

A Service of

ZBW

Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Brück, Tilman

Working Paper Coping Strategies in Post-War Rural Mozambique

DIW Discussion Papers, No. 384

Provided in Cooperation with: German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)

Suggested Citation: Brück, Tilman (2003) : Coping Strategies in Post-War Rural Mozambique, DIW Discussion Papers, No. 384, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin

This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18140

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:


Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.



WWW.ECONSTOR.EU



Opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect views of the Institute.

DIW Berlin

German Institute for Economic Research

Königin-Luise-Str. 5 14195 Berlin, Germany

Phone +49-30-897 89-0 Fax +49-30-897 89-200

www.diw.de

ISSN 1619-4535

Coping Strategies in Post-War Rural Mozambique

Tilman Brück

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) Königin-Luise-Str. 5, 14195 Berlin, Germany Tel: +49-30-89789-591, Fax: +49-30-89789-108 Email: tbrueck@diw.de, Internet: http://www.tilmanbrueck.de

27 November 2003

JEL codes: J22, O12, O13, Q12 Keywords: coping strategies, activity choices, labour allocation, portfolio model, war, conflict, reconstruction, policy, Mozambique, Africa

Abstract

This paper analyses post-war coping strategies by farm households in developing countries. The analysis is based on a portfolio model of activity choices in war-affected rural Sub-Saharan Africa. A case study using farm household survey data estimates the determinants of agricultural coping strategies in post-war Mozambique. Post-war coping strategies differ from pre- and mid-crisis coping strategies. War-affected households are forced to adopt very risky coping strategies that re-enforce their vulnerability. Households choose between market and non-market forms of exchange and even consider exiting markets entirely. Post-war reconstruction policy should focus on re-capitalizing households, providing public goods and establishing markets.

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful for helpful comments from Tony Addison, Valpy FitzGerald, Pramila Krishnan, Marta Rosário, Caterina Ruggeri Laderchi, Frances Stewart, an anonymous referee and from seminar participants at QEH and the CSAE in Oxford. The data was generously made available by the Food Security Project of the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture and Michigan State University. I benefited from a WIDER sabbatical fellowship while writing this article. The findings and views presented in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the above-mentioned individuals or institutions.

Introduction

The traditional coping strategy literature has focused on household activity choices leading up to, and during, natural disasters and famine. In contrast, this paper analyses *post-war* coping strategies by farm households in developing countries. The analysis is based on a model of farm household behaviour which is derived from portfolio theory (Bodie and Merton 1998, Dixit 1990). The model considers the special circumstances of conflict in rural Sub-Saharan Africa, which are akin to a land abundant tropical economy (Binswanger and McIntire 1987, Chayanov 1925).

Initial contributions to the literature on coping strategies analysed responses to drought and famine (Corbett 1988, Reardon et al 1988). A related literature studied activity choices and income diversification (Ellis 2000, Reardon et al 1992). These choices are affected by household size and endowments (Abdulai and Delgado 1999, Bardhan and Udry 1999: p. 108, Taylor and Yunez-Naude 2000, von Braun and Pandya-Lorch 1991), by social institutions and property rights (Berry 1993, Brück 2003, Carter and Olinto 2003, Fafchamps and Lund 2003, Platteau 1999), by formal and informal markets or by their absence (de Janvry et al 1991, Key et al 2000, Leonard 2000, Liedholm et al 1994) and by location and geography (Dercon and Krishnan 1996, Goetz 1992). Coping strategies include the decision of whether to engage in markets at all (Binswanger and McIntire 1987), the choice of crop or production technique (Sperling and Longley 2002, von Braun and Kennedy 1994) and non-market forms of risk diversification (Blarel et al 1992, Dercon and Krishnan 2000). Policy makers are concerned about activity choices and their impact on rural poverty (Adams 2002, Dercon 2002), export earnings from cash crops (Townsend 1999) or as a means of mitigating the negative effects of disasters (Sperling and Longley 2002, Webb and von Braun 1994). The traditional literature has not, however, considered coping strategies and activity diversification in situations of war.

In fact, there is very little analysis to date of the micro-economic behaviour of farm households in times of conflict. Hence the analysis of coping strategies after war is the unique contribution of this paper.

A case study using farm household survey data estimates the determinants of agricultural coping strategies in post-war Mozambique. There is a lively debate on income diversification and cash crop adoption in Mozambique (Cramer and Pontara 1998, Heltberg and Tarp 2002, Pitcher 1998, Tschirley and Benfica 2001, Tschirley and Weber 1994). Another literature records the economic effect of the devastating civil war in Mozambique (Addison and de Sousa 1999, de Sousa 2003, Wuyts 2003). This article differs from that literature by focusing on the long-term effects of war on farm household production choices.

The analysis demonstrates that post-war coping strategies differ from pre- and mid-crisis coping strategies. War-affected households have a higher demand for risk diversification yet they may be severely constrained in their activity choices. Such households are forced to adopt very risky coping strategies that re-enforce their vulnerability. Households choose between market and non-market forms of exchange and even consider exiting markets entirely, an option not often considered by basic models of farm household behaviour. Even after the end of the war, the household labour allocation will only slowly revert back to the peace-time optimal value. These findings have strong implications for post-war reconstruction policies.

The paper is structured as follows. The next sections develop a formal model of household coping strategies with two risky income activities and discuss the effects of war in the model. The subsequent section introduces the case study, reviews methodological and data issues and derives the econometric specification of the model. This is followed by a discussion of some

summary statistics, the econometric results and policy implications. The last section concludes.

A Model of the Determinants of Coping Strategy

This section develops a simple model of the choice between two coping strategies. Activity or coping strategies refer to the household labour allocation between different income generating tasks. The main activity distinctions are between on- and off-farm (or agricultural and non-agricultural) activities and between subsistence and market activities.

Consider a farm household with two production activities i = 1 or 2. (The model can be generalized to more than two activities.) Assume that land is abundant and that there are no credit or labour markets: the total labour supply equals household labour supply L. Asset endowments of households are given in each period and are normalized at 1. The main risk in household production derives from V, the variance of portfolio revenue net of costs:

V =
$$s_1^2 - 2q(s_1^2 + s_{12}) + q^2(s_1^2 + s_2^2 - 2s_{12})$$
 (1)

such that:

$$s_{12} = \rho_{12} s_1 s_2$$

where q_i is the share of labour dedicated to activity i, s_i is the standard deviation of the return of the ith activity, s_{12} is the covariance of returns between the two activities, and ρ_{12} is the correlation coefficient of the returns from both activities. This yields:

$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial q} = -2s_1^2 + 2qs_1^2 + 2qs_2^2 + 2s_{12} - 4qs_{12}$$

$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial q} = -2s_1^2 < 0$$
(for $\rho = 0$ and $q = 0$)
(for $\rho = 0$ and $q = 1$)
$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial q} = 2s_2^2 > 0$$
(for $\rho = 0$ and $q = 1$)
(for $\rho = 0$ and $q = 1$)

$$\partial^2 V / \partial q^2 > 0$$
 (for $\rho = 0$)

$$q_{Vmin} = s_1^2 / (s_1^2 + s_2^2)$$
 (for $\rho = 0$)

where q_{Vmin} denotes the share of labour allocated to the second activity such that total portfolio risk is minimized. Total farm production X is defined as:

$$X = X_1(L_1) + X_2(L_2)$$
(2)
= $a_1q_1 + a_2q_2$

where:

$$L \leq L_1 + L_2 \tag{3}$$

and where a_i is the activity-specific constant returns to scale (CRS) production technology. Total farm revenue net of variable, non-labour inputs R is given by:

$$R = R_1 + R_2$$

= $p_1 X_1 + p_2 X_2$ (4)

where p_i are farm-gate output prices. Farm-gate prices are net of transaction costs t_i so that:

$$\mathbf{p}_{i} = \mathbf{p}_{i}^{*} - \mathbf{t}_{i} \tag{5}$$

where p_i^* are given wholesale market prices. Transaction costs for each commodity are determined by given household characteristics and market imperfections. This implies that commodity prices and commodity market failure are household-specific.

At the beginning of the agricultural year, a household allocates its labour supply L between activities for a given set of expected revenues, preferences, endowments and local climatic conditions:

$$E(R) = E(p_1)E(X_1) + E(p_2)E(X_2)$$
$$= E(p_1)a_1(1-q) + E(p_2)a_2q$$

$$= E(p_1)a_1 - qE(p_1)a_1 + qE(p_2)a_2$$
(6)

where:

$$q = q_2$$
$$= L_2 / L$$
(7)

and where E(.) denotes the expectations operator.

