</i>	<i>2-firm concentration ratio</i>	<i>herfindhal index</i>	<i>log(price)</i>
log(approvals) (in square meters)	-0.071 (.008) [.022]	-0.054 (.007) [.017]	-0.075 (.009) [.025]	-0.017 (.004) [.005]
share approved	-.139 (.032) [.082]	-.078 (.026) [.063]	-.146 (.035) [.089]	-.045 (.020) [.021]
N	1890	1890	1890	90344

- a. Source: French LFS, 1975 to 1998; DECAS Applications Database, 1975 to 1998; Price Database, 1994 to 1998.
- b. “log(approvals)” and “share approved” are measured in year  $t$  in columns 1 to 3, year  $(t - 4)$  in column 4.
- c. “1-firm concentration ratio” is the largest market share in the département in year  $t$ . “2-firm concentration ratio” is the sum of the 2 largest market shares in the département in year  $t$ . “herfindhal index” is the sum of the squares of the market shares in the département in year  $t$ . See Data Appendix for further detail.
- d. Each coefficient corresponds to a separate regression. All regressions include year fixed effects, département fixed effects, and age and urban/rural demographic controls. “Age demographics” include fraction under 20, between 21 and 40, between 41 and 60 and above 60 years old in the département in year  $t$ . “Urban/rural demographics” include fraction living in rural areas, in cities of less than 20,000 people, in cities of between 20,000 and 200,000 people, and in cities of more than 200,000 people in the département in year  $t$ . Regressions in row 1 also include the logarithm of the stock of applications up to year  $t$  (columns 1 to 3) or  $(t - 4)$  (column 4). Regressions in column 4 also include dummies for specific food items and store types.
- e. OLS Standard errors are in parentheses in columns 1 to 3. Standard errors that allow for clustering of the observations at the département/year level are in parentheses in column 4. Standard errors that allow for clustering of the observations at the département level are in brackets.

**TABLE IX**  
**Effect of Concentration on Employment:**  
**Evidence from Food Retail**

<i>Dependent variable: log(food retail employment)</i>							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
log(approvals) <sub>(t-4)</sub> (in square meters)	.106 (.018) [.040]	—	.087 (.019) [.037]	—	.085 (.019) [.037]	—	.086 (.038) [.038]
1-firm concentration ratio <sub>(t-4)</sub>	—	-.278 (.060) [.129]	-.168 (.062) [.097]	—	—	—	—
2-firm concentration ratio <sub>(t-4)</sub>	—	—	—	-.376 (.072) [.166]	-.258 (.075) [.130]	—	—
herfindhal index <sub>(t-4)</sub>	—	—	—	—	—	-.250 (.054) [.117]	-.148 (.057) [.090]
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.854	.848	.851	.848	.852	.848	.851

- a. Source: French LFS, 1980 to 1998; DECAS Applications Database, 1975 to 1998.
- b. “1-firm concentration ratio” is the largest market share in the département in year  $t$ . “2-firm concentration ratio” is the sum of the 2 largest market shares in the département in year  $t$ . “Herfindhal index” is the sum of the squares of the market shares in the département in year  $t$ .
- c. All regressions include year fixed effects, département fixed effects, and age and urban/rural demographic controls. “Age demographics” include fraction under 20, between 21 and 40, between 41 and 60 and above 60 years old in the département in year  $t$ . “Urban/rural demographics” include fraction living in rural areas, in cities of less than 20,000 people, in cities of between 20,000 and 200,000 people, and in cities of more than 200,000 people in the département in year  $t$ . Regressions in columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 also include the logarithm of the stock of applications up to year  $t - 4$ .
- d. In column 2, observations are weighted by the share of each year’s total population in the département.
- e. OLS Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors that allow for clustering of the observations at the département level are in brackets.