The subjective wage W for household labour is defined as the amount of output a household would require as compensation for a given unit of leisure foregone. This is captured here through the subjective wage rate w such that total subjective equilibrium labour costs per household are:

$$W = wL$$

$$= wL_1 + wL_2$$
(8)

These wage costs are affected by the specific household characteristics, which define the dependency ratio and thus the leisure-work trade-off. Total household profits Π are defined as revenue net of subjective labour costs:

$$\Pi = \mathbf{R} - \mathbf{W} \tag{9}$$

so that expected profits are:

$$E(\Pi) = E(R) - W \tag{10}$$

The rate of return π of the activity portfolio is then given by:

$$\pi = \Pi/R$$

= 1 - (W / R) (11)

where:

 $\partial \pi / \partial R > 0$ and $\partial^2 \pi / \partial R^2 < 0$

The expected rate of return is thus given by:

$$E(\pi) = 1 - (W / E(R))$$
 (12)

The farm household utility function U contains two elements: one representing expected portfolio profits and one representing the expected portfolio risk:

$$U = U(\Pi, V) \tag{13}$$

where:

$$\partial U/\partial \Pi > 0$$
, $\partial^2 U/\partial \Pi^2 < 0$, $\partial U/\partial V < 0$ and $\partial^2 U/\partial V^2 > 0$

Households maximize utility with respect to the labour allocation subject to the labour constraint:

$$\max U = U(\Pi, V)$$

w.r.t. q
s.t. $0 \le q \le 1$ (14)

Assuming $\rho = 0$ and additive utility, this is solved as follows:

U = R - W - V
=
$$p_1a_1 - qp_1a_1 + qp_2a_2 - W - s_1^2 + 2qs_1^2 - q^2s_1^2 - q^2s_2^2$$
 (15)

where:

$$\frac{\partial U}{\partial q} = -p_1 a_1 + p_2 a_2 + 2 s_1^2 - 2 q s_1^2 - 2 q s_2^2 = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial^2 U}{\partial q^2} = -2 s_1^2 - 2 q s_2^2 < 0$$

so that this utility function, with a negative sign of the risk aversion parameter U''/U', implies risk aversion. Rearranging the first order condition yields:

q =
$$-(p_1a_1 - p_2a_2 - 2s_1^2) / 2(s_2^2 - s_1^2)$$
 (16)
 ≥ 0

The numerator of equation 16 is negative and the denominator is positive such that:

$$\partial q/\partial p_1 < 0, \ \partial q/\partial p_2 > 0, \ \partial q/\partial a_1 < 0, \ \partial q/\partial a_2 > 0,$$

 $\partial q/\partial s_1 > 0, \ \partial q/\partial s_2 < 0, \ \partial q/\partial t_1 > 0 \text{ and } \partial q/\partial t_2 < 0$

 ≤ 1

Assuming additive utility is non-trivial as a multiplicative functional form would result in a different specification of q:

$$U = \Pi / V$$

$$\partial U / \partial q = (\partial \Pi / \partial q V - \Pi \partial V / \partial q) / V^{2} = 0$$
(17)

where the first order condition also includes a term for profits and thus for the subjective wage. This implies that for farm household production in the absence of labour markets and with no riskless activity to engage in, household preferences affect the optimal allocation of resources between risky activities through both the profit and the utility functions. This result does not hold for households facing perfect markets and a riskless investment opportunity. This model differs from standard models of farm production under uncertainty by emphasizing the absence of labour and output markets, the existence of a survival constraint, and the role of the subjective valuation of labour.

Figure 1 summarizes the model where quadrant I plots the profit function (equation 12), quadrant III plots the production function (equation 6), quadrant IV plots the risk function (equation 1) and quadrant II plots the utility function (equation 13) in risk-return space. Quadrant II also summarizes the trade-off between risk and return in the activity portfolio. Households prefer higher expected returns and lower portfolio risk so that $U_3 > U_2 > U_1$. At point a, q = 1 and the household specializes in activity 2. At point d, q = 0 and the household specializes in activity 1. At point c, the portfolio has the lowest possible risk V_{min} and $q = q_{Vmin}$. Curve abc represents the efficient portfolio frontier.

Equilibrium is obtained at point b where abcd is tangential to the highest possible utility curve U_2 . The equilibrium level of q is q* which is larger than q_{Vmin} (figure 1). The household will thus decide at the beginning of the agricultural season to allocate q* of its labour to activity 2 and 1 - q* to activity 1. The expected shares of revenue from activities 2 and 1 are therefore q* and 1 - q*, respectively. Given the high war-related uncertainty, these labour allocation and expected revenue shares are only approximate indicators of the actual output shares per activity at the end of the period. Note that more risk averse households would choose a labour allocation closer to q_{Vmin} .

War and Coping Strategies

This section outlines the effects of war on the basic model of activity choices. The nature and the determinants of coping strategies during and after conflict will be discussed.

War has three effects on the risk-risk relationship of the basic model (equation 1). First, the increase in overall risk due to war will shift the whole curve right $(\partial V/\partial s_i > 0)$ with the war legacy ensuring that the post-war outcome will still be to the right of the pre-war case (figure 2). Second, the relative changes in risks (say $\Delta s_1^2/\Delta s_2^2 < 1$) will shift the lower section of the curve even further to the right $(\partial V/\partial s_2 = 2q^2s_2)$. With a large q, an increasing s_2 leads to a further increase in V. This effect is reduced in the post-war period. Third, the increase in the correlation coefficient flattens the slope near q_{Vmin} ($\partial(\partial V/\partial q)/\partial s_{12} = 2-4q$) thus reducing the scope for risk reduction through portfolio diversification. In the post-war period, there is still a higher correlation coefficient though its scale may be lower than during the war. The net effect of the changes is that, during war, the curve abcd shifts down and to the right to an area of

unambiguously lower utility for the household. In the post-war period, the curve will shift partially back towards the peace-time position (2).

War will change the profit function (equation 9) by affecting revenue and the equilibrium value of the subjective wage, in particular via enforced life-cycle effects in the household. This is most likely to occur through conflict-related morbidity and mortality in the household, especially in households near the survival threshold. If disaster is imminent, then W will be low and the risk of production and correlation coefficient of returns are likely to be very high, thus reducing the potential gain from diversification. In the post-war period, households may remain in such high risk, near starvation equilibrium, depending how quickly the value of subjective wages can rise under peace conditions. Given strong war effects, many households may exist in the post-war poverty trap in the bottom right corner of quadrant IV in figure 2.

This model can therefore resolve the apparent paradox noted in the safety-first literature where destitute households engage in very risky behaviour even though they are least able to withstand the risks inherent in such a portfolio. It does so by valuing the trade-off between leisure and labour in regard to the survival constraint through the term W, which captures the household consumption requirements.

Household assets and social capital affect the technical efficiency of production and hence a_i. With land abundance and damaged credit markets, assets fulfil a key role as both productive inputs and as a self-insurance mechanism in a risky environment. At the same time, assets are key targets of soldiers and looters. Asset characteristics thus make some activities more vulnerable to war than others. For example, cattle herding may be a productive and a risk-mitigating activity in peace-times. Nevertheless, cattle herding becomes unfeasible in a long-lasting war of destabilization and may not be worthwhile (due to an expected resumption of

hostilities) or possible (due to the collapse of cattle markets and extension services) in a high risk, poor post-war environment. Households depend on their land and their social capital for production and social exchange. The portfolio of endowments therefore affects the portfolio of activities undertaken.

The model implies that war-affected households facing substantial market constraints smooth consumption by smoothing income. This result is not obtained in the standard farm household model. Households affected by war hence behave differently from households in peace-time economies. Rural post-war reconstruction policies must support these income smoothing activities while helping to re-establish markets to allow once again consumption smoothing.

War also affects production technologies and relative prices so that both a_i and p_i in equations 2 and 4 can be expected to fall. In the case of food crops (i=1) versus cash crops (i=2), it is also likely that $\Delta a_1/\Delta a_2 < 1$ and $\Delta p_1/\Delta p_2 < 1$, as war increases the transaction costs for cash crops relatively more than for food crops and as cash crops have a given world price. In addition, war is likely to enforce the extended use of traditional cropping patterns, seeds and techniques. To the extent that these techniques are more divisible than modern agronomic practices (irrigation being an extreme example of an indivisible modern technique), households adopt a larger number of individual activities within each activity class during the war while reducing the dependence on cash crops. Such traditional techniques include the number of traditional food crops, dividing the cultivated area per household into more but smaller plots and pursuing intensive off-farm activities.

In terms of figure 2, a proportionate reduction of the parameters p_i and a_i will shift the E(R) curve to the right in quadrant III. A disproportionately large reduction of the p_2 and a_2

parameters will also reduce the slope of the curve. These war-induced changes in the technology and price variables may only be reversed partially in the post-war period.

Household activity diversification is also encouraged by institutional and market imperfections, which are worsened by war. Such imperfections affect the degree of technology embedded in production (a_i) and the farm-gate prices (p_i) net of transaction costs (t_i) . The total labour availability (L) is also shaped by market imperfections, especially through increased search, information and supervision costs in land abundant areas which lead to reduced supply of and demand for labour and hence to the breakdown of wage labour markets. Consequently, the variables L, w and W in equation 8 are shaped by the effects of war on institutions.

Household social capital is a key determinant of the profitability of low-return, off-farm activities, including social exchange and NGO donations. Households with higher social capital (for example households who hold a position of traditional authority in their community) are thus much more likely to command larger labour resources L, have lower transaction costs t_i and achieve higher net prices for off-farm activities p_2 .

Formal and even informal credit markets may cease to exist during war. This is due to the high cost of information gathering, the reduced ability to enforce contracts while state authority is so severely threatened and the high degree of risk covariance which increases the undiversifiable portfolio risk for lenders. Credit-constrained households are thus likely to increase their share of informal, social, non-market activities to substitute for war-affected credit markets.

Given the reduced number of feasible choices under war conditions, there is an externality effect of household market withdrawal. At the margin, one more household reducing its market participation will prevent all other households from joining a market. This effect is particularly pronounced if households' transaction costs are uniformly affected by the war, creating a high covariance of risks, and covariant household activity choices. This is a further reason for market breakdown in war conditions.

Volatile markets increase the incentives for households to engage in subsistence activities. "Village enclaves" (Dasgupta 1993: p. 235) are more pronounced in a post-war environment and location will be a strong determinant of household behaviour. In the extreme, these effects may create village-level poverty traps, from which no individual household can endogenously free itself.

The Case of Mozambique

Rural Mozambique provides a suitable case study for war-affected coping strategies as it experienced a devastating civil war until 1992. For example, the number of cattle in Mozambique declined from over 1.3 million in 1982 to 0.25 million in 1992 (Ministério da Agricultura 1994). Farm productivity in the post-war period continued to remain well below regional averages (Tschirley and Weber 1994) while per capita food production only reached 90 percent of its pre-war level by 1996 (World Bank 2002). In 1995, gross domestic product per capita was only 146 US dollars (World Bank 2002) and in the Human Development Index Mozambique ranked among the ten least developed countries in the world (UNDP 1999).

The north of Mozambique is often considered the "green belt" of the country. However, postwar agricultural production was hampered by poor transport networks and the absence of irrigation infrastructure and of mechanized agricultural production. There were few agricultural or non-agricultural employment opportunities, no migrant workers and no formal credit markets. The farm household survey used for this analysis includes 371 randomly selected households in 16 villages (the primary sampling units, PSU) in three districts in Nampula and Cabo Delgado provinces in northern Mozambique (MAP/MSU Research Team 1996). The findings of the survey are broadly representative of the more accessible parts of northern Mozambique. The sample was stratified according to households' cotton growing status. The survey data, here denoted FSP, was collected by the Food Security Project at the Ministry of Agriculture, Maputo, from June 1994 to January 1996. All variables below will refer to the year 1995 unless stated otherwise. The variables are summarized in table 1. The FSP survey is one of the most carefully designed, collected, and cleaned rural household surveys from the early postwar period in Mozambique. The evidence provided by the FSP survey is complemented by qualitative data collected during two visits to northern Mozambique in 1995 and 1999.

Specification Issues

Equation 16 defines the functional form for q as:

q =
$$-(p_1a_1 - p_2a_2 - 2s_1^2) / 2(s_2^2 - s_1^2)$$

where q must lie in the interval 0 to 1. The equilibrium determinants of q are thus closely related to the independent parameters p_i , a_i and s_i^2 . Depending on the functional form of the utility function, q also depends on ρ_{ij} and W. This implies that subjective wages and household endowments matter for activity choices. Furthermore, war requires controlling for the subjective valuation of leisure and household- and village-level transaction costs (equation 5).

Taking q as a general indicator of activity choices and replacing the model parameters p_i , a_i , s_i^2 , ρ_{ij} , and W with corresponding household survey indicators thus yields the reduced-form equation:

$$\mathbf{q}_{i} = \alpha_{0} + \alpha_{1}\mathbf{L}_{i} + \alpha_{2}\mathbf{F}_{i} + \alpha_{3}\mathbf{K}_{i} + \alpha_{4}\mathbf{V} + \mathbf{e}_{i}$$
(18)

where \mathbf{L}_i , \mathbf{F}_i , \mathbf{K}_i , and \mathbf{V} are vectors representing labour, field, capital endowments and villagelevel characteristics, respectively, and where \mathbf{e}_i is an error term which is not correlated with the exogenous variables thus yielding unbiased and consistent estimates for the vectors of coefficients α_h for households $\mathbf{i} = 1...N$ and groups of coefficients α_h for h = 0...4.

Equation 18 is not restricted to a specific functional form and may thus be guided by theoretical considerations, practical experience and statistical tests. A priori considerations and experience suggest mainly linear, log-linear and quadratic forms for the independent vectors L_i , F_i , K_i , and V. This specification thus corresponds closely to those used in the literature on household income diversification (for example by Reardon et al 1992).

Some of the decisions, for example to participate in markets or to adopt cotton, are discrete choices which cannot be modelled with the linear approach. Instead, assume that a household participates in a market if it considers it to be a profitable move such that:

$$q_i = 1 \text{ if } \pi_i > 0 \tag{19}$$
$$q_i = 0 \text{ otherwise}$$

where
$$\pi_i$$
 is the expected rate of profitability of market participation for household i = 1...N.
Furthermore, assume that the profitability of the activity is determined by a model akin to that
of equation 18. The binary model to be estimated is then:

Prob
$$(\mathbf{q}_i = 1) =$$

F $(\alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \mathbf{L}_i + \alpha_2 \mathbf{F}_i + \alpha_3 \mathbf{K}_i + \alpha_4 \mathbf{V})$ (20)

where F is a cumulative probability function closely related to equation 18. This model can be estimated by logit or probit, if the error term follows a logistic or normal distribution, respectively. Such a model thus estimates the probability that a household undertakes a certain activity given the household's endowments, preferences and the prevailing prices. Following Cramer and Ridder (1991), a binary (not a multiple-category) variable was adopted for this analysis to capture the essential difference between no market participation on the one hand and some form of market participation on the other hand.

One interpretation of q in equation 18 is as the share of net household income from agricultural activities (SHAREON). The share of subsistence (i.e. non-market) income is denoted 1 - q (and captured by the variable SHARESUB) and the share of market income is denoted q. The categorical variable STATUS3 identifies households which have some degree of crop market participation. Other variables break output market participation down into sub-groups such as "selling food crops only", "selling cash crops only" and "selling food and cash crops" (STATUS2), where cash crops are defined as inedible crops. The categorical variable COTTON measures whether households plant any cotton at all, which implies q > 0 in the model above.

One non-monetary and non-market indicator of household diversification is PLOTFRAG, which measures the degree of spatial diversification of farm households or farm fragmentation. Formally, PLOTFRAG is defined as the natural log of the weighted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of plot diversification:

HHI = 1 /
$$(\sum q_i^2)$$
, i = 1...N (21)

where q_i is the share of plot i's area of the total cultivated area per household and N is the total number of plots farmed per household. The HHI is weighted by the area cultivated per household to allow comparisons across households irrespective of farm size. PLOTFRAG is almost normally distributed.

Another measure of non-market diversification is the degree of social exchange (EXCHANGE). This is defined as the natural log of the sum of the absolute value of remittances and social exchange both given and received between January and September 1995 (the data for the remaining three months of 1995 is incomplete). EXCHANGE measures the sum of the absolute values as the actual flows given and received may cancel out, which would underestimate the degree of social exchange.

Results and Discussion

This section will describe and discuss some of the key findings of the empirical analysis. Given the large number of regressions presented, the discussion will have to be very selective.

Summary Statistics

Households are very dependent on subsistence food crop activities for their income, with cash crops contributing only a small share to total income but three quarters of all crop marketing income (table 2). Entrepreneurial, wage and social income account for even smaller shares of household income. The high shares of on-farm income (SHAREON) and non-market income (SHARESUB) of total income suggest that households in northern Mozambique in 1995 were still practicing many of their war-time subsistence coping strategies.

Table 3 compares these findings to those from 28 other farm surveys from Sub-Saharan African countries, which report lower on-farm and higher off-farm income shares. Interestingly, the share of social income is also higher in the other surveys, suggesting that war may also reduce a household's capacity to generate social income. Other authors report household income shares from off-farm activities in African countries of between 30% and 50% occasionally reaching 90% (Ellis 1998, Reardon 1997, von Braun and Pandya-Lorch

1991). It is thus apparent that the share of off-farm income in the post-war FSP survey is particularly low.

Household output market participation decisions were very flexible in post-war northern Mozambique (table 4). The FSP survey recorded crop sales for the two agricultural years ending 1994 and 1995. 43% of all households did not change their market participation status between 1994 and 1996, 20% of all households either added another type of crop or specialized in cash crops and 38% reduced the number of types of crops sold or even resumed a pure subsistence status. In fact, the total share of households marketing some cash crops dropped from 63% to 54% while the share of pure subsistence households increased from 13% to 21% in one year. These figures show that households adjust their market participation in the face of a variety of changing constraints from year to year and that households differentiate their market participation decisions between food crop and cash crop markets.

Degree of On-Farm Activities

The SHAREON regression (table 5a) is highly significant and has a good fit with an R^2 value of 0.59. The positive coefficient of ANIMAL suggests that having more livestock helps to increase agricultural income activities. This may be related to the synergies derived from livestock ownership (especially in the post-war absence of commercial farm inputs like fertilizers).

The social capital variables are entirely insignificant. This is slightly surprising as investments in social institutions could be a key response by households to high post-war levels of uncertainty. Their insignificance may derive from three sources. First, the share of social income in total income is very small thus reducing the role of social institutions in explaining income shares. Second, social institutions may be less important than anticipated if their determinants are equal to those of market activities. In that case, market and social exchange are not substitutes but complements. Third, the proxies for social institutions included in the FSP survey may only measure such institutions imperfectly.

Autarky versus Crop Market Participation

The STATUS3 regression (table 5b) is highly significant. One village indicator variable was dropped, as that location predicted crop market participation perfectly, and 21 observations were not used.

Households with a higher dependency ratio have a strongly reduced probability of crop market participation, indicating household-specific propensity to participate in crop markets. A higher household human capital increases market participation (EDUMAX, EDUMAXSQU). In a review of recent evidence on the effects of education in the rural economy, a similar effect of education was noted (Taylor and Yunez-Naude 2000). There appears to be no link from education to farm output but a link from education to farm activity choices in Africa.

Total farm size in 1994-95 (AREATOTAL) is a highly significant factor. This result implies that there are fixed transaction costs of market participation. Households with larger land endowments may have a comparative advantage in farming, lower transaction costs of land acquisition or market imperfections can be better internalised by larger scale farms. Strongly war-affected households may thus be doubly constrained in their reconstruction efforts. First they have less land for farming and second they have less access to crop markets, with the former effect reinforcing the latter.

The probability of crop market participation is reduced by owning more agricultural tools per household (TOOL) and increased by owning a larger range of agricultural tools (TOOLTYPE). The ownership of livestock at the end of the war (ANIMAL) is a positive

19

determinant of current crop market activity. Households which had been subjected to asset destruction during the war were thus damaged in their ability to rejoin crop markets for many years to come even after the cessation of violence.

Degree of Subsistence Activity

The SHARESUB regression (table 5c) is highly significant and has a good fit with an R² of 0.46. A variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis does not suggest a presence of significant multicollinearity. The determinants of the degree of market participation (SHARESUB) differ significantly from those for the basic decision of whether to participate in any markets at all (STATUS3). For instance, the scale effect operates through household size, and hence lifecycle effects, and not through farm size. Female-headed households, whose market participation does not differ systematically from that of other households, on average have a share of subsistence income 11 percentage points higher than other households (FEMHEAD). Female-headed households enter crop markets like other households but their share of market-based income in total income is much lower.

Environmental and social risks induce households to engage more in market activities, probably because those risks are less correlated with market risks and thus offer scope for risk diversification. Social and village level variables also strongly affect household market participation decisions. It is likely that the war increased the importance of these factors and that they will only slowly diminish in importance in the post-war northern Mozambican context.