**TABLE X**  
**Effect of Entry Regulation on Other Labor Market Outcomes:**  
**Coefficient on  $\text{Log}(\text{Approvals})_{(t-4)}$**

	(1)	(2)
	Basic	IV2
<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
<i>log(overall employment)</i>	.004 (.008) [.016]	.030 (.017) [.022]
<i>log(weekly earnings)</i> <i>(retail)</i>	-.009 (.009) [.012]	-.021 (.022) [.025]
<i>fraction male workers</i> <i>(retail)</i>	-.012 (.006) [.008]	-.011 (.012) [.013]
<i>fraction male workers</i> <i>(overall)</i>	-.002 (.001) [.002]	-.010 (.003) [.005]
<i>fraction young workers</i> <i>(retail)</i>	-.000 (.002) [.003]	.000 (.006) [.007]
<i>fraction young workers</i> <i>(overall)</i>	.000 (.001) [.001]	-.003 (.001) [.002]
<i>fraction in small firms</i> <i>(retail)</i>	-.015 (.008) [.014]	-.150 (.020) [.026]

- a. Source: French LFS, 1980 to 1998; DECAS Applications Database, 1975 to 1998; CEVIPOF Election Files, 1975 to 1998.
- b. In column 1, we estimate equation (1) for the different dependent variables. The instruments included in the IV regressions (column 2) are “cumulated fraction RPR-UDF $_{(t-4)}$ ,” “cumulated fraction PS $_{(t-4)}$ ,” “cumulated fraction various right $_{(t-4)}$ ,” “cumulated fraction various left $_{(t-4)}$ ,” “cumulated fraction extreme-right $_{(t-4)}$ ,” “cumulated fraction extreme-left $_{(t-4)}$ ” and “cumulated fraction green party $_{(t-4)}$ .” “cumulated fraction PS $_{(t-4)}$ ” is the cumulated fraction of votes going to the PS party from 1975 up to year  $(t-4)$ . All the other political variables are constructed accordingly. See Data Appendix for further detail.
- c. Each coefficient represents the result of a different regression. All regressions also include year fixed effects, département fixed effects, the representation of each political party in the département in year  $t$ ,  $(t-1)$ ,  $(t-2)$  and  $(t-3)$ , and age and rural/urban demographics controls. Age demographics include fraction under 20, between 21 and 40, between 41 and 60 and above 60 years old in the département in year  $t$ . Urban/rural demographics include fraction living in rural areas, in cities of less than 20,000 people, in cities of between 20,000 and 200,000 people, and in cities of more than 200,000 people in the département in year  $t$ . Each regression in column 1 also includes the logarithm of the stock of applications up to year  $(t-4)$ . Each regression in column 2 also includes a vector of representations for each political party in year  $t$ ,  $(t-1)$ ,  $(t-2)$  and  $(t-4)$ .
- d. Observations are weighted by the share of each year’s total population in the département.
- e. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors that allow for clustering of the observations at the département level are in brackets in column 1. Robust standard errors are in brackets in column 2.

**Appendix Table 1**  
**Summary Statistics: LFS Data**

	Mean	St. Dev.
<b>Sample: population</b>		
fraction living in rural areas	.365	.186
fraction living in cities of less than 20,000 people	.197	.112
fraction living in cities of between 20,000 and 200,000 people	.233	.162
fraction living in cities of more than 200,000 people	.205	.308
fraction under 20 years old	.108	.022
fraction between 21 and 40 years old	.358	.047
fraction between 41 and 60 years old	.288	.025
fraction above 60 years old	.245	.058
log (overall employment)	12.05	.720
log (retail employment)	9.42	.796
log (food retail employment)	8.53	.806
log (non-food retail employment)	8.84	.884
log (hotels and restaurants employment)	8.44	.898
<b>Sample: all employed</b>		
fraction in retail	.031	.011
fraction in food retail	.031	.011
fraction in non-food retail	.043	.014
fraction in hotels and restaurants	.030	.016
fraction male workers	.573	.035
fraction young workers (less than 20 years old)	.027	.014
fraction in small firms (1 to 9 workers)	.405	.148
log (weekly earnings)	8.08	.114
<b>Sample: all employed in retail sector</b>		
fraction male workers	.403	.087
fraction young workers (less than 20 years old)	.048	.045
fraction in small firms (1 to 9 workers)	.544	.142
log(weekly earnings)	7.86	.152

a. Source: French LFS, 1980 to 1998. The unit of observation is a département-year cell.