Cash Crop Adoption

The logit regression of COTTON (table 5d) is significant with a p-value of 0.011. Educational variables (EDUMUM, EDUMUMSQU) are not significant determinants of cash crop

adoption. A Ugandan farm household study found a similar absence of educational achievements on crop adoption (Appleton and Balihuta 1996). That study also analysed a post-war economy, suggesting that the adoption effects of education are more limited when general economic circumstances are unfavourable for growth and poverty alleviation.

Instead, the adoption of cotton in the post-war period in northern Mozambique is shaped by the household composition, availability and valuation of labour, by alternative investment opportunities and returns, and by comparative advantage as determined by local climatic and institutional conditions. The risk attitude and risk bearing capacity of households determine if households are willing to adopt cotton. Female-headed and local political status, for example, almost perfectly predict cotton adoption for almost 10% of the sample. A significant lifecycle effect occurs through the mean age of the household (AGEHH, AGEHHSQU). The war affects household cash crop decisions indirectly through the subjective value households attach to their labour, which are in part determined by a household's experience of the recent war. These indirect effects of war are very difficult for public policy to remove and it is likely that such differences will persist over a long time.

Plot Diversification

The determinants of PLOTFRAG are shown in table 5e. The regression is highly significant, has a reasonable fit with an R^2 of 0.39 and has no apparent problem of multicollinearity as determined by VIF analysis. Given the significance of gender and household size coefficients, the household labour constraint is an important determinant of plot diversification. This finding is supported by interview evidence with agronomists in northern Mozambique. These interviews confirmed that planting fields benefited from being done quickly to utilize the best "window of opportunity" appropriate for that field. With more but smaller fields, households can spread these points in time and thus manage a larger cultivated area with a given amount

of labour. These results confirm the hypothesis that households in the post-war period react strongly to some types of risks by altering their non-market production behaviour.

Plot diversification is also a response to life cycle effects and household endowments, with gender having a strong effect on plot diversification. Household assets reduce such diversification while some soil characteristics and social capital have less importance. Finally, market opportunities help reduce spatial diversification while market risks increase it. Households which are emerging from a position of war-induced isolation are thus clearly using non-market diversification strategies.

Social Exchange

The EXCHANGE regression (table 5f) is highly significant and has a reasonable fit with an R^2 value of 0.37. A VIF analysis does not suggest the presence of multicollinearity. The result also appears robust to the omission of the zero-exchange households. Having many women (FEMALE, FEMALESQU) or men (MALE, MALESQU) in the household increases social exchange though both effects are quadratic with minima at 4.0 and 2.7 persons, respectively. This confirms the possible dependence of rural social networks in Mozambique on very large families (Garrett and Ruel 1999).

Likewise, intergenerational dependence is a strong determining factor for informal social security mechanisms, with younger and older household heads (AGEHEAD, AGEHEADSQU) being more involved in transfers. The significant effects of the mean household age (AGEHH, AGEHHSQU) could represent the accumulation of contacts, a form of social capital, which is necessary in conducting exchange.

Better asset-endowed households can afford more insurance while also being more capable of utilizing self-insurance mechanisms. Social exchange thus appears to be an insurance mechanism for better-off households. Households in which the husband comes from the local village (ORIGINMAN) have much lower social exchange than other households. Therefore, the move of husbands to the village of their wife sometime after their wedding, as is common practice in northern Mozambique, helps to build long-distance sources of remittance and social income. This tradition should help to overcome the correlation of income within small areas.

Conclusions

This section summarizes the main results from the empirical analysis and their implications for the theory of post-war coping strategies and post-war reconstruction policy.

First, it was found that post-war coping strategies include many different market and nonmarket activities. The war forced households to specialize in on-farm, subsistence activities. In the post-war period, households are diversifying their activities as a response to the varying war legacy and to emerging peace-time opportunities. Post-war behaviour exhibits a surprisingly high degree of variance across activities. Particularly market participation rates fluctuate strongly across households and seasons.

Second, determinants of post-war diversification are primarily the indirect war effects which include risk (as expected) but also household life cycle position, household endowments and transaction costs at the household and village levels. The strong role of life cycle effects indicates the importance of land abundance for the study of war-affected African farm households (Binswanger and McIntire 1987), especially via the negative effect of war on the marginal value of effort. The estimated determinants are consistent with the model proposed initially. They indicate a stronger emphasis on household and village characteristics in the determination of activity choices than standard farm household models would have suggested.

Third, households may become risk takers near the absolute survival threshold by specializing in fewer activities and completely reducing their asset base to survive into the next season. This is primarily the result of the war-induced destruction of many alternative activity options such as asset endowments and markets and the subsequent fall of many households into various poverty traps. Even if conditions improve after the war, households suffer long-term consequences of having previously faced starvation. That is, past events and choices have strong effects on future outcomes for poor, war-affected farm households.

Fourth, there is a difference between the determinants of a categorical decision to participate in output markets and the determinants of the continuous degree of market participation. The former is more affected by household life cycle, endowment and scale effects while the latter is strongly affected by the household risk experiences, social capital and village level variables. For instance, female-headed households have the same market participation pattern but a smaller market income share than male-headed households. This pattern may extend to cash crop adoption though the data was insufficient to study the degree of cash crop adoption distinctly from the decision to adopt cash crops.


Fifth, social activities are more useful for households which face only commodity-specific market failure. For households facing market failure across a whole range of products and services, i.e. for economically isolated or almost autarkic households, social contacts may not offer a significant alternative income source in the post-war, rural context.

Sixth, farm households practice various non-market forms of activity diversification and these can be expected to be important during the war. The regression analysis focused on spatial diversification and social exchange as two such examples. Surprisingly, social exchange is quite limited after the war, in part due to the widespread absolute poverty in the sample area.

Its determinants are similar to those of output market participation. Social exchange is thus no alternative to market participation for the poorest and most war-affected households.

Seventh, village level effects were found to be extremely important determinants of coping strategies. From a policy perspective, this implies that the government and donors can assist household coping strategies by providing public goods to enhance market participation and diversification opportunities. Post-war public policy must recognize the importance of local differences in the experience of war. Reconstruction policy must hence prioritise assistance depending on the local war legacy.

Finally, other important determinants of post-war coping strategies include household labour characteristics, asset endowments, farm size and social capital. Reconstruction policy should therefore aim to re-capitalize war-affected households, enhance human capital and reduce rural transaction costs to affect the whole range of diversification determinants. Lowering war-induced transaction costs will have strong positive effects on the market participation and off-farm earnings of agricultural households.






Figure 2: The Effects of War in the Two-Activity Farm Household Model




Table 1: The Variables of the FSP Survey

Name	riables of the FSP Survey Definition	Mean	St Err	Min	Max
Activity Variables					
COTTON	Does this household grow cotton in 1995	0.505	0.062	0	1
EXCHANGE	Natural log of the total \$ value of remittances and gifts given and	0.003	0.066	-4.026	3.006
	received per capita per household January till September 1995	050.004	00.000	10.011	0 405 0 47
INCOME	Net household income in \$ in 1995	250.964	23.689	19.941	-,
INCOMEPC PLOTFRAG	Net household income per capita in \$ in 1995 Natural log of the effective number of plots per hectare per	37.130 0.381	3.609 0.037	4.500 -2.507	463.989 3.567
FLUIFRAG	household in 1995	0.301	0.037	-2.507	3.307
SHAREON	Share of income derived from food and cash crops in % per	0.821	0.018	0.180	1
ONAREON	household	0.021	0.010	0.100	
SHARESUB	Share of income derived from subsistence activities per	0.607	0.027	0.005	1
0	household in 1995	01001	0.02	0.000	·
STATUS1	Type of household by output market participation in 1993-94	2.860	0.096	1	4
STATUS2	Type of household by output market participation in 1994-95	2.544	0.182	1	4
STATUS3	Type of household by crop market participation in 1994-95	0.786	0.055	0	1
TYPE1	Which type of income activities is the household undertaking in	2.860	0.106	1	4
	1995?				
TYPE2	Household is participating in off-farm activities in 1995?	0.438	0.049	0	1
Labour Variables					
ADULT	Number of non-dependent residents per household in mid-1995	5.573	0.330	1	15
ADULTSQU	Square of number of non-dependent residents per household in	37.262	4.266	1	225
	mid-1995				
AGEHEAD	Age of household head in years in mid-1995	40.928	1.354	19	83
AGEHEADSQU	Square of age of household head in years in mid-1995	1,830.025	111.895	361	6,889
AGEHH	Average age of household in years in early 1995	22.124	0.100	8.750	69
AGEHHSQU	Square of average age of household in years in early 1995	548.877	48.504	76.563	4.761
DEPEND	Number of dependent residents per household in mid-1995	1.888	0.111	0	7
DEPENDRATIO	Dependency ratio per household in mid-1994	0.275	0.016	0	1
DEPENDSQU	Square of number of dependent residents per household in mid- 1995	5.534	0.523	0	49
EDUHH	Average number of years of education per household member in	0.964	0.061	0	4
LDOIIII	mid-1994	0.904	0.001	0	4
EDUHHSQU	Square of average number of years of education per household	1.510	0.163	0	16
LDOIIIIOQO	member in mid-1994	1.010	0.100	0	10
EDUMAX	Maximal number of years of effective education per household	3.582	0.213	0	12
EDUMAXSQU	Square of maximal number of years of effective education per	17.625	1.453	0	144
	household	11.020	1.100	Ũ	
EDUMUM	Number of years of education of the mother per household	0.774	0.159	0	7
EDUMUMSQU	Square of number of years of education of the mother per	2.333	0.556	0	49
	household				
FEMALE	Number of females per household in 1994-96	3.472	0.198	0	10
FEMALESQU	Square of number of females per household in 1994-96	15.219	1.682	0	100
FEMHEAD	Was this a female-headed household in mid-1994?	0.013	0.006	0	1
ILLNOW	Total number days ill per household in 1995-96	21.772	2.351	0	215
ILLPAST	Total number days ill per household in 1994-95	46.066	10.599	0	433
MALE	Number of males per household in 1994-96	3.956	0.183	0	11
MALESQU	Square of number of males per household in 1994-96	19.638	1.673	0	121
TIMEHARVEST	Number of hours per month the wife spent collecting water in the	24.629	3.274	0	270
	harvest season in 1995				
TIMEHUNGRY	Number of hours per month the wife spent collecting water in the	15.060	1.001	0	60
	hungry season in 1995				
Land Variables					
AREALOG	Natural log of cultivated area per capita in 1994-95 per	-1.033	0.089	-3.337	1.065
	household in hectare				
AREATOTAL	Cultivated and fall area per capita per household in 1994-95 in	4.023	0.254	0.290	35
	hectare	0.004	0.004	0 770	1 101
AREATOTALLOG	Natural log of cultivated and fall area per capita in 1994-95 per	-0.681	0.084	-2.773	1.131
	household in hectare	40.000	2 4 9 4	<u> </u>	400 574
DISTANCE	Distance to fields in minutes in 1995 per household	40.669	3.481	2	188.571
DISTANCESQU PESTHIGH	Square of distance to fields in minutes in 1995 per household Do more than 75% of all types of stored food crops suffer from	2,312.797 0.459	324.291 0.041	4	35,559.180 1
PESTRIGR	pests?	0.459	0.041	0	1
PESTLOW	Do more than 25% of all types of stored food crops suffer from	0.754	0.043	0	1
	pests?	0.754	0.040	0	
PESTMEDIUM	Do more than 50% of all types of stored food crops suffer from	0.593	0.049	0	1
	pests?	0.000	0.049	0	
RAIN	Proportion of cultivated area per household with lack of rain in	0.296	0.049	0	1
	1994-95	0.200	0.040	0	
	Very low soil quality per household?	0.286	0.047	0	1
SOILBAD	,				
SOILBAD SOILGOOD		0.408	0.053	0	1
	Very high soil quality per household? Are you worried about household land tenure?	0.408 0.522	0.053 0.075	0 0	1

ANCESTOR	Does the household have ancestors who were buried locally?	0.844	0.041	0	1
ANIMAL	Household owns at least one large animal in late 1992?	0.112	0.027	0	1
ASSET	Value of assets in real 1996 US\$ per household in late 1992	166.802	23.127	0	2,471.327
ASSETLOG	Natural log of value of assets in real 1996 US\$ per household in	2.925	0.254	0	7.813
	late 1992				
AUTHORITY	Is household head in any position of traditional or political authority?	0.071	0.013	0	1
DONATION	Has this household received food, seed or in-kind aid?	0.079	0.027	0	1
ORIGINMAN	Is this village the origin of the main man in the household?	0.678	0.049	0	1
ORIGINWOMAN	Is this village the origin of the main woman in the household?	0.652	0.050	0	1
TOOL	Number tools per household in mid-1995	6.175	0.242	0	27
TOOLPC	Number tools per capita per household in mid-1995	0.926	0.063	0	4
TOOLTYPE	Number of types of tools per household in mid-1995	2.899	0.115	0	5
Village Variables					
INFRASTR	Above average complaints about economic infrastructure and	0.451	0.122	0	1
	trade per village		0	C C	·
LABOR	Natural log of the number of hours of labour hired for farm work	7.234	0.188	5.236	9.680
ENDOR	per village in 1995	1.201	0.100	0.200	0.000
LABORPC	Natural log of the number of hours of labour hired per capita for	1.402	0.184	0.325	3.399
	farm work per village in 1995		01101	0.020	0.000
MARKET	Total crop sales by all village households in \$ in 1993-94	3,564.409	572.805	525 158	13,398.710
MARKETLOG	Natural log of total crop sales by all village households in \$ in	7.531	0.231	4.987	10.044
	1993-94		0.201		
MILL	Number of mills near household in mid-1995	2.242	0.308	1	15
YIELDCOTTON	Natural log of mean yield for cotton per village in kg per ha in	6.351	0.134	4.934	7.249
	1994-95				
YIELDMAIZE	Natural log of mean yield for maize per village in kg per ha in	5.609	0.113	4.895	6.989
	1994-95				
Control Variables					
PRICE14	Paasche price index for purchased food in late 1995 per	0.929	0.036	0.297	2.587
	household				
PRICE15	Paasche price index for purchased food in early 1996 per	1.128	0.073	0.333	3.554
	household				
PRICE23	Paasche price index for purchased non-food in mid-1995 per	1.050	0.059	0.510	2.420
	household				
PRICE24	Paasche price index for purchased non-food in late 1995 per	0.978	0.051	0.399	3.212
	household				
PRICE33	Paasche price index home produced food crops in mid-1995 per	1.044	0.066	0.456	2.736
	household				
PRICE34	Paasche price index home produced food crops in late 1995 per	1.096	0.152	0.375	2.473
	household				
PRICE35	Paasche price index home produced food crops in early 1996	1.299	0.208	0.382	2.618
	per household				
PRICEV1	Variance of PRICE1X	0.090	0.015	0.000	1.784
PRICEV2	Variance of PRICE2X	0.058	0.013	0.000	1.412
PRICEV3	Variance of PRICE3X	0.403	0.110	0.000	1.335
VILLAGE111	Does this household live in village 111?	0.042	0.030	0	1
VILLAGE112	Does this household live in village 112?	0.042	0.034	0	1
VILLAGE113	Does this household live in village 113?	0.039	0.028	0	1
VILLAGE114	Does this household live in village 114?	0.022	0.018	0	1
VILLAGE121	Does this household live in village 121?	0.104	0.091	0	1
VILLAGE122	Does this household live in village 122?	0.084	0.076	0	1
VILLAGE123	Does this household live in village 123?	0.169	0.118	0	1
VILLAGE214	Does this household live in village 214?	0.047	0.034	0	1
VILLAGE215	Does this household live in village 215?	0.034	0.029	0	1
VILLAGE221	Does this household live in village 221?	0.042	0.033	0	1
VILLAGE231	Does this household live in village 231?	0.035	0.032	0	1
VILLAGE232	Does this household live in village 232?	0.038	0.034	0	1
VILLAGE312	Does this household live in village 312?	0.095	0.086	0	1
VILLAGE313	Does this household live in village 313?	0.072	0.050	0	1
VILLAGE321	Does this household live in village 321?	0.082	0.063	0	1
VILLAGE332	Does this household live in village 332?	0.054	0.045	0	1

Table 2: Sources of Income

% of Net Household	Income in 1995 (INCOME)	Non-Market Income	Market Income	Total
On-Farm Income	Food Crop Income	59	6	65
	Cash Crop Income	n.a.	17	17
	Sub-Total	59	23	82
Off-Farm Income	Entrepreneurial Income	n.a.	10	10
	Social and Wage Income	2	6	8
	Sub-Total	2	16	18
Total		61	39	100

Table 3: Household Income Shares in Sub-Saharan Africa

% of Total Income	On-Farm	n Income	Off-Farn	n Income	Social	Income
	FSP	SSA	FSP	SSA	FSP	SSA
Maximum Survey	100	86	0	8	0	4
Mean of All Surveys	82	63	16	28	2	8
Median Survey	88	63	12	20	0	16
Minimum Survey	18	37	82	51	45	11

On-farm income includes food and cash crop income from home consumption and from crop sales. Off-farm income includes entrepreneurial and wage income. Social income includes remittances, transfers and donations. The three categories of income sum to give total income. The data reported under the headings "SSA" and "Mean of All Surveys" derived from 28 samples of farming households from Sub-Saharan Africa (abbreviated SSA) as calculated by (Delgado and Siamwalla 1999: p. 134). Most surveys covered a single agricultural year within the period 1985-89. The other data under the headings "SSA" refer to the mean values of one survey as defined below. "Maximum Survey", "Median Survey" and "Minimum Survey" refer to the income shares for the uplands area in Gambia in 1985-86, the Natural Region IV in Zimbabwe in 1988-89 and the Sahelian Zone in Senegal in 1988-90, respectively. The data under the "FSP" headings report the largest, mean, median and smallest value in the sample.

Estimated % of Population Crop Market Participation in 1994-95 (STATUS2) Sell Cash **Crop Market Participation in** No Crop Market Sell Food Sell Food Total 1993-94 (STATUS1) Participation Crops and Cash Crops Crops Only Only **No Crop Market Participation** 6.0 3.7 1.7 1.7 13.1 Sell Food Crops Only 8.7 8.6 4.7 2.4 24.3 0.8 Sell Food and Cash Crops 4.6 15.5 5.4 26.2 Sell Cash Crops Only 6.0 7.8 10.1 12.5 36.4 21.4 24.7 31.9 21.9 100.0 Total