**Appendix Table 2**  
**Summary Statistics: Applications Database**

---

Mean      St. Dev.

**Sample: all applications**

annual approval rate	.420	.369
log(approvals)	10.60	1.53
log(15-year approvals)	10.55	1.50
log(10-year approvals)	10.43	1.46
log(applications)	11.59	1.45
log(15-year applications)	11.54	1.42
log(10-year applications)	11.41	1.36
share approved	.379	.198
10-year share approved	.391	.207
15-year share approved	.382	.199

**Sample: food retail applications**

annual approval rate	.306	.373
log(approvals)	9.68	1.30
log(applications)	10.82	1.30
share approved	.283	.198
1-firm concentration ratio	.538	.265
2-firm concentration ratio	.737	.220
herfindhal index	.438	.297

**Sample: non-food retail applications**

annual approval rate	.450	.394
log(approvals)	10.19	1.54
log(applications)	11.01	1.47
share approved	.448	.207

- 
- a. Source: DECAS Applications Database, 1975 to 1998. The unit of observation is a year-department cell. To compute shares, we measure applications and approvals in square meters.

**Appendix Table 3**  
**Summary Statistics: CEVIPOF Election Files**

---

	Mean	St. Dev.
fraction RPR-UDF	.388	.093
fraction PS	.300	.101
fraction various right	.050	.068
fraction various left	.017	.038
fraction extreme right	.059	.061
fraction extreme left	.148	.077
fraction green party	.032	.046
cumulated fraction RPR-UDF	4.89	2.92
cumulated fraction PS	3.79	2.40
cumulated fraction various right	.765	.454
cumulated fraction various left	.254	.218
cumulated fraction extreme right	.400	.516
cumulated fraction extreme left	2.14	1.32
cumulated fraction green party	.197	.254

---

a. Source: CEVIPOF Election Files, 1975 to 1998. The unit of observation is a year-department cell.

## IZA Discussion Papers

No.	Author(s)	Title	Area	Date
400	R. Euwals	The Predictive Value of Subjective Labour Supply Data: A Dynamic Panel Data Model with Measurement Error	5	11/01
401	J. Boone P. Fredriksson B. Holmlund J. C. van Ours	Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions	3	11/01
402	O. Ashenfelter D. Card	Did the Elimination of Mandatory Retirement Affect Faculty Retirement Flows?	5	11/01
403	L. Ljungqvist	How Do Layoff Costs Affect Employment?	1	11/01
404	H. Battu C. R. Belfield P. J. Sloane	Human Capital Spill-Overs Within the Workplace	1	11/01
405	L. Locher	Testing for the Option Value of Migration	3	11/01
406	P. Garibaldi E. Wasmer	Labor Market Flows and Equilibrium Search Unemployment	1	11/01
407	R. Schettkat L. Yocarini	Education Driving the Rise in Dutch Female Employment: Explanations for the Increase in Part-time Work and Female Employment in the Netherlands; Contrasted with Germany	5	12/01
408	H. N. Mocan E. Tekin	Nonprofit Sector and Part-Time Work: An Analysis of Employer-Employee Matched Data of Child Care Workers	1	12/01
409	P. Apps R. Rees	Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Public Policy	6	12/01
410	H. Lehmann J. Wadsworth	Wage Arrears and the Distribution of Earnings in Russia	4	12/01
411	S. Stillman	The Response of Consumption in Russian Households to Economic Shocks	4	12/01
412	M. Barbie M. Hagedorn A. Kaul	Government Debt as Insurance against Macroeconomic Risk	7	12/01
413	H. Bonin R. Euwals	Participation Behavior of East German Women after German Unification	1	12/01
414	A. Frederiksen N. Westergaard-Nielsen	Where Did They Go?	1	01/02
415	M. Bertrand F. Kramarz	Does Entry Regulation Hinder Job Creation? Evidence from the French Retail Industry	6	01/02