Table 4: Change in Crop Market Participation Status by Household

		ί.	 . 	¦ -			ί.			
SHAREON	Coet.	St Err	- - -	P> t 	STATUS3	Odds Ratio	St Err 	ц ц	P> t 	SHARESUB
Labour Variable	oles				Labour Variables	bles				Labour Variab
ADULTSOU DEPEND		.0126305	-1.477 -1.477 2.618 0.992	 0.148 0.327 0.327	DEPENDRATIO EDUMAX EDUMAX EDUMAXSQU		0524622 3.4112 0368466		0.000 0.000 0.000	ADULT ADULTSOU AGEHEAD
AGEHEAD	.006284	.0050466			Land Variabl	es			 	AGEHEADSQU FEMHEAD
ILLPAST TLLPAST TLLPAST	C/#0000 0001988 0530550	.0001155	۳ <u>،</u> ،		AREATOTAL	 .57403 858475	556198 556198	 -37 -54	0.000	Land Variabl
EDUMAXSQU EDUMUM	.004	.0125629			DISTANCESQU SOILBAD	.1577242	.0002892.1405665	2.792	0.045	DISTANCE
		.0020037	<u>،</u> ه		Asset Variabl	les				PESTHIGH RAIN
Land Variable	Ø							10	1	TENURE
AREALOG		.0211524	1 ~.	10	ANCESTOR	.0626775 37.14033	.03911 41.74628	-4.439 3.216	0.000.003	Asset Variabl
DISTANCE	001767	.000738	<u>е</u>		DESTLOW	.0985065	82206	77.	0.009	
DISTANCESQU	8.61e-U6 0573291	4.3/e-Ub .0246265	2. Y		TOOLT.	.8089222	.03857646	4.18	0.000	ANCESTOR
PESTHIGH	0846296 .0313504	.0244551		0.001 0.039	village Vari	ables				DONATION ORIGINMAN
		.0232397	ן י ר		LABOR	.1352365	0		0.001	village Vari
Asset Variabl	les				YIELDMAIZE	1.622	.183	.44	•	ато казит
TOOL	0039323	.0025538	-1.540	0.132	Control Varia	ables				TTIW TTIW
ANTMAL	.0/35934		<u>،</u> د	•		201210			1	A L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L
AUTHORITY	.0480518		1.583	•••	PRICE15	.0131806	.0175737 .0175737	-3.247	600.0	Control Vari
Village Variables	ables				VILLAGE114	1.115601	1.186605	0.10		PRICE1
			1		VILLAGE121 VILLAGE123	108 9385	134.7856 88 13457	.11	•	PRICE3 DRICE3
INFRASTR	.2123507	.0261925	<u>.</u> –	• •	VILLAGE214	97.52673	216.203	.00		VILLAGE11
LABOR	0103357	.0145806	Ŀ.	•	VILLAGE215	1.788877	2.851237	.36	•	VILLAGE
MARKETLOG VIELOMATZE	.0200332	.0116077 0247589	1.726	0.092	VILLAGE221 VILLAGE221	.1309925 1 189642	.214853 1 686851	. 23	0.223	VILLAGE121 VILLAGE123
			•	• •	VILLAGE 312	2.737442	4.129853	. 60		VILLAGE 2
Control Variables	ables				VILLAGE313	54.29381	65.03203	. 33	•	VILLAGE 21
PRICE15		.0373487			VILLAGE321 VILLAGE332	. 1/01884	.004347	10.		VILLAGE231 VILLAGE231
PRICE24	0	.0405244	m		-					VILLAGE
PRICE35	.1714816 _ 0507845	.0263662	6.504	0.000						VILLAGE 31
VILLAGE114	0732669	.0390354								VILLAGE 3
VILLAGE121	1461745	024								
VILLAGE122	0271135 - 0333665	.0355936	n n	ч. ч.						
VILLAGE221	0938319	.0479186								
VILLAGE231	.0613586	.0244168	_							
VILLAGE312	.2388966	.0546979	101							
VILLAGE321	.0708184	.0612714	0.							
٢										

Table 5c: SHARESUB Survey Linear Regression

SHARESUB Coef. St Err t Labour Variables -0620192 014571 -4.25 ADULTSQU -00654016 0006408 0.84 ADULTSQU -0005219 0006408 0.34 ABDULTSQU -0000262 0006408 0.34 ABDULTSQU -0000262 0006408 0.34 ABDULTSQU -0000262 0006408 0.321 ABDULTSQU -0000262 00064138 2.258 DISTANCESQU -0000156 5.188-06 3.00 PESTHIGH -00345554 0152048 2.231 PRAIN -00345554 0130122 2.21 ANCESTOR -0001499 0037022 2.231 ANCESTOR -0001499 0037022 2.24 ANCESTOR -00014499 0037022 2.231 ANCESTOR -00014499 0361663 2.45 ANCESTOR -00014499 037022 2.231 ANCESTOR -00014499 0361663 2.44 ANCESTOR -00101499 0361663 2.42 DONNTION	I able 5C: SHA		vey Linear	r kegre	ssion
Dur Variables 0.0520192 0.014571 -4.2 ADULTFZQU 0620192 0.009563 5.4 ABULTFZQU 0.055103 0.05103 0.8 ABULTFZQU 0.055103 0.0054016 0.8 ABULTFZQU 0.00054016 0.00054016 0.8 ABULTFZQU 00054016 0.00054016 0.8 AFEMHEAD 000064104 0.8 0.8 AVariables 0000156 5.188-06 3.0 DISTANCESQU 0.0000156 5.188-06 3.0 PESTHIGH 002181 0.031203 2.1 DISTANCESQU 0.0001499 0.016163 3.0 PESTHIGH 002181 0.37022 2.2 ANCESTOR 0021499 0.031295 2.2 DNATION 0121725 0.31225 2.2 ANCESTOR 001499 0.031295 2.2 ANCESTOR 0014499 0.031295 2.2 ANCESTOR 0014499 0.031295 2.2 ANCESTOR 00129149 0.051528 2.1 AN	່ດງ	0	ц Ц Ц	ц	P> t
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	our Variab	0 2			
nd Variables DISTANCE 002181 .0008438 -2.5 DISTANCESOU 0.0000156 5.18E-06 3.0 PESTHIGH 00559554 0.0162093 2.1 PESTHICH 00559554 0.0162093 2.1 TENNRE 00259554 0.01621093 2.1 TENNRE 00259554 0.0162033 2.1 ANCESTOR 0069358 .0361663 2.2 ANCESTOR 069358 .031295 2.2 DONNATION 0721725 .032152 -2.2 MILL .069358 .031295 2.2 MILL .0108649 .00520152 3.1 INFRASTR .0108649 .00530112 2.4 MILL .0108649 .00515399 2.4 VILLAGE121 .01725644 .0125399 2.4 VILLAGE121 .0361665 -2.3 2.1 VILLAGE211 .01725644 .02550266 1.1 VILLAGE211 .01725644 .02550266 1.4 VILLAGE211 .03617655 .016102861 1.1 <tr< td=""><td> ADULTSQ AGEHEA GEHEADSQ FEMHEA</td><td> 062019 .00521 005401 000026 106047</td><td>.01457 000956 0006410 055103</td><td>0.4.0.0</td><td>0.000 0.405 0.710 0.062</td></tr<>	 ADULTSQ AGEHEA GEHEADSQ FEMHEA	 062019 .00521 005401 000026 106047	.01457 000956 0006410 055103	0.4.0.0	0.000 0.405 0.710 0.062
ISTANCE002181 .0008438 -2.5 FESTHIGH -0359057 .0162093 2.1 FAIN -0959057 .0162093 2.1 FAIN -0959057 .0162093 2.1 Set Variables -1028891 .037022 -2.7 anceston -00074478 .0361663 2.4 Anceston -0000218 -2.2 ONTGINMAN -0721725 .032152 -2.2 INFRASTR .00108649 .031295 2.2 INFRASTR .00108649 .032152 -2.2 INFRASTR .00108649 .032152 -2.2 INFRASTR .00108649 .0053901 2.0 TILAGE211 .0108649 .0053901 2.0 PRICE15 -00391956 .0409281 -0.9 VILLAGE211 -0138679 .0052864 -2.3 VILLAGE211 -0138679 .0052864 -2.3 VILLAGE211 -0138759 .0052864 -2.3 VILLAGE211 -0138679 .0052864 -2.3 VILLAGE211 -0138759 .00100206 -1.0 VILLAGE211 -0138759 .00107266 -1.0 VILLAGE212 -0138769 .0052864 -2.3 VILLAGE213 -134226 .0849659 -3.6 VILLAGE214 -0038645 .00528667 -1.0 VILLAGE215 -134226 .0849659 -3.6 VILLAGE215 -134226 .0849659 -3.6 VILLAGE231 -138769 .0052864 -2.3 VILLAGE231 -138769 .00528667 -1.0 VILLAGE231 -138769 .00528667 -1.0 VILLAGE231 -138769 .00528667 -1.0 VILLAGE231 -138679 .00528667 -1.0 VILLAGE231 -138769 .00528667 -1.0 VILLAGE231 -138769 .00528566 -1.0 VILLAGE231 -1165941 .0532936 -1.0 VILLAGE331 -23906459 .00528544 -2.3 VILLAGE331 -1165941 .0532544 -2.4 VILLAGE331 -23906459 .00528544 -2.4 VILLAGE331 -23906459 .00528544 -2.4 VILLAGE331 -23906459 .00528544 -1.4 VILLAGE331 -1165941 .05325444 -1.4 VILLAGE331 -23906459 .00528544 -1.4 VILLAGE331 -2390	Variable		1	i i	1
set Variables 0875478 0361663 2.4 ANCESTOR 0875478 0361663 2.4 ANCESTOR 0.0001499 0030218 -6.8 ANCESTOR 0.001499 0031295 -2.2 ANCESTOR 0.0031295 -2.2 -2.2 ANCENTRNAN - 0721725 031295 -2.2 INFRASTR 3000949 0053901 2.4 MILL .3000849 .0053901 2.4 INFRASTR .3000849 .0053901 2.4 MILL .1259888 .00515399 2.4 INFRASTR .3000849 .0053901 2.4 MILL .1259888 .00515399 2.4 PRICE1 .1259888 .00515399 2.4 PRICE1 .1072665 .0849659 -1.1 VILLAGE111 .10726655 .00520864 -1.1 VILLAGE122 .0038679 .0928867 -0.9 VILLAGE121 .0038679 .09228667 -1.1 VILLAGE215 .01726655 .00520266 1.1 VILLAGE215	DISTAN DISTAN ISTANCES PESTHI RA RA TENU	000015 034585 095905 102889	000843 .18E-0 016209 021214 .03702	2.42.0	0.005 0.005 0.039 0.039 0.008
ANCESTOR ANCESTOR DONATION ASSET DONATION ASSET CRIGINMAN DONATION 0001499 .0031663 -6.8 ASSET NUCCON ASSET DONATION 0010149 .003152 -2.2 INFRASTR MILL MILL MILL MILL MILL MILL .0108649 .00550152 3.1 2.0 PRICE33 VILLAGE111 .0108649 .00550152 3.1 2.0 PRICE33 VILLAGE111 .0108649 .00550152 3.1 2.0 PRICE33 VILLAGE111 .0108649 .00550152 3.1 2.0 PRICE33 .0100989 .00550152 3.1 2.0 PRICE33 .0410486 5.9 2440653 .0410486 5.9 2440653 .0410486 5.9 21.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0	et Variable	1 1 1 1 1 1	 		
Ilage Variables INFRASTR .3000989 .0950152 3.1 MILL .0108649 .005153901 2.0 YIELDMAIZE .1259888 .05153991 2.4 PRICEDIS .1259888 .05153991 2.4 PRICEIS .1259888 .05153991 2.4 PRICEIS .12559888 .05153991 2.4 PRICEIS .04102565 .02550026 1.9 PRICEIS .0410486 .2.3 .1072565 1.0 VILLAGEII12 .0391956 .0410486 .2.3 .1 VILLAGEI12 .0391956 .0410486 .2.3 .1 .2 VILLAGEI12 .0391956 .0410486 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 VILLAGE213 .1138759 .01012911 -1 .2 .	 ANCEST ASS DONATI RIGINM	87547 87547 00149 06935 72172	36166 00021 03215 03215	4.00.00	0.020 0.020 0.033 0.031
<pre>INFRASTR</pre>	llage Varial	les	 	ł	i i
rol Variables PRICEL5 PRICE13 1072565 PRICE23 1072565 PRICE13 PRICE23 1072565 PRICE112 -0349565 -1038679 -10402864 -11738759 -1038679 -101228 -11738679 -11738679 -112386465 -112386465 -112386465 -112386465 -112386465 -11238645 -11238645 -11238645 -11238645 -11238645 -11238645 -11238645 -11238645 -112468231 -11258 -11265441 -1266398 -1266398 -126645 -126445	INFRAST MIL IELDMAIZ	00098 10864 25988	095015	10.4	0.003 0.051 0.051
PRICEL5 -0482654 0260804 -1.8 PRICE35 01072565 0550026 1.9 PRICE35 .2440533 0410486 5.9 LLAGE111 -0391956 0400281 -0.9 LLAGE112 -1738754 1001921 -0.3 LLAGE112 -1738754 1001281 -0.3 LLAGE122 -1738754 1001281 -1.2 LLAGE121 -1738679 0928867 -0.0 LLAGE215 -0038679 0928867 -0.0 LLAGE215 -1038679 0928867 -1.2 LLAGE215 -1342226 0849659 -3.6 LLAGE213 -13458678 09549659 -1.2 LLAGE213 -1358678 09549559 -1.2 LLAGE231 -1356475 06532956 -1.2 LLAGE231 -1356475 06532956 -1.2 LLAGE231 -23906455 0904007 -2.6 LLAGE3312 -23906455 09032936 -1.2 LLAGE3312 -23906455 09032936 -1.2 LLAGE3312 -23	rol Varial	les	 		1
<pre>FKLCE35 - 2440535 .0410468 -0.9 LLAGE111 - 0391956 .0409281 -0.9 LLAGE121 - 1738759 .1001921 -1.7 LLAGE214 - 1738759 .1001921 -1.7 LLAGE214 - 3142226 .0849659 -3.6 LLAGE215 - 0338679 .0928867 -0.0 LLAGE215 - 1436878 .09528667 -1.2 LLAGE211 - 1436878 .0954559 -1.2 LLAGE231 - 1436878 .0954795 -1.2 LLAGE231 - 1358108 .0951795 -1.2 LLAGE231 - 1358108 .0951795 -3.6 LLAGE313 - 2390645 .0904007 -2.6 LLAGE313 - 2390645 .0904007 -2.6 LLAGE313 - 246398 .1012645 -3.7 LLAGE313 - 2766398 .1012645 -6.4 LLAGE313 - 2476978 .06322544 -6.4</pre>	RICE1	4826507256	026080	8.0.0	0.072
LLAGELILZ -2499554 .1052854 -2.3 LLAGEL21 -1738759 .1001921 -1.7 LLAGE2121 -1738759 .0023867 -0.0 LLAGE214 -3142226 .0849659 -3.6 LLAGE221 -1436878 .0974528 -1.2 LLAGE221 -1436878 .0974528 -1.4 LLAGE221 -1358108 .0974528 -1.4 LLAGE231 -2390645 .09361795 -3.7 LLAGE312 -2390645 .0904007 -2.6 LLAGE313 -2766398 .1012645 -2.7 LLAGE313 -2766398 .1012645 -2.7 LLAGE313 -2766398 .1012645 -2.7 LLAGE313 -2481974 .0532936 -1.1 LLAGE313 -2766398 .1012645 -2.7 LLAGE313 -24481974 .0532936 -1.1	PRICE3	44053 39195	040928	0.97 9.09	.34
LLAGELIZ - 0022007 0022007 - 000 LLAGE214 - 3142226 00849659 - 3.6 LLAGE2214 - 0839465 0052356 - 1.2 LLAGE2211 - 1436878 0074528 -1.4 LLAGE231 - 1358108 0361795 - 3.7 LLAGE232 - 2390645 00904007 - 2.6 LLAGE312 - 2390645 00904007 - 2.6 LLAGE312 - 2456398 1012645 - 2.7 LLAGE313 - 2466398 1012645 - 2.7 LLAGE313 - 2476398 1012645 - 2.7 LLAGE313 - 2472917 0532544 - 6.4	LLAGE11 LLAGE12	4996573875	105286 100192	1.73	.002
LLAGEZID04363469 .002.259 -1.4 LLAGE2211436378 .0974528 -1.4 LLAGE2211358108 .0951792 -3.7 LLAGE2122390645 .0904007 -2.6 LLAGE3122390645 .0904007 -2.6 LLAGE3132766398 .1012645 -2.7 LLAGE3132766398 .1012645 -6.4 LLAGE3132481974 .3850826 -1.1	LLAGE 21	14222	084965	- 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0	000.00
LLAGE2311358108 .0361795 -3.7 LLAGE2322390645 .0904007 -2.6 LLAGE312 -1165941 .0632936 1.8 LLAGE3132766398 .1012645 -2.7 LLAGE3133427917 .0532544 -6.4	LLAGE 21 LLAGE 22	63940 43687	097452	1.47 1.47	.140
LLAGE312	LLAGE23	35810	036179	3.75.0	.00
LLAGE3132766398 .1012645 -2.7 LLAGE3323427917 .0532544 -6.4 cons4481974 .3850826 -1.1	LLAGE 31	16594	063293	1.84	.07
ns - 4481974 .3850826 -1.1	LLAGE31 LLAGE33	76639 42791	101264	.43	000.
	uo	48197	385082	.16	.25

Regression	sion	Table 5f: EXCI	EXCHANGE Sur	urvey Linear	Regression	sion
ц.	P> t	EXCHANGE	Coef.	St Err	ц ц	P> t
		Labour Variabl	6 2 1			
іння		FEMALE FEMALESQU	1528568 .0281111		i H M G	0.144
1.96 2.48	.05	MALE	18361 02704	83864 07110	. 60	100
2.23	.03	AGEHEAD	06726	24559	.73	.000
2.24	.03	AGEHEADSQU	000687	00210 26423	. 25 84	00.00
	.03	2 臣 :	0728	00452	.61	27.
2.78	00 -	TIMEHINGRY	.009234	01681 04164	4.48 2.21	003
		EDUMUM	.18345	20155	.52	.13
\sim	01				• • •	• •
.78	•	Land Variables				
		I H	40640	94802	.64	.00
1 C		Ωŀ	309911	59030	1.94	.05
.78 .78	. 03 080	DISTANCESOU	023/604 .0001368	0/25200. 0000433	-2.494 3.160	0.003
 	200	PESTL	375710	65181	.27	0.
	· ·	Asset Variable	ן 			
		ANIMAL	02591		<u> </u>	.01
	0.011	ORIGINMAN		75	-2.998	
+ > •	•	Village Variab	les			
- 46	.00	RKET. LDMA	-1.088182	.0796022	3.737 -5.148	0.001
-2.649 2.232	0.012 0.031	Control Variab	les		i –	ł
.14	. 88		IΜ	20364	.76	.08
.33	.74	PRICE	93058	57160	.55	.01
	.19	VILLAGE111 VILLAGE112	64288 88750	28537 43971	.70	.010
- 4	.02	LLAGE11	858905	39705	3.58	001
.72.	- OT		109973 924807	67215 52074	.67 .67	- 1 - 1 - 1
.11	.04 7.04	VILLAGE214	-1.055936	.3444332 5125865	-3.066	0.004
.71	.47	3E23	346310	166991	.07	.040
. 386	.00	8.0	4490 3211	86044 01185		.19
.07	.04	31	.635804	433972	.46	.15
		3 2	398244 021883	73248	.12	. 90 06.
		U U U	81620	96514	.02	00.

Table 5e: PL	OTFRAG Su	rvey Linea	ır Regre	ssion
PLOTFRAG	Coef.	St Err	t,	P> t
Labour Varial			i	ł
FEMALE FEMALE FEMALE		08467		
MA	101867	051925	96	.05
MALESQU	011293	004552	. 4 8 6	.01
ILLN	003664	001629	2 V 4 V	.03
DND	.00767	003846	66.	.05
EDUHHSQU	4720 3285	5371 4783	78	
Land Variable			1	
TENURE				0.082
ы В Г	 			
I C	044235	020326	1 1 1	- 03
고 고 다	077757	043545	.78	. 08
ANIMA	33843	018373	1.84	.07
- O	0414/10 1212458	.0703722	-2.425	0.0950
village Varia	 	 		
MARKETLOG YIELDMAIZE	1725465 .5598447	.064982	-2.655 2.812	10.0
Control Varia				
PRICE1	691787	19993	.46	.00
CE3	91675	23377	. 6 4	.01
TLLAGE11	.20587	04021	000	. 0.5
ILLAGE11	01750	23866	.14	88.
ILLAGE12 ILLAGE12	066495 140849	474	. 81.	.41
TLLAGE12	636223	83445		.19
VILLAGE 221	. 884655		2.532	0.01
TLLAGE23	454979 333278	22189 57308	122	.00
ILLAGE31	491314	17632	09	. 55
TLLAGE31	209177 04298	92561	277	.47
ILLAGE33	30912	854		.02
u l	.53888	40368 		.04

Table 5d: C0	OTTON Surve	y Logisti	c Regres	sion
COTTON	Odds Ratio	st Err	н Н Н Н	P> t
Labour Varis	ables		 	1
AGE	.37602	191029	.29	.02
AGEHHSQU EDUMUM	.12961.	26648		100
EDUMUMSQU	749674	072727	2.97	00.
TLLNOW	965212. 991216.	0108999	4.	000.00
MALE	559738	283941	1.14	.26
MALESQU TIMEHARVEST	1.105997 1.016706	.0575611	1.936 2.113	0.060 0.041
Land Variabl	es			!
	27202	12848		
TEN	2.379682	1.047205	1.970	0.056
Asset Variat	bles			
ASSETTOG	25195	121647	1 6	
AUTHOR	7.1518	4.813	29	00.
ORIGINWOMAN	.37253	.14023	66.7	. 08 0
LTYP	04	.1297627	-2.345	0.024
village Vari	ables			1
LABORPC	1613	076614	.03	00.
MARKET YIELDCOTTON	.9999751 483.6045	.0000997	-2.497 4.841	0000.0
Control Vari			Ì	-
RICE2	017376	024508	.87	000.
ICE 3	06.368	06.669	.11	000.
RICEV	105854 268.84	92820 070.9	.14	.010
GE 11	.69615	1.4825	.60	.54
	614162	781932	. 38	02.0
LLAGE12	017330	021799	3.22	000.
-H (.12909	.37173	.10	.92
LLAGE23	.77084	.19309	00.	.04
LLAGE23	052409	073225	.11	.04
-	706807	016964	.47	.02
LLA	.6448328	1.109613	-0.255	0.800
mι	0 1 4 9 2	014650	4.28	00.1

References

- Abdulai, A. and C. L. Delgado (1999). "Determinants of Nonfarm Earnings of Farm-Based Husbands and Wives in Northern Ghana." *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*. 81(1): 117-30.
- Adams, R. H. (2002). "Nonfarm Income, Inequality, and Land in Rural Egypt." *Economic Development and Culture Change*. 50(2): 339-63.
- Addison, T. and C. de Sousa (1999). "Economic Reform and Economic Reconstruction in Mozambique." *Evaluating Economic Liberalization*. McGillivray, M. and O. Morrissey, Eds. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press: 163-85.
- Appleton, S. and A. Balihuta (1996). "Education and Agricultural Productivity: Evidence from Uganda." *Journal of International Development*. 8(3): 415-44.
- Bardhan, P. and C. Udry (1999). *Development Microeconomics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Berry, S. (1993). No Condition Is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Binswanger, H. P. and J. McIntire (1987). "Behavioral and Material Determinants of Production Relations in Land Abundant Tropical Agriculture." *Economic Development* and Cultural Change. 36(1): 73-99.
- Blarel, B., P. Hazell, F. Place and J. Quiggin (1992). "The Economics of Farm Fragmentation: Evidence from Ghana and Rwanda." *World Bank Economic Review*. 6(2): 233-54.
- Bodie, Z. and R. C. Merton (1998). *Finance: Preliminary Edition*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Brück, T. (2003). Land Access, Tenure and Investment in Post-War Northern Mozambique. *DIW Berlin Discussion Paper*. 358.
- Carter, M. R. and P. Olinto (2003). "Getting Institutions "Right" for Whom: Credit Constraints and the Impact of Property Rights on the Quantity and Composition of Investment." *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*. 85(1): 173-86.
- Chayanov, A. V. (1925). The Theory of the Peasant Economy: Irwin.
- Corbett, J. (1988). "Famine and Household Coping Strategies." World Development. 16(9): 1099-112.
- Cramer, C. and N. Pontara (1998). "Rural Poverty and Poverty Alleviation in Mozambique: What's Missing from the Debate?" *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 36(1): 101-38.
- Cramer, J. S. and G. Ridder (1991). "Pooling States in Multinomial Logit Models." *Journal of Econometrics*. 47(2-3): 267-72.
- Dasgupta, P. (1993). An Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- de Janvry, A., M. Fafchamps and E. Sadoulet (1991). "Peasant Household Behaviour with Missing Markets: Some Paradoxes Explained." *Economic Journal*. 101(409): 1400-17.
- de Sousa, C. (2003). "Rebuilding Rural Livelihoods and Social Capital in Mozambique." *From Conflict to Recovery in Africa*. Addison, T., Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 51-72.

- Delgado, C. L. and A. Siamwalla (1999). "Rural Economy and Farm Income Diversification in Developing Countries." Food Security, Diversification and Resource Management: Refocusing the Role of Agriculture? Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Conference of Agricultural Economists Held at Sacramento, California, 10-16 August 1997. Peters, G. H. and J. von-Braun, Eds. Aldershot, U.K., and Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate: 126-43.
- Dercon, S. (2002). "Income Risk, Coping Strategies, and Safety Nets." *World Bank Research Observer*. 17(2): 141-66.
- Dercon, S. and P. Krishnan (1996). "Income Portfolios in Rural Ethiopia and Tanzania: Choices and Constraints." *Journal of Development Studies*. 32(6): 850-75.
- Dercon, S. and P. Krishnan (2000). "In Sickness and in Health: Risk Sharing within Households in Rural Ethiopia." *Journal of Political Economy*. 108(4): 688-727.
- Dixit, A. K. (1990). Optimization in Economic Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ellis, F. (1998). "Household Strategies and Rural Livelihood Diversification." *Journal of Development Studies*. 35(1): 1-38.
- Ellis, F. (2000). *Rural Livelihoods and Diversity in Developing Countries*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fafchamps, M. and S. Lund (2003). "Risk-Sharing Networks in Rural Philippines." *Journal of Development Economics*. 71(2): 261-87.
- Garrett, J. L. and M. T. Ruel (1999). "Are Determinants of Rural and Urban Food Security and Nutritional Status Different? Some Insights from Mozambique." *World Development*. 27(11): 1955-75.
- Goetz, S. J. (1992). "A Selectivity Model of Household Food Marketing Behaviour in Sub-Saharan Africa." *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*. 74: 444-52.
- Heltberg, R. and F. Tarp (2002). "Agricultural Supply Response and Poverty in Mozambique." *Food Policy*. 27(2): 103-24.
- Key, N., E. Sadoulet and A. de Janvry (2000). "Transaction Costs and Agricultural Household Supply Response." *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*. 82: 245-59.
- Leonard, M. (2000). "Coping Strategies in Developed and Developing Societies: The Working of the Informal Economy." *Journal of International Development*. 12(8): 1096-85.
- Liedholm, C., M. McPherson and E. Chuta (1994). "Small Enterprise Employment Growth in Rural Africa." *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*. 76: 1177-82.
- MAP/MSU Research Team (1996). 1994/96 Nampula/Cabo Delgado Socio-Economic Study: Organization of Primary Data and Questionnaires. Maputo: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.
- Ministério da Agricultura (1994). Unpublished Data. Maputo.
- Pitcher, M. A. (1998). "Disruption without Transformation: Agrarian Relations and Livelihoods in Nampula Province, Mozambique, 1975-1995." Journal of Southern African Studies. 24(1): 115-40.

- Platteau, J.-P. (1999). "Traditional Systems of Social Security and Hunger Insurance: Past Achievements and Modern Challenges." *Social Security in Developing Countries*. Ahmad, E., J. Drèze, J. Hills and A. Sen, Eds. New Delhi: Oxford University Press: 112-70.
- Reardon, T. (1997). "Using Evidence of Household Income Diversification to Inform Study of the Rural Nonfarm Labour Market in Africa." *World Development*. 25(5): 735-47.
- Reardon, T., C. Delgado and P. Matlon (1992). "Determinants and Effects of Income Diversification Amongst Farm Households in Burkina-Faso." *Journal of Development Studies*. 28(2): 264-96.
- Reardon, T., P. Matlon and C. Delgado (1988). "Coping with Household-Level Food Insecurity in the Drought-Affected Areas of Burkina Faso." World Development. 16: 1065-74.
- Sperling, L. and C. Longley (2002). "Beyond Seeds and Tools; Effective Support to Farmers in Emergencies." *The Journal of Disaster Studies, Policy and Management.* 26(4).
- Taylor, J. E. and A. Yunez-Naude (2000). "The Returns from Schooling in a Diversified Rural Economy." *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*. 82: 287-97.
- Townsend, R. F. (1999). "Agricultural Incentives in Sub-Saharan Africa: Policy Challenges." *Technical Paper*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 444.
- Tschirley, D. and R. Benfica (2001). "Smallholder Agriculture, Wage Labour and Rural Poverty Alleviation in Land-Abundant Areas of Africa: Evidence from Mozambique." *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 39(2): 333-58.
- Tschirley, D. L. and M. T. Weber (1994). "Food Security Strategies under Extremely Adverse Conditions: The Determinants of Household Income and Consumption in Rural Mozambique." *World Development*. 22(2): 159-73.
- UNDP (1999). Mozambique National Human Development Report 1999. Maputo.
- von Braun, J. and E. Kennedy (1994). Agricultural Commercialization, Economic Development, and Nutrition. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- von Braun, J. and R. Pandya-Lorch (1991). "Income Sources of Malnourished People in Rural Areas: Microlevel Information and Policy Implications." *Working Papers on Commercialization of Agriculture and Nutrition*. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute. 5.
- Webb, P. and J. von Braun (1994). *Famine and Food Security in Ethiopia: Lessons for Africa*. Chichester: Wiley.
- World Bank (2002). World Development Indicators. Washington D.C.
- Wuyts, M. (2003). "The Agrarian Question in Mozambique's Transition and Reconstruction." From Conflict to Recovery in Africa. Addison, T., Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 141-54.